The United Nations released its 2010 Human Development Report yesterday, titled “The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development.” This year’s report, which includes new indices to adjust for inequality, women’s disadvantage, and multidimensional poverty, found that of the countries measured, Oman’s Human Development Index (HDI) score improved the most over the last 40 years. Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco also improved considerably. Overall, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain ranked the highest in the region; Egypt came in 101 out of 169, and Sudan ranked close to the bottom.
Inequality remained a significant issue, and Jeni Klugman, the report’s lead author, observed that “the most significant losses for Arab countries in the Inequality-adjusted HDI can be traced to the unequal distribution of income.” Yemen and Qatar ranked very low on gender equality, but the report also notes that women’s representation in Arab parliaments has risen in recent years. On civil and political liberties, the authors report that there is considerable room for improvement across the region.
Transparency International (TI) released its annual Corruption Perceptions Index today. In the Middle East, little changed over the past year. Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, Iran and Libya continued to experience dangerous levels of corruption all scoring 2.2 or under on TI’s 10 point scale (10 being “very clean” and 3, “very corrupt”). Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Israel once again led the region in transparency, all scoring above 6.
The Brookings Institution held an event today entitled “The Sudan Referendum: Dangers and Possibilities.” The featured speaker for the event was Representative Donald Payne (D-NJ), the chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States House of Representatives. The discussants for the event were Richard Williamson, non-resident fellow on foreign policy at Brookings, and Mike Abramowitz, director of the Committee on Conscience at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
(For full notes, continue below the fold or go here for pdf.)
Amidst growing uncertainty, the Sudanese government in Khartoum called on the international community to monitor the country’s January 9 referendum. The referendum, which if successful would grant independence to the Christian south of Sudan, faces significant opposition from the parties in the north, including President Omar Hassan al-Bashir’s National Congress Party. Each side has accused the other suppressing dissent and threatening activists in advance of the vote.
Amnesty International writes in a briefing released today that Sudanese authorities – in both the north and the south – have been repressing journalists during the run-up to the country’s January referendum on the secession of southern Sudan. In the briefing, entitled “The Chains Remain: Restrictions on Freedom of Expression,” Amnesty International’s Rania Rajji says: “The whole future of the nation will be at stake so there is the need for the whole of the country to take part in a debate over this…People need to be informed.” Following the April 2010 elections, National Intelligence and Security Services officials made frequent visits to media printing houses to prevent critical articles from being published. In the process, some newspapers were closed down and journalists arrested on politically motivated charges. Although this censorship was technically removed in the beginning of August, a “code of journalistic honor” continues to impose restrictions because newspapers self-censor out of fear of reprisal. Taboo topics for reporters include President Omar al-Bashir and his government, proceedings of the International Criminal Court, public sector strikes and the prosecution of media figures. The result, according to Amnesty, is that it is “nearly impossible” for journalists to write about human rights abuses in the country. As the referendum approaches, Amnesty is also concerned that the press may be discouraged from reporting on pro-unity voices in the south, which is pushing for independence.
The vote on a referendum to determine whether southern Sudan becomes an independent nation is set to be held in just over four months. However, some question if the referendum will even be held. Rebecca Hamilton writes in the Washington Post “… with negotiations between north and south stalled over border demarcation, and preparations for the vote lagging perilously behind, the likelihood of the referendum proceeding as planned appears slim.” Others are worried that the focus on southern Sudan will cause the world to turn a blind eye to the on going crisis in Darfur: “The Sudanese government is taking full advantage of the inability of international actors to multitask and is beginning to implement a new strategy that will likely lead to further suffering among those who have survived the past seven years of conflict.” Yesterday, the ruling party in Sudan, the NCP, rejected a list of incentives offered by the U.S. to hold the referendum on time and as planned. A senior NCP official described the offer as an “intervention in the domestic affairs” of Sudan.
The United States Institute of Peace held a panel discussion today that included four of its successful grantees. The event was moderated by Andrew Blum, a program officer at the Grant Program and opening remarks were given by Ambassador Richard H. Solomon, president of the USIP. The panelists for the event were Dr. Abdel-Mitaal Girshab, of the Institute for the Development of Civil Society in Sudan, Masood Karokhail of the Tribal Liaison Office in Afghanistan, Aari Mohammed of INSAN Iraqi Society, and Dr. Maria Emma Wills of the Historical Memory Commission in Colombia.
