Democracy in the Arab World

Our friends over at the National Endowment for Democracy’s (NED) Democracy Digest posted a link to this article the other day concerning the prospects for democracy in the Arab world.

The author, Michael Mandelbaum, observes three “barriers to Arab democracy”:

1. A lack of liberty;
2. The religious/ethnic diversity of Arab countries;
3. Anti-Western sentiments

While all three arguments are interesting (and I recommend reading the article), I am particularly interested in the argument concerning liberty.  In an explanation sure to please Fareed Zakaria, Mandelbaum argues that without liberty, democracy is meaningless. 

The author contends that the lack of liberty in the Arab world is the consequence of two factors: 1) the failure to establish a free market economy; and 2) the predominant interpretation of Islam in the region. 

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Multivector foreign policies

One concern of this blog is authoritarian cooperation. This refers to the coordinated international strategies that authoritarian governments use to keep power.

This is an excellent post about an example of that. Foreign Minister Lavrov is on record speaking about Russia’s deepening ties with populist governments in Latin America. These governments are in power because their predecessors’ “neoliberal recipes” failed to deliver on popular expectations. Their relations with Russia are based on “mutual advantage,” not ideology. Yet Russia is not seeking a Latin American sphere of influence or fomenting a new Cold War. These ties are the result of a “multivector” foreign policy, which globalization makes necessary.

Putin-Chavez summits must represent just one vector.

So what is a multivector foreign policy? Apparently Kyrgyzstan has one too. Here is one definition:

Any multivector policy is always a balance, and not always simple and easy. Kyrgyz diplomats in their assignments routinely received directions to maintain good relations with one partner without sacrificing relations with others. Multivector policies imply eschewing exclusiveness and special “spheres of influence.”

According to Gregory Gleason for RFE/RL, Kyrgyzstan’s multivector foreign policy is coming apart. President Bakiev realizes that, to stay president, he has to pick one vector and abandon others:

It may be that the unraveling of Kyrgyzstan’s multivectoral policy is less a decision of choice than an act of desperation. Bakiev is facing formidable challenges as he seeks to defend his administration from internal opposition, respond to the difficulties of the global economic downturn, and secure support from the most influential foreign partner in the Eurasian region.

Iran and the Bomb

After reading this story from the Financial Times, I am a bit more hopeful that the Obama administration understands, and might successfully handle, the threat posed by a nuclear Iran.

I admit, I shudder each time I hear members of the Obama administration call for diplomatic negotiations with Iran.  Right or wrong, I agree with the FT article that the regime would use the negotiations to continue enrichment and forestall effective action by the international (read Trans-Atlantic) community.

As the article points out, Gary Samore, an old hand at arms control from the Clinton White House, will lead the new administrations efforts at non-proliferation.  He rightly points out three important facts in our favor:

1) the collapse in oil prices renders the populist policies untenable and leaves the Iranian government and economy more vulnerable to future economic sanctions.  Such sanction might finally succeed, long term, in reducing the allegiance of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to the Islamic regime;

2) the new administration, and Obama specifically, have a better chance at offering a credible offer of normalized relations to the Iranian government.  The Bush White House, tainted by the “Axis of Evil” talk and the regime change threats, could never make a similar offer;

3) The support for Obama around the world will improve the chances that the international community will work together to prevent Iran from attaining a nuclear weapon.  I agree with him on this point, but would  add that in order to consolidate that support, Obama needs to engage in diplomacy – even if he does set a timeline for completion – to prove that the Iranians are not interested in ceasing their enrichment efforts.

Samore realizes that the intransigence of China and Russia on the issue along with Iran’s willingness to forgo normalized relations with American in order to attain nuclear warheads, will mean any initiatives to deter Iran are anything but certain. He realizes, however, that in the current situation, negotiations followed by increased sanctions are our best chance at deterrence.

One last tidbit.  I found Ephraim Kam’s analysis of Iran’s intentions, and the subsequent impact of a nuclear Iran, spot on.  

The good news is: 

“Iran will not use nuclear weapons, not against us and not against any other country.”

