President Barack Obama's well-crafted speech in Jakarta yesterday serves as a useful reminder of some of the early promise of his outreach to the Muslim communities of the world. Praise for his efforts has been rare ever since the crashing disappointment which followed the sky-high expectations raised by his Cairo speech. The litany of complaints is now familiar: failure to deliver on the Israeli-Palestinian peace or on Gaza, little visible follow-through in the months after the speech, the inability to close Guantanamo, escalating drone strikes, the impact of rampaging anti-Islam trends in U.S. domestic politics, and so on. I've made all those criticisms myself, and more. With public opinion surveys showing collapsing approval ratings for the United States in the Arab world and rampant media criticism of Obama's strategy, it's hard to find anyone willing to defend the administration's post-Cairo outreach.

But today it's worth stepping back and offering some praise. The administration has stuck with the president's clear commitment to restoring positive relations with the Muslims of the world despite all the setbacks, when it would have been really easy to give up or change course. And he has quietly made some real progress in many lower profile areas upon which the media doesn't focus. The president made clear yesterday that he understands -- perhaps better than his critics -- that "no single speech can eradicate years of mistrust." But, he went on: "I believed then, and I believe today, that we have a choice. We can choose to be defined by our differences, and give in to a future of suspicion and mistrust. Or we can choose to do the hard work of forging common ground." That quiet, long-term commitment may not be as exciting to the media as the peaks and valleys of high-stakes political battles, and isn't as revolutionary as the Cairo speech seemed to promise, but may ultimately be more important than today's headlines. If it works in terms of building robust and durable networks of interest with this rising generation of Muslims around the world, then we may wake up a decade from now extremely grateful for efforts which didn't seem noteworthy today.

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David Broder has raised some eyebrows with his bizarre Washington Post column arguing "with strong Republican support in Congress for challenging Iran's ambition to become a nuclear power, [Obama] can spend much of 2011 and 2012 orchestrating a showdown with the mullahs. This will help him politically because the opposition party will be urging him on. And as tensions rise and we accelerate preparations for war, the economy will improve." It should only be surprising to those who haven't been paying attention, though. Leaving aside the truly odd ideas about the economy, Broder is actually offering a warmed over, mainstream version of the argument coined in August by former Bush Middle East adviser Elliott Abrams that "the Obama who had struck Iran and destroyed its nuclear program would be a far stronger candidate, and perhaps an unbeatable one." Since then, each time the argument pops up I've tagged it on Twitter with "this idea was stupid enough when Elliott Abrams wrote it in August."

Broder's column is an interesting study in how really dumb ideas bounce around Washington D.C. Fortunately, it's not an idea that seems to have any support at all in the Obama White House. Unlike Abrams (who it's fair to assume does not wish Obama well in November 2012) and Broder (who... well, it's anyone's guess), the Obama team can see perfectly clearly that the American people have no appetite for a third major war in the Middle East and that launching a war with massive strategic consequences for short-term political gain would be epically irresponsible. They find this argument ridiculous. Even if they were primarily interested in their electoral fortunes in designing Iran policy, they would quickly see that such an Abrams-approved stratagem would wipe out their support on the left and gain absolutely zero votes on the right.

Now, I'm very worried that Obama's Iran strategy will lock the U.S. into ever more hawkish rhetoric which ties their hands and paves the way to future military confrontations. I think that serious people disagree about the likely effectiveness of sanctions or of diplomacy, and that all are struggling to find meaningful off-ramps in the glide towards ever more stringent and militarized regional containment. I worry about a lot on Iran policy. But this isn't one of the things that I worry about. I don't think that anyone in the Obama White House takes remotely seriously the epically bad Abrams-Broder advice to pursue military showdown with Iran for political advantage. This may offer an intriguing window into how Abrams thought about foreign policy in the Bush White House, and a depressing case study in the circulation of ideas in Washington, but it tells us nothing at all about how the Obama administration is thinking about Iran.

