The BioIndustry Initiative
Issue | Obstacles | Q&A | Quick Facts | Legislation | Agreements | Talking Points | Recommendations
The Issue
After more than a decade of effort to eliminate an urgent threat to global security, both anecdotal and empirical indicators suggest that there is a continuing risk of "brain drain" proliferation from the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU). While proliferation threats emanate from across the spectrum of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) specialties, former biological weapons specialists pose a particular challenge owing to the inability of current regimes to detect and deter the development of weaponized pathogens.
Within the first year after the collapse of the USSR, life for its once privileged community of scientists, engineers and technicians was irrevocably altered. Tens of thousands lost their jobs or went months without a paycheck. Even the brightest scientists and engineers were forced to seek work where they could get it-whether driving taxi cabs or selling their talents to foreign governments or terrorist organizations.[1] It was estimated that the Soviets had employed some 65,000 specialists within a vast biological warfare complex.[2] Most were capable of spreading materials or sensitive information to hostile groups and states. The aging community of researchers that previously raised the most concern, however, does not represent the only threat. According to recent analyses, younger bioscientists in the states of the FSU who have modern laboratory skills and direct access to biological materials at the erstwhile weapons institutes, as well as strong financial ambitions, pose equally daunting challenges to international security. The states of the former Soviet Union present a unique proliferation challenge in that the same area of the world where the most developed capacities to weaponize pathogens resides is also one of the most isolated in terms of scientific exchange. While government and private sector researchers are well acquainted with research being conducted in other developing countries-including India-FSU labs remain by and large a black box for Western researchers.
In the early 1990s when the government in Moscow eliminated funding to the massive Soviet-developed bioresearch and weapons production capacity, the United States launched a series of "scientist redirection" programs designed to ensure that the intellectual resources within that research and production complex did not proliferate to rogue states and terrorist organizations. The BioIndustry Initiative (BII) at the US State Department is one of the newer programs to emerge in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 era of counterproliferation and counterterrorism efforts. BII was created by Congress after September 11, 2001 to engage the US biotech and pharmaceutical industries as potential employers of the biological sciences expertise residing in the states of the FSU.
The BioIndustry Initiative's mandate is focused solely on biological threats, and works toward the long-term transition of large-scale FSU biological weapons production facilities, their technology and associated expertise to viable commercial research and production institutions. It also seeks to partner US and former Soviet biological and chemical weapons scientists to develop and accelerate the production of vaccines for infectious diseases that affect the FSU and the world. BII aspires to engage specific institutes, assesses their core capabilities as well as the appropriate domestic and international market, and then pairs Russian laboratories with American researchers in both academic and industrial sectors. It is anticipated that in 2007, major commercial reconfiguration projects such as the dismantlement of BW production buildings and the development of an animal feed mill at a former bioweapons production facility in Georgia will come to fruition, thus testing the viability of the BII model.
The stated objective of all current programs focused on the nonproliferation of expertise is to permanently and sustainably redirect former WMD specialists. Unfortunately, none of the existing programs is systematically creating the new jobs necessary to sustainably engage weapons experts and thus achieve this objective. Each program, while temporarily engaging the target community, is struggling to develop models that will sustain activities beyond the Western funding horizon. Because BII remains a relatively new program, its efforts have yet to bear significant fruit; however, structural limitations will likely limit long-term success due to its continued efforts to work within the walls of the erstwhile weapons institutes. The viability of the continuing focus on "conversion" of these institutes, in most instances, will not prove the most efficacious approach to creating sustainable job opportunities for the target population. At the very least, this approach is tremendously expensive. Inventive new models for effectively engaging and leveraging the talent resident in the WMD complexes in the region are overdue and must be developed.
Obstacles
- In the scheme of Cooperative Nonproliferation efforts, those focused on the human dimension, (i.e. proliferation of weapons know-how) are largely undervalued and face substantial difficulties in measuring their impact and gauging success.
- There is a common perception on Capitol Hill that threat reduction programs have become welfare programs, rather than mutually beneficial programs necessary for US national security. This mistaken view of the US-FSU relationship has been a systematic impediment to achieving faster progress from the very beginning of cooperative nonproliferation efforts. Both the West and the states of the Former Soviet Union must take steps to reverse this belief.
- While the BioIndustry Initiative (BII) was created to overcome the impediments rooted in the structure of the Science Centers, and to partner formally with industry to generate sustainable opportunities, BII has also confronted substantial limitations in its ability to systematically generate commercial opportunities for the bioscience community in the former weapons institutes. The focus on the institutes as the place of continuing employment for these scientists has created major impediments to industry's potential involvement in creating sustainable opportunities.
Q & A
Q: What was the
legacy of the complex of Soviet bioweapons institutes after the collapse
of the Soviet Union?
A:
It is estimated that the Soviets had employed some 65,000 specialists
within a vast biological warfare complex.[3] Many
were capable of spreading critical aspects of sensitive information to
hostile groups and states. The retirement and death of many of these
scientists has not reduced the threat, as a new generation with modern
knowledge of and skills in the life sciences continue to look for
sustainable employment.
