March 10-11, 1917: General MaudeTakes Baghdad

Following the Second Battle of Kut, in February, the renewed British advance on Baghdad paused

Maude

only briefly. General Frederick Maude (who had been the last man off the beach at Gallipoli), continuing to show far more speed than his predecessors, advanced to ‘Aziziyya, paused there, and on March 5 began his final approach to Baghdad.

The British had been uncertain about the value of taking Baghdad due to its limited strategic value but eventually saw it as a symbolic goal; in addition it was seen as a way to close a pincer on the Turks with British advances from Baghdad and Russia pushing south from Mosul. That was not to be: at this same moment the February (March New Style) Revolution was under way in Petrograd.

Khalil Pasha

The defense of Baghdad was commanded by the hero of the 1916 victory at Kut, Khalil Pasha, who was the uncle of Ottoman Minister of War Enver Pasha and was both governor of Baghdad and Commander of the Ottoman Sixth Army. After the war he would take the surname Kut from his victory and be known under the Turkish Republic as Halil Kut. He had the Turkish XIII and XVIII Corps defending the Baghdad region.

Maude marched his main force up the east bank of the Tigris, arriving March 8 at the banks of its big tributary the Diyala. With the Turks defending the opposite banks of the Diyala, Maude moved most of his force downstream and crossed to the west bank of the Tigris. Detecting the movement (both sides had aircraft now with Germans flying for the Turks), Khalil moved most of his force to the west bank, leaving one regiment on the Diyala. The British soon pushed this aside, and Khalil, facing British advances on both banks, resolved on a retreat from Baghdad. By the evening of March 10, the Ottoman evacuation of Baghdad was under way, with no major battle having been fought.

On the next day, March 11, the British and Indian forces entered Baghdad. The northward advance would be put on hold after Baghdad as the war unfolded on other fronts. Photo of Maude entering Baghdad on March 11, 1917:

Conquest of Western Mosul Gathers Speed

In the past two days, Iraqi Security Forces and their allies have made significant advances against Islamic State forces in western Mosul. Reports suggest senior IS leaders have already left Mosul for Raqqa. Although there is a sense of collapsing resistance, the narrow streets of the old city could still provide ample opportunity for hard fighting.

As the two maps below indicate, after crossing the Tigris and seizing the airport, Iraqi forces have steadily advanced northward, and have now taken the government center. Though the advance may slow in the old city, a key symbolic target will likely be the Great Mosque, where IS "Caliph" Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was proclaimed. Baghdadi is believed to have fled, perhaps to Raqqa, where allied forces are already maneuvering for the final assault.

Institute for the Study of War

Iraqi Joint Operations Command

Tables Turned: Will Civilians in Western Mosul Fare Better than Civilians in Eastern Aleppo?

The US and Western Allies were highly outspoken about the siege and bombing of civilians as Syrian regime forces closed in on eastern Aleppo, barring relief convoys and barrel-bombing civilian neighborhoods.

Now we may be witnessing a looking-glass parallel as another major urban area faces a potential siege and house-to-house fighting as another major city, Mosul, faces an offensive by the Iraqi Army and its Iranian and Shi‘ite militia allies, backed by US Special Forces and air power.

I am not suggesting an equivalency, moral, military or otherwise, but conquering a densely populated city where defenders are prepared to fight house by house and street by street is no easy matter, and even if we assume that "our" side is above such things, given the motley crew of "allies," including Iranian Guards Corps units, casualties may be high.

I merely raise the issue.

Second Act in Mesopotamia: the Second Battle of Kut, February 23-24, 1917

We stopped following the centennial of the British Mesopotamian campaign in World War I after General Townshend's disastrous surrender of British and Indian troops at Kut in April 1916. The twin shocks of Gallipoli and Kut stalled British efforts in the Middle East for much of the rest of 1916, despite a successful advance across Sinai.

Maude

After Kut, the British had to reorganize the forces in Mesopotamia, and the new commander, Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Stanley Maude, who in January had been the last man off the beach at Gallipoli, was ordered to consolidate in the south rather than resume the advance on Baghdad.

Baratov (on right)

In fact the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), General Sir William Robertson, considered that Baghdad was not a major strategic prize. But as 1916 wore on, the British felt that Russian successes in the Caucasus and northwestern Iran under Gen Nikolai Baratov justified resuming an offensive toward Baghdad, squeezing the Turks between the British and the Russians and isolating Iran from German influence..  (In 1916, of course, no one foresaw the Russian collapse into revolution the next year.)

Kazem Karabekir Bey

By September 1916, British policy began to shift to a new advance on Baghdad, and in December Maude launched his advance up the Tigris. Advancing initially on both banks, supported by riverine forces, he was able to defeat or brush aside small Ottoman garrisons throughout January. Winter rains and several fortified positions delayed the advance. The main Ottoman force opposing Maude were elements of the Ottoman XVIII Corps under Kazim Karabekir Bey, with some 17,000 troops around the town of Kut. were faced by 50,000 frontline troops under Maude. Requests for reinforcements sent to overall commander Khalil Pasha (Halil Kut) were to no avail. The mistakes of 1915 would not be repeated.