One year ago today, President Obama delivered a much anticipated speech in Cairo, Egypt in which he pledged "a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect." That new beginning seemed a long time ago this week, as Muslims expressed outrage over America's seeming support for Israel's naval commando attack on an aid convoy headed towards Gaza. It is no accident that the anniversary of Obama's speech has gone virtually unremarked in the Arab media this week, except for a few comments about unmet promises and some juxtaposition of that glorious moment with America's anemic response to Gaza. 

The President's spokesman, Robert Gibbs, told a press conference that he did not believe that the American position would have a great impact on Obama's relations with the Muslim communities of the world. Nothing could be further from the truth. If the Obama administration does not change its cautious approach quickly and forcefully address the blockade of Gaza which is the real heart of this week's scandal, it will confirm the crystallizing narrative of a President which either can not deliver on its promises or did not mean what he said. This would be a sad epitaph for the President's  carefully nurtured outreach to the Muslim world.

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The heavy focus on al Qaeda in the new AfPak strategy could complicate America's broader strategy of strategic public engagement with the Muslim world. The politics of the focus make perfect domestic sense, as Obama -- quite effectively, in a disappointingly Bush-like way -- tried to recapture the mantle of the "good war" and to focus American public attention on 9/11. And to the extent that this represents a limiting of American objectives, then I'm all for it. But the heavy focus on al Qaeda risks rescuing it from the position of marginality in Arab and Muslim politics to which it has largely been relegated over the last year --- and could end up strengthening the strategic threat of violent extremism even if it weakens al Qaeda Central.

I am not talking here about the much-discussed point that al Qaeda does not seem to actually be present in any significant way in Afghanistan. The argument here rests on claims that the goal is to prevent al Qaeda from returning to Afghanistan and that al Qaeda is so deeply interwoven with the various Talibans as to make the distinction meaningless. Both arguments are problematic -– but since both have been discussed elsewhere at some length, I won't dwell on them.

I am more concerned with an issue more in the areas where I focus: the relationship between al Qaeda Central and the broader network of affiliated movements (AQAM, in the lingo) and like-minded individuals (which me might call AQN, the al Qaeda Network). A key part of the Obama administration's strategy has been a very successful reorientation of America's relationship with the Muslim world, downplaying al Qaeda and refusing to allow that extremist fringe to hijack or monopolize those vital relationships. But the new focus on al Qaeda in the AfPak strategy threatens to reverse that vital achievement ... and even to revive al Qaeda's flagging fortunes in the wider Muslim world.

In part, this refects a debate which has been raging for years over the importance of AQC to the wider network of salafi-jihadist groups and individuals. The Obama administration's Afghanistan strategy seems to have taken one side in that debate –- but whether that is because it is correct, or because it is useful to justify an Afghan military strategy chosen for other reasons, is hugely important.

For Bruce Hoffmann and other "Centralists," al Qaeda Central continues to play an extremely important role in guiding, shaping, arming, and directing the seemingly inchoate network of jihadists. They point to evidence of contacts between the perpetrators of well-known cases and AQC affiliated people in Pakistan or elsewhere. They point to the deluge of AQ propaganda still pouring out of al-Sahab and other jihadist media outlets. On the other side, Marc Sageman and other "bunch of guys" analysts see the threat as primarily one of a very loosely affiliated network of like-minded individuals and organizations who neither need nor want direction from AQC. If AQC was needed as a spark to light the fire, it is no longer needed to keep the fires burning or new fires from breaking out when local conditions come together.

In reality both approaches likely have some degree of merit. AQC does still exist, does put out its propaganda, does try to shape and guide the jihad. But individuals and local organizations carry out their own analysis and planning, explode into action for their own private reasons, seek out and network with other like-minded people without being told to do so. A healthy strategy pays attention to both dimensions.

