US Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns is Retiring

Deputy US Secretary of State William Burns is retiring from the Foreign Service this year. His career has been a distinguished and varied one, but no small part of it dealt with the Middle East. Although the linked article does not mention it, he served as Ambassador to Jordan (where I crossed paths with him a time or two), and also (which is mentioned) as Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs. He also was Ambassador to Russia, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and most recently was Under Secretary, only the  second career Foreign Service Officer to hold that post; most recently he handled the backchannel contacts through Oman that led to the US-Iran nuclear talks. Bill Burns has had a distinguished career, though many Americans won't no his name, and he will be missed. I suspect though, we'll be hearing more from him in retirement.

Profile of Saeed Jalili

Laura Rozen at Al-Monitor's The Back Channel has a profile of Saeed Jalili, the Iranian National Security Council chief, nuclear negotiator and now, Presidential candidate. Since many believe that Jalili is the favored candidate of Ayatollah Khamenei, he may prove to be someone we all need to get to know.

Obama Nominates Ambassador Deborah K. Jones of MEI as Ambassador to Libya

President Obama today announced that he is nominating Ambassador Deborah K. Jones as the next US Ambassador to Libya, replacing the late Ambassador Chris Stevens. Ambassador Jones, who is the former US Ambassador to Kuwait and has served throughout the Middle East, has most recently been serving as Scholar-in-Residence here at the Middle East Institute.. Her MEI bio is here. Let me join the rest of MEI in congratulating our colleague on this appointment.

Ambassador Chamberlain on Diplomacy after Benghazi

MEI President Wendy Chamberlin has a piece on "After Benghazi: Diplomacy with a State; War Within," which deserves your attention. It also appears at The Huffington Post.

The Cairo Embassy Attack

The attack on the US Embassy in Cairo today, and the raising of a Jihadist flag (a black flag with the Muslim shahada), raises a lot of questions. The supposed provocation — a reputed anti-Islamic film about the Prophet — obviously has no official US support and appears to have been used to rally popular fury; in fact it seems to be a fringe product which will now draw far more attention than it otherwise would have. The identity of all the attackers is not yet clear, but Muhammad al-Zawahiri (brother of Ayman) and other radical Salafis are claiming credit.

I'll have more if more becomes known, but it seems likely that this will harm the image of Muslims in US opinion far more than a fringe film could have done. The fact that a US flag was burned raises questions about the Embassy's protection, both by Egyptian police and the Marine contingent. It appears that Egypt's Salafis — who have also stormed the Israeli Embassy and tried to storm Syria's — are testing their strength.

For the Fourth: The First to Recognize US Independence: The Sultan of Morocco

Blogging may be light today as I work from home on Fridays and my family is already shifting into Fourth of July weekend mode, but in honor of the Fourth I figured it's about time to bring up one important piece of historical trivia: Who was the first country in the world to recognize the independence of the United States?

Most Americans would probably say France, but King Louis and his ministers waited until 1778, after the Battles of Saratoga, to ally with the presumptuous young republic. As early as December 1776 a visiting American brig flying the new American flag received a salute from the local commander of the Dutch Island of St. Eustatius in the Caribbean, which gives the Dutch some bragging rights (and gave Barbara Tuchman a title for her book on the birth of the US Navy, The First Salute), but which was not recognition by the Dutch Home Government, which eventually followed France.

A frequent  claimant, accepted by the US State Department and the US Embassy in Morocco, is Morocco. Yes, we may have been recognized as independent by an Arab country before any other.

The Sultan, Sidi Muhammad bin ‘Abdullah, issued a declaration on December 20, 1777, announcing that all vessels sailing under the American flag could freely enter Moroccan ports. That declaration may not have explicitly recognized independence, but multiple declarations were subsequently issued and a French merchant in Salé (next to Rabat) named Caille, who acted as consul for many governments, wrote several letters to the Continental Congress and the US Agent in Paris, one Benjamin Franklin (you may have heard of him). These increasingly recognized the US as a sovereign entity. Finally somebody noticed:

When Franklin wrote to the committee on Foreign Affairs in May 1779, he reported he had received two letters from a Frenchman who "offered to act as our Minister with the Emperor" and informed the American commissioner that "His Imperial Majesty wondered why we had never sent to thank him for being the first power on this side of the Atlantic that had acknowledged our independence and opened his ports to us." Franklin, who did not mention the dates of Caille's letters or when he had received them, added that he had ignored these letters because the French advised him that Caille was reputed to be untrustworthy. Franklin stated that the French King was willing to use his good offices with the Sultan whenever Congress desired a treaty and concluded, "whenever a treaty with the Emperor is intended, I suppose some of our naval stores will be an acceptable present and the expectation of continued supplies of such stores a powerful motive for entering into and continuing a friendship."