Situation at Kut, February 22, 1917 ("1915" is a typo)

The "Second Battle of Kut" was more a battle of maneuver than of combat. As Maude's superior force approached Kut, he crossed the Tigris at Shumran Bend on February 17, threatening the Turkish right, while the rest of the force moved on its left. Outflanked and outnumbered, and certainly mindful of Townshend's disaster after letting himself be besieged, Karabekir Bey chose to extract himself from his untenable position. By February 24, the Ottoman force was retreating up the river, ursued by Maude's riverboats.

The Second Battle of Kut in some small measure may have offset the shock of the surrender, but it also marked the arrival of a much more competent commander, Less than three weeks later, Maude would enter Baghdad.

Monday Nostalgia: Iraq in the 1950s

Let's start the week with some nostalgia: a two-part Pathe travelogue about Iraq from the 1950s, likely under the monarchy: beware a fair dose of Orientalist stereotypes:

The End is Near, and it Will Be Bloody

Reportedly, Syrian regime forces now control at least 75% of eastern Aleppo, and their jihadist opponents appear determined to fight to the end unless the regime offers them an escape route, which no longer appears to be an option.

Fighting is raging in and around the ancient Citadel itself, now badly damaged. The regime and the jihadists bear shared responsibility, though the Russian and Syrian Air Forces have made it an uneven fight.

Though for obvious reasons, the US press does not like to draw comparisons between the Syrian regime and the situation developing right now in Mosul, since in Mosul the US is supporting the Iraqi forces against ISIS, despite the presence of sectarian militias and Iran as virtual allies. But the fight for Mosul has bogged down, and once again, a regime and jihadi forces confront each other, The tragedy deepens.

Iraqi Parliament, Having No Other Pressing Problems, Decides to Ban Alcohol

 Iraq's Parliament, having defeated ISIS (oh, wait), ended sectarian tensions (oh, wait), negotiated all territorial and oil issues with the Kurds (oh, never mind), has had the time, in its wisdom and with all of Iraq's other problems presumably behind them, to vote to ban alcohol.

I've only been to Iraq once, in the Saddam era. The war with Iran had just ended; the Baghdad Sheraton still had instructions on what to do in case of missile attack. The security forces were omnipresent, and even friends with the US and UK Embassies were nervous about security patrols despite their immunity. All in all, about the only slightly redeeming factor was the ready availability of alcohol. (I realize this falls into the "But Hitler loved dogs" level of justification, of trying to find a silver lining in the darkest of dark clouds.)

Who first invented beer and wine is debatable, but Mesopotamia and Egypt both seem to have known

alcohol before they acquired writing. In the Baghdad of Harun al-Rashid the sybaritic poet Abu Nawas was known for his enjoyment of wine, and Omar Khayyam's loaf of bread, jug of wine and thou beside me needs little introduction. Until the fall of Saddam, alcohol was common in Iraq for centuries. Local breweries produced beer; northern Iraq produced wines, some of it from Christian monasteries. Arak, the anise-flavored liquor similar to Turkish raki and Greek ouzo, was widely available, and so was its home-brewed version. Alcohol production in Kurdistan is apparently flourishing.

After Saddam fell, alcohol remained legal, but various Islamist groups, including al-Qa‘ida in the Land of the Two Rivers and its successor/heir ISIS, and Shi‘ite fundamentalists as well, attacked and even fire-bombed bars and liquor stores. Alcohol consumption in public faded for a while, and of course was taboo in ISIS-controlled territory.

But beer, wine, and arak are deeply ingrained in Iraqi society, in a way it never was in, say, Saudi Arabia. With Christians fleeing Iraq n large numbers, remaining wine-producing monasteries will see this as a new threat. And the Kurdish Regional Government, which has only the most tenuous theoretical loyalty to the Baghdad government, will likely ignore the ban.

So, I suspect, will many other Iraqis.

Iraqi Transport Minister: Sumerians Built First Airport 7,000 Years Ago; Went to Pluto

The headline is not an exaggeration. At a press conference in Dhi Qar, Iraqi Transport Minister Kazem Finjan announced that Dhi Qar was the site of the world's first airport, which he dated to 7000 years ago, and that they had discovered Pluto, and, he seems to imply, had visited it. See the story here. If you know Arabic, watch the video at the link, which I can't embed. (Even if you don't, you mat want to watch the expression of the man in the light jacket at right as the reacts as the Minister goes off the rails.

Iraq's Transport Minister Kazem Finjan has claimed that ancient Sumerians in Iraq invented space travel.

Finjan made the outlandish claim during a press conference in the southern Iraqi province of Dhi Qar.

In a speech, he said that the ancient civilisation had built the world's first airport in the area around 5,000 BC.

Finjan went on to claim that the airport had served as a hub for space exploration, and that the Sumerians discovered Pluto falsely claiming it to be the solar system's "twelfth planet" and discovered by NASA.

