Lebanese television station Al-Jadeed released another titillating episode in its series “Haqiqa Leaks” a few days ago, this time featuring the notorious Hussam Hussam, a Syrian intelligence agent who came forward early in the Hariri investigation with information incriminating Syrian and Lebanese security officials.

Hussam, like Siddiq (who was the star of his own Haqiqa Leaks primetime special), would later recant his story and claim that he was pressured by March 14th figures to fabricate his testimony. The leaked recording is from an interview conducted with him by a member of the U.N. investigation team in Damascus in 2007. It’s full of all kinds of accusations, among them that he was tortured by Gerhard Lehmann in a subterranean building abutting the headquarters of the Special Tribunal in Monteverdi (a residential neighborhood just northeast of Beirut), and that he was offered $5 million by Saad al-Hariri to round up other false witnesses to help substantiate the tale that he was made to tell.

According to the STL, neither Siddiq nor Hussam’s testimonies are part of the evidence presented to the pre-trial judge, having been deemed unreliable once they recanted. This will not stop many from continuing to argue, however, that the entire case is based on false witness testimony…

And whether or not one chooses to believe a word that the guy says, it’s obvious that whoever is behind these leaks knows just how damaging they will be to the Tribunal’s credibility in Lebanon. Does al-Jadeed have their own Bradley Manning deep in the bowels of the STL’s offices in The Hague? How much more embarrassing material is waiting to be revealed, and when will we see other parties circulating their own “leaks” to counter the Al-Jadeed narrative?

More importantly: don’t you just love Lebanese politics? Not content to be the first country ever to trigger a UN Special Tribunal devoted to the prosecution of a political murder, we are also the first country to coopt the Wikileaks phenomenon (and brand) in the service of undermining said Tribunal. Ghazi Kanaan didn’t know who he was dealing with when he told the Lebanese to stick to entertainment and leave the politics to Syria. Talk about a false choice.

(I’ll  be traveling for the next few days, so please behave yourselves in the comment section…)
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If recent history is any indication, this is probably the conversation taking place in the Egyptian presidential palace right about now…


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To join or not to join? That is the question that Michael Young and many other Lebanese analysts have been asking, as PM-designate Najib Miqati sets about trying to form a government. Young comes down on the side of Hariri’s participation in the Hizbullah-led March 8th coalition cabinet, but on the condition that March 14th can secure a minority veto.

Meanwhile, today’s editorial at staunchly pro-M14 website Now Lebanon argues in favor of boycotting the Miqati government as a way of staying true to the ideals of majoritarian government:

A majority government is what March 14 wanted after winning the May 2009 parliamentary elections, but it was denied the right after the opposition’s blocking third was imposed upon it. It therefore came as no surprise that what was sold to the people as a national-unity government built on supposed consensus turned out to be a mechanism for governmental inertia.

March 14 must now demonstrate the values it advocated in government as an organized and focused opposition. For to accept to be part of Mikati’s new administration would undermine the coalition’s previous calls for majority rule, to stand or fall according to its performance. It would also highlight the lust for power rather than the desire to create a genuine parliamentary process. And in this way, it will have set itself apart from its political opponents.

Alas, NOW Lebanon’s argument would make more sense if the legislative branch of the Lebanese government was actually empowered to provide oversight over the executive, but that is sadly not the case. As Michel Aoun found out the hard way in 2005, sitting out a government in Lebanon gives you little more than the right to vociferous but anemic protest. There are very few mechanisms in place that permit a principled opposition to also be one that is effective at prosecuting the case against the ruling party in the public sphere.

QN‘s community of highly opinionated political strategists went to town a couple days ago in the comment section of the last post, debating the merits of Hariri’s various options. I recommend you check out the whole thread, but here are some interesting contributions:

(For those of you unfamiliar with the increasing stock of Lebanese political acronyms, here’s  a quick guide to navigating the below comments: M14 = March 14; M8 = March 8; FM = Future Movement; HA = Hizbullah; STL = Special Tribunal for Lebanon; FPM = Free Patriotic Movement; QN = Qifa Nabki)

MM writes:

“1-Future Movement need not participate in this government if M14 is to get a blocking third.

2-Giving the PM (Mikati in this case) the free hand to choose Sunni Ministers works in favor of Hariri in the future.

3- Mikati is being put on the defense and with regards to any political salvation within his community he will have to be an extra stubborn defender of “sunni rights” (if there is such a thing)within the government. I don’t doubt that he will.

4- With regards to the STL, if there is a blocking third to M14 then this third will try to thwart any cancellation attempts of the STL and resign at will when most appropriate.

5- Everybody needs to look ahead to the 2013 elections. We all know that the real electoral battles will be in Christian areas and the biggest prize is the vote of Aounis or quasi Aounis who are with the STL, and they are many. (yes there will be some extra seats up for grabs in the Mountains as well)

6-FM should prop their christian allies in the next government and they should give up any seats allocated to the FM to their Christian allies.

7- FM should stay out of the government and should work on putting its house in order. (A tall and arduous assignment)”

Gabriel says:

“M14 should sit out as opposition. Mikati should be given free reign. Let’s see what he’s made of. Will he follow the path of truth and justice, or will he buckle like a deck of cards.”

