Siege in Lahore Points to Challenges in Pakistan

The Obama administration’s new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan seems to take heed of observations echoed by many South Asia specialists. In Pakistan, the administration has tentatively bet on Zardari’s civilian administration to lead efforts to battle extremism within Pakistani territory. The aid package of $1.5 billion per annum for 5 years focuses on development rather than military aid. This is a welcome change given Musharraf’s proclivity for military spending. However, as most development practitioners note, setting realistic conditionalities and metrics is a difficult task, one made more difficult by the sheer size of the development challenge in Pakistan.

Secondly, the US is aiming to bring in other powers in dealing with the region’s problems. In Pakistan, the US is hoping that military posturing between India and Pakistan can be reduced so that the Pakistani military can focus on the militant threat within its own borders. This requires making headway in Kashmir, which did enjoy a relatively calm cease fire until it expired last year. However, the military has long been an independent actor in Pakistan, and shifting its raison d’être is sure to have staunch opposition. The military continues to operate as a state within a state in Pakistan, which may lead to an awkward marriage between promoting economic development and reducing military funding.

Yesterday’s police academy standoff in Lahore exemplifies the gravity of the problem in Pakistan. On the one hand is the Pakistani government’s impotence, on the other is the resistance that increased US actions sparks. While the security forces prevailed relatively quickly and decisively, the militants may still have their way in undermining the government and terrorizing the state in the long run.

The realization that the issues in the region cannot be dealt with by military means alone is a positive developments, but, in this writer’s opinion, the prospects remain bleak in Pakistan.

Early Argentine mid-term elections?

Via Vittorio at The Olive and the Arrow, Argentine President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner has asked her country’s congress to move up presidential elections by four months.

Someone in the comments notes the Senate has approved. Kirchner has until Saturday to secure the consent of the lower house. If the Chamber of Deputies goes along, the election will be on June 28, 2009, instead of October 28, 2009.

According to the NYT article Vittorio links, “she wanted to give Argentines less to worry about in the face of the worsening global financial crisis.” That makes sense for Kirchner’s allies in congress if she assumes – probably correctly – that economic conditions will be worse in October than June. Unfortunately her bid appears to have accelerated the decline of investor confidence.

Talk About a Double-Edged Sword…

Everything just got a lot more complicated in Sudan.

That seems to be the real conclusion behind this piece in the Washington Post.

Remember that the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s arrest.  As a result, the mass murderer (not genocidal, according to the warrant) kicked out all aid organizations in the country.

Of those organizations, four were working with the World Food Program and supplied approximately “35% of Darfur’s food distribution capacity.”

Additionally, some of these organizations provided the displaced refugees with clean water.  As Gerson points out,

Without international aid groups to organize supply, only about 9 percent of people in the camps have access to clean water.

9 percent. Oh, and there’s a meningitis outbreak sweeping through the camps – the treatment for which was coming from the aid groups now expelled from the country.

The international community, not to mention the development organizations, is thus stuck with two horrible options:

1) Provide aid to the Sudanese regime who not only lacks the capacity to distribute the aid but is responsible for the plight of the Darfuris in the first place AND supports militias that have killed, maimed and raped thousands upon thousands already.

OR

2) Continue applying pressure to the Sudanese regime with the knowledge that thousands more will die from lack of food, water and medicine as a result.

The two options assume that forcible regime change is off the table.

So what can we do?

The international community can back off and hope that al-Bashir allows the aid organizations to resume operations.  We might save some lives in the short run but al-Bashir’s regime will continue to kill with impunity, we allow an evil regime to remain in power and the international community shows just how weak it is. 

The other option, as noted above, is to continue applying pressure.  Undoubtedly, thousands will die as a result from lack of access to food, medicine or water.  Complicating the matter is the fact that any amount of pressure we apply might not result in a regime change.  All these people might die and al-Bashir will probably remain in power anyway.

I don’t pretend to know the answers, but here is a case where lives are really on the line.  Sadly, it appears the international community is caught like a deer in the headlights.  We can’t stomach al-Bashir’s regime but we won’t accept the loss of so many innocent lives.  Either we stay “strong” and continue “punishing” al-Bashir and Sudan (really punishing the people of Sudan) or concede “defeat” and hope for the best (but who knows, we might just subsidize Sudan’s paramilitary activities and forfeit the power and legitimacy of the international community).