In front of a beleaguered audience Finjan sought to back up his claims asking sceptics to study the works of Sumerian experts such as Russian professor Samuel Kramer.

He specifically cited Kramer's History Begins at Sumer, a familiar popular introduction. Apparently the copy on my shelf is a different edition from the Minister's, since it doesn't mention airports or space travel, and uses the standard dating in which Sumer rose around 3000 years BC, or 5,000 years ago, not 7000. (Did he confuse 5000 Before the Present with 5000 BC?) True, he mentions the Sumerians as pioneers in astronomy, but with no mention of Pluto  (which used to be the ninth planet, not the twelfth, until it was demoted). And it was discovered in 1930 by Clyde Tombaugh, long before NASA existed. I think the Minister may have confused Kramer with something he saw on Ancient Aliens.

Or perhaps he's made the biggest discovery by an Arab official since the Egyptian Army discovered a cure for both AIDS and hepatitis C without blood tests.  I wonder how that worked out.

Capture of Airbase from ISIS a Stepping-Stone to Mosul

The Air Base on Google Earth

Even as the Islamic State has stepped up terrorist attacks, it continues to lose ground steadily on the battlefield. The capture July 9 by Iraqi and coalition forces of the Al-Qayyarah West Air Base could prove to be a major stepping stone en route to the recapture of Mosul, some 75 kilometers to the north. The base could provide, if cleared, a base of operations for helicopter gunships and ground attack aircraft.

The capture of Mosul is still distant, however. ISIS remains in control of the town of al-Qayyarah, on the Tigris to the east of the airbase, and also of the town of Shirqat farther south on the river.

Irbid, Ben Guerdane, Hilla: Signs ISIS is Resurgent, or on the Ropes?

Within a matter of days, we have seen a cross-border raid from Syria into Jordan at Irbid, another cross-border raid from Libya into Tunisia at Ben Guerdane, and a deadly bombing at Hilla in Iraq (a largely Shi‘ite city). ISIS and its subsidiaries are certainly prime suspects.

But given ISIS' battlefield setbacks of late, I would raise one question: is ISIS showing a resurgence, or are these the desperate attempts of a movement in retreat lashing out in an attempt to appear still relevant? I suspect it may be the latter.

The Syrian Situation

Several days into the quasi-ceasefire (officially, the "cessation of hostilities") in Syria, the fragile truce is holding despite multiple accusations of violations. The fact that ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra are excluded from the cessation has meant that US strikes against ISIS and Russian strikes against both ISIS and Nusra have continued unabated.

One irony is that, as the Presidential candidates in the US argue over who would be most effective against ISIS, ISIS is steadily losing territory. In Iraq estimates say it lost 40% of its territory on 2015, and in Syria 20%.

Following the capture of Ramadi,  Iraqi and Kurdish forces are preparing, with the help of US air power and allied militias, for the hard challenge of recapturing Mosul.In Syria and Iraq both, Kurdish forces have largely cut ISIS' supply lines from Turkey. Both the YPG from the north and the pro-regime alliance in the Aleppo area seem to be maneuvering for a campaign against the ISIS capital at Raqqa. I'm not saying there is light at the end of the tunnel, Mosul and Raqqa are not yet directly hreatened, but ISIS seems a far less potent threat than it did last year.

Deir Mar Elia was Destroyed by ISIS in 2014; but it's Making Headlines this Week

There has been a lot of publicity this week about the destruction of what is believed to be Iraq's oldest Christian monastery, Deir Mar Elia (St. Elijah) near Mosul, by ISIS. It is, like all of ISIS' destruction of ancient sites, a barbarous act. But what may be missed by those who read only the headlines, is that it was destroyed in August-September 2014. Iraqi Christian sources from the Assyrian and Chaldean churches throughout last year. What is new is the publication by the Associated Press of DigitalGlobe satellite photos that confirm that the ruined walls of the monastery have been obliterated. It provides a dramatic visual, but the destruction had been reported long before.

Mar Elia was founded as an Assyrian (Nestorian) monastery in the AD 590s. Much of the structure was built from the 11th century onward,  and destroyed in  1743 by the Persian Nadir Shah. Is ruins, though roofless, were cared for by the Chaldean Catholic Church and was a site for pilgrimages. The ruins were used as a military base by Saddam Hussein,  and during the US Occupation a Catholic chaplain celebrated Masses on the ancient altar.


It's another crime against antiquity, but it's not fully new news.

Juan Cole on the Ramadi Campaign

Juan Cole asks a useful question: "If Defeating ISIL/Daesh is so important, why isn’t Ramadi Campaign all we’re talking about?"

He notes:

The end of Daesh militarily can be envisioned. But unless the Iraqi government becomes more inclusive and politics successfully with Iraqi Sunnis (and spends some of its billions in oil income to rebuild their cities), then radicalization will remain a threat.

