A new Israel-Lebanon war?

A variety of intellectuals and scholars comment on the possibility and logic for new Israel-Lebanon war centering on the prospect that Israel will launch a new war.  Contributors include Rashid Khalidi, Noam Chomsky, Norman Finklestein, Helena Cobban, John Meirsheimer, Mu'in Rabani, Michael Desch, 'Ashaf Kafuri,  and me.  The war would be a punitive campaign that enacts great punishment on Lebanon, but would be likely to strengthen not weaken Hezbollah, as well fomenting much anti-U.S. sentiment. There is also doubt expressed, notably by Meirsheimer, that the Obama administration would behave very much differently than the recent Bush administration in terms of preventing or ending the war.

As published in al-Akhbar.

Here is my contribution:

We can construct a very rational argument for Israel to maintain the status quo vis-à-vis Lebanon rather than attacking for the ostensible purpose of disarming Hezbollah.  Notwithstanding the tree incident in early August, the border has been very quiet since the 2006 war ended.  With the exception of contested areas of the occupied Golan Heights, notably the Shiba’ farms, the border area was also quiet from the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 until the July 2006.  Since the 1990s the Hezbollah-Israel rules-of-the-game have been well understood and both belligerents have been generally measured in their actions (as opposed to their rhetoric) and reactions.  July-August 2006 was an exception, of course.  

Roiling inter-sectarian tensions, particularly between Shi’is and Sunnis, have erupted in deadly clashes, as they did this week between Hezbollahis and Ahbashis.  Even so, Hezbollah’s resistance narrative is widely supported in the Shi’i community, even if it is derided in some other Lebanese quarters.  The November 2009 ministerial statement that launched the current government embraced the right of “resistance”, while simultaneously and incongruously committing the government to the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 1701.  Although naïve commentary in the U.S. focuses on the need for the Lebanese Army to disarm Hezbollah, it is obvious that resistance to Israel is popular in the ranks and in the officer corps, and the prospects for Hezbollah being disarmed by the army are zilch.  

If Israel were to attack Lebanon with the objective of weakening, if not defeating Hezbollah and destroying a significant proportion of the group’s arsenal of rockets and missiles, it runs the risk of falling short.  If so, Hezbollah’s resistance narrative would not be undermined but validated, again.  Israeli military sources have argued recently that Hezbollah has “bases” in  more than 100 villages in the South.  This suggests an Israeli campaign that would wreak even wider destruction than the 2006 war.  A landscape of smoldering ruins across southern Lebanon is more likely to inspire not dampen support for Hezbollah.

In addition, Israel would not be unscathed.  Withering rocket fire in northern Israel would cause the displacement of a million or more Israelis.  If Hezbollah makes good on the promise to retaliate-in-kind for Israeli strikes on Lebanese cities then the dangers will cascade for Israel.

This adds up to a rational case for not attacking Lebanon.  

Perhaps, but there is good reason for concern that the Israelis will not be deterred.

Israel—with very generous U.S. support—is committed to maintaining its military superiority over any combination of regional foes.  In addition, Israeli strategic culture emphasizes the need for Israel to “maintain its deterrence”.  This means that Israel’s foes will not seriously contemplate attacking Israel because their defeat is certain and Israel will inflict disproportionate military power should they try.  The punitive campaign against Gaza in December 2008-December 2009 is an example of the latter.  

Particularly in the case of Hezbollah, Israel faces a re-armed foe that flaunts its contempt for Israeli hegemony.  Given a pretext or a miscalculation, it is not far-fetched to imagine an Israeli war plan premised on a fierce and rapid ground attack and an accompanying devastating air campaign designed to overcome Lebanese resistance in a matter of weeks.  Israel would ostensibly demonstrate that it will not be deterred by Hezbollah.  

If Israel launches an air campaign on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, it is axiomatic that a pre-emptive attack on Lebanon would be on the menu because it is assumed that the first wave of Iranian retaliation would come in the form of Hezbollahi rockets. Both the Bush and the Obama administrations have firmly counseled Israel against bombing Iran, and there is little enthusiasm in the Pentagon for starting a war with Iran.  