Clearly, the Obama administration does not intend to ignore the other areas of concern -– countering violent extremism across the spectrum and around the world. But the AfPak strategy puts a tremendous amount of resources into one side of the equation -– al Qaeda Central. This could only be justified if it were the case that AQC is in fact vitally important to the survival and efficacy of the broader jihadist challenge (AQAM and/or the AQN). The case here remains fairly weak, though. Even granted that they try to make a difference, it seems likely that were bin Laden and Zawahiri to be killed or brought to justice -– inshallah –- it is unlikely that this would materially affect the ideologically motivated actions of the pockets of salafi-jihadist mobilization around the world.

And all other things are not equal. The AfPak escalation may well increase the pressure on AQC –- especially if the Pakistanis can be brought more fully on board. But at the same time, it may well galvanize and strengthen the affiliated movements and like-minded individuals around the world. Affiliated movements may benefit from personnel or resources leaving the Afghan theater or Pakistani safe havens, and strengthen the capabilities of insurgencies in Yemen, North Africa, Somalia, Iraq or elsewhere.

And to the extent that the escalation angers Arab and Muslim public opinion, it could create a point of entry into mainstream attitudes which al Qaeda has largely lacked in recent years. It could reinforce the growing notion that Obama is no different from Bush, that the U.S. is waging a war against Islam, that moderation does not pay. This would resonate dangerously with the breakdown of Obama's efforts to push Israel towards a settlement freeze (especially if the Israeli-Palestinian front collapses into violence comparable to the 2000 al-Aqsa Intifada) or if tensions with Iran spike into military confrontation.

It is therefore absolutely vital that the Obama administration coordinate its AfPak strategy with its wider Middle East foreign policy and with its efforts at strategic public engagement with Arab and Muslim audiences. It needs to be sharply attuned to signs suggesting that its escalation in Afghanistan is restoring the ability of al Qaeda to appeal to the generalized "resistance" discourse which retains great sway with Arab public opinion. If it doesn't do that, then even a successful campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan against AQC may end up actually strengthening the wider challenge of violent extremism which it is ostensibly meant to defeat.

MANPREET ROMANA/AFP/Getty Images

By Marc Lynch

I thought Obama's speech on Iraq this afternoon was outstanding.It laid out a powerful rationale for the new policy, sent a very clear signal to Iraqis about American intentions, placed American policy firmly within the context of the Status of Forces Agreement negotiated with the Iraqi government, and embedded the policy effectively into its wider regional context.  I know that some on the left are worried about the 50,000 figure for the residual force and about the timeline, but I think those concerns are overblown.The plan Obama laid out today is entirely consistent with his campaign promises and -- more important -- is the right strategy for today's Iraq.

Here's what I liked:

• The very clear signal. "The drawdown of our military should send a clear signal that Iraq’s future is now its own responsibility."Obama stressed repeatedly and clearly that he was bringing the war to an end -- "Let me say this as plainly as I can: by August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end" -- and that all troops would leave Iraq in accord with the SOFA by December 31, 2011. Everything I've written over the last year has emphasized the importance of the clarity of this signal. This is more important than the specifics of the pace or number of troop withdrawals -- which are better handled by the military commanders and diplomats on the ground -- because it gets to shaping the political calculations of Iraqis and Iraq's neighbors. Obama did this extremely well today, taking pains to reiterate and to flag his signaling so that it could not be misinterpreted.
• Iraqi responsibility. Obama also did an outstanding job of framing the U.S. drawdown in terms of a shift to Iraqi responsibility: "The drawdown of our military should send a clear signal that Iraq’s future is now its own responsibility. The long-term success of the Iraqi nation will depend upon decisions made by Iraq’s leaders and the fortitude of the Iraqi people." This emphasis throughout the speech on the agency of Iraqis deserves particular attention and praise. Gone is the assumption that what happens in Iraq is all about America, that only the force of American will and material commitment matters.The future of Iraq is for Iraqis to decide, not Americans.
• Public diplomacy. Obama's decision to speak directly to the Iraqi people -- and not only to Iraqi leaders -- was brilliantly conceived and executed. His very clear statement that the U.S. had no aspirations on Iraqi territory or resources -- no permanent bases -- was pitch perfect. And I just really liked this frank, direct, respectful talk:

So to the Iraqi people, let me be clear about America’s intentions. The United States pursues no claim on your territory or your resources. We respect your sovereignty and the tremendous sacrifices you have made for your country. We seek a full transition to Iraqi responsibility for the security of your country. And going forward, we can build a lasting relationship founded upon mutual interests and mutual respect as Iraq takes its rightful place in the community of nations."