Meanwhile, critics of President Obama’s plan, set out 18 months ago– which involved training of Iraqi troops and rebuilding the Iraqi army. and the offer of close air support to them– may have to eat some crow. That is, they may have to if US cable news bothers to notice that out there in the real world, Daesh is facing another major setback, after its losses of Tikrit, the refinery town of Beiji, and the Kurdish area of Sinjar.

I suspect part of it is thatmost US journalists are based in Erbil and find it easier to report Kurdish advance, and some of it may be that the Iraqi Army''s Shi‘ite militia allies and IRGC advisers don't fit the preferred narrative. (No one is paying much attention to the Asad regime's successes in Homs, either, though not against ISIS.) But it's a valid point.

November 22-23, 1915: The Battle of Ctesiphon, Part II

As noted in Part I of this post, the Turkish position at Ctesiphon was a strong one. General Townshend arrived before the Turkish position late on November 21,  planning to attack at dawn on the 22nd.

We discussed the numbers and units involved in Part I. Nureddin had the 35th division deployed on the west (right) bank of the Tigris, the 38th division on the east bank in an L-shape, with the inexperienced 45th division refusing the flank in the short leg of he L. The 51st division was the reserve, with Arab units in support.

Both sides had poor intelligence. The Turks overestimated the size of Townshend's force, and he British underestimated Nureddin's numbers.

Townshend divided his 6th (Poona) Division into three infantry columns plus a "Flying Column" of cavalry and some infantry with transports.. He labeled the infantry columns A, B, and C, each consisting of several battalions with artillery and sapper support.

Column C was intended to attack the Turkish forces west of the river, B and the Flying Column were to carry out a turning movement against the Ottoman left flank, and A was intended to attack the center. The river flotilla was intended to support the attack.

General Nixon, the overall Mesopotamia Commander, was presen with the Army but left the tactical command to Townshend.

But he British found ground conditions on the west bank unsuitable so all the columns attacked east of te river, with C along the riverbank. The flotilla, meanwhile, came under artillery fire from the Turkish guns and also discovered the Tigris was heavily mined, so the boats provided little support.

In the attack, C and A encountered strong resistance but Colmn B, on the right, successfully carried the forward Turkish trench line. Nureddin fell back to his second defense line and committed his reserves and brought the 35th division from the west bank. The Flying Column encountered resistance from  Turkish and Arab cavalry and failed to turn the Turkish flank.

By the end of November 22, the British held the first line of Ottoman trenches but both sides.had suffered heavy casualties. On November 23, the Turks counterattacked. Casualties continued to mount with the British unable to make a decisive breakthrough.

British-Indian forces lost over 4600 dead and wounded; the Turks over 6000; in both cases nearly a third of their strength. Townshend who had complained of insufficient strengt all along realized he could ot hope to take Baghdad and decided to withdraw to Kut a decision that would prove fateful. Ironically, Nureddin also planned to fall back due to his losses but changed his mind when he realized the British were withdrawing.

The battle was essentially a draw, but it ended the first British attempt to take Baghdad.

Official History, Campaign in Mesopotamia, Volume II

November 22-23, 1915: The Battle of Ctesiphon, Part I

We last left the Mesopotamian Campaign a century ago in October, with the British decision to advance to Baghdad, which I dealt with at length in six posts: Part I. Part II, Part III, Part IV, Part V, Part VI.

As we saw, there were major differences  in perception between London, India, and the generals on the ground, and differences between the Regional Commander General Nixon and the commander of the advance, General Townshend. All are introduced in some detail in the earlier series.

Townshend made his way slowly as he advanced from Kut al-‘Amara to Baghdad. He had reached ‘Aziziyya in October.

Nureddin

Some 40 miles up he Tigris from Kut, and some 20 miles southeast of Baghdad, the Turkish forces under Nur al-Din Pasha (later known as Sakallı Nurettin Paşa) were solidly entrenched on both sides of the Tigris at the old Parhian and Sasanian capital of Ctesiphon (Arabic Al-Mada'in), where a loop in the Tigris makes for a good defensive position.

The British had fought against Nureddin  several times during the advance up the Tigris and had a low of his military skills. What they did not appreciate was that Nureddin reported to the Governor of Baghdad Khalil Pasha (known postwar as Halil Kut) and, as of mid-October the the new Commander of the Ottoman Sixth Army, the aging Prussian Field Marshal Baron von der Goltz though he had yet to take the field.

Furthermore when the decision to advance was made in mid-October The War Committee estimated that for at least the next few months Nixon would face no more than 9,000 Turkish infantry. In fact, at Ctesiphon Nureddin had four divisions, under strength but still numbering 18,000 men to Townshend's reinforced single division with about 11,000. But the Turks had been entrenched for weeks behind two lines of trenches, and south of that a 20-foot-high ancient wall. They also had 52 artillery pieces situated to cover the river.

Nureddin's four divisions were the 35th, based in Mosul before the war and amix of Arab, Kurdish, and other ethnicities; the 38th, based in Basra and mostly Arab; the newly formed 45th, raised around Pozanti near Adana;  and the 51st, a veteran regiment that had served in the Caucasus and at Gallipoli.

