So We're Told Mullah ‘Omar Died Two Years Ago ...

It was widely reported today that Mullah ‘Omar, the rarely seen, one-eyed leader of the Afghan Taliban, died in 2013 in a Pakistani hospital; Afghan officials have indicated that Pakistani officials confirmed this to them recently.

Given the memory of Usama bin Ladin's hide-in-nearly-plain-sight final years, this raises some questions: Was his sanctuary in Pakistan officially authorized, or otherwise?

Or will we ever find out?

February 3 and 4, 1915: The Turks Attack the Suez Canal

For several days now, I've been dealing with the preparations for the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal. A century ago yesterday and today, the attack came. The Turkish plan depended heavily on the element of surprise, but as we have seen, due to aerial reconnaissance, British knew where the Ottomans were advancing. Ottoman hopes for a rising in Egypt against the British also failed.

Excerpts from the British Official History are available online from the Australian Light Horse Studies Centre, while the Official Naval History is excerpted here; as a result I will let those works tell the bulk of the story, interspersing my own comments occasionally

FROM the 31st January onwards the British troops stationed along the Canal expected the attack at any moment and, having had ample warning of its approach, awaited it with confidence.

The dispositions of the enemy, so far as they could be discovered, were on the 1st February as follows:

At Bir Habeita, 6 miles east of Serapeum, at least 2,500 infantry and apparently two guns; at Moiya Harab, 30 miles to the south-east and in a position such that they might be intended either to reinforce the former body or to strike at the 1st Sector in the neighbourhood of Shallufa, about 8,000 men; further north, at Bir el Mahadat, 10 miles E.N.E, of El Ferdan, about 3,000 men. On the other hand, trenches which had been dug by the Turks 5 miles north-east of Qantara now seemed to have been evacuated, and behind, at Bir ed Dueidar, only about 300 men could be seen, though the palm grove of this oasis was certainly large enough to conceal many more. In rear, on the northern Sinai route at Bir el Abd, 40 miles east of the Canal, and at El Arish on the Palestine frontier ; on the southern route at Nekhl ; there appeared to be further considerable forces.

No move by the Turks was detected on this day but for a slight advance opposite Ismailia Ferry Post, as a result of which the bridgehead there and Bench Mark Post, 2 miles to north of it, were reinforced. A little further north small bodies of the enemy in the desert east of El Ferdan were scattered by the fire of H.M.S. Clio from her station near Ballah.

Ottoman advance on the Canal

On the morning of the 2nd February it was discovered by patrols from Ismailia Ferry Post that there had been a further advance opposite that point during the night. Small detachments which moved out from the bridgehead made contact with the enemy and were in action till about 3.30 p.m. A high wind, which had grown stronger as the day wore on, whipped up the sand till the troops found themselves almost in darkness, and aerial reconnaissance became impossible. The enemy showed no immediate intention of coming to close quarters. He apparently entrenched himself in the evening 22 miles south-east of the British defences.

A French naval officer, Enseigne de vaisseau Potier de la Morandière, thus describes the reconnaissance from the Ferry Post:

On the hills, ten or fifteen kilometres from the Canal, we could see numerous traces on the sand of the columns which had moved "forward during the night. But in the plain there was nothing. The desert, in its high light, looked like a smooth cloth, but was in "reality cut by numerous depressions in which troops could be hidden. The first patrols which moved out were met by rifle fire. They were reinforced; then artillery was sent out to their support. At my side was a battery of Indian mountain artillery, commanded by a young English officer, the only European in it. He had just been ordered to go forward. A sharp command and, in a few seconds, before we could see how it was done, the guns which had been in position were packed on the mules and the column was on the move.

Meanwhile there had sprung up a sand storm which hid everything from view. I went out on to a dune with the English colonel in command of the post. But there it was even worse. Even to keep one's eyes open was horrible torture. And to think that people were fighting out in that. In the evening the detachments came in, one after another, the officers cursing the sand, the wind and the enemy, who had fallen back before them. Then quiet fell and we began to think there had been a false alarm.

Not only at the Ferry Post but on the whole twenty mile front from Deversoir to El Ferdan the British outposts were in touch with the enemy during the day. The Clio again came into action, driving the groups on which she fired out of range.

It was now more than ever certain that the attack would fall upon the central hector, though still unknown whether its main weight would be directed north or south of Lake Timsah. In view of the enemy's activity in front of El Ferdan further reinforcements were brought up to that point: an armoured train with four platoons of New Zealand infantry, and two platoons to support the 5th Gurkhas in the post on the east bank. In that part of the sector between the Great Bitter Lake and Lake Timsah there were now the following troops:-

19th Lancashire Battery R.F.A. (T) (four 15-pdrs.);
5th Battery Egyptian Artillery (four mountain guns and two maxims);
1st Field Company East Lancashire Royal Engineers (T) (two sections);
22nd Indian Infantry Brigade, less 3rd Brahmans (62nd and 92nd Punjabis, 2/10th Gurkha Rifles);
2nd Q.V.O. Rajputs;
Two Platoons 128th Pioneers (escort to the Egyptian battery);
137th (Indian) Field Ambulance.

Of these there were six companies on the east bank; two of the 92nd Punjabis in the Tussum Post, two of the 92nd in that of Serapeum, and two of the Gurkhas at Deversoir. On the west bank were eleven posts each held by two platoons, [The total number of posts between the two lakes was twelve, but No. 1 Post on the left, which was protected by the large lagoons at the southern end of Lake Timsah, consisted of a half platoon only. It manned an observation post on a dune known as Gebel Mariam, just west of the point where the Canal channel enters the lake.], each platoon on a frontage of some 600 yards and finding three sentry posts 200 yards apart. In reserve at Serapeum were three companies. At the first sign of the attack a company of the 62nd Punjabis was ordered up from here to the danger point, mile-post 47.4, a little south of Tussum, and this company was subsequently reinforced by six platoons of the 2nd Rajputs.

1. The sand storm continued into the night. The Indian sentries, peering into the darkness, their faces screened in their puggarees and the breeches of their rifles wrapped round with rags, saw and heard nothing till 3.25 a.m. on the 3rd February, when an observation post at Tussum heard troops passing south-east of the post and towards the Canal bank. A moment later loud shouting and howling broke out south of the post. [The noise, in defiance of strict orders, was made by irregulars, "the Champions of Islam," calling upon Allah and adjuring the attackers to die for the faith.] Major T. R. Maclachlan, who was in command, moved a machine gun and half a platoon down to the southern flank of the post to rake the east bank. The shouting thereupon ceased and the enemy replied with ineffective machine-gun fire. 

