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Exum and Foust on Tactics in Afghanistan

Josh Foust and I, as we often do, were engaged in a lengthy Twitter conversation on how to properly evaluate counterinsurgency tactics in Afghanistan. Writing in 140-character increments was going to drive me crazy sooner rather than later, so I suggested we do a joint blog post on the subject. What follows is the question and answer session we had this afternoon. This is cross-posted on Josh's blog. Enjoy.

JF. Recently, Paula Broadwell recounted on Tom Ricks' blog some operations in the Arghandab Valley, in Kandahar province. I found some of the events she described, like razing entire villages to the ground, appalling. At least in terms of tone, you seemed to agree: on Twitter, you referred to some passages as "cringe-inducing." I saw that as an example of questionable tactics in service of a non-existent strategy. But it also made me think back to a report you filed when you returned from a tour of the Arghandab. "Counterinsurgency," you wrote, "as practiced at the tactical level, is the best I have ever seen it practiced." Clearly, I'm missing something between the two accounts of this valley. So, what are the indicators you use to evaluate tactical counterinsurgency as the best you've ever seen?

AE. Yeah, the main problem I had with Paula's post concerned the inability to see how ISAF actions might -- while making perfect sense to ISAF military officers (and a West Point graduate like Paula predisposed to see things from the perspective of a military officer) -- be perceived from the Afghan perspective. One of the things you often hear older military officers tell younger military officers is to "turn the map around": how might the battlefield look to the enemy? I think that in counterinsurgency operations, where the population might matter more than in conventional, maneuver warfare, we have an obligation to turn the map around and see how our actions might be perceived by the local population.

Like Paula, though, I was impressed with a U.S. unit I visited in the northern Arghandab River Valley (ARV) last month. I have not had the chance to visit or observe the ARV over a long period of time and cannot say whether or not improved tactics will have a strategic effect, but I have observed U.S. military units struggle with the conflict in Afghanistan since 2001. I myself served there as a young platoon leader in 2002 and again as a Ranger platoon leader in 2004. I only mention that because I often compare and contrast units and small-unit leaders today with myself and the units I led in 2002 and 2004. I returned again in 2009 after several years spent wandering around the Arabic-speaking world.

The way one evaluates the tactical performance of a unit in combat depends a lot on how one perceives the conflict and what is important for victory. When it comes to maneuver warfare, the U.S. military has reached something approaching consensus on how we evaluate the tactical performance of leaders. U.S. Army Field Manual 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, for example, is a commonly accepted reference used to teach small unit leaders how to fight maneuver warfare at the tactical level in an infantry unit. It is based on both recent historical experiences as well as practical lessons learned. It contains loads of assumptions, most of which have been pretty rigorously tested. (With often painful results for those testing them!)

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and  U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency offer similar standards for how we can teach and then evaluate units in combat in counterinsurgency operations. I should add, though, that I do not think the U.S. military and the scholarly community has reached anything approaching consensus with respect to counterinsurgency. I also do not think we have as rigorously tested the assumptions in these manuals as we should. (To give but one example, I question the degree to which our provision of social services really matters for success.) That having been said, when it comes down to it, I feel both of our counterinsurgency field manuals get a lot right. The emphasis in 3-24.2 on leveraging and supporting host national security forces, for example, is spot on. So too is the appendix on intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB): you can't just know who you are fighting; you also have to know about the environment in which you are fighting. And I agree with the considerations for both offensive and defensive operations. [Note: I welcome any scholars who would criticize the manuals. My own thoughts on the things I think each manual gets right have been influenced by a) historical studies, b) what I myself have been able to learn by fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan and c) spending a lot of time studying the conflicts in southern Lebanon and Afghanistan as a civilian scholar and researcher.]