The bad news is:

An Iran with nuclear weapons could destabilise the region in numerous ways. It could back radical Islamist movements such as Hizbollah and Hamas with more energy and less fear of reprisals. It could threaten and intimidate the oil states of the Gulf. It could frighten more of the educated and mobile Israeli middle class into emigrating. And it could precipitate a destabilising arms race across the region – as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Gulf States and Turkey all rushed to go nuclear.

So, do we “manage an Iran with a bomb or bomb Iran”?  If we can’t stop them…you can pick your poison.

Sharia for Peace?

This week the Pakistani government in the NWFP agreed to a truce with the Taliban in the Swat Valley.  In exchange for a permanent cease fire the provincial government has agreed to the imposition of Sharia Law. Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari has yet to sign off on the deal, but thus far the price of the cease fire looks to be Taliban control in Malakand, Shangla, Buner, Dir and Chitral, which adds up to roughly 1/3 of the NWFP.

On the one hand, this seems to legitimize Islamists in the NWFP and further undermines an already brittle Pakistani state capacity. Critics fear that ceding the territory to the Taliban will create another haven for terrorist activity and the Pakistani’s inability to defeat militants will only embolden their activities.  Indeed, this pact seems to legitimize what has already been happening in the province, namely Islamabad’s continuing inability to exert control and rule of law in its tribal areas.

It is also important to note the historical experience of Swat, Chitral and Dir,  which officially joined the Pakistani state as “Malakand” in 1969. Historically, tribal law was the source of the judicial system in these areas. The imposition of the ineffective Pakistani judicial system led to calls for a return to tribal/Sharia law. By 1994, the Tehrik-Nifazi Shariat Muhammadi (TNSM) movement was formed under a slogan calling for a return to Sharia Law. Swat elected a secular party in 2008, but militant elements began assassinating the party’s political leadership.

The best hope seems to be that the cease fire and acquiescence to the demand for Sharia will isolate the “Taliban” elements in the province unwilling to adhere to the ceasefire. In a visit to Washington today Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Shah Mahmood Quereshi, called the truce a “local solution to a local problem.” However, the imposition of Sharia could ultimately prove to be too costly for Pakistan’s statehood.

A brief NYT documentary captures some of the risks that ordinary inhabitants of Swat face….

The Future of Democracy Promotion – Part II

After reading Jack’s excellent post, I wanted to respond to a few points he makes with regards to democracy promotion in general, and the new administration specifically.

First, with regards to democracy promotion, I am a bit surprised by how thoroughly Jack dismisses traditional democracy promotion – what he defines as political party development, NGO capacity building, election assistance, training of journalists, etc – as a means to pursuing democratic gains in non-democratic systems.  I particularly disagree with his assertion that democracy promotion assistance to countries such as Morocco is a waste of our money.  

For countries like Morocco, with what I perceive to be a relatively moderate authoritarian ruler who has gradually invested in the development of his country and the relaxation of state oversight, traditional democracy assistance is EXACTLY what is needed.   These programs, such as political party development, parliamentary support and training and civil society capacity building, have the potential to reinvigorate and legitimate alternative sources of power to the monarchy.  While elements in the regime will undoubtedly try to stymie such efforts, I doubt they would kick USAID or any other organization that supports/funds democracy promotion out of the country.  Nor do I think they would tell NDI or IRI to leave.  Perhaps I’m being optimistic but I think (hope?) I’m right.

I do agree with Jack, however, regarding the paradox of our decisions regarding who to support with our limited democracy promotion funding.  What Jack leaves as a footnote in his post is quite possibly one of the most understudied phenomenon in development assistance: we provide more development assistance to countries with either a questionable, or non-existent, commitment to democracy than we do to democracies facing crises.  It seems logical, not to mention prudent, that we should support: 1) countries that have wholeheartedly made the transition to democracy, or 2) countries that have transitioned to democracy even though they’re ambivalent about its survival before supporting countries that oppose democracy and actively work to undermine democratic ideals.  

In such a world, I understand Jack’s frustration over countries like Egypt, North Korea, Kyrgystan, Azerbaijan, Khazakstan, et al receiving democracy funding.  We supported (and often pushed) countries to transition to democracy.   Some did because they agreed with us on principle, others because it was politically expedient and advanced their short-term interests.  Now, when an economic collapse (which, ahem, we started) threatens to deligitimate the very form of government we advocated for them to adopt, we continue to send tens of millions of dollars to non-democracies while only sending a fraction of that to our struggling democratic allies.