Given Israel’s strategic culture and its fixation on “maintaining its deterrence”, an Israeli onslaught into Lebanon would also be justified as thwarting Iran’s hegemonial ambitions while reducing the threat posed to Israel by Hezbollah.  In the Bush White House, Senior National Security Council officials actively encouraged the Gaza War.  The Obama White House is far more likely to urge restraint on Israel, but this will not stop Israel from starting a new war if it elects to do so.

Prudent counsel may prevail, and the tense conditions along the Israel-Lebanon border may persist for some time to come.  Unfortunately, unwise and counter-productive decisions by Israel have become increasingly common. Plus, Israeli officials have often succumbed to the fallacy that inflicting pain on Lebanon reduces support for Hezbollah.  This usually does not work, and often has the opposite effect. 


Crossposted with "From the the Field".

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"Hizbollah only has the Miss Lebanon title left to win"

Football is already highly politicized in Lebanon, where fans have been barred from some matches since 2005. Celebrated games in the past pitted Lebanese teams against Syrian teams, and turned into celebrations of Lebanese nationalism. More recently, it is the Sunni-Shi'i divide that has demarcated key matches; one of many symptoms of polarization. During a recent visit to Lebanon there were widespread worries (including among civilian supporters of Hezbollah) about the militarization of Salafi groups, particularly in the environs of Tripoli (where there have been recent clashes between Salafis and 'Alawis). Over the past few years Salafi groups held their noses and took Saad al-Din al-Hariri's money and accepted his role as a communal leader, but now they see him as a failed leader and they are making their own way. Recent calls by the Syrian ikhwan for Qatar to assist Lebanese Sunnis are only the tip of the iceberg. The Hezbollah led incursion into West Beirut is widely understood as a Sunni defeat, capped by the Doha agreement. Meanwhile, the horse-trading over the formation of a new government in Beirut only exacerbates the sectarian tensions. The best reasonable hope is that a consensus government--the norm in Lebanon, by the way--will provide a context for dialogue and reconciliation, not further deadlock and recrimination. There are long odds on the former possibility.

FT.com / World - Hizbollah outshoots football rivals: "'Hizbollah only has the Miss Lebanon title left to win,'" Read more on this article...

President Suleiman's Inaugural Speech

General Michel Suleiman, Lebanon's new President, delivered a concise inaugural speech today, May 25. Listening to his words on al-Jazeera, I was struck by several elements in the speech:
He emphasized the need to connect with Lebanon's expatriate community, which includes many Christians. He spoke of the rights of this group, in contrast to those who were given citizenship in the 1990s without deserving it. This was a direct reference to citizenship decrees signed by the late Rafiq al-Hariri as Prime Minister. Al-Hariri extended citizenship to tens of thousands of people, many of them Sunni Muslims.
He insisted that Lebanon must renew its national dialogue and he underlined the importance of the Constitution.
His remarks about the Hezbollah-led "resistance" were measured, and he underlined that the resistance must not be used internally. He noted that the resistance won widespread national support in 2000, when Israel unilaterally withdrew its occupation forces and the South was liberated.
He also underlined that the Shiba' farms were still occupied, thereby noting a rationale for a continuing role by the resistance.
He referred to the sons of Lebanon who were still prisoners, which might equally apply to those held by Israel or Syria.
He spoke at comparative length about relations with Syria. He insisted on relations based on mutual respect. He said we should put aside past differences and build a relationship that includes mutual diplomatic relations (Syria still has not embassy in Beirut).
He noted the Palestine issue and emphasized that no one should use Palestine as a pretext. He recalled that the State will not allow terrorism, a reference to the Nahr al-Bared fighting last summer.
He stated tat Lebanon supports the Arab League initiative vis-a-vis an Arab-Israeli peace.
Referring the opposition incursion into West Beirut, he reminded his audience that the army needs to maintain a balanced position.
The U.S. was only represented in the chamber by a Congressional delegation led by Congressman Nick Rahall, a Lebanese-American. I was struck that Suleiman did not mention the U.S. at all. [Were it not for U.S. obstruction I believe the crisis in Lebanon would have been long ago broken, and on terms decidedly more favorable to the U.S., but I will develop that further later.]
Qatar, which shepherded the Doha negotiations, was honored.
In all, Suleiman was impressive, and one may sense that there was a collective sigh of relief in Lebanon as Suleiman took office.