Still there was nothing to be seen. Then the moon, only two days past full, emerged from the clouds, and dark masses were discerned moving slowly down the gullies on the east bank towards the water. Presently these masses were discovered to be pontoons and rafts carried by squads of men. At 4.20 a.m. the Egyptian battery, which had moved to this point the previous day and dug in on the top of the high west bank in order to obtain a field of view, opened fire, with good results, for it was soon observed that the two foremost pontoons had been abandoned. With the assistance of rifle fire from the 62nd Punjabis and 128th Pioneers at Post No. 5, the battery checked most of the attempts of the enemy to carry his craft down to the water.

It is not clear whether the Turks had intended to make their first crossing at this point or whether the other detachments moving on the Canal had been slightly delayed in the darkness by the rough ground. At all events, within a few minutes gangs carrying pontoons appeared upon the east bank on a frontage of a mile and a half from a short distance north of the point of the first attempt. The rapid fire of the defenders caused most of the craft to be abandoned on the bank, while the pontoons which reached the water were quickly holed and sunk.

A captured pontoon

Three pontoons only crossed the Canal, under cover of heavy machine-gun and rifle fire now opened by the enemy from the sand-dunes close to the east bank. To the south, a boat-load of Turks landed opposite mile-post 43.3, on the front of Post No. 6. The party was instantly charged with the bayonet by a small body under Major O. St. J. Skeen, 62nd Punjabis, and all killed or wounded. The other two boat-loads landed at the original point, opposite mile-post 47.6. This party was at once attacked by Captain M. H. L. Morgan and Lieut. R. A. FitzGibbon with small detachments of the 62nd Punjabis and 128th Pioneers from Post No. 5. [Both officers were wounded, the latter mortally, though, after being hit, he ran a considerable distance with a message to the Egyptian battery of which he commanded the escort.] Six Turks were killed and four wounded; about twenty escaped and hid under the west bank, where they were later rounded up and captured by a party of the 2nd Rajputs. The small parties which made these gallant attacks were the only Turks to cross the Suez Canal, save as prisoners, in the course of the war. Six months later a few raiders swam the Canal near Qantara and placed sticks of dynamite on the railway line. These, however, were probably native smugglers, who had taken Turkish pay when their peacetime occupation was gone.

The Fighting in the Tussum-Serapaeum Sector

The fire from the east bank was intense and well directed, and casualties among the defenders began to mount up. But as the light improved it was seen how roughly the enemy had been handled. His iron pontoons, rafts 2 and other abandoned material littered the east bank, along which also lay many dead. His surprise crossing had been a complete failure. The pontoons were of the German service pattern, of galvanized iron, each capable of holding about 20 men. There were also a number of rafts, subsequently found to consist of a light wooden framework filled with empty kerosene tins. They were 15 feet long by 12 feet wide and equipped with long-necked crutches to enable them to be rowed across.

Yet the Turkish command had by no means abandoned hope. At dawn an attack was launched against Tussum Post, and the enemy artillery began to shell the British positions, the warships in the Canal, and merchant shipping moored in Lake Timsah. The Hardinge and Requin in turn opened fire upon parties of Turkish infantry in the desert, as they became visible, and by the time it was daylight the action was general. It was now discovered that the Turks were holding a trench 200 yards south of Tussum Post, facing westward. Enfilade fire from the machine guns in the post practically destroyed this party. It was next found that a larger body of the enemy, some 350 strong, had made a lodgement in the British day trenches east and south of the post. At 7 a.m. a counter-attack from the southern flank of the post, led by Captain H. M. Rigg, 92nd Punjabis, recaptured a portion of these trenches and took 70 prisoners. At 11 a.m. a further counter-attack was carried out against the day trenches by Lieut. J. W. Thomson-Glover, 35th Sikhs, attached 92nd Punjabis, from the northern end of the post. This was completely successful, though not until 3.30 p.m. were the whole of the trenches regained. In all 7 Turkish officers and 280 other ranks were captured or killed and a quantity of material taken in these trenches.

Br.-General S. Geoghegan, commanding the 22nd Indian Brigade, observing at 6.30 a.m. that there was no sign of an attack south of Serapeum, decided to collect at that point sufficient troops to clear the Turks still in front of or south of Tussum Post out of the trenches and sandhills. Two companies of the 2/10th Gurkhas with their machine guns moved up from Deversoir to Serapeum, where six platoons of the 2nd Rajput had also been collected. Crossing by the ferry, two platoons of the Rajputs with the two companies of the 92nd Punjabis from the post on their right, began at 8.40 a.m. to advance up the east bank towards Tussum. As this movement continued, the enemy broke in surprisingly large numbers from hummocks and sandhills in the neighbourhood of the point from which his southern boat-load had crossed during the night. But at the same moment a considerable Turkish force came into the open some three miles to the north-east, deployed, and, supported by two batteries,' began to advance in the direction of Serapeum Post. The force which carried out this attack was afterwards found to have been the 74th Regiment, 25th Division; the other two regiments of that division, the 73rd and 75th, having already been committed to the attack against Tussum Post and the Canal immediately south of it. Behind the 7th Regiment the 28th of the 10th Division, Djemal Pasha's reserve, also advanced, though how nearly it approached the Canal is not clear.

Against this superior force the British counter-attack was unable to continue. The Rajputs, pushing on along the bank, came under heavy fire and lost the officer commanding the detachment, Captain R. T. Arundell, before they were brought to a standstill. The Punjabis were concentrated on the right to face the Turkish attack, and six platoons of the 2/10th Gurkhas moved up into support, the whole detachment on the east bank being now under the command of Lieut.-Colonel F. G. H. Sutton, 2/10th Gurkha Rifles. But the little force held its ground and its determined front brought the enemy's attack to a standstill, nowhere nearer than 1,200 yards to the British line. A second cause of the failure on the part of the Turks to press the attack was probably the fire of the French warships Requin and D'Entrecasteaux, of which more will be said later.

The abandoned pontoons lying along the Asiatic bank constituted a certain danger, as there was a possibility of their being again employed after the fall of darkness, should the enemy re-establish himself in force upon the bank. About 7.45 a.m. Br.-General Geoghegan requested Lieut.-Commander G. B. Palmes, R.N., in command of T.B. 043 at Deversoir, to destroy these. The torpedo boat moved up the Canal, firing two rounds from its 3-pdr, into each pontoon. 3 Feb. Lieut.-Commander Palmes then landed to see if any still lay behind the east bank, and succeeded in blowing up two more with gun-cotton. Finally he almost walked into a trench full of Turks, but succeeded in regaining his dinghy.