(For complete notes continue below the fold or click here to read as a pdf.)
Desmond Butler, at The Associated Press, criticizes U.S. policy on human rights in Sudan in a recent piece, arguing that as problems with Sudan have worsened over the past nine months, the administration has backtracked on the promises it made last year to hold the government to account if it did not move forward on fighting terror and improving human rights. Butler says that though the administration indicated last Friday that it was “deeply concerned” about worsening political, civil, and human rights violations in Sudan, the U.S. has failed to deliver any concrete consequences for this regression. Instead, according to Butler, the administration has “offered small incentives” to Sudan based on its perception that the country is making progress on various issues, including the recent elections, which the U.S. views as significant despite widespread accusations of fraud. Jennifer Rubin writing at Commentary registers her agreement with Butler’s assessments, proposing that “the Obama policy has been a complete failure” in Sudan.
In another interesting piece in The New York Times,Dave Eggers and John Prendergast express their concern over the upcoming referendum in Sudan, in which it is expected that Sudanese in the southern region of the country will overwhelmingly vote to secede from the north. Eggers and Prendergast fear that the referendum could lead to a breakout of fighting, arguing that “all signs indicate that the Khartoum government will undermine the voting process or not recognize its results.” To avoid this scenario, the authors advise the U.S. to develop “a more robust package of carrots and sticks” in its dealings with Sudan. On the “sticks” side, Eggers and Prendergast suggest that specific actions should include: threatening to place sanctions on ruling party officials, blocking debt relief from the IMF, supporting International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrants, tightening the UN arms embargo, and offering more support to the south. They propose that incentives, on the other hand, should involve: offering conditional suspensions of ICC warrants and normalization of relations between Khartoum and Washington, if certain conditions leading to peace are met.
Meanwhile, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued three counts of genocide against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on Monday, adding to five counts of crimes against humanity and two counts of war crimes for allegedly orchestrating atrocities in Darfur. Both the White House and the State Department issued statements urging al-Bashir to cooperate with the ICC: Mike Hammer, spokesman for the White House National Security Council, stated, “The United States strongly supports international efforts to bring those responsible for genocide and war crimes in Darfur to justice and believes that there cannot be a lasting peace in Darfur without accountability,” adding, “We continue to call on the government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court.” However, The Sudan Tribune reported today that U.S. special envoy to Sudan Scott Gration made comments criticizing the ICC decision and indicating a U.S. reliance on the al-Bashir government, saying, “The decision… will make my mission more difficult and challenging especially if we realize that resolving the crisis in Darfur and South, issues of oil and combating terrorism at a 100%, we need Bashir.”
In a piece in Foreign Policy, Freedom House highlights the twenty nations it has identified as the “least free” in its 2010 Freedom in the World report. Six nations and territories in the Greater Middle East and North Africa (GMENA) are featured in the piece: Libya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara.
Freedom House offers harsh criticism of the human rights and democracy records of the regimes in these areas. Regarding Libya, the piece argues that “despite Libya’s new, more positive image, gross abuse of human rights endures. Organizing or joining anything akin to a political party is punishable with long prison terms and even death.” The piece criticizes President Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan, pointing to the fact that al-Bashir rules as a military dictator, is accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur, and oversaw “highly flawed” elections earlier this year. While giving a nod to some steps at reform recently taken by Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah, it points out that critics view these measures as aimed at consolidating Abdullah’s power, and calls Saudi Arabia “an authoritarian monarchy in which all political power is held by the royal family.”
Regarding Syria, the piece observes that President Bashar al-Assad’s “early presidency saw a brief political opening that was quickly replaced by a return to repression. Freedoms of expression, association, and assembly are now tightly restricted.” It emphasizes the high numbers of political prisoners held by the Syrian regime, specifically pointing out the cases of prominent activists Ali al-Abdallah, Muhannad al-Hassani, and Haitham al-Maleh, whose sentencing was recently condemned by the U.S. government. Finally, the article designates the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara– the site of a long-running territorial dispute between Algeria and Morocco -as one of the least free areas in the world, commenting that local “Sahrawi activists, human rights defenders, and others continue to face harassment and arbitrary detention and torture. Moroccan authorities regularly use force when quelling demonstrations in Sahrawi villages.”