Based on the doctrine, what I observed in the ARV was encouraging. I saw a unit conducting aggressive offensive operations, fully integrating special operations forces into their plans and operations, and taking local security forces really seriously. I also saw a very sophisticated IPB -- the best I had myself ever seen at the company-grade level. The unit I spent an afternoon with, for example, really knew their neighborhood. They knew everyone who lived there and all the buildings in their area of operations. When something changed, I got the sense this unit would notice. And that's really important. I use The Wire a lot to explain everything from Lebanese politics to counterinsurgency, and I would liken the U.S. Army to the character Ellis Carver: when we meet him in Season One, all he wants to do is kick ass and take names. By Season Five, though, he's become a much smarter police officer. He's taken the time to get to know the people he's trying to protect and can thus better separate the bad guys from all the people just trying to get on with their lives.

Anyway, all of that led me to observe that U.S. counterinsurgency operations at the tactical level were some of the best I had ever seen. Caveat lector, I do not know whether or not these improved tactics will yield a strategic effect. There are too many phenomena -- many of them exogenous, as @ndubaz pointed out on Twitter -- that we cannot even observe much less measure. And we still have a lot of known pains in our asses (like Afghan governance and sanctuaries in Pakistan) that could render tactical gains ephemeral.

As one final caveat lector, my observations were based on a limited sample, and unit and leader performance should be assumed to be uneven across the country. Still, I was encouraged.

JF. Okay, so I can summarize: the operations you saw last year in the Arghandab matched with your interpretation of how one would enact both tactical and counterinsurgency doctrine, yes? Aggressive operations, integrating SF, and taking local security forces seriously, all of which add up to good tactics? Is there any way to be more specific?

For example, in this Broadwell episode, the local unit was most certainly using aggressive operations, and they integrated SF, and they even worked through the ABP to develop local knowledge. The thing is, the aggression resulted in the destruction of an entire village (something General McChrystal strongly urged against in the 2009 COIN guidance for which you were a consultant), and the SF's use of the ABP -- Col. Raziq is not from the Arghandab (the ABP has no jurisdiction in the district) and his tribe has been in conflict with many communities in this part of the Arghandab -- is, let us say, a bit questionable. How can we tell the difference between an appropriate use of these three aspects of good tactical activity, and inappropriate use of these three aspects of good tactical activity? For example, what makes aggression proper now, versus the restraint previous COIN strategies required?

AE. Those are great questions, some of which I am hesitant to answer. I am reticent to pass judgment on operations I have not personally observed. I am especially reticent to comment from Washington, DC on operations in Afghanistan. My perch at 1301 Pennsylvania Avenue is a great place to think about strategy or policy, sure, but not so much operations and tactics. The best (only?) place to observe the latter is in Afghanistan itself. So instead of passing judgment on the aforementioned operations, let me ask some questions instead -- questions that may be useful for both commanders on the ground as well as for analysts like Paula who have had the chance to directly observe the operations themselves:

1. What are we trying to do here?
2. What effect will these operations have on the enemy?
3. How will these operations affect or be perceived by the local population?
4. What are the trade-offs for using a character like Col. Raziq? (On the one hand, he is seen as being effective, but on the other hand ... well, anyone who has not yet read the 2009 Matthieu Aikins profile of Raziq for Harper's should.) 
5. What are the likely second- and third-order effects of our operations?

The thing is, you can be, to quote one Stan McChrystal, "tactically brilliant but strategically stupid." Are the operations that Paula describes tactically sound? Maybe -- I don't know. But I would hope that officers on the ground -- as well as Paula herself -- are thinking through whether or not these operations will have the strategic effect we hope they will have. Maybe they will. But I would hope we're thinking through those five questions I listed above, which have more to do with strategy than tactics.

As far as tactics are concerned, I would again refer readers to FM 3-24.2 for what the U.S. Army considers to be good counterinsurgency tactics. I cannot myself reduce "good tactics" down to three or four things: I just picked out three or four things that I believed helped to illustrate why I left the ANV last month impressed.


JF. Okay, so you don't like to condemn events you didn't personally witness. That's... fine, I guess. I wonder why, though, an afternoon of briefings is sufficient to declare tactics good in one case but a few thousand words describing tactics is insufficient to question tactical decisions elsewhere. It's kind of the crux of what started this whole discussion: at what point can we reasonably ask probing questions about conduct? The outlines of this village razing incident in the Arghandab, in my view, warrants probing questions precisely because it is such a drastic measure.