A final point, Lebanese governments have used operated on the norm of consensus decision-making. Keep this in mind as you weigh whether the existing government is a departure from standard practice. Read more on this article...

Lebanon on the cusp

The political stalemate in Lebanon shows little sign of ending anytime soon. President Emile Lahoud’s undistinguished nine-year term in office sputtered to an end last November. His extension in office, imposed by Syria in 2004, precipitated a process of dissent, political resistance and retaliatory violence, including the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri in February 2005. With Lahoud poised to leave office, many Lebanese and outside observers worried that an unoccupied presidential palace in Ba’abda would be an invitation to danger. My own concern, as I expressed it in a recent article, was that Lebanon could not “totter endlessly on the cusp of the maelstrom.” External powers have since accustomed themselves to the vacancy, and it is now possible that nothing will happen until after the 2009 parliamentary elections. This is a dangerous experiment in delay, one that may well have disastrous consequences for Lebanon.

Government and opposition forces have stiffened their positions, with significant encouragement from external sponsors, especially the U.S. , France, Saudi Arabia, on the pro-government side, and Iran and Syria on the opposition side. The result is that bargains that may have been possible months ago, witness the candidacy of General Michel Suleiman, may no longer be on the table. While an Arab League summit is scheduled for late March, in Damascus, it is probably a good bet that the summit will be delayed, if not canceled, especially after much celebrated assassination of Imad Mughniyah.

There is good reason to worry that the stalemate may erupt rather than collapse. While many adult Lebanese have direct experience of the civil war (1975-1989), there are many shabaab—young bloods—who have no living memory of the civil war and are ready to fight. It is distressing to listen to well-to-do teen-agers declare their readiness to pick up arms and fight, despite their parents’ attempts to dissuade them. Clashes that end in deaths are thankfully still relatively uncommon, but the incidence of inter-sectarian clashes in urban neighborhoods is on the increase, and in some places skirmishes are now nightly events.

Will the time will come when even wise leaders will no longer be able to rein in the hot tempers? The army, in particular, has done a reasonably effective job of keep the violence in check, but there are limits to its self-control as we have already witnessed.

Last week’s assassination of Mughniyah has certainly increased the political polarization. Mughniyah--one of a cohort of young militants who imbibed the ideology of Iran’s revolution and then were radicalized by the Israeli invasion of 1982--had plenty of blood on his hands. Celebrations of his violent end have painted him as a mastermind of all manner of bloodshed and chaos over the course of the past quarter century or so. His role in some cases, such as the infamous hijacking of TWA 847 in 1985 or the kidnapping and despicable treatment of hostages in 1980s, is well-documented. His role in the early 1990s in the Buenos Aries bombings has been substantiated by Argentinean investigators.

I am not convinced that he deserves all the credit for terrible deeds that has fallen on his corpse. For instance, was he a 21 year old Svengali who directed the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut in April 2003 and the horrendously effective truck bombing of the marine barracks in the autumn of the same year? Perhaps not. Mind you, Mughniyah had plenty of blood to answer for, but hearing the litany of deeds attributed to Mughniyah one has to be a bit skeptical. The Long Commission, aptly in my view, characterized the attack on the marines in 1983 as an act of war by Iran. Mughniyah would have been a player, but not the mastermind.

In recent years, little was ever said about Mughniyah in Lebanon. Lebanese close to Hezbollah usually noted that he was most likely in Iran, and he had been close to Pasdaran figures since at least the early 1980s. A variety of commenters, including Israeli officials, have alluded to his operational role in the 2006 war. My own hunch is that the great service that he performed in the July war of 2006 was to maintain the supply conduit between Hezbollah and Iran, as well as being the Pasdaran’s nexus with Hezbollah.

End of part I. Read more on this article...

The Lebanese Impasse

The premise in this column by Jackson Diehl is that with a united international front, it will be possible for the sitting government to elect a new president, one who will work to undermine the strength of Hezbollah and maintain preferential ties to the West.

