Afghanistan has long been a crossroads of world cultures, economies, politics, and militaries. RAND's early research on Afghanistan examined the 1980s Soviet military campaign and the subsequent fundamentalist Islamic regime. Since Operation Enduring Freedom, the 2001 U.S. military effort to rout the Taliban and find Osama bin Ladin's Al Qaeda network, RAND has engaged the new Afghan government, military, and people to support reconstruction, counterinsurgency, and nation-building efforts.
REPORT
The "Americanization" of NATO's mission in Afghanistan may prove crucial to the future of Afghanistan, but the alliance could suffer long-term harm by being relegated to the position of junior partner to the United States.
NEWS RELEASE
The "Americanization" of NATO's mission in Afghanistan may prove crucial to the future of Afghanistan, but the alliance could suffer long-term harm by being relegated to the position of junior partner to the United States.
COMMENTARY
We have come through wars, depressions, natural and man-made disasters, indeed higher levels of domestic terrorist violence than that we face today, writes Brian Michael Jenkins.
REPORT
The C-27J Spartan is a reasonable replacement for the C-23 Sherpa aircraft that now transport mission critical, time sensitive (MCTS) cargo and passengers to brigade combat teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army's direct support approach for moving MCTS shipments using its organic aircraft is inherently more responsive than that of the Air Force, but both services should be able to improve the responsiveness of delivering MCTS shipments.
REPORT
The Afghan government and NATO can improve security in Afghanistan by leveraging traditional policing institutions in rural villages and mobilizing the population against insurgents. However, action needs to happen quickly to take advantage of a growing amount of local resistance against the Taliban across Afghanistan.
MULTIMEDIA
Counterterrorism expert Arturo Munoz discusses the viability of establishing civilian defense forces to complement Afghan National Security Forces in this May 10, 2010, Congressional Briefing.
REPORT
Approaches to counterinsurgency from 30 recent resolved campaigns show that good counterinsurgency practices tend to "run in packs" and that historically, the balance of selected good and ineffective practices perfectly predicts the outcome of a conflict.
REPORT
Some view DNA as a useful way for the U.S. Department of Defense to keep track of a large and ever-growing number of people as it executes its mission. However, serious questions remain about the technical requirements, policy and legal ramifications, and costs and benefits of this tool compared with other biometrics.
COMMENTARY
The Afghan government has embarked on a high-stakes gamble: Try to negotiate with the leaders of the various insurgent networks to end the nine-year-old Afghan war, write Wali Shaaker and John Parachini.
REPORT
Militaries from the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Denmark, and Israel all see a role for heavy forces, including tanks, in irregular warfare and hybrid warfare environments because they reduce operational risk, minimize friendly casualties, and provide an intimidation factor against adversaries.
COMMENTARY
President Obama's declaration last week that a change in personnel will not mean a change in policy suggests that the administration took only some of the lessons contained in Michael Hastings' Rolling Stone article, writes Celeste Ward Gventer.
COMMENTARY
By replacing Gen. Stanley McChrystal with Gen. David Petraeus, U.S. President Barack Obama has treated the most recent symptom of his Afghan malaise—an insubordinate, or at least indiscreet, general. He has not, however, addressed the underlying malady, writes James Dobbins.
REPORT
Building on a framework for integrating civil and military counterinsurgency (COIN), this volume presents an approach to the civil component, illustrated with three case studies from Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
NEWS RELEASE
The rising number of terrorist plots in the United States with links to Pakistan – most recently the failed car-bombing in New York City – is partly a result of an unsuccessful strategy by Pakistan and the U.S. to weaken the range of militant groups operating in Pakistan.
REPORT
The rising number of terrorist plots in the United States with links to Pakistan—most recently the failed car-bombing in New York City—is partly a result of an unsuccessful strategy by Pakistan and the U.S. to weaken the range of militant groups operating in Pakistan.
REPORT
The increased use of cash bonuses by the U.S. Department of Defense to encourage military enlistment and reenlistment had a positive effect on recruiting and retention in the armed forces. Until recently, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have placed greater stress on military recruitment and retention.
REPORT
The U.S. must determine how best to promote long-term security and stability in the Persian Gulf region while seeking to reduce the risks and costs imposed by its role as a permanent regional power—particularly vis-à-vis Iraq's future, the role of Iran, asymmetric threats, regional tensions, and the roles of other external actors.
COMMENTARY
President Karzai's Washington visit last month was basically a "be-nice-to-Karzai summit." After a period of harsh and direct U.S. criticism this past fall, the air is cleared, but issues remain—corruption in particular, write Cheryl Benard and Elvira Loredo.
REPORT
The ability of the United States to forge a broad yet effective relationship with Pakistan depends on likely developments in its internal and external security environment over the coming decade as well as Pakistan's national will and capacity to solve its problems.
COMMENTARY
President Karzai of Afghanistan wants to talk to the top Taliban leadership, and that's going to be a thorny issue for President Obama. Some U.S. officials would prefer that Mr. Karzai and his government concentrate instead on detaching low-level fighters from the insurgent cause, writes James Dobbins.
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