In the end, if we can’t stop al-Bashir…who can we stop?  If Russia and China will protect even this regime from justice, is there any hope they’ll stop providing Iran cover with which to acquire nuclear weapons or turn against Mugabe’s Zimbabwe?

More on Collier and Democracy

Tyler Cowen over at Marginal Revolution explains Colliers new book, “Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places,” well in a new post.

Cowen raises a few particularly important issues the book identifies that development experts need to take note of:

The claimed takeaway is that African nations have too much sovereignty, not too little.

Also, we need to take better care of what donor funding is doing:

Collectively, the countries of the bottom billion are spending around $9 billion on the military, of which up to 40 percent is being financed by donors.

It seems we’re financing the militarization of African regimes that then use that money to kill and oppress their own people.

Anyone who disagrees with the “too much sovereignty” issue can speak to experts on Sudan and Zimbabwe.  I am sure they’ll have some eye-opening examples (think: Gukurahundi and Operation Murambatsvina).

Zakaria on Trade

It seems Fareed Zakaria shares my concerns on the potential for trade wars that will cripple world economic production and extend the recession. 

Important paragraph:

Every action by one government is producing a countermove by another, in a classic and depressingly predictable spiral. The United States shuts down a pilot program allowing a few Mexican trucks into the United States to deliver their goods—so Mexico, justifiably and legally, imposes duties on a number of American goods. The House puts a “buy American” clause into the stimulus package, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations explains that its own “buy local” provisions are a justified response to Washington’s measures. “Buy American” sounds great, except if Germany puts in a “buy German” provision and France a “buy French” one. Then who will buy American exports—which are the only part of the U.S. economy that has been growing for the past year?

He also makes some interesting comments regarding the effects of steel subsidization in the U.S.

Worth reading throughout.

Stifling Democracy Through Trade

Yesterday, I read an article in the Wall Street Journal about trade between Iran and Iraq.  Essentially, the article explains how and why businesses in Iraq, particularly in cement and automobiles, are suffering from a huge influx of cheap Iranian goods.

The news is troubling (though predictable) for several reasons:

First, as Iranian goods stifle the market for Iraqi goods, more and more Iraqis will lose their jobs.  Rising unemployment, coupled with dropping oil prices that limit the ability of the state to support social security programs, will undoubtedly lead to more instability and re-invigorate the weakened insurgency.  One worker interviewed for the story admitted to planting roadside bombs and IED’s for money before leaving the insurgency to work at the brick factory.  Now, that same man is concerned about how he will support his family.  I doubt the story is unique.  The trend is already starting:”reports of auto theft, robberies and burglaries are up in the past six months.”  Auto theft, robbery and burglary, however, are much different than taking up arms against the U.S. military/a rival ethno-religious group/the government.

Second, the Iranian goods are destroying the commercial classes of Iraq.  The importance of such classes to the development of democracy is documented throughout the literature.  The argument follows as such: the development of the commercial classes creates a segment in society that does not depends on the state for survival.  Additionally, over time, the state begins to depend on the commercial classes for its tax revenue.  The independence of the commercial classes allows them to oppose the government on certain initiatives and the tax base they provide gives them the leverage to affect government policy from time to time. However, they eventually desire a structured method to advocate for their preferences.  Long story short, the commercial classes force the executive to accept restrictions on his power and, eventually, they develop the institutions of elections and Parliaments to support their influence over the executive.

Normally, Iraq’s oil revenues would distort the process and dilute any connection between the people and the government.  If the government doesn’t need the tax revenue, it doesn’t need to entertain political voice to any meaningful level.  However, with oil prices low, the Iraqi government is increasingly needing other sources of revenue.  As the pie chart in the article points out, Iraqi exports are abysmally low – $200 million (compared to $4 billion worth of imports).  Enter the commercial classes…well, enter Iran actually.

That is the real threat of Iranian goods.  As the government increasingly receives revenue from the operation of Iranian organizations (and from the purchase of Iranian goods), two results seem clear: 1) the Iraqi government  will become more dependent on Iran (as Iranian goods will provide the basis for certain important sectors of the economy, and more importantly, 2) the Iraqi government will need to develop systems that handle the displaced and unemployed Iraqi citizens. 