Freedom House has published an interesting new report, “Worst of the Worst”, listing the world’s most repressive states and human rights abusers. Among the seventeen countries listed are Saudi Arabia, Syria and Sudan. According to the report, these countries represent states that will “use every means necessary to prevent progress in democratic governance.”
Democracy Arsenal has a very interesting back and forth about the Obama administration’s just-released National Security Strategy. Building upon Heather Hurlburt’s rejection of the political right’s claim that Obama’s foreign policy effectively mimicks the principles first introduced by George W. Bush, David Shorrreminds that this view is only true insofar as the right acknowledges that Bush’s approach underwent a severe reformation in 2006 — well after many of his first-term decisions laid the foundation for years of additional problems. Michael Cohen largely agrees, but notes that the administration’s “platitudinous support for multilateral institutions, diplomacy, democracy promotion, etc.” seems like it’s “built on the shaky foundation of Beltway conventional foreign policy wisdom about US primacy and our habitually broad post-Cold War definition of US interests.”
However, Shadi Hamidpushes back on Cohen’s suggestion that the NSS is needlessly broad, saying that “this seems like an odd time to narrow the scope of our ambition.” He further calls it unwise for the president to announce a concession when the U.S. for years “has not been an agent of change but a dogged protector of the status quo.” Michael Cohen counters by saying that “the simple fact is that America’s relative power IS in decline” and that “what we need is a national security strategy that is not only more prudent, but also reflective of actual US interests and threats (both of which are far smaller than this NSS would have Americans believe).”
Using a different lens, Alex Meixner of Save Darfur is quite pleased with the way the NSS reorients U.S. policy toward genocide, calling it “exactly what Save Darfur, the Genocide Intervention Network, and our other partners have been calling for.”
After an election that not only saw incumbent President Omar al-Bashir garner 68 percent of the vote but also a janjaweed leader win a seat in parliament, Sean Brooks of Save Darfur paints a rather bleak picture of the prospects for “peace, protection, and justice” in Darfur moving forward. Although South Sudan experienced their own electoral problems, “no such silver lining as the referendum exists for those mired in the chaos that remains Darfur,” he says. Daily insecurities and the omnipresence of Sudanese security “allowed for the complete rigging of elections in Darfur.” Yet Brooks contends that the international community’s focus on Darfur’s political corruption and violence is not nearly sufficient, with most of the attention now on the forthcoming political battle between North and South Sudan. If Darfur gets pushed to the backburner for another year, he worries that a “political resolution and return to normalcy” will be much more difficult in the future.
Last week’s Los Angeles Times editorial urged a similar commitment of resources, saying a “multination diplomatic drive focused on Sudan should be at or near the top of the priority list for Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton” in order to ward off the “imminent danger of devastating conflict.”
Last week, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) released its annual report [PDF] documenting the status of religious freedom in 28 countries from April 2009 until March 2010. Within the Middle East and North Africa, USCIRF cites Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan for their egregious “abuses and limitations” of religious freedom. Of those four, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan currently reside on the State Department’s list of “Countries of Particular Concern” (CPC). While Iraq has been on the “Watch List” since 2007, the Commission requests for the third straight year that it be designated a CPC due to “violence, forced displacement, discrimination, marginalization, and neglect suffered by members of [vulnerable religious minorities] that threaten these ancient communities’ very existence.”
In addition to documenting violations and urging a stronger U.S. response, the report also highlights the failure of the Department of Homeland Security to “adequately address” serious flaws in U.S. immigration policy — identified in a 2005 USCIRF study — that place asylum seekers at risk of being returned countries where they may face persecution and abuse.
Former President Jimmy Carter penned an op-ed in today’s Los Angeles Times relaying the findings of his Carter Center monitors who observed the Sudan election in each of the country’s 25 states. “Two major problems on the ground involved voters lists and the location of polling stations,” Carter writes. There were also some observer reports of “intimidation, especially in the south, and of serious irregularities and a lack of transparency in the vote tabulation process.” However, the former president argues that these electoral deficiencies should not detract from the overall positive power of Sudan’s first multiparty vote in 24 years — an event he believes will “permit this war-torn nation to move toward a permanent peace and strengthen its quest for true democracy.”
