December 9th, 2009 by Jason

General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry testified about the new Afghan strategy before the Armed Service Committees in both the House and Senate yesterday. They will continue their testimony on the Hill both today and tomorrow.

According to Chris Good at The Atlantic, General McChrystal’s prediction of success in Afghanistan was couched in “a healthy amount of humility.” McChrystal argued that a combination of the resolve of the Afghans, the unpopularity of the Taliban, the evidence of recent ISAF success in providing better security and goverannce, and the Afghan support for the ISAF mission all portend the potential for success. But Dana Miliband notes that McChrystal managed a “careful linguistic dance” to avoid uttering the actual word victory, defining success instead as the ability for the Afghans to win for themselves.

Anatol Lieven and Maleeha Lodhi in The New York Times don’t see much of a chance for success at all. They therefore argue “it is essential that the U.S. plan incorporate a political strategy aimed at Afghan national reconciliation - and that plan should involve negotiations with the Taliban.” Azeem Ibrahim also calls for negotiations with the Taliban and allow “moderate elements of the Taliban to share power in a democratic Afghan system.”

After a recent trip to Afghanistan, Michael Shank contends “Afghans are simply asking for an Afghan-centered approach, one that puts Afghans at the fore of every peace and security effort, one that builds sustainable Afghan state and local capacity, and one that sets new precedents for justice and accountability.” Such is the plan outlined by General McChrystal. However, Fred Kaplan pounces on McChrystal’s comment that “there is much in Afghanistan that I do not understand” and argues for the necessity of understanding the local society and culture for COIN to be effective. Additionally,which Andrew McCarhty at NRO critiques,  “General McChrystal would employ COIN tactics in the course of a broader nation-building scheme. It is the nation-building to which I object. It is premature: Nation-building, if we should do it at all, should follow the enemy’s defeat.” He goes on to defend the original Bush Doctrine formulation “before it was modified by the ‘forward march of freedom’ rhetoric that has nothing to do with American national security.”

Patrick Barry also questions whether the U.S. is nation-building or not, focusing on McChrystal’s warning against “thinking of local militias as a better security off-ramp than the Afghan army.” He also  wonders why Pakistan is not received sufficient attentiongiven that, per McChrystal’s testimony, our goal in Afghanistan is to primarily fight Al Qaeda. Laura Rozen explores how the Obama administration has both de-emphasized the faltering leadership of President Asif Ali Zardari while also offering a mixture of sticks and carrots to the Pakistani military to ramp up efforts against Islamist militants and especially the Afghan Taliban.

In another post, Rozen reports that a recent memo from retired General Barry McCaffrey suggests “the international civilian agency surgewill essentially not happen […] Afghanistan over the next 2-3 years will be simply too dangerous for most civil agencies.” Rozen contends such analysis “bolsters chatter that the U.S. military leadership may not be ready to put aside tensions with its civilian counterparts,” as fleshed out by this recent New York Times article on the relationship between General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry.  Nonetheless, Jen DiMascio of Politico reports that the pair “sought to present a unified front” yesterday on the Hill.

Posted in Afghanistan, Committee Meetings, Congress, Democracy Promotion, Military, Pakistan, Taliban, Terrorism, US foreign policy, al-Qaeda |