Townshend's force consisted of the 6th (Poona) Division with supporting troops, consisting of four infantry brigades and one of cavalry,and two river gunboats, HM Gunboat Firefly and an older gunboat, the Comet. Firefly was the first of a new class of riverboats known to history as the Tigris Flotilla but called at the time "Small China Gunboats" to conceal their intended use in Mesopotamia. With them were two small river launches, Shaitan and Sumana. The stern-wheeler riverboats Shushan and Messoudieh were towing boats with 4.7 inch naval guns. The problem was that this small flotilla and its guns were on the river, and the powerful Ottoman artillery controlled the river.

Official History, Campaign in Mesopotamia, Volume II

If you're thinking that's a pretty formidable position, a superior force with superior artillery barring the river and he route to Baghdad, you're right.

Part II will discuss the battle itself, The most visible landmark of the battlefield was the Great Arch of Ctesiphon,in the nearby town of Salman Pak, remnant of a Sasanian Palace. In Part II, we'll discuss the battle itself.

Official History, Campaign in Mesopotamia, Volume II

Ken Pollack on Ahmed Chalabi

I certainly haven't always agreed with Brookings' Ken Pollack on Iraq, though I respect him as an informed analyst. But I think his appreciation (or perhaps depreciation) of the late Ahmed Chalabi is right on target,

I will simply quote his lead and urge you to follow the link.

I first met him soon after the Persian Gulf War when I still worked for the CIA. I cannot remember if it was 1992 or 1993. I just remember that my immediate response after meeting him was that I wanted to take a shower. I could not believe that we were giving him money to try to overthrow Saddam Hussein. He was so unctuous, so obviously duplicitous and self-serving, I could not understand why anyone would buy what he was trying to sell.

Ahmed Chalabi, 1944-2015

Ahmed Chalabi

Ahmed Chalabi has died at the age of 71, apparently from a heart attack. For several years before the launch of the Iraq War in 2003, Chalabi was the darling of the neocons, the liberator who would democratize Iraq. By the time he died yesterday, a Member of Parliament in Iraq and a Committee Chairman, some of his onetime champions had come to accuse him of being an Iranian agent.

Although like most Middle East hands in Washington I crossed paths with Chalabi a few times,  but never quite understood what so captivated his admirers. He was a well-spoken, well-dressed man, a persuasive speaker, but I could never really envision him as leading Iraq. And in the end, though he held Cabinet positions, he never gained he political traction in Iraq that he had enjoyed in George W. Bush's Washington.

Chalabi was also at pains to explain the fact that he was a wanted man in Jordan following the failure of the Petra Bank he had founded;  he insisted the prosecution was political, inspired by Saddam Hussein, and perhaps that was true.

Unlike some, I don't blame Chalabi for "causing" the US to invade Iraq; if I'd been an Iraqi Shi‘ite I'd have wanted a superpower to take out my enemy too. I blame the credulous neocons who believed everything Chalabi and the rest of his Iraqi National Congress said, and somehow mistook him for George Washington. The US is responsible for its own mistakes, and those who were surprised when he became a sectarian Shi‘ite politician instead of an author of the Iraqi version of the Federalist Papers, never understood Iraq or Chalabi, an Iraqi Shi‘ite from a wealthy background, married to a daughter of Lebanese Shi‘ite figure and Speaker of Parliament ‘Adel ‘Osseiran.

Trudeau to Pull Canada's CF-18s Out of Iraq

 Canadian Prime Minister-elect Justin Trudeau has announced that he has informed President Obama that, in keeping with his campaign promises, he will withdraw Royal Canadian Air Force CF-18 Hornets from the anti-ISIS bombing campaign in Iraq and Syria. Canada's contribution to the coalition campaign is known as operation Impact, but Canada will retain the special forces troops present as a non-combat training mission while ending combat operations. The RCAF CF-18s based in Iraq have also been used to carry out strikes inside Syria. No date has been announced for withdrawal of the aircraft.

Genesis of a Quagmire: The Debate Over Advancing to Baghdad, 1915: Part VI: Nixon Gets the Go-Ahead

This will conclude my series on Britain's disastrous decision to advance to Baghdad in October 1915, which would lead to the siege and disastrous surrender at Kut. Earlier parts concentrated on introducing the players in Mesopotamia/Iraq (Part I), the Indian Government and High Command (Part II), and the divided coalition Government in London (Part III), particularly the India Office and War Office. Part IV and Part V traced the debate over occupying Baghdad from the beginning to the October 6, when Sir John Nixon had been ordered not to advance beyond Kut though General Charles Townshend was already at ‘Aziziya, more than halfway to Baghdad (see map at bottom.)

Part V ended with Nixon pleading not to have to withdraw from ‘Aziziya, but his October 6 plea about Townshend's advance used the assurance, "Navigation difficulties have been overcome," to say that Townshend had been able to advance by land routes and towing barges, temporarily overcoming the lack of shallow-draft river steamers. London instead assumed all navigation difficulties had been solved. The debate in London shifted to reinforcing manpower, while Nixon still lacked steamers. This added a bit to the growing divergence in the debate between what was wished for politically and the military realities on the ground.