The systems most able to handle the displaced and unemployed result in a a dependence on the state for survival, thus limiting opportunities for citizens to impose restrictions on the executive and create systems of political accountability.  If 50% of citizens live off of payments from the government, how can they realistically threaten that government? 

Commercial classes provide jobs and create a segment of society invested in the country (as opposed to solely interested in profits).  It is these commercial classes (shopowners, factory workers, etc) that provide a check on the government precisely because they do not depend on the government for survival.  That point cannot be overstated.  

As the cheap imported goods kill the commercial classes, the Iranian government gains huge amounts of influence while undermining Iraq’s process of democratic development.* 

*This is not to say that Iraq would be a perfect democracy with commercial classes, but rather that large commercial classes greatly improve the likelihood of success for democracy.

Mi última observación

The people of El Salvador have a lot to be proud of. This past Sunday, they took part in an election that, despite a number of irregularities, went smoother than many – including myself – had expected.

As election observers, we left for the polls at about 4 a.m. to make sure that all of the proper election materials and personnel were present and in order, and that the rules governing the preparation of voting centers were being implemented. Observing the formalities of this process, though important, was quite tedious, and I will spare readers the details. What was interesting, however, was to witness the informal interactions between the poll workers and partisans throughout the day.

In Salvadoran national elections, a vote reception board (JRV) sits at each voting table and oversees the actual voting process. Each contesting party receives equal representation within the JRVs. In addition to this, an equal amount of individuals from each contesting party are allowed to serve as vigilantes. Vigilantes provide an additional layer of scrutiny, so that each party can ensure that its interests are fairly represented within the dealings of the JRVs. The role of the vigilante is more overtly partisan than that of the JRV board member. The idea is that the JRV exists to protect the rules, but when adherence falls out of balance, the vigilante, the defender of the slighted party, will call attention to it and even the keel. The institutions immediately governing the actual voting process, in sum, are designed to encourage rigorous contestation.

Two Vigilantes

Yet, despite the high-stakes, competitive race, vigilantes from both parties upheld a standard of respectful disputation, resisting any temptation to resort to degenerative confrontation. Early on in the day, just before voting had opened up and the rush to organize the election materials had settled, I even saw an Arena man light a cigarette for a young FMLN lady. The image was a surreal contrast with the civil war that ended only two decades ago, or even the spike in pre-electoral violence that occurred only days prior. At this point, I remembered being told during my training that relations between parties in the early hours would determine how the rest of the day would pan out.

This insight turned out to be quite prescient. For the rest of the day, I personally saw few disputes, and those that did flare up were for the most part quickly and peacefully resolved. At one polling center that we visited, Rodrigo Avila, the Arena candidate, happened to show up with a large entourage of supporters. (Apparently, he was there accompanying his daughter as she cast her ballot.) Given that there were already a large number of FMLN supporters within the polling station, this created a situation where things seemed like they could easily get out of hand. Arena supporters marched in chanting slogans and singing party songs, while the FMLN crowd confronted them in a battle of decibels. At the fault lines of the two groups, there were even several physical skirmishes. However, these were quickly broken up – not by police officers or security guards, but by moderates on both sides who did not want to discredit their cause or the democratic process. To be sure, the gathering of the two crowds was an inherent violation of several rules, but most of us came away with the impression that it could have been much worse, and as evidence that both parties have come a long way in adhering to civil means of political interaction.

"Patria Si, Comunismo No!": A Spot of Rowdiness in the Polling Center

Perhaps the greatest achievement was not what happened during the voting process, but what occurred once all the votes were tallied. Inferring from the polls that FMLN would carry the day, I staked out Arena’s national headquarters to see what the mood would be like on the losing side as the results came in. Before the outcome was settled, the atmosphere was celebratory, and there seemed to be a conscious effort to maintain morale until all of the results were in. However, a number of people that I spoke with conceded that FMLN would likely come out on top, and that democracy and governance would suffer as a result.

“Do you know what this means?” a man asked me as he held up his two fingers in a symbol of peace, a symbol FMLN supporters have adopted. “It means two terms,” he said, and went on to elaborate predictions about how the FMLN will change the constitution and transition into a Chavista regime. “Sounds pretty scary,” I sympathized, and asked him whether he thought that this fear would spur violence on the part of Arena radicals. “Maybe,” he said, “…maybe not.” I was glad to know I wasn’t the only one caught up in the ambiguity of the evening.