It is certainly crucial for the Lebanese to succeed in electing a president to replace Emile Lahoud. While the Lebanese constitution specifies that a parliamentary quorum is a simply majority, the consistent practice ('urfi) in Lebanon has been to require a quorum of two thirds of members. Thus, it is impossible to comprise a quorum without opposition participation. This means that there must a serious dialogue between government and opposition. In practical terms this is all the more important because the opposition arguably accounts for more than fifty percent of the population (the vast majority of Shi'a, a minority of Druze and Sunna, at least half of all Arab Christians, and a big chunk of Armenians).
The problem is that the selection of a president who cannot bridge the political divide raises the risk of fracturing the country.

To date, the U.S. government has been unable to swallow the unpalatable answer of a solution to the impasse in Lebanon that addresses the demands of the opposition, which include both the foreign policy orientation of Lebanon and domestic governance issues. It is certainly true that the opposition embraces a relationship with Syria rather than advocating ostracising Syria, but that does not mean the opposition is a puppet of Syria. My hunch (and I have not been in Lebanon since April, so any observation about opinion must be qualified) is that most Lebanese believe that Syria is behind the assassinations and attempted assassinations that that been carried out since 2004. Even so, anxiety about malevolent Syrians games is matched by anxiety about the U.S. and Israeli agenda in Lebanon.

It needs also to be emphasized that for the citizens of predominantly Shi'i southern Lebanon, there is a real-life security problem, one that is addressed by Hezbollah not created by Hezbollah. Other Lebanese disagree, obviously, but significantly the structural opposition alliance, which includes many Christians, has endured in part because the narrative being promoted by Saad Hariri (and his allies, including Maronite militia-chieftain Samir Ja'ja) is not their narrative.

A finally observation on Jackson Diehl's column: the notion that positive change in Lebanon may then reverberate in the broader Middle East requires careful consideration of what constitutes positive change. An effort to elect a president in Lebanon who represents less than half the population certainly does not qualify as positive change in my view.

Jackson Diehl - Forsaking the Egyptian Free Press - washingtonpost.com

"If the same coalition were to unite in demanding that Damascus stop interfering in the Lebanese presidential election, [Saad] Hariri reasons, the Lebanese could strike a deal that would allow the choice of a president committed to the country's independence, to strengthening its government and its armed forces, and to creating a state that would eventually crowd out militias such as Hezbollah. "If we succeed as a moderate democracy, it will have an enormous impact on the region, and on Syria," Hariri says. "If we fail, terrorism and extremism will flourish." In other words, the Middle East can paralyze Lebanon -- or, just maybe, Lebanon can start to change the Middle East."

Cross-posted from: Speaking Truth to Power from Boston: Dexter Filkins: Kanan Makiya Read more on this article...

Pan-Arab Talk Shows on Libya, Arms Deals, Jordan: OSC

These are the portions of the USG Open Source Center roundup of Arab satellite channels' talk shows during the past week that concern subjects other than Iraq. Covered are the United Nations and its legitimacy, an interview with the son of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhdhafi, Western arms sales to the Middle east, the Lebanese political crisis, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamic theology. For the Iraq portions, see Informed Comment.

Weekly Roundup of Pan-Arab TVs Talk Shows 5-11 Aug Corrected version; replacing text; changing Subject Qatar -- OSC Summary Thursday, August 16, 2007 . . .


Al-Jazirah at 1905 GMT on 7 August carries a new episode of its weekly talk show "The Opposite Direction" moderated by Faysal al-Qasim. The topic of discussion is the United Nations Security Council and the international legitimacy. To discuss this topic, Al-Jazirah hosts in the studio Faysal Jallul writer and researcher, and Akram al-Bunni, writer and human rights activist.

Writer Akram al-Bunni

Commenting on an opinion poll posted on Al-Jazirah Net which showed that 95 percent of participants do not believe that there is international legitimacy; Jallul says that the poll results speak for themselves, adding that the majority of people in the Arab world, Latin America, and Africa currently have no trust in the "so-called international legitimacy."