• Realistic goals. Last September Brian Katulis and I argued that "the United States will have to distinguish between those outcomes that are truly catastrophic and those that are simply suboptimal." Obama did so clearly today: "What we will not do is let the pursuit of the perfect stand in the way of achievable goals." This, combined with the emphasis on Iraqi responsibility, demonstrates a very healthy realism about the enterprise which has too often been lacking from American rhetoric.
• Respecting the SOFA. Obama referred repeatedly to the Status of Forces Agreement, which others have preferred to ignore or wish away.
• Regional context. He correctly placed Iraq within its wider regional context: "America can no longer afford to see Iraq in isolation from other priorities".His commitment to direct engagement with all Iraq's neighbors -- including Syria and Iran, singled out -- and higher expectations for their positive contributions fits well within his strategic vision for the region. With the Arab states unifying their ranks ahead of next month's Doha Summit, and Kuwait's Foreign Minister paying a historic visit to Baghdad today, I expect significant movement here in the near term.
• Refugees. I was heartened to hear Obama put such prominence on the issue of Iraq's displaced and refugees, and to define their plight as both a strategic interest and a moral responsibility for the United States.

No plan is perfect. I would like to have heard more about the pace of troop withdrawals, particularly in the early going. The role of the residual force could have been better explained. But I must say that I am far less concerned about the size of the residual forces than are others on the Left. Such a residual force was always a part of Obama's campaign platform, and -- more importantly -- is perfectly consistent with the Status of Forces Agreement, which does not require U.S. troops to leave until the end of 2011. Their mission will change, and they will play an important role in training and support for the Iraqi government and security forces. Nor am I at all bothered by the two month difference between the campaign promise and the timeline in the speech -- and can't imagine that anybody else is either.

Obama's speech today was all that I had hoped, especially after yesterday's conflicting reports. It very closely follows his campaign commitments.It maintains a clear timeline for withdrawal, and sends the clear, unambiguous signal that Iraqis and the region needed to hear while re-emphasizing America's commitment to engagement with the region. It puts Iraqis first and defines a normal, positive future relationship between governments and peoples. And it does this with a frank recognition of Iraq's continuing fragility and plethora of unresolved political fissures, and the tough road ahead. And most remarkable of all, he may even succeed in commanding a bipartisan and inter-agency consensus in support of this policy at home.

This speech is something for which I and many, many others have been waiting -- and working -- for a long, long time. There's much hard work to come, but the die is cast and the signal is clear.

Photo: MANDEL NGAN/AFP/Getty Images

It's impossible to exaggerate the symbolic importance of Barack Obama choosing an Arabic satellite television station for his first formal interview as President -- and of taking that opportunity to talk frankly about a new relationship with the Muslim world based on mutual respect and emphasizing listening rather than dictating. His interview promises a genuinely fresh start in the way the United States interacts with the Arab world and a new dedication to public diplomacy.

_{Obama on al-Arabiya (screen capture)}

In his conversation with the estimable Hisham Milhem (a good choice for an interlocutor), Obama reached out directly to the Arab public via the Saudi TV station al-Arabiya (which shrewdly posted the transcript immediately).  It signals the importance of the Middle East to the new President, his commitment to engaging on Arab-Israeli peace, his genuinely fresh thinking and new start with the Muslim world, and his recognition of the importance of genuine public diplomacy. 