Tosk59 writes:

“Your scenarios assume that HA (and M8) actually want a government in place… My thought is that after pulling the plug they ‘leaned’ on enough folks (Jumblatt) to deny M14 a majority and the ability to get their PM and govt. This means that M8 has a majority, and they put forward a PM candidate to prove it, but will NOT form a govt. They will spend the next several weeks and months talking a lot about a unity government, but making it as difficult for Hariri as possible, and counting on him to not go along with it. However, they will refrain from setting up a M8-only version.

Essentially, the name of the game *right now* is to temporize and buy time, pending the STL indictments being made public (and then seeing how it pans out). Rather than a M14 govt backing the STL, or a M8 govt against the STL (but not credible), best for them right now would be NO government. Clearly this is not tenable for the long haul, but HA is in a tough spot and buying time is the best they can do *right now*…”

S writes:

“QN, There is a third option that you missed. If Future does not join the government (or even if it does), Hizballah can remain outside of it by choosing not to have any ministers in the government, and thus technically remaining in the opposition. They have already announced that they will not take part, and I wonder if this means zero cabinets for them. In many ways though, I think many people will then call this a puppet government with the Hizb effectively controlling it from the outside. But this would be one way to keep Future in check and also to answer your question of how to minimize Future’s effectiveness as an opposition. Mikati has suggested a government of technocrats. That’s another option.”

David writes:

“For lots of reasons, everyone wants to make this about HA’s encounter with “national politics,” but just as interesting (and just as vexing for the concerned party) is that of Hariri, Jr.’s. Can HA as we know it survive leading a governing coalition: possibly not. Can Sheikh Saad survive being outside the government: possibly not.

What we have now is a weakening of both positions: Hariri is now even more dependent on his “foreign support” and HA is now even more dependent on their Lebanese and Syrian allies. Does this relative and respective weakening make them more amenable to a coming deal? Probably. Will some Lebanese get killed in the process? Hopefully not.

Was there a deal? Is there a deal? Who knows, who cares. The real crisis point remains where “they” always prefer it: in the near distance. And really that’s the thing about inevitability: it’s always around the next corner.”

J. Estiphan writes:

“I think what is most likely to happen is that the Future Bloc/Lebanese Forces “March 14″ will be a Loyal Opposition, and a constructive Opposition with a coherent programme. They can have influence on individual laws and in the committees of Parliament and just by helping to frame the debate ahead of the 2013 elections. It could be the start of something closer to a two party alternate governing arrangement.”

New-at-posting writes:

“In terms of Hizbullah’s political strategy, there is another option that hasn’t been considered in the post above: allow M14 a blocking third in the cabinet but focus on corruption & false witnesses, rather than pulling out of the STL. It’s possible that they no longer have an interest in the government pulling out of the STL; perhaps that is part of the “before/after the indictment” difference. In a recent speech, SHN mentioned the false witnesses issue, corruption and “conspiracy against the Resistance” as issues the opposition won’t be silent about; he’s also made a separation between the two tracks of gov’t & STL. “Conspiracy against the Resistance” is certainly vague, but it does leave open the possibility that they’ve moved on to a new phase in which getting the gov’t to pull out of the STL doesn’t matter. Maybe an investigation into the false witnesses will do enough to discredit the STL… So maybe that’s the end-game (for now)? If the M8 government focuses on corruption and false witnesses, does M14 really have a good reason to bring down the government?”

UPDATE:

Mickanthrope’s comment on this thread was too good not to post up here:

“1. Mikati will assemble a consensus cabinet, in which neither Hizbullah nor FM are represented. Today, Mikati emphasized his “technocratic” approach. This cabinet will consolidate the Opposition’s victory in the battle since 2005 on whether government should be governed by consensus or majoritarian decision-making. They won this as a concession to return to the government after the first walk-out (with the promise that decisions will be made by consensus not majority vote). Then, at Doha, won this again with the formation of the new cabinet (ensuring a blocking third). Then, after with the formation of the government 6 months after the elections, they consolidated this formation. To their credit, both M14 and the opposition have stood by their principled positions: M14 for majoritarian government; opposition for consensus. My prediction: Opposition will prove its position on consensus government by allowing a technocratic cabinet in which (and I agree here with S) there are no Hizbullah ministers (thus taking the wind out of the sails of those who would raise concerns about a Hizbullah-dominated cabinet); FM of M14 will prove its stance on majoritarian, but the rest will opt-in (since a majoritarian stance only favors Sunnis in confessional calculations). The formation of a consensus cabinet of technocrats of the various confessions (rather than zaims) will settle the dispute about the cabinet left unresolved by the ambiguous language of Taif. I also agree with “New to Posting” that this cabinet would address “false witness” etc rather than pulling out of STL.

2. Even with a technocratic consensus cabinet, we might still see clashes in the coming weeks:

A. February 10 GLC strike. Previous clashes (in Jan 2007 and May 2008) coincided with GLC strikes. The relationship between the opposition and the GLC (which offers power of the street) has been recognized by M14 to the extent that Harb and other M14 politicians have sought to shift the leadership of the GLC and generate competing commissions.

B. Feb 14. After the day of rage, this will likely involve street actions. Moreover, if FM sees the cabinet moving forward without them, this will increase the “rage” factor.

C. Nasrallah specifically de-linked cabinet negotiations with response to the indictments and the STL. If the indictments are leaked around that time, then this could be an epic conflagration. If I were very cynical and conspiratorial (which I am sometimes), I would suggest that if the cabinet appears to be going in a direction that consolidates Hizbullah power (formally or informally), the indictments could be leaked opportunistically to instigate street action that would discredit Hizbullah and take the wind out of the sails of a new cabinet that M14 does not dominate. Right now, the US seems to be taking a “wait and see” attitude toward Mikati (til the cabinet is formed, presumably). Hariri seems to be playing hardball–indeed far harder than his hand seems to warrant. Why would be be doing so if he were not receiving reassurance that he would be backed?”