So, at best I can tell this leaves me with two remaining questions.

1) If tactics are good and adhere to theory, but either undermine or don't advance our overall strategy, what's the point of praising tactics? Isn't that just wasted time, effort, money, and, most importantly, lives?

2) I can accept your view that it's difficult to question too much from the U.S. But if no one sitting in Washington, DC, can really question the tactics we read about, in what way can we, in good faith, question and strive to understand the war? This, too, is at the heart of why I'm asking these questions. It's not as if everyone who is interested in understanding the war can go embed with the troops (and there is, unfortunately, greater difficulty for war skeptics to get precious embed space, compared to non-skeptics). If personal accounts, even (as I called Broadwell's latest) hagiographies, are not enough to prompt serious questions about our conduct, how can we reasonably evaluate what's happening?

AE. Okay, I'll address your points one at a time, but before I do, let me just say that I have really enjoyed this. Compared with trying to explain this over Twitter, conventional prose is a joy. And your questions are good ones.

1. Oh, there is a lot of good in praising good tactics. Let me name two. First, improved tactics demonstrate a military organization that has learned -- which big bureaucracies often have trouble doing! That's very positive. Second, it is too early to tell whether or not the near-term security outlook for the ANV has changed for the better. But if it does, we will want to note the correlation between improved tactics and improved security for rather obvious reasons.

2. This is a great and legitimate question. I should be more careful and allow that we can, in fact, judge operations from afar when the documentary evidence is solid. I'm not trying to say I can't second-guess or judge William Calley, for example, because I wasn't personally at My Lai! But I would want a lot more documentation than Paula's single blog post before weighing in on this particular example.

I think you are somewhat incorrect to say that skeptics do not get to visit Afghanistan. You write this because you're thinking of people like me who travel there as part of our jobs as civilian researchers and have been outspoken in support (to varying degrees) of the current strategy. But plenty of other civilian researchers and journalists I know visit Afghanistan as guests of the command and return to write critical reports -- and then visit again (see Hastings, Michael). Other journalists and civilian researchers write highly skeptical accounts without ever embedding (see Dorronsoro, Gilles). I mentioned earlier the journalist Matthieu Aikins, whose reporting I love. It's worth pointing out that he has, in addition to observing the war as both an embedded and unembedded journalist, also been an outspoken skeptic of the current strategy and, together with fellow activist-journalists Nir Rosen, Gareth Porter and Ahmed Rashid, offered his own policy recommendations. (Along with some guy named Foust and a bunch of other non-journalists.) So if all we had to go on was a blog post from my friend Paula, I would agree with your point. But I linked to that great Aikins piece on Raziq from Harper's that is required reading for many government analysts working on Afghanistan. There is a lot more of that kind of critical reporting and analysis out there -- you and I link to it every day. I'm just hesitant to judge something after reading any one thing -- and I think you would agree with me there.

Afghanistan, COIN

20 comments

Sometimes the more rantish

Sometimes the more rantish parts of your commentariat describe you as a courtier. Normally I ignore them. But the transition between your willingness to think out loud in your twitter exchange, and the conversational maneuver warfare you practice here to avoid making statements you think are hard to support or might be politically awkward, is frustrating. This blog isn't a thesis you have to defend to other academics. It isn't an appearance on a talk show or a stump speech on the campaign trail. So why not comment on operations you haven't seen?

To riff off the tragedy of the commons - even if you restrain yourself, others won't. There will always be critics right across from Teddy Roosevelt's man in the arena willing to make a guess. And, rightfully or not, public dialogue will be shaped by noise. Better that we also be able to hear a clear and honest(ish) voice from someone has more experience and a different perspective, like you, than just be stuck with a media chorus of the most disgruntled and the most shameless.

I'm being hard on you, but a good public intellectual is hard to find, and I'm loathe to see signs of your candle slipping under the courtier's bushel.

I am not a public

I am not a public intellectual. I am a very naughty boy.

But I take your points and appreciate the criticism.