Finally, in December 1780, three years after the first gesture, the Congress sent its first official communication to the Sultan:

We the Congress of the 13 United States of North America, have been informed of your Majesty's favorable regard to the interests of the people we represent, which has been communicated by Monsieur Etienne d'Audibert Caille of Sale [Salé], Consul of Foreign nations unrepresented in your Majesty's states. We assure you of our earnest desire to cultivate a sincere and firm peace and friendship with your Majesty and to make it lasting to all posterity. Should any of the subjects of our states come within the ports of your Majesty's territories, we flatter ourselves they will receive the benefit of your protection and benevolence. You may assure yourself of every protection and assistance to your subjects from the people of these states whenever and wherever they may have it in their power. We pray your Majesty may enjoy long life and uninterrupted prosperity.

This all led, after negotiations between Thomas Jefferson in Paris and John Adams in London (you may have heard of them, too) with representatives authorized to speak for Morocco, to the dispatch of the US Consul in Paris, Thomas Barclay, to Morocco, resulting in a Treaty of Friendship and Amity in 1786, known as the Treaty of Marrakesh. It pledged friendship but required no US payment of tribute, as other "Barbary" states often demanded. This was still in the Confederation Period and preceded the US Constitution. The US Embassy in Morocco tells the rest:

Barclay and the Moroccans quickly reached agreement on the Treaty of Friendship and Amity. Also called the Treaty of Marrakech, it was sealed by the Emperor on June 23 and delivered to Barclay to sign on June 28. In addition, a separate ship seals agreement, providing for the identification at sea of American and Moroccan vessels, was signed at Marrakech on July 6,1786. Binding for 50 years, the Treaty was signed by Thomas Jefferson at Paris on January 1, 1787, and John Adams at London on January 25, 1787, and was ratified by Congress on July 18, 1787. The negotiation of this treaty marked the beginning of diplomatic relations between the two countries and it was the first treaty between any Arab, Muslim, or African State and the United States.

Congress found the treaty with Morocco highly satisfactory and passed a note of thanks to Barclay and to Spain for help in the negotiations. Barclay had reported fully on the amicable negotiations and written that the king of Morocco had "acted in a manner most gracious and condescending, and I really believe the Americans possess as much of his respect and regard as does any Christian nation whatsoever." Barclay portrayed the King as "a just man, according to this idea of justice, of great personal courage, liberal to a degree, a lover of his people, stern" and "rigid in distributing justice." The Sultan sent a friendly letter to the President of Congress with the treaty and included another from the Moorish minister, Sidi Fennish, which was highly complimentary of Barclay.

The United States established a consulate in Morocco in 1797. President Washington had requested funds for this post in a message to Congress on March 2, 1795, and James Simpson, the U.S. Consul at Gibraltar who was appointed to this post, took up residence in Tangier 2 years later. Sultan Sidi Muhammad's successor, Sultan Moulay Soliman, had recommended to Simpson the establishment of a consulate because he believed it would provide greater protection for American vessels. In 1821, the Moroccan leader gave the United States one of the most beautiful buildings in Tangier for its consular representative. This building served as the seat of the principal U.S. representative to Morocco until 1956 and is the oldest piece of property owned by the United States abroad.

Of course all of this can't possibly have happened, because all Middle East countries are creations of the colonial era after World War I, right? I'm sure I heard that somewhere. Actually, Sultan Sidi Muhammad was a direct ancestor of King Muhammad VI.

In 1790 the first American vessel called in Oman. US merchants were active in the Eastern Mediterranean even before missionaries were, and by the early 1800s we'd fought wars with the "Barbary States," landed on the "Shores of Tripoli," but also started to explore trade opportunities in Constantinople, Alexandria, Beirut and other places. Americans were welcome then, because unlike the Europeans, they clearly had no imperial ambitions. I'll refrain from obvious comments about how we've changed our approach.