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The political story in Lebanon is changing so quickly that I’m loathe to forecast how things are going to play out over the next couple of weeks. A few quick thoughts, though, on the calculations of the various players and the choices they face:

1. Tables are turned

Lebanon’s Sunnis are calling for a “day of rage”, but  it’s more apt to call it a day of deep hypocrisy and cynicism. Consider the following:

  • In 2005, after winning a majority in the elections, the March 14th coalition wanted to nominate a Shiite Speaker of Parliament other than Nabih Berri. The main Shiite parties, Hizbullah and Amal, made a big fuss over this and claimed that such a move would violate that infamously vague clause of the Lebanese Constitution (Preamble, j), which states that “there shall be no constitutional legitimacy for any authority which contradicts the pact of communal existence.” March 14th acquiesced and appointed Berri.
  • In 2006, Hizbullah and Amal withdrew from the Siniora government and then called it illegal and unconstitutional because of the lack of Shiite participation. Speaker Berri then refused to allow Parliament to convene for over a year and a half, so as to prevent the body from ratifying the Lebanese government’s cooperation agreement with the UN Special Tribunal (later passed via Chapter VII), and voting on Emile Lahoud’s presidential successor. (I recommend reading Gary Gambill’s superb discussion of the 2006 constitutional crisis for more background on this issue.)

So, these two parties — Hizbullah and Amal — have played the “consensual democracy” card to the hilt over the past six years, using its logic to demand executive appointments, block legislation, and, eventually, bring down Hariri’s government. And yet, today, these same parties are the ones acting like the fish-out-of-water majoritarians whom they accused March 14′s leaders of being between 2005-09.

Meanwhile, March 14th supporters are calling for a day of Sunni rage, burning cars, and rioting in the streets, while the West threatens Hizbullah to respect Lebanon’s pact of communal coexistence. How d’ya like them apples?

2. Consensual vs. majoritarian democracy

While I sympathize with those who chafe at the hypocrisy of March 8th’s newfound majoritarian impulses, I strongly support the democratic principle that legitimizes Hizbullah’s current move. The March 8th coalition is now Lebanon’s parliamentary majority. They should have the right to bring down this government and form their own. Governments fall all the time, all around the world. This should be able to happen in Lebanon without sparking sectarian protests.

On a slightly more abstract note, I found myself wondering today (as I did back during the 2006-08 constitutional crisis), what effect the majority coalition’s pro-democracy rhetoric would have on Lebanon’s political culture in the long term. The fact that we’ve seen both sides of the political divide appealing to a majoritarian logic within the space of six years seems significant to me. No?

Obviously, what I would like to see happen is for this new method of choosing prime ministers (and speakers) to be enshrined in the Constitution, such that we don’t keep flip-flopping between consensual and majoritarian procedures every other year. A precedent has been set. Let’s stick with it. But you can bet that won’t happen.

3. Another desperate move?

Setting aside the cynicism of Hizbullah’s political strategy, I continue to think that it’s somewhat desperate and uncharacteristically short-sighted. What has Hizbullah really achieved by replacing Hariri with Miqati? The Daily Star (now owned by Hariri, fyi), argues vociferously against Miqati’s candidacy today in its editorial, on the basis that he is not a consensus candidate and that he would have had to agree to March 8th’s conditions with regard to the Tribunal before being nominated.

But even if Miqati did agree to doing the opposition’s (excuse me, “the new majority’s”) bidding, isn’t it obvious that he can’t end Lebanon’s cooperation with the STL on his own? He needs the cabinet to vote on it. And since both he and Nasrallah are currently calling for a national unity government, the Miqati government would effectively be hamstrung by the same conditions that Hariri’s was, and so any move to withdraw the Lebanese judges from the court, stop financing, and abrogate the cooperation agreement could be torpedoed by Hariri’s coalition. The only way that Hizbullah and its allies could ram through their agenda on the STL would be by either:

  1. denying March 14th a blocking third in the cabinet, which would be the biggest act of chutzpah I’ve seen since… well, since Hizbullah appointed a Sunni PM other than Hariri;
  2. counting on the fact that Hariri would refuse to join their government, thus giving March 8th leeway to do whatever they wanted.

The first option is highly unlikely; the second is deeply unsatisfactory, as it will simply re-energize Hariri’s base in Lebanon, and make Hizbullah look like it is willing to contravene every principle, custom, and precedent of Lebanese consociationalism in order to suffocate the STL. And it wouldn’t work! That’s what so desperate and puzzling about this whole strategy. The court has been set in motion. The evidence is going to be made public sooner or later. It’s just that it will now come out with an angry Sunni audience in Lebanon led by a politician who has less to gain than ever from playing by Hizbullah’s rules. Had they tried to find a way to put Humpty-Dumpty back together again, they could have at least made Hariri do the talking when Lebanon got around to formally denouncing the STL indictments. Now it will have to be Miqati, who has already been branded as a Hizbullah puppet. (That’s too bad, because I think he’s actually light years more competent and a better fit to be PM than Hariri will ever be.)

What would you do if you were in Hariri’s shoes? Join the government and play the role of spoiler (as Hizbullah/FPM have done since 2008)? Or stay out of the government, hoping that March 8th will fall on its sword before the 2013 elections? The floor is open.

