February 7th, 2011 by Naureen

Joshua Stacher, writing in Foreign Affairs, argues that “Egypt’s democratic window has probably already closed.” He states that “contrary to the dominant media narrative, over the last ten days the Egyptian state has not experienced a regime breakdown.” In fact, Stacher argues that the Mubarak regime, which has the unwavering support of the military, has implemented a sophisticated good-cop, bad-cop strategy with the police functioning as the regime’s repressive army and the army keeping order in the streets: “With the protesters caught between regime-engineered violence and regime-manufactured safety, the cabinet generals remained firmly in control of the situation.” They have also launched a strategic campaign to wear down the non-protesting population, which had generally supportive of the anti-regime demonstrators. Stacher goes on to say that while calls for President Hosni Mubarak to resign have intensified, the real question is if the those guiding the transition will choose to direct it towards democratic ends; if that person is Vice President Omar Suleiman, he says, “the prospects for democracy are grim.”

Michael Allen, writing at Democracy Digest, also questions the future of democracy in Egypt given the military’s ties to Mubarak, Suleiman’s dismissal of the protests as “promoting a foreign agenda” rather than reflective political aspirations and socio-economic grievances, the lack of cohesion among opposition groups and growing rifts within the groups.

Posted in Democracy Promotion, Egypt, Protests, Reform |