While the attacks on Tussum and Serapeum were in progress, another Turkish force, advancing from the southeast, threatened Ismailia Ferry Post, on the other side of Lake Timsah. [This force consisted of the 68th regiment, 23rd Division.] This attack was never seriously pressed, the enemy's advanced troops entrenching some eight hundred yards from the defences. On the other hand his artillery, well handled, speedily became menacing. It appeared that the two field batteries were in action in support of the infantry, while from far out in the desert a 15-cm. howitzer battery also opened fire.

At 8.15 a.m. these guns, which had been directed against the Hardinge but had hitherto been shooting short, began to straddle the ship. First a ricochet carried away the wireless aerial. A few minutes later a high explosive shell struck the forward funnel, another the base of the after funnel; next a shell from one of the heavy howitzers burst over the fore part of the ship, causing casualties to the guns' crews. The steering gear was damaged and the fore stokehold rendered untenable. It was only too evident to Commander Linberry that the heavy guns had his range exactly. If he remained where he was there was considerable risk that his ship, unarmoured and highly vulnerable, would be sunk in the channel. At 8.45 a.m., therefore, the Hardinge slipped and proceeded to anchor in Lake Timsah, outside the fairway. The heavy howitzers fired only three or four rounds more at her, then switched to another target.

The artillery defence of Tussum now fell largely upon the Requin, [The Requin, whose specially dredged berth had been long chosen, had made preparation for the defence of the Sector by placing numerous range-marks in the desert. Her role was, in fact, that of a floating battery.], the only warship in the area, except the armed tug Mansourah and T.B. 043, both armed with light guns. She was searching for the enemy's field artillery and shelling small groups of infantry in front of Ismailia Ferry Post with her 10-cm. guns when she came under the fire of the 15-cm howitzers which had previously engaged the Hardinge.

She could not find the enemy battery, the shooting of which became more and more accurate. Presently it straddled the ship and the situation became uncomfortable. The crews of the 10-cm. guns, which had no protection, were moved beneath the shelter of the steel deck, and a bigger head of steam raised in case the ship should have to shift her moorings. One 27.4-cm. turret gun alone remained in action, at first without effect. But at 9 o'clock a puff of smoke was observed in the desert, corresponding with the fall of a big shell near the ship. It was estimated that the Turkish howitzers were firing from a point 9,200 metres distant. Fire was accordingly opened with the turret gun at ranges varying from 9,000 to 9,500 metres. After the third round the heavy howitzer fire ceased suddenly and was not resumed, a serious danger to the Canal being thus removed.

The Requin did further good work opposite Tussum and Serapeum, aided by the cruiser D'Entrecasteaux. The latter had received orders to move up and replace the disabled Hardinge. Subsequently these orders were cancelled, as the flagship Swiftsure was on her way down from Qantara to carry out that task. The D'Entrecasteaux therefore moved about three-quarters of a mile north of Deversoir and then received the wireless message: "Repulse the attack on Serapeum." She could see Requin's shells bursting east of that point and she herself at once opened fire with her 14-cm. guns. The crossfire from the heavy guns of the two French ships was now therefore directed upon the area of the Turkish deployment. It was probably in great measure owing to the moral effect of the melinite that the Turkish troops could not here be induced to advance.

The enemy had now been definitely repulsed between Serapeum and Tussum. His artillery continued to shell the west bank intermittently till 2 p.m., when fire ceased. The silence that followed indicated that the action had been broken off, and bodies of Turks were soon seen moving eastward, to be hastened on their way by the 24-cm. gun of the D'Entrecasteaux, firing at extreme range. The force under Lieut.-Colonel Sutton which had carried out the counter-attack now withdrew to its former position north of Serapeum. About half an hour later a small body of the enemy occupied the ridge which it had evacuated, but was shelled off it by the British artillery.

Opposite Ismailia the enemy's artillery persisted longer, numerous shells falling in the bridgehead and camp, though 3 Feb. without causing any casualties. But at 3.30 p.m. the Requin apparently silenced a battery firing on the shipping in the Timsah, and here, as further south, the action now died down.

Reinforcements of the 31st Indian Brigade, which began to arrive at Serapeum at 4.30 p.m., were not required, but they were retained in positions of close support at various points in view of the possibility that the offensive would be renewed. Major-General A. Wallace, commanding the 11th Indian Division, took over command of the front between the Great Bitter Lake and Lake Timsah. The Swiftsure had now taken up the former berth of the Hardinge, the Ocean had also moved to this part of the front, and the Hardinge had been sent to replace the Swiftsure at Qantara.

Further reinforcements for the front at Ismailia, consisting of Headquarters 2nd Australian Brigade, with the 7th and 8th Battalions Australian Infantry, arrived in the town during the evening. All was ready for the fresh attack which, it seemed probable, would have to be met in the morning. The night passed quietly, save for some musketry fire from the east bank south of Tussum Post.

Elsewhere the attacks on the Canal had been of minor importance, nowhere pressed with energy sufficient to give Major-General Wilson a moment's inquietude or uncertainty as to the enemy's real plan. In the Suez sector the enemy did not come to close quarters. Fire was exchanged between a small detachment and the post on the east bank at El Kubri, after which the Turks withdrew.

Against El Ferdan, the northernmost post of the 2nd Sector, the infantry attack was equally feeble. There had been some firing on this part of the front before dawn, and daylight discovered two lines of trenches dug about two and a half miles from the Canal. On these the Clio opened fire.

Soon after 9 a.m. two Turkish field guns began firing on the railway station, making good practice and securing several direct hits. The Clio located and engaged these guns within less than half an hour, whereupon the Turks turned their attention to her, continuing to do remarkably pretty shooting. She was hit twice and had some small damage done to one of her guns, but she sustained no casualties among her crew. By 10.30 a.m. she had silenced the Turkish guns. During the afternoon she had further practice against bodies of the enemy seen falling back towards the northeast.

At Qantara, in the 3rd Sector, there was a rather stronger attack, between 5 and 6 a.m., upon two piquets furnished by the 89th Punjabis. The machine guns and rifles of the piquets caused heavy loss to the enemy when he came up against the British barbed-wire defences, and he was driven off without difficulty. Thirty-six prisoners were subsequently brought in here and 20 dead found outside the wire. These figures did not represent the whole of the enemy's losses, as he carried off further dead and wounded in his retirement.

These feint attacks had all been conducted with so little resolution as to fail completely in their object. There were known to be further detachments of the enemy in the Suez Sector in the neighbourhood of posts other than at El Kubri, but they did not appear within machine-gun range of Baluchistan, Gurkha or Shallufa.

Although the British pursued  into Sinai, the Turkish withdrawal proved to be rapid and nearly complete.