PS: Andrew Exum has a very interesting piece on where Israel fits into this picture.

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The above graph provides a visual representation of the current balance of power in the Lebanese Parliament. (Click for large PDF version)

Last Saturday, Lebanon’s As-Safir newspaper published an excellent analysis of the different possible scenarios that could lead to the nomination of a new Prime Minister. It sheds important light on the political math behind the question of who will lead Lebanon, now that Saad al-Hariri’s government has fallen. Download the As-Safir report here. (The above graph, produced by a friend of mine, puts the basic balance of power in visual context for all of you non-Arabic speakers.)

According to Article 53.2 of the Lebanese Constitution, the Prime Minister is appointed by the President of the Republic following binding consultations with Parliament. In other words, Parliament basically votes for the new Prime Minister, but does so via the back-room politicking of the “presidential consultations” ritual.

The solid parliamentary majority that March 14th won during the 2009 elections evaporated once Walid Jumblatt decided to forge his own path independent of his former allies. Today, Jumblatt is playing the role of kingmaker, which is one of the principal reasons he dropped out of March 14th in the first place. The question of who will be Lebanon’s next Prime Minister turns on Jumblatt’s decision to stick with Saad al-Hariri, betray him to the opposition, or abstain and let the MPs in his bloc make up their own minds about where to hang their hats.

Which brings us to the numbers game. As-Safir outlines four possible scenarios for how the various parliamentary blocs and independents might vote, once President Sleiman gets around to launching the consultation session:

  1. Status quo: March 14th’s 55 MPs are joined by Jumblatt’s bloc of 11 MPs plus 6 independents (Miqati, Safadi, Fattoush, etc.) leading to a majority of 71 to the opposition’s 57 votes. Result: Saad al-Hariri is re-appointed (71-57)
  2. Stalemate #1: Jumblatt’s bloc is split such that 4 MPs vote with March 14th, and 7 vote with March 8th, while the independents also vote for March 14th. Result: Deadlock in the Parliament (64-64).
  3. Stalemate #2: Two members of Jumblatt’s bloc vote with March 14th but the rest abstain along with all of the independents. Result: No majority for either side (57-57).
  4. March 8th prevails: Most of Jumblatt’s bloc and some of the independents vote with the opposition, while March 14th only attracts six additional votes. Result: March 8th names a new Prime Minister (67-61)

Hizbullah and the Free Patriotic Movement have already declared that Hariri will not be their candidate, while Berri and Jumblatt have been more circumspect, preferring to find a way to re-nominate Hariri as part of a larger deal on Lebanon’s response to the Special Tribunal indictments. When push comes to shove, Berri will line up with his allies in the opposition, but Jumblatt is still wavering. This explains the Druze leader’s recent meetings with Bashar al-Assad as well as U.S. Ambassador Maura Connelly’s meetings with MPs like Nicola Fattoush: both sides are trying to pressure the independents to break for their allies.

This may sound over-optimistic, but as bleak as things look these days, the fact that politics in Lebanon still comes down to a matter of counting votes and persuading (read: intimidating?) MPs to vote one way or another strikes me as something to feel good about. Sort of.

UPDATE: 7:45 PM (Beirut time)

Saad al-Hariri just gave a televised address to the nation from his residence in Beirut. Here are the basic points:

  • I will not sacrifice the dignity of my family and my father’s memory just for the sake of politics (read: I’m not going to cut a deal on the STL)
  • I was willing to look for some kind of compromise in order to safeguard Lebanon’s stability, but the various foreign initiatives to reach this compromise were met by the opposition’s refusal to re-nominate me as Prime Minister (read: I’m not going to cut a deal on the STL)
  • We (i.e. March 14th) will go to the parliamentary consultations when President Sleiman launches them, and we will accept their outcome because we support the Constitution and not the politics of the street.

I have to say that I thought this was a surprisingly decent performance by Hariri. He put a positive spin on the possibility that he will not be nominated PM, and he also sent the message to his followers to shy away from any acts of civil disobedience that may result from the transfer of power.

If the opposition does succeed in mustering the votes necessary to bring Omar Karami into office (as is being reported now), then I would hope that Hariri would sit that government out and leave March 8th to face the music. A cult of consensus has poisoned the well of Lebanese governance for far too long, and I’m tired of hearing excuses  from this side or that about why nothing seems to get done.

More later…
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It’s been another marathon day for political deal-making in Lebanon. As recently as this morning, the Syrian-Saudi initiative remained dead and buried, only to be resurrected under Qatari-Turkish stewardship (and French oversight) by the afternoon.  Tomorrow, we may see the Brazilians and the Russians tossing their hats in the ring, and before you know it, the Tasmanians will be elbowing their way to the bar as well.

Lebanon’s speaker of parliament Nabih Berri was quoted in a story in An-Nahar today confirming the terms of the Syrian-Saudi initiative, which were first discussed by Hizbullah Secretary-General Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah in his speech on Sunday evening. These terms, as you will recall, were based upon the following three demands by the opposition:

  1. that Lebanon end its financial support of the U.N. Special Tribunal (STL);
  2. that the Lebanese judges be withdrawn from the court;
  3. and that the treaty of cooperation between Lebanon and the court be annulled.