For his part, Al-Bunni argues that people in other parts of the world believe in international legitimacy as it helped bring an end to their problems. He says that the Arabs' failure to believe in the presence of international legitimacy is mainly attributed to the Arab-Israeli conflict. . .

At 1905 GMT on 8 August Al-Jazirah carries a new episode of its "Without Borders" talk show, moderated by Layla al-Shaykhali. Today's episode hosts Sayf-al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Libyan President Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi and director of the Al-Qadhafi Institute for Development.

Al-Qadhafi starts by talking about the Bulgarian nurses issue, saying that his institute was asked by the families of the AIDS children and by the Bulgarian and Libyan governments to intervene in the matter, and maintains that Libya and the families received the best possible deal from the matter as a result of competition between European countries. He says it was the Europeans who controlled the negotiations and offered Libya millions of dollars in addition to a partnership with the European Union and massive aide, and accuses Europe and the United States of blackmailing Libya. He provides background information and details on the Bulgarian nurses' case, and expresses his belief of the nurses' innocence, noting explains that the nurses remained in custody because there were varying theories on the AIDS infections and because the Libyan judiciary was intentionally given false information. He praises Qatar's role in resolving the issue and speaks of a Qatari-French-EU arrangement, but notes that Libya only cares for the end results and is not concerned with details. He defends his exposure of French and British arms deals related to the nurses case, saying that the case was the key to defensive, economic, and political issues of concern to Libya. . .

At 1905 GMT on 10 August Al-Jazirah carries a new episode of its weekly program " More Than One Opinion" moderated by Malik al-Turayki.

The topic of discussion is the question of why do Egypt and the Arab Gulf states continue to buy weapons and spend tens of billions of dollars to buy weapons from the United States instead of investing the money in economic development.

The guests of the program are Lieutenant General Salah Salim, strategic analyst in Cairo; Brian Katulis, researcher at the Center for American Progress in Washington; and Iranian political analyst Ali Nuri Zada in the studio.

Salim says the open objective of the arms deals is to realize a strategic balance between Iran and the Arab Gulf states and deter the Iranian interference in the region. He says the real reason for these deals is to attach the major Arab countries to the US strategy before a US attack on Iran.

Katulis expresses belief that there is no clear US policy on Iraq, and says that the Bush administration seems not to know what it is doing and rules out the econ omic considerations in the arms deals. Zada says the different viewpoints within the US Administration is something new. He says Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE have always been the clients of US weapons. He expresses belief that the economic factor was not the motive behind the arms deals. . .

Al-Jazirah at 1905 GMT on 11 August carries a new episode of its weekly program "Open Dialogue" presented by Ghassan Bin-Jiddu. The program hosts General Michel Awn, leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, in Beirut, to discuss the political situation in Lebanon, the recent by-elections, the role of the church in Lebanon, the possibility of running in the presidential elections, relations with Hizballah, and other issues.

Asked about the recent by-elections in Al-Matn, Awn says it was "a very difficult battle" for his trend, adding that the US Administration threatened to freeze the assets of any Person who wished to support his party. He goes on to say that the some institutions and clergymen in Lebanon worked against his party during the recent by-elections, and that his opponents used the blood of martyr Pierre al-Jumayyil for propaganda purposes during the recent by-elections. Awn also criticize s the use of money by his opponents to buy votes, and the use of media outlets and intimidation against his trend. He goes on to say that Amin al-Jumayyil, who is a leader of a political party and a former president, should quit political life after losing the by-elections in his constituency.

On the US Administration's interference in the recent by-elections in Al-Matn and whether it plays a role in the Lebanese internal conflicts, Awn says that there is "excessive support" by the US Administrations for Siniora's government, and not Lebanon's government. He adds that the Lebanese Constitution, and not the US Administration, decides whether the Lebanese Government is legitimate or not. He goes on to say that the US Administration supports some Christian sides against him because of "his understanding with Hizballah." He says that he is ready to help the United States achieve its interests, but adds that "the US policy threatens our existence.

"On a possible initiative by the Vatican, Awn says that the Vatican closely watches developments in Lebanon, adding that Lebanese politicians should abide by the apostolic nuncio's "spiritual guidance". . .