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Obama drops democracy. Or does he?

Saturday’s NY Times piece is causing a stir. These snippets capture the essence:

[Obama's] Inaugural Address a few days later was a sharp contrast from Mr. Bush’s four years ago. Where Mr. Bush called the spread of freedom the central goal of American policy, Mr. Obama made just passing reference to those who silence dissent being on “the wrong side of history.” Indeed, his secretary of state, Hillary Rodham Clinton, outlined a policy of the “Three D’s” — defense, diplomacy and development. The fourth D, democracy, did not make the list.

And:

To many Democrats, [democracy promotion] ought to be lower on the agenda. America should not lecture others, if only because quiet diplomacy may work better, they argue. In this view, the whole focus on elections, particularly, is misplaced when so much of the world is suffering from poverty, hunger and disease. Mr. Obama seems to side with that point.

Going by the quotations, many in the democracy business are concerned that Obama’s foreign aid approach will emphasize AIDS, cholera and mosquito nets in rural Zimbabwe, for instance, over political reform in the capital city Harare. We cannot reject the possibility, however, that this is a recalibration of democracy assistance in light of new challenges.

The Third Wave has crested. As measured by Freedom House, the number of democracies in the world has declined for the third year in a row. Just as Huntington identified reverse waves of dictatorship following each of the first two democratization waves, we appear to be in the midst of a third reverse wave.

At a symposium held jointly by IFES and Georgetown last December, several experts and practitioners discussed the challenge and how to respond.¹ In sum, authoritarian leaders have become more sophisticated in the means by which they maintain power. They back each other in multilateral institutions like the UN, support each other with bilateral aid and share best practices on stymieing opposition without resort to naked repression.²

These manifestations of reversal call conventional democracy assistance methods into question. Conventional democracy assistance refers to the usual programs: political party development, NGO development, election assistance, training journalists, et cetera. It is important to note that, most often, these programs require permission from host governments. Broadly speaking, from the perspective of promoting democracy, there are three kinds of countries:

1) New democracies where underdevelopment poses a latent threat to the legitimacy of democratic institutions. These states represent the Third Wave’s most stable gains. These are the countries with leaders most amenable to democracy assistance. Therefore they can benefit from it most. At the same time, persistent underdevelopment combined with the current financial crisis means these regimes are at risk of losing performance legitimacy. Frustration with democracy’s perceived inability to solve complex social problems can make non-democratic ‘solutions’ palatable to populations. So development assistance and governance reform are as important as democracy promotion in these cases.³

2) Weaker democracies whose leaders are ambivalent about democratic institutions. The number of regimes in this category is shrinking, most recently with the exits of Venezuela and many Central Asian states. Now Pakistan and Ukraine are at risk. In these countries, leaders may tolerate democracy assistance programs, but pressure at the top to respect democratic institutions is more likely to produce results. Likewise, development assistance is important for building bottom-up demand for institutions of limited government.

3) Closed regimes. These are countries where leaders do not tolerate democracy assistance at all (North Korea) or only to the point where an opposition might win an election (Egypt, Morocco). There is little sense in running programs to build opposition – that is, conventional democracy assistance – when leaders are unwilling to transfer power after a free and fair election. In these cases, combined pressure at the top and development assistance are jointly more important than conventional democracy assistance.

Gone are the days of smooth transitions. Most of those happened in Eastern Europe. Three factors explain much of their success: post-Soviet window of opportunity, strong incentives for economic and political reform and concerted, high-level pressure to effect it. The last two factors resulted from European Union expansion. The EU unfortunately does not exist in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America or Eurasia. The challenge, then, is to replicate elsewhere the conditions that advance political liberalization, free markets and more equitable distributions of wealth.

If the above is correct, Obama’s recalibration is not based solely on a widely recognized need to tone down democracy rhetoric. It reflects recognition that, in today’s political landscape, conventional democracy assistance is insufficient for consolidating and ineffective at creating democratic gains. Perhaps we are moving toward the unification of democracy and governance assistances with a dose of incentives to liberalize. In light of that possibility, it is worth revisiting a line from the President’s inaugural address:

To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.