But for Louise Roland-Gosselin, director of Waging Peace, framing the elections as a “staging post” on a much longer journey “sadly lacks any basis in reality.” She reports that for people like herself, who have worked extensively in Sudan, Bashir’s conduct was not only unsurprising, but entirely predictable. And by “permitting Bashir to openly commit electoral fraud without repercussions, the international community is damaging its own credibility, setting a very concerning precedent for democratic transitions across the world and legitimising the use of violence and intimidation.” The ultimate victims of this “farcical process” will be the Sudanese people, she says, who “are left to wonder once again what it might take for the international community to stand up to Bashir and to protect them.”
Sudan’s election results are in, and, unsurprisingly, Omar al-Bashir held on to the presidency with 68 percent of the vote, while his counterpart Salva Kiir retained his job as president of Sudan’s semi-autonomous south. During his victory speech, al-Bashir praised the character and quality of the Sudanese people, and also attempted to mollify those who fear for the survival of next year’s referendum on southern independence, which he announced would be held “on schedule.”
But these remarks did little to pacify Kiir and his Sudan People’s Liberation Movement supporters, who felt “total dismay” about the alleged electoral irregularities and fraud. Still, “No amount of intimidation or provocation will lead us back to war,” Kiir told reporters. “We will maintain security and prepare our people for the referendum in 2011.”
As Sudan moves forward in its post-election environment, “The focus now should be for Sudanese political forces to find a way of achieving political stability,” saysFouad Hikmat of the International Crisis Group. “If Bashir can push for an agenda of peace in Darfur… if he can bring an element of stability in the border regions of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile state, and if he can implement the full Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the south, then there is a chance for peace.”
Meanwhile, in a piece over at the Guardian, Nesrine Malik identifies what she believes is the primary culprit behind the eminently predictable al-Bashir victory: the last twenty years of Sudanese history have created a rather apathetic political culture, thereby leaving the elections devoid of any viable alternative to al-Bashir. “There is no pressing imperative for a change… In Khartoum, most people are just grateful to be able to eat out in the plethora of new restaurants and go about their business without fear of a curfew guillotine or security forces.”
UPDATE: The National Democratic Institute relays a press release by two Sudanese observation networks, the Sudanese Group for Democracy and Elections (SuGDE) and the Sudanese Network for Democratic Elections (SuNDE). Among their many points of criticism, the monitors observed serious administrative deficiencies in both south and north Sudan, recorded significant flaws in the election process at polling stations, and accused the National Elections Commission (NEC) of failing to adequately plan and prepare for the elections.
Although last week’s poll results were originally schedule to be revealed today, Sudan’s National Election Commission announced a delay until next week due to counting and logistical difficulties. Gregg Carlstromaddresses the news over at the Majlis, and Sean Brooksrelays some interesting commentary from local voices at Save Darfur.
For those seeking a more thorough assessment of Sudan’s ongoing electoral battle and the political issues at stake, check out Brooks’ just-released piece for the Progressive Policy Institute’s April 2010 Policy Memo.
In what may be a rather damning smoking gun, a new video has surfaced on YouTube showing Sudanese election officials, employed by the ruling National Congress Party, allegedly stuffing boxes with multiple ballots. Reutersbroke the news, and quotes a member of the National Elections Commission questioning the video’s authenticity. “We will not do any investigation because we have not got a complaint,” he said. “We will not investigate anything that appears on the internet.”
Check it out below — the suspicious behavior occurs at 0:09 and 0:26.
According to African Union observers on the ground, the just-completed Sudan elections were not only a significant step in the right direction, but also relatively free and fair considering the troubled history of Sudanese politics. Although “it was not a perfect election,” Kunle Adeyemi, chief of the AU’s observer mission in Sudan, reported that “We have not found evidence of fraud… we saw a vote that was very transparent.”
This show of support, albeit carefully qualified, runs counter to a preliminary assessment provided by the Carter Center, whose monitors were dismayed that the “elections will fall short of meeting international standards and Sudan’s obligations for genuine elections.” But these deficiencies may be of temporary consequence should the regime adhere to the remaining components of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. “Sudan’s government must ensure that the democratic opening is expanded and deepened,” it said, referring to both creating space for civil society and following through on next year’s referendum. “Full respect for human rights, democratic principles, and transparency will help to heal the mistrust that has detracted from the electoral process.”
State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley echoed the Carter Center’s concerns, telling reporters at his Monday briefing that “This was not a free and fair election. It did not, broadly speaking, meet international standards.” With regard to next year’s referendum, Crowley acknowledged the “value of having millions of people in Sudan exercise their right to vote,” but cautioned that there’s still much work to be done in order to meet the CPA’s “very aggressive and difficult timetable.”