 Here, from Wikipedia, is a letter of George Washington to the Sultan (click to enlarge):
 

So, In the Name of the Sultan of Morocco and the Continental Congress (to misquote Ethan Allen considerably), I wish you a happy Fourth of July weekend. Even my British readers, if you don't mind; after all you haven't burned Washington for 198 years now.

I will post if, as seems unfortunately probable, Friday produces major developments, but wanted to get my Fourth of July post on record.

And the Winner is . . . Someone Who Wasn't Running

Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil ElAraby has been elected the new Secretary-General of the Arab League, which is interesting since, until just before the vote, he hadn't been a candidate. By tradition, the Secretary-General comes from the host country, which means all have been Egyptian, except for one Tunisian when the League was headquartered in Tunis after Egypt's expulsion due to its peace with Israel. But Egypt's candidate this time, Mustafa al-Fiqi, was seen as a symbol of the old regime, and many Egyptians opposed the nomination. Qatar fielded a rival candidate, but at the eleventh hour, Egypt announced that Fiqi was withdrawing and that ElAraby would be its candidate; the Qatari withdrew and the deal was done.

ElAraby is a former diplomat with a distinguished career and widely admired in the region; he has also shown a new emphasis in his few weeks as Foreign Minister, being more critical of Israel and seeking openings with Iran.

Qatar Recognizes the Libyan Rebels

Qatar, so far the only Arab country patrolling the Libyan no-fly zone, has become the first Arab country to recognize the Libyan rebel council as the sole representative of the Libyan people. Qatar will also assist in marketing oil from eastern Libya.

Qatar has always pursued a maverick and distinct foreign policy in the Arab world, and this is in keeping with that.

Richard Holbrooke

I didn't post anything yesterday about the death of Richard Holbrooke, mostly because the Egypt Wikileaks and my Winter issue kept me busy enough. So I'm literally a day late and probably a dollar short as well. I'll keep it brief since most of it's already been said.

His major involvement in our region has been as the Obama Administration's AfPak envoy, on the civilian side. So much of the appreciation (and video of a Holbrooke speech) posted by Foreign Policy may be a bit out of theater for my readers. Abu Muqawama's brief post is more to our point, perhaps.

You may well have heard, as has been widely reported, that his last words to his doctors before going into surgery were reportedly "You've got to stop this war in Afghanistan." I think that's a fitting epitaph for a veteran diplomat, so I'll give him the last word.

Wikileaks and Potential Blowback in the Arab World

I'm not going to try to get deeply into the whole Wikileaks issue, but the release of a huge collection of US diplomatic cables clearly has policy implications in the Middle East. There's more than enough commentary on the overall diplomatic embarrassment caused, and on the question of how to stop these sorts of leaks. And I certainly haven't read all 250,000 cables, but the ones spotlighted so far seem more embarrassing than revelatory. But the issue has some region-specific implications in the Arab world.

Issandr El Amrani and Marc Lynch both address this issue today. As Issandr notes:

There is so much information flowing around about US policy — and often, a good deal of transparency — that a smart observer with good contacts can get a good idea of what's happening. Not so in the Arab world, and the contents of the conversations Arab leader are having with their patron state are not out in the Arab public domain or easily guessable, as anyone who reads the meaningless press statements of government press agencies will tell you. Cablegate is in important record from the Arab perspective, perhaps more than from the US one.

Lynch echoes this and then raises a key dilemma for the Arab media:

But, as Issandr el-Amrani pointed out earlier today, the real impact may well be in the Arab world, where rulers go to great lengths to keep such things secret. The Arab media thus far is clearly struggling to figure out how to report them, something I'll be following over the next week. One of the points which I've made over and over again is that Arab leaders routinely say different things in private and in public, but that their public rhetoric is often a better guide to what they will actually do since that reflects their calculation of what they can get away with politically. Arab leaders urged the U.S. to go after Saddam privately for years, but wouldn't back it publicly for fear of the public reaction. It's the same thing with Iran over the last few years, or with their views of the Palestinian factions and Israel. But now those private conversations are being made public, undeniably and with names attached.