Concesión

Eventually, as results came in and it became clearer that Avila would likely not be the victor, a caravan of SUVs pulled up and it was announced that Avila would give his concession. We all rushed the doors to the main hall as Avila took the stage. The mood of the crowd was not one of anger, although disappointment was in the air. Avila, for his part, reaffirmed his commitment to the democratic process, and encouraged his party to do the same: “In a democracy, we all have to realize that sometimes you achieve your objectives and sometimes not.” He also provided assurances that the party would still be a relevant player within the established institutions: “ARENA now passes into the opposition…it can be assured that it will be listened to and respected.” Since then, I have been unable to find reports (at least in English-language media), of violence on the part of Arena supporters.

Following this, several of us from the Georgetown contingent went to the center of FMLN festivities to get a sense of the mood there. Upon our arrival, we exited our cab into a sea of red t-shirts and flags, beeping horns, and celebratory chants. On the one hand, images of Castro and Che, as well as the hoisting and waiving of flags bearing sickles and hammers was enough to send chills down this gringo’s spine. On the other, the crowds seemed to appreciate the current U.S. president every bit as much as Latin America’s most notorious revolutionaries. Almost every time we were noticed, someone from the crowd would shout “Obama!” Among the more prominent of chants was “Si se pudo” (yes we could), a past-tense adaptation of Obama’s “Si se puede” (yes we can). More importantly, the crowds proceeded orderly through the streets (with some minor exceptions), and none of us witnessed any misconduct.

In many ways, then, this year’s presidential election can be seen as both a culmination of a long-endured democratic peace process. The FMLN has made a big, and perhaps final step towards “coming in from the cold,” while Arena and the majority of its supporters have exhibited a commitment to stepping aside and accepting the role of loyal opposition.

A New Era

Of course, democracy does not end on election day. Many within and outside El Salvador legitimately question the FMLN’s democratic bona fides and whether the new president will ultimately govern in a way that upholds the pillars of democratic preservation. Some even believe that El Salvador is now destined to become another notch in Hugo Chavez’s regional belt of leftist governments with doubtful commitments to liberal democracy.

I have my own thoughts, but there are many variables at play and so for now I will leave predictions to more seasoned analysts of a country with which I have only recently become familiar. For now, suffice it to say that while questions continue to surround the future El Salvador’s democratic experiment, the immediate events of election day, at least those that I witnessed, served as a sign of hope for an otherwise skeptical observer.

Heading for Trade Wars?

It certainly seems so.  Apparently we aren’t very good at taking our own advice on how free trade is good for economic growth.  Just look at U.S. government policy, and trading partner reactions, recently:

- Threats by candidate Obama to renegotiate NAFTA;

- Passage of the “Buy American” act in the 2009 Stimulus Bill requiring domestic goods be used for projects (the Senate slightly lessened the restrictions, but kept the provision in tact);

- Passage of the $410 billion spending bill that included language to prevent Mexican-licensed trucks from traveling beyond commercial zones along the U.S.-Mexico border;

- Energy Secretary Steven Chu says that U.S is open to imposing a carbon tariff on countries that do not limit carbon and greenhouse gas releases.

The responses have not been pleasant, as you can imagine.

The E.U. threatened to sue the U.S. through the World Trade Organization for the Buy American act.  Forunately, they backed down after the provision was weakened.

Mexico imposed approximately $2.4 billion dollars of tariffs on 90 unnamed, American-made, agricultural and industrial products.

China warned that attempting to place a carbon tax on their goods would start a trade war. 

Even Canada told us to back off.  They likewise let us off the hook after the provision was amended.

Hopefully, the recent events are all talk.  I doubt it, though, as it seems a protectionist surge seems to be cresting in the U.S.  As more Americans lose their jobs it will become (and is becoming) politically unpalatable to allow U.S bailout money to end up outside the U.S.  Maybe in the absence of an organized, world-wide effort to stabilize the financial markets, it makes sense to concentrate our money at home.  But with a globalized economy it’s unlikely that we will bounce back from this crisis unless other countries do as well.

FMLN Wins Historic Election

If you have been paying attention to the media, you know by now that yesterday, Mauricio Funes of the FMLN won the Salvadoran presidential election with 51.3% of the vote.