All the political forces in London (War Office and India Office), the campaign (Gulf Political Agent Percy Cox), and India recognized the propaganda value of taking Baghdad. India was nervous that Turkey and Germany might succeed in persuading the Amir of Afghanistan to attack India, virtually denuded by the export of Indian troops to France, Egypt, East Africa and Mesopotamia. A fall of Baghdad would also, it was argued have an affect on Persia/Iran, officially neutral but with parts of its territory occupied by Russian, Ottoman, and British troops and much of the rest under local or tribal forces, while the teenaged Ahmad Shah Qajar was well-advanced on his way to becoming the last of his dynasty.

The lure of Baghdad, as I have suggested elsewhere, had as much to do with the popularity of the 1,001 Nights as with the actual military value of an Ottoman provincial city.  It was the capital of Harun al-Rashid, not of Halil Pasha and Baron von der Goltz. But it was a potent lure. Percy Cox argued that for the Muslim world, and Persia in particular, the fall of Baghdad would be second only to the fall of Constantinople. And London was in the process of figuring out how to get its vulnerable troops off Gallipoli without disaster. So the temptation of taking Baghdad loomed even larger.

General Nixon had become even more confident that Townshend could take Baghdad with one quick push. (As we saw last time, Townshend begged to differ and was overruled.) Though the word "cakewalk" certainly existed at the time, I can't find anyone using it, depriving us of the wonderful ironies in which a French general in the 1950s and and an American general in the 1960s referred to a "light at the end of the tunnel" in Vietnam.

In Nixon's defense, he was consistent in saying that while he could take Baghdad with his existing troops (though he was wrong), he could not hold on to it against a Turkish counteroffensive without at least one, and preferably both, of the Indian divisions in France.

Another complication that would reveal itself in the days after October 6, and would be criticized by the subsequent investigating commission, was the tendency of many of the principals (particularly in the India Office and the Indian Government) to communicate by "private" telegrams not shared with other responsible ministries or the field commanders. Thus there were private conversations the content of which many of the principals had not seen.

On October 7, Nixon reiterated that he could not retreat from his present position without disaster, but would not advance without assurance of reinforcement. Also on the 7th, Secretary of State for India Austen Chamberlain asked Nixon how much additional force he needed, not just to take but to hold Baghdad, and also informed the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, that the Cabinet was eager to take Baghdad and asking Hardinge (note: the Viceroy, not the field generals, though Nixon had been asked  a similar question) if one division would be sufficient. Cable traffic for the next day or two centered on whether one or two divisions would be required, as command wanted to assure success without weakening other fronts.

On October 9 Chamberlain telegraphed Hardinge in a private message,

Private. Hope to give you definite information as to possibility of reinforcement in a few days.Meanwhile Nixon should maintain his present position and be prepared to advance if reinforcements asked for can be sent to him. Please instruct him accordingly.

 On the same day, Nixon complained again about the transport problem, but the aforementioned  misunderstanding persisted, and the complaint seems to have made no impression.

On the 11th, Townshend informed his troops they were not to advance until further orders.

Sir Thomas Holderness

But other things were happening in the meantime. An "Inter-Departmental Committee" had been set up by Prime Minister Asquith to resolve the debate and to consider the issue of advancing to Baghdad. Chamberlain named his own deputy, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India Sir Thomas Holderness, as its Chairman. It included representatives of the India Office, War Office, Admiralty, and Foreign Office. On October 11, it delivered a report that was at best inconclusive and raised questions about taking Baghdad before reinforcement.

The Holderness Committee report, inconclusive as it was, went before the War Committee of the Cabinet (then widely known as the Dardanelles Committee) on October 14, 100 years ago today. Chamberlain, not normally a member, was in attendance. They had before them reports from the General Staff (very likely, as we have seen, echoing Lord Kitchener's views), favoring an advance on Baghdad but also requiring an additional two divisions. But apparently Lord Kitchener himself, unlike virtually everyone else, did not feel that holding on to Baghdad was essential and favored occupying it, destroying military supplies and withdrawing.

The Dardanelles Committee's recommendation of sending two Indian divisions from France was soon overtaken by events: the recall of General Sir Ian Hamilton from command on the Dardanelles, but the Indian Government remained uncomfortable with the idea of taking Baghdad if it had to then be evacuated.

On October 21 the War Committee issued a detailed study which suffered from the deficiencies that plagued the Mesopotamia campaign: poor intelligence and underestimating their adversary. The War Committee estimated that for at least the next few months Nixon would face no more than 9,000 Turkish infantry. Within a month at Ctesiphon, they would face twice that number. The British had a disdainful attitude towards their immediate opponent Nureddin Pasha and seem to have been unaware that Baron von der Goltz was now on the scene, with Halil Pasha in support in Baghdad.