According to Berri, there was a last-ditch effort on Sunday to reach an agreement with Saad al-Hariri on this deal (before the UN Prosecutor Daniel Bellemare could file his indictment to the pre-trial judge on Monday), but it fell through. Had Hariri accepted, he would have presumably been re-nominated prime minister by the opposition. Instead, he turned it down, which led to a flurry of diplomatic activity meant to prevent the security situation in Lebanon from spinning out of control.

The Daily Star is reporting that the Turks and Qataris have stepped in where the Syrians and Saudis failed, and are apparently close to hammering out an agreement which is based on the earlier initiative. While we wait to hear how this pans out, I thought it would be worth reflecting on the opposition’s demands, and what they tell us about how Hizbullah and Hariri view the consequences of the Tribunal.

First of all, as Nasrallah himself noted in his speech, even if Hariri were to accept the three-point plan, this would not bring an end to the STL’s proceedings. This morning, I interviewed the STL Registrar, Herman von Hebel, and he had this to say about the issue of financing:

I’m very confident that we will be able to get the financial support for the budget. Lebanon continues to be obliged to cooperate with the Tribunal and provide financial support – regardless of the state of the government. There remains strong support for the Tribunal in the international community: 20-25 countries around the world are supporting us financially. Following the issuance of the indictment, we have only seen increased attention and support. So, I am confident that even if Lebanon’s share (49% of the budget) were not provided, we would be able to continue our work with contributions from other states.

Similarly, I imagine that withdrawing the Lebanese judges would not represent an insurmountable obstacle for the STL, nor would the annulment of the agreement between the STL and the Lebanese government be anything more than a symbolic move, since the agreement was never ratified by Parliament anyway (it was imposed by Chapter VII).

So, if these three steps make no practical difference to the functioning of the STL, why are they so important to Hizbullah? No one in Lebanon would believe that Hariri and March 14th had changed their true position on the STL even if they did agree to “distance” themselves from it using these measures. So why insist on the charade? On the other hand, because the indicted individuals will almost certainly have to be tried in absentia (since the Lebanese Army can’t be trusted to break up a street fight in Zoqaq al-Blat, let alone arrest a member of Hizbullah and put him on a plane to The Hague), does it really matter, practically speaking, what the Lebanese government’s official stance is on the STL? And if not, why didn’t Hariri accept the proposed settlement?

The obvious answer to these questions is that Hizbullah is seeking to put another dent in the STL’s public image, so as to mitigate any anticipated tarnishing of its own image. I say that this is the “obvious” answer only because it’s the one that people typically offer whenever talk of the Tribunal’s consequences comes up. But the truth is that no one really knows how (or if) the trial will impact Hizbullah’s image once the trial begins. In my opinion, that will depend entirely on the kind of evidence that is marshalled, and not on any transparent political games being played in Beirut.

More on this tomorrow…
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Here are some quick thoughts on Hizbullah secretary-general Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah’s speech this evening, which I live-blogged here (see here for another English translation).

Firstly, I found Nasrallah’s discussion of the terms of the Syrian-Saudi initiative to be quite interesting. If Saad al-Hariri really did agree to the opposition’s demands that they (a) withdraw the Lebanese judges; (b) stop funding; and (c) abrogate the cooperation agreement with the STL, then this is noteworthy. What were, I wonder, al-Hariri and the Saudis’ demands? It seems unlikely to me that al-Hariri and his allies would have agreed to these three demands, which amount to essentially torpedoing public trust in the STL, even if it would not have brought the actual Tribunal to a close (as Nasrallah pointed out).

Secondly, the fact that Nasrallah is able to make so much hay out of the false witness issue is entirely the fault of Hariri himself and his political advisors. As I’ve argued in the past, Hariri’s people have failed miserably in shaping the debate on the false witnesses, while the opposition has basically taken the issue and run with it. Even as we speak, the al-Jadid recording is changing minds in Lebanon, even though it more or less confirms what March 14 politicians have consistently (but poorly) articulated, namely that Siddiq was not fed information by Hariri’s people.

Thirdly, Nasrallah did an excellent job of framing the resignation of the opposition in terms of their dissatisfaction with the Hariri government on a number of fronts (corruption, lack of transparency, incompetence, false witnesses, vulnerability to foreign pressure, etc.) rather than just its commitment to the STL. Earlier in the day, Michel Aoun had similarly made a persuasive and typically belligerent case against Hariri’s government, articulating the reasons that the opposition had decided to abandon the national unity path. The question is: does Nasrallah know something that the rest of us don’t, with respect to Nabih Berri’s nomination decision? All of this will become clearer in the next couple of days.

Finally, allow me to reiterate a basic point that I’ve made several times before: can anyone doubt that the opposition has the big guns (rhetorically speaking) in Lebanon? Here we have Hasan Nasrallah, the leader of a conservative religious-political party and a militia stronger than the Lebanese army that is about to be accused by the United Nations of masterminding the assassination of a Sunni prime minister, and he sounds like the most reasonable, rational, straightforward politician in Lebanon. Note that I am not agreeing with the content of what he said (which was, let’s face it, just another shade of demagoguery like everyone else’s talking points), but simply pointing out the obvious: Hizbullah would be in a vastly different position in Lebanon today were it not for the leadership of Hasan Nasrallah. No one else would be capable of reconciling the manifold contradictions in Hizbullah’s projected identity and framing their program in as capacious and catholic a manner as Nasrallah. To understate his role is to misunderstand the rise of Hizbullah completely, in my opinion.

The floor is open.