At 1908 GMT on 9 August Al-Arabiyah carries a new episode of its weekly program "In Plain Arabic" presented by Giselle Khuri. The program hosts Samir Ja'ja, chairman of the Lebanese Forces' Executive Committee leader of the Lebanese Forces Army, to discuss the current political situation in Lebanon following the results of the by-elections and the upcoming presidential elections.

Asked about the reason for having security forces around his home, Ja'ja says that he is "threatened" and might be targeted just like those who were targeted in the past.Asked why he was not killed in jail if he is really targeted, Ja'ja says that had he been killed in jail, it would have been a very clear crime.

Asked about the possibility for running for the post of president in the upcoming presidential elections, Ja'ja says that he will not run for the post of president of the republic. Asked about the 14 March candidate for the presidential elections, Ja'ja says that he thinks that the candidate for the post of president will be announced at the last minute. He adds that it is not necessary to have a certain candidate at present.

Commenting on the fact that Patriarch Sfayr does not prefer to have any former military persons, such as General Awn or General Michel Sulayman-- run for the post of president, Ja'ja says that that he feels that Patriarch Sfayr does not support introducing any amendments to the constitution or having "ex-gen e rals" run for the post of president.

Asked whether Christians will agree on a candidate, Ja'ja says that he supports this idea because Christians are divided between General Awn and Christians from the 14 March forces.

Answering a question, Ja'ja says that President Lahhud, whose term will end on 23 November 2007, does not have the right or the authority to appoint or suggest any person to succeed him in accordance with Article 62 of the Lebanese Constitution. . .

At 1830 GMT on 10 August Al-Arabiyah carries a new episode of its weekly program " Point of Order" presented by Hasan Mu'awwad. The program hosts Salim al-Falahat, controller general of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) group in Jordan, to speak about the MB's withdrawal from the municipal elections in Jordan.

MB Controller General Salim al-Falahat

Asked whether the recent withdrawal from the municipal elections six hours after the beginning of voting was legal, Al-Falahat says that the decision to withdraw from the elections was taken based on the 'huge rigging" that took place in the voting centers. He adds that the withdrawal was not a premeditated decision but was taken following developments in the field. He goes on to say that "rigging is illegal" ands that citizens have the right to participate or not in the elections. Asked why the movement withdrew from the elections six hours after the start of voting although they noticed violations before the day of the elections, Al-Falahat says: "We are realistic and realize to what extent we have integrity and democracy in the third world countries.

"Answering a question, Al-Falahat denies reports that four members from the Islamic Action Front (IAF) did not withdraw from the elections and won. Asked about the MB's relations with HAMAS, Al-Falahat also answers questions on relations with HAMAS, Gaza incidents, and other issues. . .

At 1905 on 5 August Al-Jazirah carries a new episode of its weekly talk show "Life and Religion" moderated today by Uthman Uthman. The episode hosts Dr Fathi Malkawi, executive director of the International Institute of Islamic Thought, for a discussion on individual perceptions of the world from political and religious standpoints and the dangers posed by radical archaic perceptions of the world as one consisting of good and evil. Malkawi explains that one's perception of the world is but a response to questions about the creator, his existence, his creations, and the nature of his creations, particularly humans and the meaning of life, and says that this applies to philosophy and extends to a person's perception of their place in the world and their relation to their surroundings. Malkawi goes on to explain how individuals perceptions are formed and the factors contributing to those perceptions, and speaks about the differences in perceptions, be they secular or religious, and the perception that the world consists of Muslims and infidels, explaining that it is not a perception of the world, but is a jurisprudence-based diagnosis of the circumstances experienced by a particular society at a particular period of time. Read more on this article...

First reflections on the August 5 by-elections in Lebanon

Muhammad al-Amin Itani won handily in Beirut in a by-election to fill the seat of Walid Eido, who was assassinated in June. Eido was a member of the March 14 alliance, which holds a slim majority of parliamentary seats. Itani's victory was anticipated. The voters in his Beirut district are strongly supportive of Fouad Siniora's government, and many are followers of the Moustaqbal--or Future--movement associated with the late Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri.