Suez Canal Notes: Auchinleck and the 62nd Punjabis at Suez 1915

Badge of the 62nd Punjabis

Tomorrow, February 3, marks the 100th anniversary  of the Ottoman attack on the Suez Canal in 1915. I'll be narrating the battle tomorrow, but I thought I'd anticipate it with a vignette of one Indian Army Regiment that distinguished itself in the battle, the 62nd Punjabi Regiment.

This regiment's lineage traced to an Indian Army unit formed in 1759, and which had served under Arthur Wellesley (the future Duke of Wellington) in one of his first great victories, at Assaye in 1803.

It arrived in Egypt in December 1914. As fate would have it, the 62nd happened to be deployed near the Tussum Post on the Canal, at the site of what would be the only point where Turkish pontoons actually reached the west bank of the Canal. Only three pontoons made it across.

Two landed at mile 47.6, and a third at milepost 43.3. The Turks (actually Syrians of various ethnicities from the 23rd Homs and 25th Damascus Divisions. The 62nd Punjabis attacked and killed or captured the Turks who made it ashore. Naik Safdar Ali and Sepoy Sher Khan of the 62nd rushed forward; Safdar Ali was killed and Sher Khan badly wounded; both won the Indian Order of Merit.

Naik Safdar Ali (source)

The next day, the 62nd was instrumental in pushing the Turks back from British trenches they had occupied on the east bank of the Canal, Havildar Muhammad Azim distinguished himself and won yet another Order of Merit.

The 62nd went on to fight hard in Mesopotamia, One of its British captains at the Canal battle was getting his first taste of combat, but not his last: Captain Claude Auchinleck, better known in World War II as Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck (and to his men as "the Auk"), commander in the early stages at El Alamein and the last British Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army. Captain Auchinleck is standing at far right in this photo from Egypt in December 1914 of the officers of the 62nd Punjabis:

The 62nd Punjabis later became the 1st Battalion, 1st Punjab Regiment, and  at Partition in 1947 were allocated to the new Pakistani Army. Today, as the ist Battalion, the Punjab Regiment of the Army of Pakistan, they are said to enjoy the oldest unit lineage of any Indian Army regiment still in existence.

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, 1931-2014

Robert B. Oakley

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, whose long and distinguished diplomatic career was often spent in trouble spots such as Pakistan and Somalia, has passed away at the age of 83. He held a range of posts during his career in the State Department, the National Security Council, and as a Special Envoy.

Joining the Foreign Service in 1957, his first posting was to Khartoum. He also served in Abidjan, Saigon, Paris, and Beirut. He was Senior Director for the Middle East and South Asia at the National Security Council. In 1979 he was named Ambassador to Zaire, and in 1982 Ambassador to Somalia.

In 1984 he became Director of the State Department Office for Combating Terrorism, and in 1987 he returned to the NSC as Assistant to the President for the Middle East and South Asia.

In 1988, when US Ambassador to Pakistan Arnold Raphel died in the same air crash that killed Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq, he was named Ambassador to Pakistan at a moment of crisis.

Oakley retired from the Foreign Service in 1991, and served at the US Institute for Peace but he was soon back at work as in late 1992, President George H.W. Bush named him Special Envoy to Somalia. He served in the same capacity for Bill Clinton in 1993-94.

He later served at National Defense University. With his wife Phyllis, who held senior State Department positions as well (including Spokesman), and who survives him, he was a familiar and approachable figure in the foreign policy community here in Washington.

Israel's Stepped-Up Air Defense Alerts: MH 370. Gaza, and Perhaps Iran as Well?

Blogging may be light for a couple of more days due to Spring issue deadlines at the end of the month, but there's been some attention paid in Israel to reports the country has stepped up it's air defenses due to the uncertainties about the whereabouts of the missing Malaysian airliner. (I may be the only person who hasn't talked about that yet, but until now, other than the two Iranians on fake passports, there was no resonance in the Middle East.)

Since there's no evidence of what actually happened but some evidence pointing to some nefarious purpose, it's hardly news that Israel (and other countries in the region I would presume, not least India and China) might be stepping up the vigilance of their air defenses. Claims (among the many other theories) that the aircraft might have landed somewhere in non-government controlled regions of Afghanistan or northwestern Pakistan (and be under Afghan or Pakistani Taliban control) may be wildly improbable (surely US, Indian, and Pakistani intelligence monitoring has that area pretty much saturated). Even if there's a remote chance, though, no one wants another 9/11. Well, no neighboring state does.

But I would also note that even before the reports of stepped-up Israeli measures due to MH370, Israel had already announced a limited callup of air defense reserves last week after a barrage of rockets from Gaza and Israel's retaliation. That, and the fact that belligerent rhetoric towards Iran has seen a resurgence lately, all may contribute to an enhanced alert condition for Israel's air defenses.

Egyptian Presidents, Pakistan, and Hats: Then and Now

You'll recall that when President Morsi received an honorary degree in Pakistan, he got a lot of online comment for this picture:
And then Bassem Youssef's supporters showed up at the court with this:
Well, it seems that Egyptian Presidents visiting Pakistan tend to get photographed wearing unusual headgear.  A hat tip to Sarah Carr for pointing out this wondrous pic from a Nasser visit in 1960:


But you know, somehow I have to say, Nasser actually makes this work. He somehow pulls it off, as Morsi does not. On him it looks good, or perhaps more precisely his smile and his eyes convey the sense of  "I look ridiculous, don't I?" as if it's an inside joke. Nasser, who was never freely elected, knew how to play his audience like a true politician. Morsi, who was freely elected, doesn't get it. Not yet anyway, and perhaps not ever.

A sense of humor might help. I've said before Morsi seems to have been the very rare Egyptian born without one, or perhaps he had it removed. Nasser's eyes say it all. It's a joke to him, and he's sharing it with his countrymen.

This Sort of Photo was Made for Social Media . . .

. . . and Egyptians on Facebook and Twitter are predictably having fun with it. President Morsi is in Pakistan, and has been given an honorary degree by the National University of Science and Technology, which apparently required this ceremonial dress,

In fact, this is not some lodge initiation; it seems to be the university's academic garb:

Spring Issue: Now Online

The Spring issue of The Middle East Journal is now available online. You can purchase a download if you're not a subscriber. or become a member here; if you're already a subscriber instructions for online access is here.

• "Continuity and Change in the Social Background of Israel's Military Elite," by Oren Barak and Eyal Tsur. The authors, working with a database that they compiled, analyze the personal backgrounds of high-ranking officers in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

• "The Potential Impact of Palestinian Nonviolent Struggle on Israel: Preliminary Lessons and Projections for the Future," by Omri Arens and Edward Kaufman makes the argument that a "massive, organized, and sustained nonviolent Palestinian resistance" has the best chance of success for Palestinians seeking to establish a Palestinian state.