So here's the million dollar question: were their fears of expressing these views in public justified? Let's assume that their efforts to keep the stories out of the mainstream Arab media will be only partially successful -- and watch al-Jazeera here, since it would traditionally relish this kind of story but may fear revelations about the Qatari royal family. Extremely important questions follow. Will Arab leaders pay any significant political price for these positions, as they clearly feared? Or will it turn out that in this era of authoritarian retrenchment they really can get away with whatever diplomatic heresies they like even if it outrages public opinion? Will the publication of their private views lead them to become less forthcoming in their behavior in order to prove their bona fides -- i.e. less supportive of containing or attacking Iran, or less willing to deal with Israel? Or will a limited public response to revelations about their private positions lead them to become bolder in acting on their true feelings? Will this great transgression of the private/public divide in Arab politics create a moment of reckoning in which the Arab public finally asserts itself... or will it be one in which Arab leaders finally stop deferring to Arab public opinion and start acting out on their private beliefs?

All countries are more candid in private diplomatic exchanges than in public statements, of course; that's why diplomatic exchanges are not published until years after the fact. But the disconnect between public positions and private assessments is usually not as great in the West, where there is plenty of public debate about policy issues, as in the Arab world. (There are exceptions; the release of the Pentagon Papers during the Vietnam War showed such a divergence between public statements and actual policy as to provoke scandal.) But the culture of secrecy in the West is nowhere near as pervasive as in the Middle East, where even things that are well-known are routinely denied.

One of the most-headlined revelations, that Saudi Arabia is so concerned about Iran that it urged a US attack, is not a huge revelation to most Westerners who follow the region, but it no doubt comes as a surprise to many Saudis, since it doesn't reflect official statements. Certain realities that "everybody knows" or at least suspects, may not in fact be known to Arab populations back home. Some things, especially surreptitious cooperation with Israel, are absolutely taboo and always resolutely denied. Exact details of military cooperation with the United States are equally sensitive, even if details are easily learned from US military veterans returning home.

The US has always honored these local sensitivities, and thus certain questions remain unanswered. Certain aspects of the US air war against Iraq in 2003 have never been fully documented because of sensitivity over where the sorties originated. The Wikileaks documents apparently address the not-so-secret US role in air strikes in Yemen, also never publicly acknowledged.

As Lynch notes, the Arab media face a dilemma here: secrets that were fairly openly known in the West have just been publicly released, with names and direct quotes. Some in the West may say, "Oh, I knew that already, or strongly suspected it." But what in the past was coolly denied is more credible when a Ruler is being quoted by a US Ambassador. The tendency to distrust the US and question its reliability as a partner may be the first instinctive response. While the excessive culture of secrecy in the Arab world is easy to deplore, it is, for now, a fact of life in the diplomacy of the region. The harm created by these leaks is less likely to be a direct unraveling of policy than a growing unwillingness of diplomatic partners to confide their true thoughts for fear of reading them in the newspapers.

Diplomacy: It's Hard to Keep Track of What's PC

As Barbie supposedly might have said, Diplomacy is Hard: Let's Go Shopping. Apparently Fidel Castro recently said some nice things about Israel in an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic. Binyamin Netanyahu, who's not getting a lot of good press at the moment, apparently praised this, and President Shimon Peres sent a thank-you note of sorts.

Oops. The incoming Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, now that the Republicans have taken the House, is Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), a longtime staunch supporter of Israel but, trumping that, a Havana-born Cuban-American who represents Miami's Little Havana, so she sent Bibi word that, as much as she loves Israel, she hates Castro more. Netanyahu has now clarified his position: he only agrees with Castro when he praises Israel, not for any of that other stuff.

Glad we cleared that up.

Former Egyptian FM Ahmed Maher

Former Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher has died of a heart attack at age 75. President Mubarak led the funeral today.

In addition to serving as Foreign Minister 2001-2005, his diplomatic career included Ambassadorships to Moscow and Washington. He served in the then Soviet Union during its dissolution, and as Ambassador to the US from 1992 to 1999. He seemed both effective and approachable during his Washington tenure. His brother ‘Ali, also a diplomat, served as Ambassador to France.

Both men were grandsons of Ahmed Maher Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt in 1944-45, who was assassinated on the floor of Parliament.