On October 23, 1915, despite divided counsels, uncertainty about whether Baghdad could be held for long (no one then questioning that it could at least be captured), and only the vaguest commitment to (eventual) reinforcements, the Cabinet instructed the Viceroy to instruct Nixon, "Baghdad advance."

Baghdad would not be captured. Townshend would fall back to Kut and be besieged and relief was frustrated by the very lack of river transit the Cabinet thought had been resolved. Within six months, Townshend and his troops would surrender to the Turks in the worst defeat since Yorktown and the largest surrender of British Empire troops in history up to then (exceeded only by the surrender of Singapore to the Japanese in 1942). I'll continue the tale next month on the anniversary of the Battle of Ctesiphon.

Anyone wishing to consider modern parallels is of course free to do so, but it clearly was no cakewalk.

Map 8, FJ. Moberly, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vol. II

Genesis of a Quagmire: The Debate Over Advancing to Baghdad, 1915: Part V: India Halts Nixon

This is Part V of a series of six.The first three parts of this current series on Britain's disastrous decision to advance to Baghdad in October 1915, which would lead to the siege and disastrous surrender at Kut, concentrated on introducing the players in Mesopotamia/Iraq (Part I), the Indian Government and High Command (Part II), and the divided coalition Government in London (Part III), particularly the India Office and War Office. Part IV traced the debate over occupying Baghdad from the beginning to the point where General Sir John Nixon ordered General Charles Townshend to advance from Kutn al-‘Amara to ‘Aziziya, despite having instructions not to advance beyond Kut without clearing it with the Government of India. Since in what follows you may not be able to tell the players without a scorecard, please read those if you haven't already. You'll also find photos of all the principal players  in Parts I-III.

Map 8, FJ. Moberly, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vol. II

On October 3, with Townshend already en route to  ‘Aziziya but encountering transport delays, Nixon telegraphed that he felt the retreating Turks were concentrating at the ruins of Ctesiphon, but that he could open the road to Baghdad and take the city with his existing forces, He conveyed his intention to concentrate at ‘Aziziya (which Townshend had already been ordered to do anyway).

Townshend had never been enthusiastic for the advance beyond Kut. Also on October 3, from aboard a steamer on the Tigris he signaled Nixon's headquarters at Kut that

"you will see . . . that there is no more chance of breaking up the retreating Turkish force . . . They have also probably been reinforced from Baghdad . . . If I may be allowed to express an opinion I should say that up to the battle of Kut our object has been the consolidation of the Basra vilayet and occupation of the strategic position of Kut . . .If Government does not consider that the occupation of Baghdad is yet politically advisable owing to doubt of the Dardanelles situation [Gallipoli] and consequent possibility of any small force we might put into Baghdad being driven out again by superior forces from Anatolia, and so obliged to retreat along an extremely long line of communications infested by hostile or semi-hostile, and o news of retreat actively hostile, Arabs,then we should on all military grounds occupy ourselves with consolidating our position at Kut. The plan of entering Baghdad on the heels of a retreating and disordered force was upset by the sudden fall of water rendering our progress in ships of great difficulty and toil and extremely slow. On the other hand, if Government were to desire to occupy Baghdad then I am of the opinion that methodical advance from Kut by road by two divisions or one army corps, or one division closely supported by another entire, exclusive of line of communication troops . . . is absolutely necessary unless great risk is to be incurred. It is absolutely impossible to send laden ships up river now.

The coming campaign would give rise to many questions about Townshend's military judgment, but it's hard to fault his reasoning here. The fall in the river was delaying his advance, and he recognized, as even Nixon did, the risks of occupying Baghdad with only a single division.

But by this time, Nixon was obsessed with the lure of Baghdad. He had his Chief of Staff send Townshend the following reply, as quoted in the official history [punctuation from the official history];

Your (telegram) . . . does not seem to take into account the appreciation of the situation in my (telegram) which I sent you last night [footnote: referring to Nixon's October 1 telegram  to India] . . . . The Turkish force there (i.e., at Ctesiphon) is inferior in numbers and moral [meaning morale] to the force you successfully defeated at Kut, and the position is not nearly as strong. It is the Army Commander's intention to open the way to Baghdad, as he understands another division will be sent here from France* and he would like to know your plan for effecting this object with the force you had at Kut plus maybe four squadrons and a R.H.A. [Royal Horse Artillery] battery.

 *The official history adds a footnote to the statement about a division from France, "Apparently he had received private information concerning this, as no official information to this effect by this date can be traced in the records." Though promises would be made in coming days the additional division seems to have been mostly something Nixon hoped for but had not been promised officially.

Townshend would later claim that he doubted a division from France could arrive in time, but that he felt he had done his best and been overruled by his superior officer. He later claimed that he remained unconvinced, but nevertheless in his response to Nixon he said:

My information I consider, points to a different estimate of the hostile force being concentrated at Ctesiphon . . . you did not mention the arrival of a division from France and that makes all he difference in your appreciation. I will wire my plan to-morrow morning as it requires some careful thought . . .