• "Factors Influencing Military-Media Relations in Turkey," by F. Michael Wuthrich. This article examines the sometimes cozy and sometimes contentious relationship between the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and Turkey's mass media, seeking to explain the factors behind the TAF's "informal mechanisms of power."
• "Democratic Islamization in Pakistan and Turkey: Lessons for the Post-Arab Spring Muslim World," by Juris Pupcenoks looks at two previous case studies, Pakistan and Turkey, and extrapolates some lessons applicable to Islamist political participation in Egypt, Tunisia, and other countries affected by the "Arab Awakening."
• "What the Social Sciences Can Tell Policy-Makers in Yemen," by Robert E. Mitchell emphasizes a theme that is close to our core mission here at the Middle East Institute: understanding the importance of a thorough and nuanced understanding of a country’s social and cultural context as critical tools in the formation of policy.
• The book review article in this issue, by As’ad Ghanem, deals with five recent books on Palestinians in Israel within the Green Line, the people usually referred to as Israeli Arabs, and their changing roles and attitudes.

Aliaa ElMahdy Revisited: As the Real ElMahdy Says She's in Hiding, Pakistani and Tunisian Actresses Try to Gain PR By (Sort of) Daring Photos

I really am not a dirty old man, and for the record I've only posted once, directly, up to now about Aliaa ElMahdy's notorious posting of nude photos of herself, though I've referred to it in passing in discussing the cases of Samira Ibrahim and Mona ElTahawy, both victims of violent sexual  abuse and thus hardly the same thing, though they received, at least in the first case, less international attention. I also try to keep this blog PG-13 and keep controversial material in the links, with due warnings. But it seems to keep coming up still, and it may be time for an update, and some commentary on my part.

The immediate storm in the Egyptian media and blogosphere faded with the confrontations in Tahrir and the elections, which overshadowed it, so I've kept away from the story. Now, however, tabloid headlines in various countries are proclaiming a "Pakistani Aliaa ElMahdy" and a "Tunisian Aliaa ElMahdy," even though the real Aliaa is apparently underground for her own protection.

No, those press reports of growing Islamist strength throughout the region are not attempts to cover up some sudden outburst of female nudity: the tabloids aside, it's not happening. Both of these latest claimaints are actresses apparently seeking publicity and neither of their photos is all that revealing (about PG-13 on a US film rating). Neither of their pictures reveals more than the Cosmopolitan covers on display in the checkout lines in this country, not to mention European magazine covers, whereas the real Aliaa, who left nothing to the imagination, now says that she's gone into hiding due to threats against her life. The fact of the matter is, she, at age 20 and perhaps unwisely, took much bigger chances and is paying a much bigger price (but with a less commercial motivation) than a couple of actresses already known for daring roles, who appear in suggestive but not really naked poses. The comparison is a reach, since Aliaa ElMahdy was far more offensive to societal values and has a lot more to lose. Assuming she really has gone underground, given the electoral results (my next post coming up this morning), she may have good reason.

Aliaa ElMahdy

A website called CyberDissidents.org recently published what it described as an interview with Aliaa ElMahdy. It would seem to be her first public comments since an interview with CNN when the story first broke. In that interview she talked openly about her sex life, losing her virginity at 18 to an older man (not her current boyfriend), and other issues that are taboo in Egypt and, along with her proclaimed atheism, transgressed just about every boundary. Now she's more circumspect.

CyberDissidents.org: You've paid a heavy personal price for publishing your picture. Who is threatening you and why?

Aliaa Elmahdy: Individuals, unions and Islamists.  They are afraid that I might influence others and change the position of women in Egyptian society.  One woman who reported me to authorities said that she is afraid of my influence on her children. She is afraid she will lose control over them.

CyberDissidents.org: Has the political revolution in Egypt also sparked a social revolution? 

Aliaa: Not yet. 

CyberDissidents.org: What does freedom mean to you?

Aliaa: Freedom means doing what you want and making your own choices so long as you don’t hurt others.  Real freedom to me is not a gift.  I can say I’m free because I practice my freedom even though I know I can be hurt for doing so. 

She did deny that she is the young woman shown in a YouTube video being kicked out of Tahrir Square and apparently beaten.  The video is disturbing whoever the young woman may have been, and I'm not embedding it here. It may explain her going underground, though.

I'll say more about the debate over Aliaa later, but first, her actress "emulators," though again, the pictures don't reveal much. I'll link to them but not publish them here only because I'm not their publicist and I know publicity stunts when I see them.

Pakistani actress Veena Malik seems to have an unusual career track for a Pakistani actress: after a career in Pakistan, lately she mostly acts in India, first on TV, now with aspirations in Bollywood. She appears on the cover of the Indian edition of FHM Magazine, apparently naked but with her arms and legs strategically placed. Noticeably, she has "ISI" tattooed or Photoshopped on her (strategically positioned) arm, which is of course the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence. This is causing a furor in the Pakistani social media, and I imagine it got ISI's attention as well.  Uri Friedman at Foreign Policy discusses the issue here. She has denied that she ever posed nude, claiming the cover must be photoshopped, but the Magazine Editor insists he has both video proof of the photoshoot and e-mail evidence she saw the pictures beforehand. Though I edit a very different sort of magazine, I tend to assume magazine editors have their legal bases covered. I also think India Today in the last link nails it: publicity stunt. Maybe she got cold feet when she learned of the reaction in Pakistan. She seems to spend most of her time in India and it's a Cosmopolitan cover level of "nudity" at best, so she's hardly the Pakistani Aliaa ElMahdy.  (If you must see the cover, all three links above reproduce it.) Though she might want to stay in India as long as her visa permits, unless she can come up with something else "ISI" could stand for.

I'm also unimpressed by the "Tunisian Aliaa ElMahdy." Actress Nadia Boussetta has appeared on her Facebook Page and, apparently, will appear in Tunivisions Magazine posing wearing a vest open down the front, but covering all but cleavage and her navel.You'll see more skin at the Oscars, or almost any beach; including, I might add, many Tunisian beaches catering to French, German and Italian tourists.  Calling this one "semi-nude" as many are is rather misleading if not downright deceptive outside of Afghanistan.  (Note that the last link, BikyaMasr in Egypt, transliterates her name "Bostah," but the Tunisian sites show it's Boussetta.) She has told the media that she intended no political statement (link in French) and seems to be pretty honest that she's just promoting her film, Hekayat Tunisia (Contes tunisiennes, Tunisian Stories), which, according to this article about worries over censorship in the new Tunisia, had already been raising hackles with Islamists for its candor. At least she's honest about doing PR for a movie, and frankly, the average Arab movie poster shows more. Only tabloid newspapers and Islamists would consider these "nude" pictures. The latter is particularly inoffensive.

