Tactics vs. Strategy in Afghanistan Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at abumuqawama and registan.net, Josh Foust and Andrew Exum have posted a rather interesting exchange that examines the tactical efforts of the US military in Afghanistan. It's a fascinating debate between two smart people and one that I highly recommend.

But, and I mean this not to be insulting to either, it's a digression even diversion from the real issues regarding the current US mission in Afghanistan. To explain check out this quote from Andrew:

U.S. counterinsurgency operations at the tactical level were some of the best I had ever seen. Caveat lector, I do not know whether or not these improved tactics will yield a strategic effect. There are too many phenomena that we cannot even observe much less measure. And we still have a lot of known pains in our asses (like Afghan governance and sanctuaries in Pakistan) that could render tactical gains ephemeral.

It's good that Andrew makes this connection (because there seem to be a lot of folks who don't) but he's dramatically downplaying it's importance. In the end, it doesn't really matter how good the US military gets at counter-insurgency and it doesn't really matter if the Arghandab Valley is more secure than it was a year ago; particularly if the larger strategic impediments to success in Afghanistan remain in place. Indeed, our fetishization of tactical "successes" has become a distraction from our abundant strategic failures in Afghanistan.

Over the 18 months we've seen no evidence that the Afghan government is seriously interested in clamping down on corruption or is able to provide more effective governance for its citizens. We've seen no evidence that Pakistan has any interest in turning against the Afghan Taliban (in fact quite the opposite). We've seen little evidence that the ANSF will be able to take over from ISAF in providing security any time soon and the same goes for the police. And on the latter point, the lack of an effective judiciary system in the country tends to demonstrate how uselss a police force we are likely creating. All of this is happening while the clock is ticking on US engagement and NATO allies are becoming increasingly wary of their commitment to the fight in Afghanistan.

In short, from a strategic perspective we've seen very little progress on our larger objectives that are (and this is rather crucial) supposed to support the tactical gains that folks in the US military love to brag about. (And if I sound like a broken record on this point . . . it's because I am).

This is elemental to the success or failure of our mission and speak to the sustainability of our current operations. Indeed, if there are no guarantees that the ANSF can take over security in the Arghandab valley any time soon or that the government can provide vital services or that the spigot of fighters from Pakistan can be turned off . . . then all we doing here is "mowing the lawn."

The worst part of this is that by believing enhanced security in the Arghandab valley or elsewhere in southern and eastern Afghanistan is a metric of success not only distracts us from our real challenges, but it allows military commanders and in turn political leaders to resist needed shifts in strategy.

So for example, the recent "success" in killing Taliban insurgents is used, in part, as a justification for not embracing a more robust political strategy of reconciliation. Why should we if the enemy is on the run? We're winning, or so the story goes, and thus it's not a good time to open up a political channel or embrace confidence-building measures that might bring the Taliban to the table.  From this perspective, believing that we are winning tactically in Afghanistan is our greatest curse; in fact, it's the root of all our problems. You see, if we recognized we weren't winning, we might shift course a la surge 2007 in Iraq, but instead we see progress where there isn't and ignore the many signs of failure.

This brings me to the final point: Andrew's evoking of the Wire (aka the best TV show in history):

I use The Wire a lot to explain everything from Lebanese politics to counterinsurgency, and I would liken the U.S. Army to the character Ellis Carver: when we meet him in Season One, all he wants to do is kick ass and take names. By Season Five, though, he’s become a much smarter police officer. He’s taken the time to get to know the people he’s trying to protect and can thus better separate the bad guys from all the people just trying to get on with their lives.

We could spend a whole week making a connection between international affairs and the Wire, but I think this misses the crucial takeaway from the Wire. Carver is not a smart police officer . . . he is a tragic figure. He doesn't realize that knowing the neighborhood better and separating the bad guys from ordinary folk does not change the fundamental nature of the Drug War, which overwhelms all efforts at effective policing. 

You bust one corner boy, another one sprouts up; you take down a package, another comes in; you arrest a drug lord, guess what another one takes his place. Unless you try to change the very strategy a la Bunny Colvin and Hamsterdam, you're just spitting against the wind.

So if there is a lesson from the Wire it is that the tactical efforts of the cops is a waste of time and resources. It doesn't matter how good they get at their jobs because ultimately the game is the game . . and the game is rigged.

Sounds like Afghanistan, doesn't it?

Comments

[Chris]

Great post. Not to get too bogged down in analogies to The Wire, but Carver's maturation over the course of the series does include self-awareness of the permanence of The Game, beginning at the end of Season 4 after his failure to save Randy, and manifesting during Season 5, as evidenced by his bar conversation with Herc (ep. 7). What makes Carver a smart police officer AND a tragic figure is that he continues to work and mature despite knowing the permanence of The Game. His reprimand of Colicchio demonstrates Carver's philosophy that even though The Game will continue (and is rigged), policework still matters, and should be done well. Bringing this (overly?)extended analogy full-circle to Afghanistan, can't we acknowledge and praise tactical gains(good policework) while also acknowledging that the larger situation won't truly change without dealing with the larger strategic issues(The Game)?

I really like your metaphor of "mowing the lawn" for tactical successes (doing something worthwhile even though it won't last) but really don't like your metaphor of "spitting in the wind". Good tactics matter, even if they are impermanent.

[juicy couture]

the real issues regarding the current US mission in Afghanistan...

[Taylor Wray]

Good response by Chris above to a characteristically incisive post from Michael. I agree that American soldiering should still be done well, where it is done, but what if the effect is to prolong a misguided strategic engagement because of the appearance of success?

In metaphorical words, if successfully "mowing the lawn" keeps tricking generals/officials/media/the public into thinking that the rest of the yard work is finally going to get done once and for all, is it still worthwhile? I think Michael might agree with me that the answer is no.

It would actually be better to see more tactical failure, because that would lead to a quicker exit from a war that we've established is NOT in our national interest.

[best mp3 player]

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[ofis koltuklari]

Chinese probably need to cut back the number of active duty soldiers, but in order to do this the army would have to relinquish its role as a interna