1. The causes of democratic breakdowns are multiple and beyond the scope of this short blog post.
2. Several means have been covered on this blog. See our tag on authoritarian upgrading.
3. Paradoxically, however, these states get the least democracy assistance. States in the other two categories get more.

The Future of Democracy Promotion

Yesterday’s New York Times ran a story by Peter Baker about the new administration’s approach (thus far) to democracy promotion.  Anyone in the democracy promotion business – or those interested in starting in that business – would do well to read it.

Simply put, the author suggests that the Obama administration is “demoting” democracy.

While many of the practitioners interviewed for Baker’s piece worried that Obama might write off democracy promotion, most of them agreed that we need to lower our profile, so to speak.  Thomas Carothers, who is releasing an article soon (for those interested in such happenings), expresses the sentiment well for the practitioners when he writes,

“Caution and moderation on democracy promotion are very much in order, including a careful post-Bush process of repair and recovery,” he wrote. “At the same time, however, President Obama and his foreign policy team should not, either explicitly or implicitly, embrace a broad realist corrective.”

It seems what most practitioners worry about is a “realist” backlash, whereby we remove democracy promotion from our foreign policy, on account of the hangover we worked up from eight years of an often hypocritical democracy promotion agenda.

Jennifer Windsor, assistant director at Freedom House, also captures the mood of democracy promoters when she says,

“The challenge for the Obama team is to find words and concepts that enable the administration to distinguish itself from the Bush administration, but not to downgrade support for democracy and civil and political rights,” she said. “So far, I haven’t seen them even try.”

It’s too early to pass judgment but so far it seems the administration is, understandably so, putting democracy promotion on the back-burner while they attempt to save the economy (oh, and Pakistan and Afghanistan).  It will be interesting to see how they Obama-ize democracy promotion abroad.

Lobbying and the 17th Amendment

I read an interesting article today written by George Will.  Under his scathing – though well-written – shots at Feingold and McCain, he poses an interesting and relevant question: did the passage of the 17th Amendment have the unintended consequence of increasing the power and influence of lobbyists?

In between ridiculing Russ Feingold for proposing to amend, instead of repeal, the 17th Amendment of the Constitution (direct election of senators), Will writes: 

Severing senators from state legislatures, which could monitor and even instruct them, made them more susceptible to influence by nationally organized interest groups based in Washington. Many of those groups, who preferred one-stop shopping in Washington to currying favors in all the state capitals, campaigned for the 17th Amendment.

His argument is that while “less democratic”, the indirect election of senators limited the ability of lobbyists to influence government decisions.  Before the passage of the 17th Amendment lobbyists were forced to advocate for their clients in at least 25 states.  Currently, they only have to convince 51 senators (60 max) in Washington D.C.  The change decreases the costs of lobbyists and increases the likelihood that they can build a majority.  I do not deny that state legislatures are very susceptible to lobbyist influence (as someone from California, I know this first hand), but “influencing” 25 state legislatures is a lot harder than “influencing” 51 senators.  First, state capitols are far away from each other, increasing the costs (both time and money) associated with lobbying.  Second, the proposal must either benefit 25 to 30 states or benefit the “nation as a whole” to even have a chance at passage.  Third, it limits the importance of having the right champion in Congress on the right committee (or sub-committee) with the right connections.

Will ignores several problems relating to his argument (such as the limited scope of state interests and the power of individual senators with “favors”), but it never-the-less poses an interesting solution to a problem Washington struggles with (or at least pretends to struggle with) all the time: the influence of lobbyists. 

It is easy to dismiss Will for his politically charged writing style, but I think doing so would be a mistake.  I do not think that lobbyists are evil, but I do think they have been able to influence decisions in a way that harms the many to benefit the few (re: financial industry regulation, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac, etc).  Perhaps it is an imperfect solution, but it is one worth considering.

P.S.  Here are two other passages I found interesting. Well, I found one interesting (the first) and the other humorous (the second):

1) The Framers gave the three political components of the federal government (the House, Senate and presidency) different electors (the people, the state legislatures and the Electoral College as originally intended) to reinforce the principle of separation of powers, by which government is checked and balanced.