I admit that I'm a little biased here. How can I not be thrilled that Obama has adopted the policy advice I've been offering since the publication of "Taking Arabs Seriously" in Foreign Affairs back in 2003? And in his first interview anywhere, less than a week into job, no less.  I have to admit it feels a bit odd to see an administration doing things right after all these years. But that said, credit should go where credit is due. I do think that this is an extremely significant gambit which signals his commitment to real public diplomacy, his engagement with Middle East issues (repudiating all the pundits expecting him to neglect foreign policy), and his ability to speak in a genuinely new way to the Muslim world.  

His remarks hit the sweet spot again and again.  He repeatedly emphasized his intention of moving past the iron walls of the 'war on terror' and 'clash of civilizations' which so dominated the Bush era.   "My job is to communicate to the Muslim world that the United States is not your enemy," Obama said, emphasizing as in his inaugural address that he is "ready to initiate a new partnership [with the Muslim world] based on mutual respect and mutual interest." And where so much of the Bush administration's 'public diplomacy' was about manipulating and lecturing, Obama begins -- as he should -- with listening: "what I told [Mitchell] is start by listening, because all too often the United States starts by dictating..so let's listen."

He clearly understands that this won't be easy, that there are real conflicts and obstacles and enemies. He obviously recognizes that the Gaza crisis and eight years of the Bush administration have left a heavy toll on America's reputation and credibility. He stressed the importance of engaging on Israeli-Arab issues right away, the need for new ideas and approaches, and the interrelationships among the region's issues that I've always seen as the key to his Middle East policy ("I do think that it is impossible for us to think only in terms of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and not think in terms of what's happening with Syria or Iran or Lebanon or Afghanistan and Pakistan. These things are interrelated.")

And above all, he understands that words are only the beginning, and that ultimately deeds and policy will determine Arab views of the United States. Public diplomacy is not about marketing a lousy policy -- it's about engaging honestly, publicly, and directly with foreign publics about those policies, explaining and listening and adjusting where appropriate.  Obama gets it:

"But ultimately, people are going to judge me not by my words but by my actions and my administration's actions. And I think that what you will see over the next several years is that I'm not going to agree with everything that some Muslim leader may say, or what's on a television station in the Arab world -- but I think that what you'll see is somebody who is listening, who is respectful, and who is trying to promote the interests not just of the United States, but also ordinary people who right now are suffering from poverty and a lack of opportunity. I want to make sure that I'm speaking to them, as well."

 I couldn't have written this script better myself.

Arabs are both impressed and skeptical.  As one prominent Jordanian blogger commented,

" I agree that, generally, Americans are not the enemy of the Muslim world. However, I’m just not sure how to classify those Americans who have big guns, big tanks and big jets that occupy a neighboring country and have a habit of killing a lot of its people. Or, at least, the Americans who sell those big guns, big tanks and big jets to other people that occupy another neighboring country and have a habit of killing a lot of its people."

I will update with additional Arab reaction as it begins to pour in (it's a day too soon for editorials, for the most part there are only a few straightforward news reports like this one in Jordan's al-Ghad). 

Three other important points which have thus far been missed in the general commentary:

• This is also outreach to Saudi Arabia.  Al-Arabiya is the Saudi contestant in the Arab media wars, and scoring the first interview with Obama is a major coup. It has lost a lot of ground because of Gaza, and this will help it regain some buzz.  After the initial perceived snub of the Saudis, Obama has now had a much-hyped phone call with King Abdullah and now given the Saudi al-Arabiya his first interview. Feathers have been smoothed in Riyadh.

• Not al-Jazeera.  Granting the first interview to al-Jazeera would have reached a much larger audience, and would have been more daring -- like going on to Fox News instead of MSNBC. Bush administration officials almost always used al-Arabiya on those rare occasions when they wanted to talk to the Arab public, so this isn't a change. That said, there will be time for al-Jazeera down the road, and I hope Obama doesn't shy away from that challenge. 