The real contest was in the Metn, the Christian heartland and the home base of the Gemayel family. In that race the contest was between Amin Gemayel (Jumayyil) and Camille Khoury, who is associated with the Free Patriotic Movement of General Michel Aoun. Amin Gemayel, of course, was President of Lebanon (1982-88). He is also the father of Pierre Gemayel, who was killed last November in a gangland-style killing. When he was assassinated, Pierre was the Minister of Industry in the Siniora government.

A victory the former President Gemayel would have been an important symbolic victory by the March 14 coalition and the Siniora government. U.S. policymakers were betting that the former president would win the by-election. The hope will be unrequited. In a close election, with a turnout of less than fifty percent, the victory in the Metn went to Camille Khoury and the Aounists.

Although the U.S.-supported government in Beirut holds a slim majority in the parliament, it does not enjoy the same level of support among the Lebanese public. As I have argued in various publications, and in a variety of interviews and presentations over the past year, the opposition enjoys broader support than the U. S.-supported government.

Aoun's blood foe is Samir Geagea, who heads the Lebanese Forces, which greeted the Camille Khoury victory with the headline (in Arabic): "Congratulations to Bashar al-Asad for the victory of Aoun...." Aoun’s adversaries see him as a Syrian wedge back' into Lebanon, much like the U S. does. No doubt. Syria is happy with the result in the Metn, but it is self-deceiving to imagine that Aoun's continuing support stems merely from his (now) cordial relationship with Syria.

The general sustains his following among Lebanese Christians because many of them are disgusted by the political system, and its endemic corruption, favoritism and inefficiency. They also share the general's scathing critique of the Siniora government. Whatever one's feelings about Aoun, and I have longstanding misgivings about the general and his judgment, there is no denying that he has sustained durable popular support in Lebanon. While his alliance with Hezbollah--which precedes last summer's war--has lost him some supporters, there is a structural coherence to the opposition alliance. Indeed, were general elections held now in Lebanon, the opposition would probably capture a majority of parliamentary seats.

I hope the U.S. Secretary of State will understand the importance of what has happened in the Metn by-election. Despite hearty U.S. support, the popular support of the Siniora government is far thinner than official rhetoric in Washington suggests. Taking into account defections and the August 5th election result, the government commands only a slim majority in the parliament.

This should suggest that it is now urgent to end the stalemate that has trapped Lebanon since Aoun and Hezbollah launched demonstrations to topple the government. They faded, but they have succeeded in immobilizing the government, and the economy for eight months

Meantime, as the continuing bloody battles in northern Lebanon illustrate, the political stalemate has not frozen the ability of extremist affiliates of al-Qaeda to set up housekeeping in parts of Lebanon. Nearly 130 Lebanese soldiers have died in the course of more than two months of tough combat in and around the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in the north (recall that the population of Lebanon is only four million, so the toll of military dead is immense).

It is crucial that the political stalemate end so the Lebanese government may turn its attention to the formidable dangers that confront Lebanon. The Bush administration has tended to view Lebanon in very black and while terms, as though our allies in the Siniora government were the "good guys" while Aoun, Hezbollah and a variant of other groups were the "bad guys Sorry, but it is just not that simple.

A Lebanese presidential election looms. Emile Lahoud. extended in office by Syrian diktat in 2004, is scheduled to leave office in November. The parliament is scheduled to convene to elect a president on September 25. A quorum of two-thirds is necessary for the election to proceed. A simple majority vote is necessary an to elect a president, once a quorum has assembled.

What is needed now is a dialogue between government and opposition. The U S needs to stop blocking that dialogue. Otherwise, if the presidential election fails, we have a small hint in the Metn election of how Lebanon may split.

Fostering instability in Lebanon is not something the U.S. should wish to do right now.

Augustus Richard Norton, Boston University Read more on this article...

Army continues bombardment on Lebanon camp

The crisis between the Lebanese military and Fatah al-Islam militants inside the Nahr al-Barid camp near Tripoli continues. After renewed bombardment in recent days, the Lebanese military has begun entering the camp. Such an incursion is extremely rare. Video follows:

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