The Ayalon-Prince Turki Handshake

We're still digging out here from the big storm and the Federal Government (and MEI which follows the Feds) will be closed tomorrow, though I'll be posting here. First though, in case you missed it, one of the big subjects of discussion in the region is the handshake at a security conference in Munich between Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Dany Ayalon and Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal (former head of Saudi Intelligence, former Ambassador to London, former Ambassador to the US — and he was a year ahead of me at Georgetown). Here's Ha'aretz here, Kuwait's Al-Qabas here, Jerusalem Post here, and Prince Turki's explanation of the handshake to the Saudi Arab News here.

It's in the first six or seven seconds of this YouTube video; Turki is obviously seated in the front row and Ayalon is on his way to join the panel.

Hmm...Is Something Happening? Maybe Even a Diplomatic Hat Trick?

I'm most likely grasping at straws again, but there seem to be several little threads that could, for an optimist, augur for good on the Iranian, Syrian, and even Israeli-Palestinian fronts. Consider the evidence:

Iran

On the literal eve of the Western talks with Iran, Ahmadinejad says Iran would allow a third party to enrich uranium to the levels it requires. (Is this good or bad: Iran gets enriched uranium but doesn't need to spend the money to enrich it?) More to the point, the US allowed Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki to swing through Washington and Iran's interest section.

19.75% is generally considered far too low in U-235 to have utility in weapons, though theoretically anything above 20% can cause mischief. The usual standard for "weapons grade" is 85%, though Little Boy at Hiroshima was 80% and that seemed to be enough.

I don't know enough about the technical side and I suppose the real concern would be that Iran would further enrich after the 19.75% enriched uranium was returned to them. But this seems to a non-physicist to be a positive sign on the eve of the talks (literally the eve since they start today) and this sends a different message from the rather in-your-eye message sent by the long-range missile tests on Yom Kippur.

And here's a Reuters report (from a Qatari paper in this case) that suggests even the Israeli leadershp is ratcheting down the rhetoric on Iran.

Syria

Right on top of Josh Landis' positive post of the other day (and my earlier comments here) came word that the Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister was coming to Washington, the highest ranking Syrian official to come in five years. No word on outcomes yet, but a better sign than the many negative stories of recent vintage.

Palestine

I didn't even comment on Khalid Misha‘al's positive comments about the latest reconciliation proposals. I thought Marc Lynch did his usual skillful job of commenting on it, right down to the extremely cautious optimism but desire to actually see something happen. But it's long been clear that there's no future for Palestinian-Israeli talks until Palestine gets its two separated parts together again, and that means finding a modus vivendi between Fatah and Hamas. Note, though, that the positive signs are coming not from the Gaza leadership (though not contradicted by them), but from the Damascus leadership, primarily Mish‘al himself. That's a good sign. A whole lot can still go wrong. But it's one more straw to grasp at, and there seems to be movement on the Gilad Shalit issue between Hamas and Israel as well.

The Middle East is full of false starts and aborted initiatives. I won't be opening any champagne any time soon. But each of these three developments seems to move a little closer to actual compromise on issues of potentially great explosive force.

More Signs of Back-Channel Diplomacy

A piece in Al-Masry al-Youm noting that the Qatari Prime Minister has met with Omar Suleiman under Saudi auspices in an attempt to patch things up between Qatar and Egypt. (The Qatari PM, who is also Foreign Minister, is quoted as saying that there are no tensions between Egypt and Qatar, and they're all Egypt's fault. Go figure.)

But this is yet another sign that while we've all been focused on Iran these past two weeks, the back channels have been busy. The Saudis and Syrians are trying to reconcile; Lebanon is forging a new government; the US and Syria are moving towards normalization; and the Gilad Shalit situation is possibly on the verge of resolution. I won't even link to the previous posts; just scroll down for the last couple of days to find them.

In the two weeks since the Iranian elections we have all, justifiably, been focused on Tehran. But there is clearly movement elsewhere. Whether we are on the verge of some sort of breakthrough is hard to say: I've been around the Middle East too long to indulge in excessive optimism. But back-channel diplomacy seems to be producing some results.