As expected, the Salvadoran media is awash with coverage of yesterday´s electoral process. Pages upon pages of color photos from and articles about Election Day filled this morning´s papers, showing the massive turnout across the country, highlighting the minute by minute movements of the two presidential candidates, and the personal stories of hopeful Salvadorans casting their ballots.

The U.S. and international press also had extensive coverage of yesterday´s events and results (for a few examples, check out the BBC, NY Times, LA Times, Reuters, and Washington Post articles). Coverage highlighted the promises made in Funes´acceptance/victory speech- that he would respect private property, the constitution, and freedom of speech. Funes also promised to promote unity and reconciliation in the country, and invited Arena to be a constructive opposition. Moreover, Funes presented himself as an agent of safe change, hoping to model himself after other moderate leftists in the region. These types of promises and statements were undoubtedly made to combat the worries Arena and its supporters expressed during the campaign- for example, that FMLN is a communist party and that a victory for Funes would constitute handing over the country to the likes of Chavez and Castro.

However, from what I´ve read (certainly not everything out there), there are important discussions just touched on by or missing in these articles. I did not see any attention paid to the vote of Salvadorans living in the U.S. On the surface, it may appear insignificant, since less than 300 Salvadorans came from the U.S. to vote (out of the 40,000 that registered for a DUI and the approximately 2.5 million Salvadorans legally in the U.S.), but there are important issues here. While monitoring, we saw person after person turned away because of problems with their Unique Identification Document (DUI) (US-issued DUIs with Salvadoran addresses or Salvadoran-issued DUIs with U.S. addresses meant that person could not vote). FMLN poll workers blamed this problem on a lack of voter education about where and with what information Salvadorans in the U.S. should have obtained their DUIs. Coupling these problems with the fact that Salvadorans living abroad, but not in the U.S., didn´t have the opportunity to get a DUI and come back to vote, makes a strong case for an absentee ballot process or other reforms. Also, while Funes is bending over backwards to promote his moderate credentials, questions remain about the Vice President-elect, Salvador Sanchez. He is part of the old gaurd of the FMLN and his role and influence in governing has not been declared as yet. He may be in favor of more radical policies. We´ve heard rumors from opponents of the FMLN that they plan to change the constitution to allow for re-election, as other Latin American countries have done recently. It will be important to watch the transition process and how the FMLN governs under the guidance of Funes. 

The historic importance of this election has been touched upon by the press, but it should be stressed further. As Funes said last night in his speech, El Salvador is finally ready for an alteration in governing parties, 17 years after the Peace Agreements were signed. El Salvador is a small country, but it is an important case study in conflict resolution, peace implementation, and democratic consolidation.

Khatami Withdraws from Presidential Election

Muhammad Khatami, the President of Iran from 1997 – 2005, officially withdrew his candidacy for the Presidency today.

Known as a “reformer,” Khatami is best known for his liberalization of the media and other aspects of Iranian life throughout his Presidency.  Unfortunately, he is also very well known for disappointing millions of his supporters when he allowed the government to reverse the liberalised policies he promoted.  In fact, many say that Ahmadinejad came to power as a result of Khatami’s failure to affect change – a failure that caused most of his supporters to stay home on election day.

His withdrawal must be hard for the reformist party in Iran.  While definitely “damaged goods” from his time as President, Khatami none-the-less carried wide-spread name recognition and solid credentials as a moderate.   His decision to run for office might also have breathed new life into a demoralized but anxious reformist movement.

In withdrawing, Khatami is expected to support Mir Hussein Mousavi – a fellow reformer and the last Prime Minister of Iran.  According to the Al Arabiya article, Mousavi manages to attract many conservative votes.  The necessity of these votes cannot go unsaid because it is widely considered that the reformist party alone will prove unable to beat Ahmadinejad at the ballot box.

Even should Mousavi manage to attract enough votes to present a threat with his cross-over appeal, he will still need to deal with either Ahmadinejad or Muhammad Bagher Qalibaf (the former Mayor of Tehran). 

It should be an interesting race – I’ll try to keep you updated.  At the end of the day I agree with the Al Arabiya article:

Analysts have said the fate of the race could depend on whether Ahmadinejad retains the support of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei…

Whoever earns or receives the blessing of Khamenei will most likely succeed Ahmadinejad to the Presidency (unless it is Ahmadinejad himself… in which case I doubt any change will occur).