Meanwhile, Sudan state media is reporting that President Omar al-Bashir“scored overwhelming victories” in a sampling of 35 polling places, winning anywhere between 70 - 92 percent of the presidential vote. Gregg Carlstromlinks to a National Elections Commission report that puts al-Bashir at “roughly 90 percent.” And earlier today, these lopsided returns prompted two of Sudan’s eastern region opposition parties to concede defeat — though in doing so, they accused the regime of blatant electoral fraud.
UPDATE: The White House just released a statement on the elections as well, saying that despite limited political freedoms and reports of intimidation and voting irregularities, “The people of Sudan are to be commended for their efforts to make Sudan’s first multi-party elections in over two decades peaceful and meaningful.” Like both the Carter Center and Crowley at the State Department, the White House sees the election as an essential step toward fully realizing the vision laid out by the CPA.
This short quip, courtesy of the Economist, signifies what appear to be remarkably different electoral environments in Sudan’s two major regions. While the elections in the north were marred by “rigging, intimidation, and boycotts” — thus all but ensuring a landslide victory for President Omar al-Bashir and the ruling NCP — in the south, the Economist reports, the opposition Sudan People’s Liberation Movement is “sure to win handsomely—and pretty fairly.”
To be sure, few now expect these results to dramatically alter the short-term political equilibrium. But the broader question, according to the BBC’s Andrew Harding, is “whether the elections will actually prove useful to the south, or whether they could yet undermine stability in the region as it moves towards a referendum on independence - and an almost inevitable “yes” vote - early next year.” There are plenty of reasons to be worried, he says, since even if the “extraordinarily resilient people of Southern Sudan manage to limp the last mile to their long-awaited referendum next January, and vote - as almost everyone I met in the south insisted they would - for independence, then a whole new clutch of uncertainties come into play.”
Over at Foreign Policy, John Norrislikens what he views as the Obama administration’s “bungled” approach toward Sudan to its erstwhile treatment of the controversial elections in both Iran and Afghanistan. In each case, “the administration seemed reluctant to acknowledge upfront that the elections were profoundly flawed, even though it had more than enough evidence to that effect. In all three cases, the administration moved only slowly to toe a tougher line — after widespread howls from human rights activists, opposition parties in the respective countries, the media, and Republican critics were heard first.” Norris’ larger critique, however, surrounds the dissonance of the administration’s efforts to create a “more respectful, nuanced approach” to foreign policy while willfully ignoring realities on the ground. “There’s no need to sacrifice U.S. policy goals to lofty truth-telling,” he says. “For example, if the administration had taken a tougher line with Khartoum about creating the underlying conditions for a free and fair national election, the country would already be further down the road toward creating genuine power-sharing in Sudan.”
The answer is ‘yes,’ according to Shadi Hamid of the Brookings Doha Center in a recent Christian Science Monitor op-ed. The former POMED director of research explains that throughout the Middle East there is a sense of ‘Bush nostalgia,’ particularly for Arab reformers “who, while disliking the Bush administration in almost every way, were fully aware that Bush’s ‘freedom agenda’ helped usher in a promising moment for Arab reform.” Hamid criticizes current U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East for its “business as usual” approach - turning a blind eye to illiberal practices of government suppression in return for supporting U.S. regional objectives. Though “the Obama administration’s Middle East policy is a welcome respite from the anger and acrimony that dominated Bush’s final years,” they still need a more “coherent strategy” and “imaginative policy” toward the region.
Gregg Carlstrom provides qualified support for Hamid’s argument. He disagrees with the notion that the Arab world misses Bush or his policies but agrees that “the Obama administration has really backed away from democracy promotion in the Middle East.” He laments Obama’s retreat on this issue, specifically as it relates to corrupt elections in Sudan and a suppressed civil society in Egypt. At the same time, he suggests some pragmatic reasons for this foreign policy approach, including a need to publicly break from his predecessor and a practical inability to back up democracy-laden rhetoric with consequences for noncompliance. In sum, Carlstrom expresses his frustration with the democracy promotion policies of the last three administrations: “The Bush administration’s selective and short-lived support for democracy in the Middle East hardly deserves any plaudits. But neither does Obama’s return to the short-sighted realism of the Clinton era.”