UPDATE: Trella.org has the transcript of the second Al-Jadid recording. And here’s the actual recording on YouTube.
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Hizbullah secretary-general Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah will give a live televised address this evening at 8:30 PM Beirut time (6:30 PM GMT). Arabic speakers outside Lebanon will almost certainly be able to watch the speech on this website. For non-speakers, I will be live-blogging and translating the speech here.

I expect Nasrallah to address the following topics:

  1. The reason for the opposition’s walk-out, and the failure of the Saudi-Syrian initiative.
  2. The formation of the next government: will Hizbullah agree to re-nominate Hariri if he agrees to their conditions, or are they committed to a different candidate altogether?
  3. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s indictments against Hizbullah, which are expected to be given to the pre-trial judge tomorrow.
  4. The tape released by al-Jadeed featuring Hariri discussing his father’s murder with Muhammad Zuhayr al-Siddiq.

Because Nasrallah’s speeches tend to run a little bit long, I imagine that al-Jadeed will release Part Two of their scoop before 8:30 PM. Will try to bring some commentary on that as well, but it may have to wait until tomorrow.

Stay tuned.

*

8:30 PM: Nasrallah begins speech by discussion the Syrian-Saudi initiative.

8:35: It was clear from the beginning that indictments were not going to be canceled. This was out of Saudi hands. It was in American and Israeli hands. What we were negotiating over was: (1) Postponing the emergence of the indictment; (2) Finding a way to preserve Lebanon from any strife resulting from the indictments.

8:37: How could we preserve Lebanon from problems? The government could: (a) withdraw the Lebanese judges from the STL; (b) stop Lebanese financing of the STL; (c) canceling the cooperation agreement between the Lebanese government and the STL. These three things would not abolish the STL! Far from it. Withdrawing judges, stopping funding, and ending official cooperation would not stop the STL. This was the basis of the agreement. And the other side had demands for our side as well that we were negotiating about.

8:40: The atmosphere was very positive. Then the Saudi king got sick and went to America, and the negotiations slowed down.

8:41: Then Saad al-Hariri said that he was waiting for the other side to take its steps. This was read as a positive development because it acknowledged the presence of an agreement about how to solve the crisis.

8:43: Then, without any forewarning, the Saudi side got in touch with the Syrian side and said that the deal was off. This was after Saad al-Hariri’s meeting with the Americans. This was when we decided to withdraw the government.

8:45: It is clear that the Americans and Israelis were opposed to the Syrian-Saudi initiative, from the beginning. They let it go for a while because they were betting that the two sides would not get to a solution. When they saw that it was actually leading to a solution, they came in to disrupt it. Can you give me another explanation?

8:47: Saad Hariri said that the initiative succeeded but that some parties in Lebanon did not fulfill their obligations. This is wrong. But let me go along with him for a bit. Let’s say this is true. Since there was a strong possibility that this initiative would succeed, why would he go to America and accept to be told that the deal was off?

8:49: What happened to sovereignty and independence and freedom? When America says no, then everything stops?

8:50: I will not reveal what Hariri’s side was asking from us. But one day, if someone else does reveal this, then the Lebanese will have to judge whether or not his demands were really in the national interest. Some of the things that they were requesting may have been in the national interest. But others were purely in the political interest of Hariri’s party.

8:52: The false witnesses were responsible for destroying the Lebanese-Syrian relationship and led to the worst sectarian atmosphere. They were responsible for the political climate that led to parliamentary election results.

8:54: One of the things that was being requested from us as part of the S-S initiative was closing the file on the false witnesses. You (i.e. Hariri’s people) should have been the most interested in discovering the truth about the false witnesses and prosecuting them. And yet, you wanted them to be part of the negotiated settlement.

8:55: Now we are starting to understand why the country ground to a halt in order to prevent a vote on the false witness issue.

8:56: What is comical is that some people in Lebanon are saying that the Al-Jadid recording was fabricated. These are the same people who refuse the idea that the STL’s evidence is fabricated.

8:57: Future TV has promised to publish the entire recording, since Al-Jadid’s recording was apparently taken out of context. How is that you have this secret recording? Where did you get it? It’s supposed to be secret.

9:00: We’ve been asking where the $11 billion disappeared to. When we ask about this, they start talking about how this is raising sectarian strife, etc.

9:02: This government has left this country vulnerable. This government is completely powerless before the decisions of the STL.

9:04: In view of this situation, we had to resign from this powerless government.

9:05: We did not bring down the government in the streets, and we did not demonstrate, nor did we use any weapons. We came in a very democratic way and said: here is our resignation. And what happened? America, and France, and various Arab countries were up in arms, and released statements, and applied pressure, and protested. What does this tell you?

9:07: We are not afraid of their armies or their navies or their airplanes, so how could we be afraid of their press releases? We acted in a democratic way, and yet all of the world’s capitals came to criticize us for this democratic action. What does this tell you? It tells you that the world does not want anyone in Lebanon to criticize or oppose [March 14].

9:09: The opposition is united in its determination in not naming Saad Hariri as prime minister. I will not reveal who our choice is tonight. In this domestic issue, why is the world getting involved? Why is Hillary Clinton making phone calls?

9:11: This is supposed to be a democratic process. Let the parliament vote on its choice. Why should it come under pressure from various corners of the world? Is this democracy?

9:12: Imagine that the American ambassador went today to visit Nicola Fattoush in Zahleh. Does she really care about what Zahleh wants? No, she visited him because he’s working on the issue of the next prime minister.