I do, of course, recognize it takes a certain courage even for an actress to defy the conventions of her society. But I suspect their motives are pretty much aimed at promoting their careers. Aliaa ElMahdy's daring, whatever you may think of her judgment, is of a totally different scale, and may have denied her a career. She dropped out of the American University in Cairo, she told CNN in the link above, because her parents cut off her tuition when she moved out of their house. She is now apparently in hiding, though she or her boyfriend Kareem Amer occasionally post links or photos to social media.

While I don't want to emphasize her story overmuch, or fuel some of the more prurient discussions out there, she does represent an unprecedented defiance and transgression of the rules. Since it has been several weeks since my first post on the subject, it may be worth surveying, briefly at least, much of commentary on her act, which has been extensive.

Mona ElTahawy's post at The Guardian, "Egypt's Naked Blogger is a Bomb Aimed at the Patriarchs in Our Minds," is a frank discussion of her daring, and concludes:

When Mohammed Bouazizi, fed up with humiliation, repression and poverty, set himself on fire in Tunisia last January, essentially taking state abuse to its logical end, he ignited the revolutionary imagination of the Middle East and north Africa. Aliaa Mahdy, fed up with hypocrisy and sexual repression, undressed. She is the Molotov cocktail thrown at the Mubaraks in our heads – the dictators of our mind – which insists that revolutions cannot succeed without a tidal wave of cultural changes that upend misogyny and sexual hypocrisy.

One of the most extended discussions by an Arab woman on the subject is Maya Mikdashi's at Jadalyiyya, "Waiting for Alia." It deserves to be read in full. (Like Mona ElTahawy's post it reproduces the picture of Aliaa, uncensored, so be aware.) Among the key points:

The idea that female bodies are sacrosanct, and that somehow they are “protected” from overt sexualization in Egypt is false. Contrary to what many of Alia’s detractors and what many commentators on the Arab world have said, female bodies have long been the site of struggle, interrogation, harassment, and commodification throughout the region. In particular, Cairo is famous for being the premiere public ass-pinching, breast-grabbing, and body-rubbing capital of the Arab world. The fact is that a woman (unveiled or not) cannot walk down a crowded Cairene street or take a public bus without expecting, and thus constantly guarding herself against, sexual harassment. In recent months, females involved in protests at Tahrir Square were subjected to “virginity tests” by the military junta. The “virginity tests” were administered via the age-old method of inserting two (male soldiers') fingers into each woman's vagina. These women were violated in order to ascertain whether they had engaged in consensual sexual activities. Of course, the real point of these virginity tests is not to actually see if someone is a virgin. The point is to humiliate, threaten, and to demonstrate and reassert control over a body and through that individual body, the body public and the notion of “public morality.” The point is to terrorize, and the aim of terrorism is always to instill fear (and hope that that fear will incite self-policing) in a civilian population . . .

Of course, the female body is not only a site of political control and the regulation of patriarchal public morality. It is also a primary vehicle for making money. The horizontal and vertical cavalcade of visual imagery and signage that is ubiquitous throughout the city will have awed anyone who has been to Cairo. In Cairo and in Beirut, the little sister with a Napoleon complex, the public display of the sexualized female body is everywhere. Women in various stages of undress writhe and pose in film posters, advertisements, and publicity campaigns for female pop stars.

Mikdashi posts several videos and still pictures of video sexuality, lingerie ads, lurid movie posters and such, to prove her point that defense of the female form is not quite so obvious as ElMahdy's critics suggest.

(Let me add as an aside that though it's become shorthand for the entire world, I'm a little bothered by the "nude Egyptian blogger" label: she is known for only one blogpost, and I have no idea what she may have been wearing when she posted it.)

One of the best (at least of those I can reproduce on a PG-13 site) cartoon comments I have seen is this one by Kaveh Adel:

Most of you will recognize the emergence from conservative dress, through the feminist symbol, which Aliaa transforms into the Ankh, the Ancient Egyptian symbol of life. Adel's title is "From  Non-Existent to Life for Aalia AlMahdy." I hope that does indeed prove to be the outcome of her act.

Hoda Sha‘arawi

At least one blogger, Ashraf Ezzat, has argued ("Cry for Freedom by a Nude Egyptian Blogger") that Elmahdy's defiant act is somehow in continuity with the daring act of Hoda Sha‘arawi (1879-1947) appearing without her veil in 1923; my concern is that this will lead to a "slippery slope" argument among Islamists who think Hoda Sha‘arawi's act leads directly to Aliaa ElMahdy's.

There have been some efforts to persuade other Arab and Muslim women to emulate Aliaa, not counting the publicity seeking actresses mentioned above. A large number of Israeli women did pose nude in solidarity, though they showed a lot less than Aliaa did, at least in the linked photo, and they no doubt helped convince many in Egypt the whole thing was an Israeli-Zionist plot. Otherwise, publicity-seeking actresses excepted, she did not start a groundswell of nudity. A Facebook Page calling for "Nude Photo Revolutionaries" to post in solidarity went nowhere; a British-based feminist activist hasn't had much better luck.There are some posts in sympathy by a Tunisian woman living in Italy and an Iranian woman living in Denmark (where, in the minds of Islamists, everyone is naked all day and also drawing cartoons of the Prophet); both look like professional studio shoots and neither goes beyond toplessness, and rather demure at that, and I see no need to link: it's hardly a daring act in Italy or Denmark. Apparently one woman inside Iran did post a photo of her topless, not showing her face, but she took it down within 48 hours saying the authorities had discovered her real identity. I hope she's OK, and will not otherwise identify her (no longer extant) site.

Now to Aliaa's case itself. My remarks about the anodyne and rather Cosmopolitan-cover nature of the Pakistani and Tunisian actresses' "daring" photos comes not from disappointment but from dismay at the notion that they have done something as risky and transgressive as Aliaa ElMahdy. Do not, however, assume therefore that Aliaa's picure is somehow pornographic, though I have to get a little more specific in discussing it, and therefore if you're uncomfortable with the discussion, don't proceed, there's nothing here that should shock a mature adult.  Her picture is naked, yes, but not overtly sexual. The photo itself would seem mild in any Playboy from the 1970s or later, and downright lame in this century, to Western, jaded eyes. I'm still not going to print an uncensored version, since I don't want the MEI blog being banned in those countries that don't already ban it (Syria and Iran, last time I looked), but it's hard to talk further without a censored one, so one appears below. (Warning: clicking on it will take you the uncensored, fully nude, NSFW original.) The black circles are not there in the original and are not what she wanted the world to see, but as you can see from what is shown, she is not posing erotically, despite the mesh stockings, or seductively: her expression shows, I'd guess, both apprehension and defiance. The fact that, unlike her Pakistani and Tunisian alleged emulators, or even her foreign supporters posting topless pictures abroad, she hides nothing, is part of the whole transgressive nature of her act. 