Matthieu Aikins wrote a

Matthieu Aikins wrote a fascinating piece on Abdul Razziiq and Spin Boldak but it left me very uneasy. I think that his descriptions of what he did and how he did it probably left some people in fear of their lives if not dead. I'd like to hear his explanation of how he dealt with the issue of ethics, i.e. doesn't a journalist have an obligation to ensure that his reporting doesn't cause harm to someone?

Abdul Raziq maintains that he doesn't discriminate in favor of his Achekzai kinsmen, and that he treats the Noorzai fairly, but his historical track record argues differently. In addition to a notorious incident involving the killing of unarmed Noorzai prisoners, his troops allegedly committed many abuses when they were first called upon to fight in Panjwayi and Zhari in 2006. And I was told by a Kandahari politician that his battalion in Maruf District was engaging in abusive behavior in 2008. He is the commander of a militarily effective force and it was the Governor of Kandahar that invited him to join clearing operations in the Arghandab and other districts but we shouldn't lose sight of the fact that he is basically the leader of a tribally-based smuggling organization that happens to wear ABP uniforms. Our short-term expediency may come back to bite us in the rear end in the long term.

Finally, as I previously commented on Joshua Foust's Registan site, it worries me that we seem to have no institutional memory nor ability to see things from the Afghan perspective. Destroying a village may have been necessary from the U.S. tactical perspective, but it likely looks very different to an Afghan villager that has lost his home and that remembers that the Arghandab was a peaceful place before the deployment of U.S. battalions in mid 2009. I wonder if this will turn out to be a case of being tactically brillant but strategically stupid.

If a think tanker with a blog

If a think tanker with a blog who publishes in MSM publications occasionally and has published a book, who's about to receive his PhD from KCL (yes, you'll pass your defense) isn't a public intellectual, who is? You're (obviously) not obligated to respond (what coercive leverage do I have upon you?), but if you do respond, please don't do so by listing who you *do* consider public intellectuals; rather, lay out the rationale(s) for why you're not a public intellectual. I've stated my criteria you fill: think tank, blog, MSM publications, book publication, PhD. What are yours? ("I'm a very naughty boy" does not really qualify.)

Thanks
ADTS

He's not the Messiah. He's a

He's not the Messiah. He's a very naughty boy!
:)

Little courious........ What

Little courious........

What is this pissing contest about?

1) Foust having a problem with aggressive tactics?

2) Trying to improve guidance for boots on the ground?

Calley took the rap for mistakes made.

How does an incident like the

How does an incident like the one described by Ms. Broadwell appear to the civilian populace in Year 1 of a war, compared to how it appears in Year 9 of a war?

Maybe the passage of time makes no difference, or maybe the population just gets used to all sorts of things that look strange to people outside the combat area. I suppose there are other possibilities as well, but if the counterinsurgency tactics being used here are the right ones I would hold the self-congratulation if I held military rank, considering how many years of war it took to arrive at them. And if these tactics are the wrong ones...well, that would be just a damning indictment of the American military command, wouldn't it? Assuming one felt confident enough to pass judgement, of course.

Another naughty person Obama

Another naughty person

Obama is telling the middle class they are number one, with his middle finger.

http://www.politico.com/click/stories/1101/tonights_china_state_dinner_....

along with corporate CEOs

PS....At least Jackie Chan made us laugh.

I do not expect corporate America selling more product into China is going to create more jobs in America. Why manufacture in America when you can manufacture locally in China, sell it, and not pay taxes at home?

Not happy that my tax dollars are subsiding this.

Buy "the American made Label"

You can debate tactics all

You can debate tactics all you want, but Karzai postponing the inauguration of a new parliament underscores the severity and magnitude of the governance problem. You seem to love glossing over this Achilles heal. At your event with Woodward and Barno you mentioned the two Achilles heals then proceeded to discuss the issue of sanctuaries exclusively. The absence was disturbing to say the least. This is more than a pain in the ass, as you posit, and deserves far more scrutiny than the efficacy of our tactics and operations. As you say time and again, if you're 'winning' at the tactical and operational level but not moving forward on strategic goals, then you're still losing.