9:14: The STL was called upon to hasten its release of the indictments. They moved to release them on Monday so that it would happen before the next prime minister was nominated.

9:16: What’s next? I want to be very clear and honest. Tomorrow or the day after, there will be two tracks taking place at the same time. One is the track that will lead to the nomination of a new prime minister. The second is the track that will lead Bellemare to present his indictments to pre-trial judge Fransen.

9:17: These two tracks are independent. On the first track: we consider this to be a democratic, constitutional track. We demanded it. We resigned and requested that consultations would lead to a new government. All of the political blocs have a responsibility, a historic responsibility, over the next couple of days. What kind of government do they want to present to the Lebanese people? I leave all of these individuals to their conscience.

9:19: We lived the experience of this government and the previous one. This was a new experience for us, because we had not participated in governments before. I would like it to be clear that whatever government is formed, that government has to assume its responsibilities. From now on, we will not accept any government to be silent on the question of false witnesses. Any government that protects the false witnesses, especially if it is composed of those who fabricated the false witnesses, we will not be silent about it. Any government that protects financial corruption, we will not be silent about it. Any government that does not assume its responsibilities in a serious way, we will not be silent about it. Any government that conspires against the Resistance, we will not be silent about it.

9:23: We hope that the Lebanese form a government with the priorities of the people. I’d like to say that what happened in Tunisia over the past couple of days should be a lesson to us. What is the lesson? The lesson is that the Tunisian regime always had relations with France, America, and even secret channels to Israel. What happened to him? Those government would not even let his plane land in their capitals. This is the lesson.

9:25: We as Lebanese can sit down and solve our problems. But the other side does not want us to solve our problems as Lebanese. It wants the intervention of other countries.

9:26: Finally, with respect to the indictments. We’ve described it as an American-Israeli tribunal, based on facts. We are going to defend our own dignity and presence. This second track is completely independent from the first track. We will not accept our reputation or our dignity to be touched by this tribunal or even by any accusation. My conviction is that the Israelis assassinated Rafiq al-Hariri. George Bush was a crazy man; now they’re saying that the current guy [i.e. Obama] is a bit better.

9:30: The consultations may indeed lead to the re-nomination of Prime Minister Hariri. That’s fine, but it will still be a new era.

9:31: End of broadcast.

 

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Well this is embarrassing. Lebanese TV station al-Jadeed has a major scoop tonight: a leaked recording of a meeting between Saad al-Hariri, Information Branch chief Colonel Wissam al-Hassan, STL deputy chief investigator Gerhard Lehmann, and Muhammad Zuhair al-Siddiq. You can watch the entire report below.

It’s not entirely clear just how damaging this could be for Hariri. On the one hand, judging from a comment made by Siddiq near the beginning, this conversation must have taken place shortly after the attempted assassination of May Chidiac on September 20th, 2005. That was still very early in the investigation, well before the IIIC determined that Siddiq was unreliable (note the date of the report shown in the video: August 2006). For an excellent background document on the whole false witness scandal, see here.

Furthermore, the al-Jadeed audio clip does not portray Hariri or al-Hassan feeding Siddiq any information. Rather, it’s the other way around, and the German investigator raises doubts about the veracity of the witness’s testimony. If anything, what the clip seems to show is:

  1. Hariri and his people wanted Siddiq to provide “clear evidence” of Syrian involvement.
  2. They were convinced by what he said, and were trying to convince Lehmann that his testimony was valuable.
  3. Al-Hassan looks even more eager than Hariri to get the information out of Siddiq.

Now, despite all of this, I do believe that the clip could be seriously damaging — depending on how Hariri handles it. The opposition is going to claim that Hariri lied about not having anything to do with the false witnesses (even though this audio actually seems to confirm that he was the recipient of Siddiq’s testimony, not the originator of it.) The mere fact that he was in contact with Siddiq is enough to further poison the well of public trust in the STL.

More on this tomorrow (al-Jadeed has promised us another tape!)

UPDATE: I’ve translated selections from the recording into English, and will translate the rest later if I have time. For those who read Arabic (but are having trouble hearing everything said on the recording), see Elaph’s transcription of the discussion.

*

[1:25]

Hariri: (addressing Siddiq) Neither I nor you, nor Murad, nor Gerald, nor Andy, nor anyone in Lebanon or Syria doubts that they did it.

Siddiq: No one doubts?

Hariri: …That they did it. Now, we’re working with countries — Arab countries. If you can’t bring them clear evidence that the Syrian regime using X, Y, and Z, with evidence A, B, and C was involved [in the crime], then we have a problem.

Siddiq: … If you want to speak like this, then you need to begin to respond to them with [??] That’s the first thing, in respect to the Arab countries, apart from the foreign [i.e. non-Arab] countries.

(The tape is then cut off abruptly)

*

[2:30]

Siddiq: I take responsibility for what I’m saying, Wissam. Because there’s going to be a confrontation, and I’m going to confront people myself.

*

[2:40]

Siddiq: I don’t want to say something, for him to ask me: “When is that going to happen?”

Hariri: When are you going to bring 1, 2, 3?

Siddiq: Those who are carrying out the explosions in Lebanon: I get them.I get them all. That’s my job. That’s what I do. I’m the one who gets them.

*

[2:57]

Siddiq: The telephone call in which I told you that they would send 20 people. The telephone call in which I told you that the explosions would begin. Didn’t it happen? You’re seeing it. I called you the night before last, do you remember? Did you see the call?