Aliaa ElMahdy censored

[Again: clicking on the photo will not enlarge it: it will take you to an uncensored version.]
If you are one of the few people who have not yet seen her original and now heavily visited website, and if you don't feel awkward (she is only 20, and as the father of a daughter I do a bit, but have made the sacrifice for professional blogging reasons), then do so (click on the PG-13 picture at left for the original photo alone, or for the whole web posting, link here, but both sites contain full frontal female nudity, latter site  both female and male, and both are most definitely not safe for work).

This is not a pornographic picture. It's a picture of a young woman standing there, not wearing clothes. Most classical sculpture is more erotic.  Not everyone gets that, and here I have to be a little graphic, so if verbal discussions of nudity bother you, stop here. Annoyingly but not surprisingly when it first appeared, some commenters (mostly women and Westerners) praised her for her daring; many, predictably, of both sexes denounced her as a tool of the devil; some (mostly male) liberal Arabs suggested she would fuel the Islamists' wrath and therefore denounced her; and, completely missing the point, some younger Arab males have complained that her breasts aren't big enough. Let's look at that rather adolescent comment.

I cannot think of a more obvious way to completely miss what this young woman was trying, however awkwardly, to say. "Big enough" for what, exactly? She is not trying out for Playmate of the Month, or trying to be some silicone-enhanced starlet; she is not asking you to look at her breasts, or focus on her breasts, though she is welcoming you to look at them if you choose to: she is saying, simply, this is me, this is my body, and I'm not ashamed of it, and I don't give a flying fuck whether you think my boobs are big enough or not, because I'm not doing this for you; I'm doing it for me. It's about freedom, not whether some horndog Arab male thinks her tits are big enough for his masturbatory fantasies. The Internet is big: look elsewhere. Boobs are all over the place. Get your kicks there, not from her political statement. The derogatory remarks about her breast size make her point more than anything.

Unlike the actresses above (whose nonexplicit photos with hands and vests concealing their breasts call more attention to their hinted-at breasts than Aliaa's photo) and the occasional European-based women whose "solidarity" has been expressed by professional studio shots that show, at most, their breasts, this photo is not focused there or on any other body part: she's just there, naked, looking at the camera. In fact, if she'd only shown her breasts, I suspect it wouldn't be so controversial: as Mikdashi's post linked above notes, partially though not completely bare breasts are common in Arab movies (and more so in their billboards), lingerie ads, music videos, and much more. The fact that she displays her pubic area is the really transgressive act. Again, she doesn't flaunt it or call attention to it, but it raises alarm bells. But she's just there. Nothing flaunted, nothing concealed. But a lot of Arab commenters won't say this, because while breasts are taboo, down there is somewhere beyond taboo.

That's one of many things her sexist commenters are missing. She's saying, "hey, this is me, and who I really am," not, "hey guys, look at my big boobs." She's not showing them off, or bragging about them.  They're just part of her. Really. I shouldn't comment on a 20-year-old's body or you will think I'm a dirty old man, but she, and if you must know, they, her breasts, look pretty normal or average to me.  She's a young, slender, and attractive (sexually and otherwise), woman, but no more or less so because she is easily seen naked.  I blame Hugh Hefner for the American focus on big breasts (not that there's there's anything wrong with them, mind you, just they're not essential: a woman is not her mammary glands); in Egypt, I think it's the film industry and their highly suggestive billboards. This is what Aliaa is rejecting, not encouraging. She's not trying to titillate you (pun fully intended). Cool off, guys, you're totally missing her point. She wants you to think of her as a whole person. Stop salivating about breasts, boobs, tits. Look at the woman.

Most won't. That's one way her message may fail. "Nude" and "sexual" are equated in, not just the Arab world, but still in large parts of my own country.  Not so many years ago some Internet blockers were blocking breast cancer sites because of the word "breast." I hope that doesn't happen to this post,  which also includes words like "nude" and "naked," "tits" and boobs," and even worse: but that's a reminder that we're not that far away from where Egypt is.

Since I'm already deep into the subject, and have probably already offended some readers, let me say a few more things. Whether or not this daring act was wise will, of course, depend upon one's individual definitions of what is acceptable; it was unquestionably daring, and it captured the imagination of many female Arab feminists as well as the international media. But most of those praising it are female and outspoken feminists already (Mona ElTahawy, Maya Mikdashi, both excerpted above) or Western men and women with Western assumptions. While the wisdom of the posting is disputable, there are Arab pornographic sites and personal sites that show as much or more: she posted it to the whole web, and made it political. She really has thrown the bomb into the minds of many people.

She may not be the new Hoda al-Sha‘arawi, though I am unsure that's a completely irrelevant metaphor. I just hope she does not regret, as apparently she already may, her profoundly transgressive and defiant fame. She is forever the "nude Egyptian blogger," whatever else she may do after the age of 20, though she hasn't blogged much and, for all I know, was clothed when she did.

MEI's Weinbaum on the Taliban after Rabbani Assassination

My MEI colleague Scholar in Residence Marvin Weinbaum offers his views sat The National Interest on the Taliban after the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani.

And Now, Baluchi Mercenaries in Bahrain

Bruce Riedel in The National Interest  discusses how the Bahraini government is hiring Baluchi "mercenaries" in Pakistan — retired soldiers and police — to serve in the police and Bahrain Defense Force. So, following the earlier Saudi/UAE intervention, Bahrain is importing still more Sunnis, these not even Arab, to control its restive Shi‘a majority. Not a good sign.

Revealed: Is This How Bin Laden Escaped Detection in a Major Town Full of Military Camps?

So Usama bin Laden was hiding in a large compound in the midst of a major town which includes military camps and, near the Bin Laden hideout, a major military academy. Many will no doubt say that the Pakistani Army has got some 'splainin' to do, but there may be a more innocent explanation, as Monty Python demonstrates:

Jundallah Claims Credit for Chabahar Bombing on Eve of ‘Ashura

A mosque bombing in the Iranian city of Chabahar has killed at least 39 people, and has been claimed by the Sunni movement Jundallah (Army of God), which has staged attacks against Shi‘ites in southeastern Iran; this attack came on the eve of the Shi‘ite mourning day of ‘Ashura. The target of the attack was the Imam Hussein mosque, named for the martyr of Karbala', so it is clearly aimed at outraging Shi‘ites.