Hezbollah stages coup drills

Hezbollah stages coup drills in Beirut as indictments loom....

Fear of

Fear of China?

http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_US_CHINA?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&...

President Barack Obama is looking to assure Americans that they should not fear China's economic rise, using Chinese President Hu Jintao's high-profile state visit to announce job-creating business deals worth billions of dollars to U.S. companies.

I do not fear China, I fear what the American Consumer and Corporate America will do.

The US owes China over a trillion dollars, America is losing its Independence. For cheap consumer products? Over the past twenty years American Corporations have offshored American workers by the millions. So we are excited about gaining a few 100,000 jobs in America by exporting to China? Where are the jobs?

Why do we keep selling America out?

So, Corporate American can have billion dollar deals.....the Multi-national corporations do not pay full US income taxes on those billions !

Guys, America has 20% underemployment/unemployment. The unemployment numbers has not responded to the stimulus packages yet the consumer is spending. There is a reason for that. Look for the , "made in China" warning label on the next product you puchase.

Do you know anyone that has been offshored? I do, I know 11, 300 American citizens whose jobs were offshored.

Broadwell describes what

Broadwell describes what appears to be an American brand of the dahiya doctrine. That the boots in place resent the mixed message of reconstruction shouldn't be surprising; it's all about guilt mitigation for us here in the "homeland" and must get in the way of the whole 'Win' thing. Much less staying alive when you're become, by your actions, the very personification of evil.

We are warring on the peoples of Afghanistan and Pakistan, not delivering humanitarian services. What a bullshit line that last phrase is! Equally so is talking about the "host government". We invaded, and remain in armed occupation, apparently in order to assure India's cooperation in our international diplomatic efforts, although it requires propping up an expensive and corrupt government that all too clearly reflects the one that set it up back in the early oughts. But it keeps the goodies rolling out to the only economy going gangbusters in the US: the militarized "security" complex.

We are not the good guys here; haven't been for quite some time. People who do bad things often say afterward: that wasn't me, not the real me. Well, get a grip, people: this is the real us, better than the sequential Nazi-Soviet occupation of Poland only because there is still some dim memory of the consequences of that evil.

But memory can be distorted with the passage of time, even used to support new varieties of the same old atrocities, used to allow, or even seem to require, wholesale slaughter and destruction of people and places outside our direct experience, in the name of "our security."

You've all noticed how much more secure in our working lives and homes we all are, haven't you?

There was a reason Boehner

There was a reason Boehner did not go.....

Look at the comments...
http://www.politico.com/click/stories/1101/state_dinner_filled_with_olds...

In the middle of the worst recession, Obama showed America how well he was doing. At least he moved it in doors and did not waste my tax dollars on the tent.

There is more than Boehner missing, the middle class is missing. Last year we had a coulple gate crashers.

Thank you Mr. Boehner for saying NO.

Visitor@7:21: Wow. Really?

Visitor@7:21: Wow. Really? I hate to even dignify your post with a comment, but I just wanted to say that I have spent over 27 months on the ground in Afghanistan and you, gentle reader, are a wonderful example of shooting your mouth off without having a clue what you're on about. Oh, you will respond with a mixture of venom, pop-culture memes and tired historic references intended as damning indictments, but you are still a twisted soul who adds nothing of value to the discussion. Please do not mistake this as some sort of acknowledgment that you have said anything close to being worthy of actual discussion. I am merely scratching an itch and poking the dragon. There has to be a 12-step group for people with your affliction; go find a meeting. Step 1: you are powerless over your thought disorder. Recovery awaits.

Now, for the REAL discussion... Josh knows that the second and third order effects of any action are dependent on the viewpoint of the locals. It is not that the civilian perspective "might" be more important in counterinsurgency operations than in maneuver operations, either. They are key. However, there are several key points to the village destruction that are not addressed and, knowing how things work in Afghanistan, should be looked for before a complete understanding of the situation can be had.

