More On Raymond Davis
Posted by Michael Cohen
So there is a rather interesting article on the Raymond Davis controversy that quotes a number of Congressmen and Senators saying it would be a terrible idea to use US aid to Pakistan as a tool for winning Davis's release.
And generally I agree with this sentiment - but to be sure it's not as if aid is providing much of any leverage with the Pakistani government otherwise. Still, this quote from Lindsay Graham was sort of priceless:
Senator Lindsey Graham, the top Republican on Leahy's subcommittee, strongly warned against any roll back to assistance to Pakistan, citing the need for help in the war in Afghanistan and the hunt for suspected terrorists.
"Our relationship's got to be bigger than this," Graham said.
"This is a friction point, this is a troubling matter, it doesn't play well in Afghanistan. We can't throw this agent over, I don't know all the details, but we cannot define the relationship based on one incident because it is too important at a time when we're making progress in Afghanistan," he said.
This is sort of a prefect encapsulation of the dysfunction at the heart of the US-Pakistan relationship - and the failure of US policymakers to recognize it as such. First of all, we're not really making progress in Afghanistan, but that notwithstanding if we were making progress it wouldn't be because of Pakistan . . it would be despite it. Perhaps Senator Graham has some unique insight into US-Pakistan relations, but it sure does seem as though Pakistan is actively supporting and giving sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban insurgents that are killing US soldiers and have repeatedly rejected US demands/inducements to turn against their nominal allies.
And a good part of the reason for this dysfunction is that we are not only trying to convince the Pakistan to do something they don't want to do but we are overestimating our own leverage and influence with Islamabad (hint: it's marginal at best).
As I wrote a few weeks ago in World Politics Review, there might actually be a better way:
It is small wonder that, despite years of American cajoling and demands that Pakistan break ties with the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistanis refuse to do so. Why should they? There is no incentive for them to take the steps that the U.S. wants them to, especially since they can be fairly confident that the United States will not cut off aid to Pakistan anytime soon. After all, considering how many NATO supply trucks wind their way across the Pakistani border to Afghanistan, the U.S. needs Pakistan just as much as Pakistan needs the U.S. And since the Pakistanis are no doubt aware that at some point in the near future the United States and NATO will leave Afghanistan, they have even less reason to be compliant with U.S. demands.
So what would be a better approach? It begins with recognizing that, to be effective, U.S. policy in Afghanistan must work in concert with and not in opposition to Pakistan's interests. Instead of seeking to marginalize or even eliminate the Taliban in Afghanistan, the United States and NATO should adopt a political strategy that ensures that the Taliban -- and in turn Pakistan -- have a political voice in Afghanistan's future. This is not necessarily an ideal solution, but it's certainly a more realistic one. Adopting such an approach, might also pay dividends for the U.S. in getting Islamabad to devote resources to taking on jihadist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Haqqani network and, of course, remnants of al-Qaida. Continuing the current strategy will only ensure that U.S. and Pakistani policymakers will remain at loggerheads, and that progress in Afghanistan will remain uncertain.