US Said to Be Sending Ambassador to Syria

CNN is reporting that the US will name an Ambassador to Syria soon. That, I think, is good news, and perhaps the first fruit of George Mitchell's mission, (though I'm sure neither he nor his senior staffers are among the "senior Administration officials" leaking the news). The US recalled its previous ambassador, Margaret Scobey (now Ambassador to Egypt) in 2005 after the Hariri assassination. The Embassy has been headed by a chargé ever since, though Syria kept Ambassador-level representation in Washington.

While expressing US outrage over the Hariri assassination made sense, the idea that George Mitchell is supposed to be negotiating with Syria and Israel when we don't have an Ambassadorial-rank representative in Damascus full time does not. It will be interesting to see whether the designee is a professional Foreign Service Officer or someone else; there've been rumors that one of Mitchell's people might get the job.

Multiple Arab Diplomatic Offensives

Marc Lynch blogged recently about the multi-faceted efforts at Arab reconciliation diplomacy we've been witnessing lately. His post provides an excellent overview and by following his links one can fill in much of the background, but I thought I'd add a few comments of my own.

On the Hamas-Israel front, a snag seems to have emerged in the past day or two. Many press reports had suggested that today (Wednesday) would be the day a prisoner exchange/ceasefire deal was announced. So far as one can tell from press reports, the Egyptians thought they had a deal in place, but the Israeli security cabinet was insisting on some linkages that weren't part of the deal as negotiated. It is of course clear that Hamas' primary goal is a ceasefire to stop continuing Israeli air strikes, and a lifting of the siege of Gaza; it's just as clear that Israel's goal is an enforeceable end to the rocket fire and the release of Gilad Shalit. But these deals are often hostage to last-minute conditions, and for whatever reason the Israelis seem to want to avoid linking the prisoner exchange with lifting the siege. Of course, there's the obvious fact that Israel is in political limbo; the incumbent Olmert government is negotiating the deal; the Foreign Minister is one of the candidates for Prime Minister; the opposition wants to lead the next government; and the Defense Minister has just seen his party drop to fourth place. Not an ideal moment for critical compromises. The fact that the Israelis are negotiating with Hamas (via Egypt) while everyone insists they are not negotiating with Hamas adds an Alice-through-the-looking-glass aspect to it as well.

On the other key Palestinian issue the Egyptians are trying to broker, some sort of deal between Hamas and Fatah seems more necessary than ever, since any remediation of Gaza's predicament would seem to need an interlocutor with which the outside world is willing to deal, and that means Fatah, though given Hamas' popular strength, a unity government that includes Hamas is necessary. There are still a lot of obstacles to this and, like the Hamas-Israel deal, it can easily come unraveled.

This, I think, is where the Saudi and Arab League openings to Syria are key. Syria's alignment with Iran has been a theme running through so many regional issues: Hamas versus Fatah, the Lebanese political situation, Saudi and Egyptian geopolitical concerns about Iran's nuclear program and regional meddling. Syria, which historically boasted of being "the beating heart of Arabism," has been aligned with Iran against much of the Arab world, but that has in part been because it was excluded by its fellow Arabs.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the two big Arab players, both have shrewd diplomats with geopolitical savvy, and they seem to be committed to bringing Syria back into the Arab fold. And for all the uncertain signals coming out of the Obama Administration so far, the opening to Syria seems to be the least unambiguous. John Kerry is going to Damascus and Bashar al-Asad is sending very positive signals. Not only has Asad continued to express a willingness to cut a peace deal with Israel (albeit on terms the Israeli right may reject), but he continued to express such willingness right through the Gaza campaign, when much of the rest of the Arab world was expressing outrage. How's that for an unclenched fist?

A whole lot can go wrong with all this. The Hariri assassination commission starts meeting in the Hague March 1, and Syria could find itself being asked to hand over senior officials and find itself ostracized again just as it is trying to build bridges. Any real progress on an Israel-Syria deal will be hard if Netanyahu forms a hard-right government. The fact that the Shalit-ceasefire exchange deal seems to be hanging fire is a reminder that breakthroughs are not easy in such a longstanding and complex conflict. But a lot does seem to be happening,m a sort of diplomatic offensive tous azimuts, and thus perhaps a moment of opportunity, not to concentrate on a comprehensive peace but to move towards amerlioration of the situation on the ground in Gaza and a ceasefire that might hold for a finite time.