Broadwell indicates that the villagers were compensated for surrendering their village to the insurgents. She seems to assume that this indicated some sort of acquiescence, but it may not. Even if the villagers were being forced out, it is likely that there was some pressure put on the insurgents through traditional arbitration to compensate the villagers even though they were being unwillingly ejected from their homes. Also, there is inadequate evidence in her post to indicate whether there was any agreement with locals on the idea that destruction of the (already paid-for) village being razed as a way of rendering the danger there harmless. This may or may not have happened. Regardless, there is an indication that someone compensated the villagers for their homes upon their vacation. There is further indication of the willingness of ISAF to rebuild the village or pay for rebuilding.

I would be more interested to know the details of the unit functions that Exum observed on his visit. Above he indicates that something akin to an ASCOPE/PMESII analysis was ongoing in the AOR. That is encouraging, and would be even more encouraging to know that a standardized format (easily understood by follow-on units) such as ASCOPE was being used. I would also be interested to know if they were trained in and applying the District Stability Framework, which would require the gathering of local perceptions to help in determining courses of action regarding all stabilization activities. It would also lead them to determining methods for measuring 2nd and 3rd order effects of chosen actions. These would confirm or deny the decision-making processes involved in selecting the course of action. If they are making use of these decision support frameworks, then it is quite possible that local input was sought and considered in making the decisions leading to the destruction of the village.

Also, because these frameworks require that the decision process be documented, it would be much easier for a distant observer... or a follow-on unit, or a higher commander... to delve into the reasoning of that process.

Can you describe the documentation of the comprehensive knowledge that the unit was developing? Were they keeping an ASCOPE, for instance? And, did you see any evidence that the DSF decision support methodology was being utilized?

Old Blue - I'm sure your God

Old Blue - I'm sure your God approves of all you do, and forgives the harm you do in his name. That doesn't change the reality of war, nor does it make it less evil.

There is a aura of sanctity regarding the military in modern America, which goes a far distance to rendering it even worse than it might otherwise be.

But you're a good citizen, and rational, as your carefully reasoned comment demonstrates.

You and Eichmann.

But you're a good citizen,

But you're a good citizen, and rational, as your carefully reasoned comment demonstrates.

You and Eichmann.

Godwin's Law!

What a putz. Don't you know that it's more fashionable to cite Goebbels than it is to trot out Eichmann?

what kind of toxic waste will

what kind of toxic waste will this bombing leave behind? Will it be safe for human habitation, and safe for farm animals and crops?

The US bombed Fallujah to smithereens and now they have exceedingly high cancer and birth defect rates.... higher than seen in Hiroshima.

Although I do appreciate the

Although I do appreciate the "man in the arena" prespective, the criticism of tactics is a very powerful force of positive development. It inspires thought, debate, and develops young Army LTs like myself to evaulate how we will operate in Afghanistan. It contributes to the learning organization we want to be. I know this blog probably has a wide spectrum of readers, but I would hope one key demographic is company grade Marine and Army officers that think about how they will operate becasue of something they read here.

To the gentleman who insists

To the gentleman who insists we have 20% unemployment: you are incorrect. We have 9.3% unemployment, and best estimates that also include "discouraged workers" (a government term for people who have given up looking or are no longer looking) places it at 16.3%. "Natural unemployment" is considered to be around 6% (though there is strong debate about this). We haven't had 20% unemployment, afaik, since the depression, when it was 25%.

To those critical of any war effort at al: you're arguing an old question. 2001 was a long time ago. We can't go back and undo the war. We have a huge pile of shit, and now we must make shit salad as best we know how. We will always be foreign aggressors to the Afghans to some extent. We will always be fighting people who use the civilian population-- with their consent or without-- as way to handicap effective use of force and to disrupt stability and rebuilding efforts. This means that there is no truly satisfactory option, which is of course a chief goal of the other side's plan. Therefore, we can only choose from more efficacious options and lesser evils. Our hands are dirty no matter what, but dropping the baby is no better than throwing it out with the bathwater.

God and Eichmann and evil, oh

God and Eichmann and evil, oh my!

Oh, wow... really? LOL!

AM, your audience is fantastic!

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