Jundallah operates in southeastern Iran, reportedly from bases inside Pakistan. Iran claims Jundallah is backed by the United States, though this is denied by the US, which now classifies Jundallah as a terrorist group.

India, China Stepping Up Training in Afghanistan?

An interesting piece in The National datelined New Delhi and indicating that India and China are both looking at increasing their training presence in Afghanistan, looking towards the day the US withdraws.

India has, of course, long had an involvement in Afghanistan, usually either covert or at least mostly under-the-radar, since it clearly sees a need to offset Pakistani influence in the country. China is a bit less obvious, but it is certainly concerned with the role the Taliban and Al-Qa‘ida have played in encouraging radicalization of China's Uighur (East Turkestani) separatists in Xinjiang.

It's a reminder that the Great Game in Central Asia is still very much afoot, and will be when the US leaves as well.

Halford Mackinder, please call your office.

Story of An Alleged Hostage Deal

A colleague calls my attention to this story, "How Iran and Al-Qaeda Made a Deal." It's from the Hong Kong-based Asia Times Online and may be disinformation, but since I've seen nothing elsewhere on this I thought I'd call it to your attention.

Two Recent Al-Qa‘ida Items

A couple of recent items of Al-Qa‘ida-related interest:

• From Jihadica, "Did the Quetta Shura Break with Al-Qaida?
• In the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, Michael W.S. Ryan on Zawahiri on Pakistan, among other items. (PDF)

Great Games and Small, India and Afghanistan: The Often Neglected Player

Yesterday's major suicide bombing attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul was a reminder of a fact that is generally clear enough in the strategic vision of the regional country players but is often forgotten in Washington: India is still, as it has been for centuries, a player in Afghanistan. In our Western tendency to divide the world, while we consider Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India all part of South Asia in some sense, we tend to shrug India off as separate from the Muslim World and thus not really a player in the "Great Game" in its modern incarnation. The locals don't make that mistake. Pakistan sees India as its primary strategic enemy, and India accordingly sees a strategic value in counterbalancing Pakistan's interest by supporting, first the pro-Soviet, and now the pro-Western, regime in Afghanistan. That makes the pro-Taliban elements hostile to India, though they and al-Qa‘ida were already so over the Kashmir issue, which actually is a major one for some of their ideologues. Kashmir moves many Pakistanis deeply, but also the radicals of al-Qa‘ida.

Nothing I've said here is news to the regional specialists, but oddly it's possible to read serious pieces about the "AfPak" theater, as it's now called, that barely mention India (or China). The fact that the world's two most populous countries, both of them with fast growing economies and both of them with nuclear weapons, border Afghanistan and Pakistan is not, actually, a peripheral geopolitical consideration. Obviously, whoever bombed the Indian Embassy in Kabul was aware of that.

Aluf Benn on a Possible Attack on Iran

Since the death of Ze'ev Schiff, Aluf Benn, the defense analyst at Ha'aretz, has been one of Israel's most reliable defense journalists. His "Cries of 'hold me back' may lead Israel to strike Iran" is most assuredly worthy of your attention.

I think the Israeli realists, including Defense Minister Ehud Barak and many in the IDF general staff, understand both the fundamental problems of an attack on Iran if the US isn't on board (logistics, refueling, violation of airspace) and the potential blowback through Hizbullah, Hamas, Sadrists in Iraq, and potential disruption of tanker traffic in the Gulf. But that still does not completely reassure, and I hope that the negotiations with Iran later this week can find a modus vivendi, even if it's only a temporary figleaf. The fact that Israel's nuclear arsenal is rarely part of the debate is, of course, a bit bizarre. If no on else in the region had nuclear weapons, why would Iran need them? But Pakistan does, Russia does, India does, and Israel does. And Americans sitting in Iraq and Afghanistan have them too, though not necessarily in theater. If I were sitting in Iran's seat, I'd want a deterrent too. Oddly enough, we weren't nearly this worried about the Shah's nuclear ambitions in the 70s.

I'm not defending Iran here, but I'm saying something I've said many times before: whoa, let's not start the nonproliferation regime with "okay, Israel, Pakistan, and India have the bomb, but you can't have it." Let's suggest instead, can we all dial this back a bit? Proliferation did not begin with Iran. And it still insists that it is pursuing a peaceful program. (Okay, I don't believe it either.) But let me also remind everyone that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) allow signatories (of which Iran is one, but Israel, India and Pakistan are not) to break out of the treaty on six months' notice. That means Iran could simply withdraw from the treaty and develop nuclear weapons without violating any treaty obligations,

Oh, sure, I see the problems. But I also see that much of the Arab and Persian and Turkic speaking worlds see a real European/American double standard at work here.

Let's hope we can all find a modus vivendi here. I think Khamene'i and Larijani and others have been saying some pretty hopeful things. (Ahmadinejad doesn't control the nuclear program: he's just grandstanding and demagoguing.)

Homework

I'm tired of always calling this "Weekend Reading," and my daughter starts fourth grade Monday so we've been talking about the imminent return of homework, so I think I'll call it that for now. Should you feel the need to spend still more time reading about the Middle East, here are some items:

• Podcasts of recent events at MEI: On August 27 (yesterday), US Ambassador to Kuwait Deborah Jones gave a briefing on Kuwait; I attended this one and she was pretty forthcoming, especially in the Q&A. Also, from August 19, Dr. Shamsh Kassim-Lakha on "Development Challenges in Pakistan." Podcasts begin to play when you click on the link.

• Dana Moss, a Libya specialist at WINEP, has some thoughts on Qadhafi's 40th anniversary of the revoloution and his forthcoming visit to the UN. (I'll post about the whole Englewood, New Jersey controversy at some point. Qadhafi setting up his tent in Jersey is just too good to leave alone.)

• A friend and reader passes along this article on the Al-Ghosaibi family's claim that they have been the victims of a massive fraud by a Dubai bank. From the Financial Times.

• The same reader also recommends this peace by Hazem El-Beblawi, "Political Identity and Economic Interest." Also worth a read.
  

Pakistan's Mehsud Dead (Again)

The Pakistani Taliban, who had previously denied that their leader Baitullah Mehsud had been killed — as widely reported by the US and Pakistani authorities — in a US missile attack August 5 (although they had announced his replacement), are now saying he was wounded in the attack but finally died this past Sunday. So at least there is no lingering mystery: if he wasn't dead already, he is now.