(pause)

Siddiq: I called you the night before last.

Hariri: Mmm.

Siddiq: You didn’t answer. I called a second time and you didn’t answer. I said maybe he went to sleep and he’ll call me in the morning. [I was calling] to tell you that there was a bomb going to the LBC. It ended up being for May [Chidiac]. May was lost.

(Note that Siddiq did not actually communicate this to Hariri prior to the bombing. He’s claiming to have had advance knowledge but he didn’t actually warn Hariri ahead of time, because he allegedly couldn’t reach him on the phone.)

Hariri: Usually, when you want to speak to me you send me an SMS.

Siddiq: At a time of urgency?! An SMS?! …

(Discussion of Nabih Berri’s visit to Spain and then Syria to meet with Bashar al-Assad and Hassan Nasrallah)

*

[4:27]

Siddiq: Go confirm this information.

Hassan: Zuhair, let’s go back to the scene of the crime.

Siddiq: The scene of the crime, ya habibi, I’m going to tell you about it. What I want to tell you is this: if the report is going to come out without any confusion whatsoever, it needs to have the names of nine people: four Lebanese and nine Syrians. That’s what the report should say. Nine Syrians and four Lebanese.

*

[4:51]

Siddiq: Tell him [i.e. Lehmann] something for me. Tell him that Zuhair will not let you become a spectacle [nazra?] in front of the world, no. Tell him that I have the truth and that all of it will come out, God permitting…

*

(Discussion of where Siddiq’s wife would stay when he came to Lebanon. My friend Alex pointed out that this conversation reveals that the meeting between Siddiq and Hariri did not take place in Lebanon. Where did it take place? If someone can dig up an old press report that mentions which country Hariri was in shortly after May Chidiac was killed, then we can guess where this meeting happened.)

To be continued…

UPDATE: Here is Part Two.

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The developments in Lebanon are little more than a distraction compared to the amazing events that have unfolded in Tunisia over the past couple of days. Demonstrating protesters! Police brutality! Collapsing governments! Fleeing autocrats! Thrilling stuff…

Now that the Western media has finally sat up to take notice of what’s been happening in Tunisia, several debates are developing in tandem. What will happen next? Was this the first Twitter revolution? The first Wikileaks revolution? Is the role of social media being overstated? Is social media actually harming the protesters’ chances of success? If you’re interested in following these stories, be sure to check in regularly with Foriegn Policy‘s Mideast Channel, and tune your Twitter feed to #Tunisia.

One thing I’ve found a little bit puzzling about some of the commentary on the “Jasmine Revolution” is the emphasis on the fact that the ousted dictator, Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, was an ally of the West. This is obviously true, but it’s not clear to me what this has to do with the protests themselves. Have we seen people marching in the streets of Tunis with signs denouncing America? Not really: the main target has generally been Ben Ali and his successor. And yet, the fact of Ben Ali’s ties to the U.S. is increasingly raised as a token of the “authenticity” of this particular Middle Eastern revolt, in distinction to certain other popular movements such as Lebanon and Iran in 2005 and 2009, respectively.

Let me put it another way. Let’s imagine that Tunisia’s revolution succeeds, ushering in a democratically-elected government. While tackling problems of unemployment and corruption, this government also establishes strong relations with America and Europe. Does anyone believe that these relations will push people out into the streets again to demonstrate against their government? Seems unlikely.

Why, then, is civic action in the Tunisian case more authentic to some people than the derisively-labeled “Gucci Revolution” in Lebanon, or the abortive Green Revolution in Iran that so many commentators dismissed as insignificant and over-hyped? Why does one get the sense that those who call for drastic political change in Egypt, for example, would prefer to tweet about the weather if such change came to Damascus or Tehran?

Similarly, doesn’t it diminish the significance of what is happening in Tunisia to compare it to the current Lebanese standoff, as my friend Nick Noe did today? (Nick, If you’d let people comment on your blog, I wouldn’t have to do it here!) He argues:

Having just come out of a meeting with Hizbullah officials, there is little doubt in my mind that the SMART play would be for Sayyid Nasrallah to endorse the Tunisian “process” NOW – to name it, embrace it etc (JASMINE REVOLUTION? The same mistake as Bush’s Cedar Rev? I wonder here strategically?) AS BREAKING THE sectarian attempts (which happened often in Tunisia) to split the Resistance Axis from the Sunni “street.” I am not sure Hizbullah has the courage to do this right now…. especially given the domestic choices it now faces as a result of its decisions over the past few days. Publicly highlighting the toppling, linking it to the toppling project in Lebanon and CALLING FOR A TRIBUNAL FOR THE SUNNI LEADER in Tunisia….. who has the blood of tens of thousands on his hands unlike the Hariri murder

Come on. Hizbullah’s walk-out is a “toppling project” akin to the Sidi Bouzid protests? Can one really imagine Lebanon’s Sunnis buying into that argument? To my mind, equating Hizbullah’s resignation from Hariri’s cabinet to the Sidi Bouzid revolt is not only a stretch: it cheapens the significance of the latter.

What we are witnessing in Tunisia today is a monumental event, despite the fact that it has almost nothing to do with the West. And like it or not, the March 14 protests in 2005 along with the Iranian Green movement were similarly monumental, despite the fact that the West was obsessed with them. I feel that a little bit more intellectual honesty is needed on these issues.

Back to the Twitter feed…

UPDATE: Nick Noe responds to this post here.
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