January 20th, 2011 by Cole

Models of constitutional democratic transitions from Eastern Europe are not easily applied to Tunisia, writes Nathan Brown, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington University.  Instead, Tunisians must reach consensus by engaging all actors and social groups in the process.  As Islamists seek to re-establish their social presence in Tunisia over the next decade, their participation will become particularly important.

See also the previous contributions to the Democracy Digest-POMED Tunisia symposium from Amr Hamzawy, Steven Heydemann, Larry Diamond, Arun Kapil, Shadi Hamid, Kamran Bokhari, Nabila Hamza, and Kristina Kausch. 

The drama of recent events in Tunisia has led to greater demand for expertise on the country than the scholarly world can easily provide.  There is, quite simply, a shortage of expertise on the country.  Tunisia is small and the Ben Ali regime was notoriously closed; its brand of authoritarianism was harsh even by regional standards.    Many questions can only be answered with time. But on two questions that have already arisen, a bit of a comparative focus may be able to help us fill in some of gaps of what we do not know about Tunisia.

The first question is whether the disintegration of a harsh authoritarian regime can give way to a reasonably democratic transition.  A comparative focus reveals real problems for Tunisia but also a possible path forward.

When an authoritarian regime collapses in a sudden and unexpected manner, the problem of political reconstruction can sometimes be likened to (in a metaphor developed after 1989 in eastern Europe) rebuilding the ship at sea.  A new political system has to be built in difficult circumstances and the only tools readily available are those that are already on board.  How can a new system be built out of a system that was so thoroughly authoritarian, one which snuffed out any promising signs of political life?  In the Tunisian case, the problem is especially acute: the path of using existing constitutional tools (one way for negotiating a transition in some other countries) is blocked.  In eastern Europe, most transitions were effectuated by breathing life into previously moribund constitutional mechanisms.   In the Tunisian case, that won’t be enough. The constitution calls for immediate elections, bars a truly open process, and prohibits constitutional amendments or parliamentary elections in the mean time.  Ben Ali left behind not only a rotten system but also a collection of rotten ingredients.

Deviation from the constitutional procedures will be necessary. But how can Tunisians negotiate such a deviation? And how can they make any new system legitimate? The only way to do so is by being as inclusive as possible—by inviting all political actors and relevant social groups to participate and endorse the process.  Moving by consensus is slow work and success is not guaranteed. But outside observers can judge the success of the enterprise by gauging how truly inclusive the process is.  Indications thus far are mixed at best.

And that leads to the second question: where are the Islamists in this process?

Several very knowledgeable observers have been quick to point to their absence as suggesting a different mode of Arab politics.  Others have spoken darkly of how Islamists might “exploit” Ben Ali’s collapse to demand a political role.  Based on the experience of Islamist movements elsewhere, both groups are rushing to conclusions far too fast. The real questions about the political role for Islamists are not likely to arise for several years.

Islamists have not been major actors thus far because the regime so thoroughly and brutally stamped out any sign of political Islam (and even seemed suspicious of many public forms of religiosity).  At the beginning of Ben Ali’s presidency, Islamists were a growing presence in social and political life; as a result they bore the brunt of his repression (in an Orwellian fashion, the Ben Ali regime used “tolerance” as a theme for smashing forces it could not control).

Islamist movements throughout the region are generally dedicated toward building social life on what they see as more Islamic foundations—they aim at comprehensive reform of the individual, the society, and the political system. Most see this as a slow process—the goal is rarely to gain political control tomorrow; instead it is to work in many different fields over a generation.

Islamists will therefore likely not seek immediate political power; they will probably be satisfied with one seat at a crowded table.  Their real focus will instead be on the more long-term project of reestablishing their social presence.  On most social and political questions, the Tunisian Islamist movement was at the liberal end of the Islamist spectrum. That may put them in a good position intellectually to make inroads into a society that is more secular than most in the Arab world.

But the real question is not where Islamists are politically and intellectually today.  Instead, it makes more sense to see whether they will succeed in becoming a major social presence over the next decade. If they do succeed, then the political question that so many are asking today—“Where are the Islamists” will become a pressing one indeed.

Posted in Islam and Democracy, Islamist movements, Tunisia, Tunisia Symposium |