2) Irony alert: Feingold’s amendment requiring elections to fill Senate vacancies will owe any traction it gains to Senate Democrats’ opposition to an election to choose a replacement for Barack Obama. That opposition led to the ongoing Blagojevich-Burris fiasco.

Is Japan Ripe for Democracy Assistance?

Freedom House rates Japan as “Free.” But reading yesterday’s New York Times, I can’t help but wonder if even free countries might be able to put a little democracy assistance to good use.

Since its founding in 1955, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party has been out of power for all of 11 months. But this may be about to change. The party’s favorability rating has dropped to 26.8%. You might think the main opposition, the Democratic Party of Japan, would have reason to celebrate. But you’d be mistaken. Their approval rating is only 28.3%. Something is obviously wrong.

Both parties have multiple internal factions; The Times points out that neither party has anything resembling a coherent ideology. And Japanese voters may indeed want to “throw the bums out,” but they have little confidence in an alternative that is strikingly inexperienced in governing.

Both parties need to get back to basics, and find out what is important to voters in the here and now. It’s a safe bet the economy is on their minds. CNN reports that that the Japanese economy is at its worst since the end of World War II. So a winning Japanese party will need a good plan for that.

But no one is against economic recovery, so they’ll also each need a distinguishing message. This is where polling and focus groups could come in. Who’s tough on crime? Who will fight corruption? Who can work well with international partners? Who can promise their finance minister won’t be tipsy on “cold medicine” during overseas press conferences? On a more serious note, some Japanese want to engage in a public debate about whether or not to retain the country’s peace constitution, Article 9 of which renounces war as a sovereign right. Certainly this is something that should be subject to vigorous and meaningful public discourse.

And you can be sure that grassroots party activism is suffering when the most popular party can only summon the support of 28.3% of the people, so while we’re at it, the democracy assistance community might have something useful to say about energizing party grassroots.

Of course, this suggestion is a little tongue-in-cheek. But why throw all the D&G money at hopeless cases? Our friends might be able to use a little help, too.

Does Iran Have the Bomb?

According to the Financial Times and the IAEA, Iran now has enough enriched uranium “to provide the raw materials” for one nuclear weapon.  

While seemingly straight forward, the issue is less clear than it seems.  

Natural uranium is composed of two isotopes, U235 (approximately 99% of the uranium) and U238 (less than 1% of the uranium).  In order to develop weapons grade uranium – aka highly enriched uranium – a country uses centrifuges to separate the isotopes and increase the concentration of U238 to approximately 90%.  Between natural uranium and highly-enriched uranium, there is a yet another classification, low-enriched uranium.  The absolute amount of uranium (kg) decreases each time the uranium is enriched – so if you start with 10 kg of natural uranium, you end up with 1 kg of highly-enriched uranium at the end of the process (number here are not scientific, only for explanatory purposes).  According to the report, Iran now has enough low-enriched uranium (which is approximately 2-3% U238) to allow it to develop the necessary amount of weapons grade (highly-enriched) uranium for a single nuclear warhead.  (Information from BBC).

Even though such news is not uplifting, it is by no means the “end” or “inevitable”.  Well, at least not any more inevitable than it was previously. However, we do need to realize that the window of opportunity for the U.S. and Western nation to prevent Iran from actually constructing a nuclear warhead is QUICKLY closing.  

To put the release in perspective, Mohamad ElBaradei of the IAEA correctly points out that Iran has not developed an atomic bomb…yet.  However, his argument is based on technicality not necessarily on technology.  ElBaradei recognizes that in order to refine uranium to the necessary levels for a nuclear weapon, Iran would need to restructure its Natanz enrichment site – a difficult and expensive procedure – or have an alternate site ready to continue the enrichment.

The question is, then, do we believe Iran has the capability to take the enrichment to the next level?  ElBaradei must not, or he is being disingenuous by not pointing out the relative ease with which Iran could develop a nuclear weapon now that it has enough fissile material.  Considering that the revelation of the present uranium enrichment sites came from an organization (the Mujahedin e-Khalq) currently designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the State Department, I’m skeptical we have the intelligence assets to know if Iran has already developed a clandestine site to complete the enrichment of uranium.  It’s possible they do not have the capability…but it is equally as likely that they do and we just don’t know.

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