• Not al-Hurra. Wouldn't it be nice if the United States had its own Arabic-language satellite television station to present such exclusive, desirable interviews?  Oh, wait... the U.S. has spent half a billion dollars on one which nobody watches. Forget the Broadcasting Board of Governor's endlessly optimistic presentation of fabulous increases in al-Hurra's audience and market share. Obama's choice to give his ground-breaking interview to the Saudi al-Arabiya and not to the American al-Hurra is as clear a statement as it is possible to make of al-Hurra's failure. It's time to face the facts and clean house to recoup some of that investment.

More to come, no doubt. This is only a start and won't solve anything on it's own, but this is simply an outstanding way to start transforming the American engagement with the Arab world. Well done.

UPDATE:  in light of its relevance to Obama's outreach to Arab television, Foreign Affairs has made the full text of my 2003 article available online for free.  Thanks!

A reported two million people watched Barack Obama's inauguration today.  I, unfortunately, wasn't one of them. If you don't care why, and just want foreign policy blogging, skip the rest of this post and come back tomorrow.

See, I went to the show with a few friends who received excellent Purple tickets as a reward for untold hours volunteering as foreign policy advisers for the Obama campaign.  We got down to the security checkpoint for the Purple section bright and early (I left home at 4 AM), and were guided into a long tunnel which had been closed to traffic.  We waited in line for nearly four hours, in a claustrophobic tunnel with no porta-potties, no food or drink, and not a single official or volunteer in sight.  Finally, we got within sight of the Purple Gate -- only to find that it had been closed.  Thousands of people in front of us hadn't gotten in (not that anyone bothered to tell the people languishing in the tunnel that the gate had been closed, mind you). Thousands of purple ticket holders were behind us.  It's remarkable that there wasn't a riot.  I rode the metro home with a lot of people who had been turned away, including an elderly African-American woman muttering over and over to herself that it had been one of the worst experiences of her life.

Searching for a foreign policy angle so that it isn't just my own bitter rant (and can be justified on FP.com)...

Maybe it's a metaphor for how foreign policy advisers to the Obama campaign feel -- thrown out into the cold, shunted into a dismal and dank tunnel, abandoned without any communication, and ultimately locked out of the show.

Or maybe the Israelis could study the experience to learn how to stop the Gaza tunnels -- give every Hamas member a Purple ticket.

Either way, I just hope that Obama runs his foreign policy more effectively than the inaugural committee ran the ticketed sections today.   What a dismal way to begin the new era.  Bleah.  I hope it was a great speech.

UPDATE:  okay, enough whining (though I see I'm not the only one)... looks like it was indeed a great speech. I liked this part:

To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect.  To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict, or blame their society's ills on the West - know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy.  To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist. 

Onward.... 

UPDATE 2:  join the Facebook page "Survivors of the Purple Tunnel of Doom" here.. I didn't start it, I swear! Maybe if it gets big enough we can get someone to explain how they managed to give out thousands more tickets than they had room for, why they had absolutely no crowd control or support, and why they didn't have a backup plan.  Not the biggest issue in the world, I know, but first had to take care of the world I know...

THE UPDATE THAT WON'T END (sort of like the tunnel):

_{Inside the tunnel: note the absence of any officials or order, and imagine a stampede.}

The Facebook group is already over 100 150 strong, with comments pointing out the unbelievable security risks posed by putting thousands of unscreened people into a tunnel... with no security, no paramedics, no officials with walkie-talkies. With Gaza in ruins it seems absurd to continue complaining, but still... someone's got some explaining to do. People traveled from far away, many at great expense, because they thought they had guaranteed tickets. And there were an awful lot of Obama campaign staffers and volunteers in that section. The police chief lied bald-faced to the Washington Post ("There's nobody that didn't get to see the inauguration today who had a ticket") and had to reverse himself. They and we are all incredibly lucky there wasn't a stampede.

REALLY LAST ONE:  over 1650 members of the Facebook group now, and some media attention... but no real satisfaction (though this apology is a start). For the record, the Obama foreign policy adviser analogy was just an analogy, not for serious!