Meanwhile, Nixon's October 3 telegram announcing his decision to concentrate at ‘Aziziya and move on London set off alarm bells at the India Office in London. On October 4, before seeing the telegram, the Military Secretary, General Barrow (See Part III) wrote a minute urging caution about any advance to Baghdad without reinforcements. The Secretary of State for India, Austen Chamberlain, supported the suggestion of the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, to withdraw the Indian divisions from France and create a reserve in India. Hardinge, as we have seen, felt India had been stripped bare of troops and feared the Germans and Turks might succeed in efforts to persuade the Amir of Afghanistan to attack India.On the 4th Chamberlain wired Harding asking about Nixon's intentions, and emphasizing that "if, owing to navigation troubles, there is no probability of catching and smashing the retreating enemy, there is no object in continuing the pursuit."

On the same day, Nixon telegraphed asking if an additional division would be provided from France so that he could hold Baghdad once taken. Note that the day before he had assured Townshend such a division was on the way.

On October 5, Townshend reached ‘Aziziya.

Also on the 5th, Chamberlain cabled Hardinge that the Cabinet was appointing a committee to consider the advance.but warning "Kitchener can hold out no hope  of reinforcements from Europe or Egypt."

The same day, Sir Percy Lake, Chief of Staff, India, cabled n assessment that Turkish forces in India were estimated at 7500 infantry, 600 cavalry and 28 guns, and that while Nixon had earlier said he did not expect the Turks to be reinforced, developments in the Balkans and Gallipoli could allow the Turks to reinforce in Mesopotamia. Lake argued that unless Nixon could be assured that an additional division could be withdrawn from France by the end of October, Nixon would not be authorized to go further. This was approved by the Commander-in-Chief, India, Beauchamp Duff, and the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge. Nixon was ordered by Lake to stop his advance:

No reinforcements can at present be spared from India, so that unless the Secretary of State can arrange for the despatch of an Indian division from France you cannot advance to Baghdad. This being so, we see no advantage in an immediate forward concentration at Aziziya which can hold no advantage to us except as a step to Baghdad. Chief considers you should not advance in strength beyond Kut el Amara until it is certain that we may expect reinforcements from France which we consider very doubtful.

But Townshend was already arriving at ‘Aziziya.

On October 6, the Political Department of the India Office generated a two-page memo, "Advance to Baghdad: Political Considerations." Beginning by quoting a telegram from Percy Cox saying that in terms of influencing events in Persia and Afghanistan the fall of Baghdad would be second in importance only to the fall of Constantinople itself, it discussed all the political ramifications, but also recognized that an occupation of Baghdad followed by withdrawal might have a negative effect.

On the 6th as well, the Government of India wired the India Office in London notifying them that Nixon had been ordered to halt but emphasizing the advantage of taking Baghdad and the dangers if it were taken and then abandoned, urging that one or both Indian divisions be withdrawn from France, and increasing the estimate of Turkish infantry available from 7,500 to 8,500.

Still on October 6, Nixon sent another telegram arguing for an advance. In keeping with his tone of optimism, he continued to push for an advance, but one phrase he included would lead to a major misapprehension in London:

Navigation difficulties have been overcome by lightening ships and utilising them for towing laden barges and by marching troops with land transport . . . Enemy appears to be no longer retreating but has occupied Ctesiphon position and thereby constitutes a threat to us. Our information is that his troops, especially those locally recruited, are so demoralised by defeat at Kut al Amara in a position which they considered impregnable.They are now so near Baghdad that Nur-ud-Din will have difficulty making a determined stand with men who are close to their homes and wish to desert. I consider that there is every probability of catching and smashing the enemy at Ctesiphon as soon as 6th Division has fully concentrated at Aziziya and reinforced by drafts and cavalry now on their way from Basra. If on the other hand we retire from Aziziya to Kut the enemy and whole tribes will place their own construction on such a movement.

 He went on to argue that the enemy was weakened and vulnerable and that the opportunity  to take Baghdad should not be missed. It was typical Nixon: dubious intelligence, underestimating Nureddin's morale, and special pleading. But in the next stage of the ongoing debate between Nixon, India, and London, those far from the scene would seize on that one line near the beginning, "Navigation difficulties have been overcome."

The subsequent qualifying phrases indicate that Nixon meant that the navigation difficulties had been temporarily overcome during Townshend's advance to ‘Aziziya.by the expedients of using land transport for the troops (slower and more difficult than river transports) and towed barges.Nixon continued and would continue to complain of the lack of shallow-draft boats.

But in the debate between Nixon, the various ministries in London, and the Indian Government in Simla, "Navigation difficulties have been overcome" was read as meaning just that, and the focus would shift to the question of finding sufficient troops. Despite continuing reluctance on the side of the Indian Government, the weight of the debate was about to shift, in part due to the political arguments rather than the military caution, toward the "On to Baghdad" side of the scales.

We are beginning a three-day holiday weekend in the US, after which the tale will continue in Part VI.