Q: What
are some of the obstacles to the success of BII and related scientist
redirect efforts in general?
A: BII is a relatively new
program, so its efforts have yet to bear significant fruit. However,
structural limitations will limit long-term success due to its continued
efforts to work within the walls of the erstwhile weapons institutes or
convert them for commercial purposes. Overall, scientist redirect
programming has been fairly successful at keeping former weapons
scientists in place at their institutes and providing them short-term
financial means to survive. However, efforts to find or generate
sustainable, commercially-viable opportunities for the target
communities have confronted insurmountable structural problems in terms
of program management and funding streams. In addition, these programs
have been subject to strained governmental relations and dwindling US
political support or understanding of their potential value to US
nonproliferation and foreign policy objectives.
Q: What are some alternative approaches
for effectively engaging former BW scientists?
A: One
alternative is to draw existing scientific capacity and expertise into a
commercially viable enterprise outside of the weapons complexes.
Short-term incentives could be used to engage private sector companies
as employers. Additional incentives could be provided through
collaboration with similar programs that stand to benefit from the
sustainable employment of former BW specialists.
Quick Facts
- The Soviet Union is believed to have developed antibiotic-resistant strains of both tularemia and plague. [4] It is known that they had an overwhelming capability to undertake a strategic attack using plague or smallpox.
- The Soviet military designated tularemia and Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis as the principal agents for tactical or operational use on the battlefield. Anthrax and Marburg virus were nominated for attacking rear areas. A third category of agents comprised the highly transmissible agents smallpox and plague, which were categorized as strategic weapons and destined for use against enemy population centers.
- A small airplane dispersing 220 pounds of anthrax spores could inflict more casualties in the Washington, DC metropolitan area than a missile carrying a hydrogen bomb.[5]
- Biological agents may be the weapons of choice for terrorists because they are easily accessible (compared to nuclear materials), tracing the source of a disease outbreak can be extremely difficult, and many can be spread from person to person, causing an epidemic which can have severe social, psychological and political ramifications.
Recent Legislation
- N/A
Applicable Treaties, Legislation, and Other International Agreements
- The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-201, also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act) outlined the threat posed by biological weapons and expanded the scope of Cooperative Nonproliferation programs.
- Chapter 3 of Division B of the Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act of Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-117) authorized the establishment of the BII.
Talking Points
- It is estimated that the Soviets had employed some 65,000 specialists within a vast biological warfare complex.
- At the end of the Cold War, Moscow cut funding to its bioresearch and weapons programs. To stem "brain drain" proliferation, the US government launched a series of scientist redirection programs to keep scientists at work in their former institutes. This approach is not the most effective for preventing proliferation, as scientists are left isolated from the global research community and do not have sustained employment. New models are urgently needed.
- The aging community of researchers that has previously raised the most concern does not represent the only human proliferation threat. Young FSU bioscientists with modern laboratory skills that have direct access to biological materials at the erstwhile weapons institutes, as well as strong financial ambitions, pose equally daunting challenges to international security.
- By attempting to establish programs with commercial viability, the BII is attempting to ensure the long-term sustainability of the program.
- BII has an Intellectual Property (IP) Support program that aims to bridge the gap between the program's laboratory research and commercially attractive deals.
- BII's emphasis on working in the walls of former BW institutes will limit its long-term success and sustainability. Efforts to foster sustainable employment and project viability in the marketplace must extend beyond these boundaries.
- BII is currently engaged with 38 different Russian institutions.[6]
Recommendations
-
Since
the introduction of the Cooperative Nonproliferation (CNP) programs in
the early 1990s, there has not been a global reassessment of these
programs' roles and objectives to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in
the current strategic environment. A National Security Council designee
should spearhead an interagency process to reassess the global role of
CNP efforts in today's context, including those that have arisen in the
past few years. Such a close examination of the entire suite of
programs, including those that deal with biological weapons, across all
relevant government agencies should strive to eliminate duplication,
consolidate where necessary, and fill any gaps within the existing
efforts.
[See Book Recommendations #1 and #11] -
Define
goals for BW threat reduction and redirect programs in the context of
each participating agency's objectives as well as within the long-term
strategic objectives of the US Government's foreign policy. In addition,
each agency's role and relationships must be clarified.
[See Book Recommendations #2 and #16] -
A
reassessment of the prospects and pitfalls of US-Russian relations
should be a fundamental component to a reevaluation of the suite of
cooperative threat reduction programs, including those related to BW.
Not only should the radically changed economic situation provide the
context for a fresh look at US Government programs with Russia, but the
analysis should include concrete measures for leveraging recent
US-Russian agreements to begin the transition from "patronage to
partnership."
[See Book Recommendation #5] -
A
bicameral congressional task force should be created to regularly
provide briefings from a broad array of the programs and actors involved
in the actual implementation of biological weapons-related CNP
activities. Such briefings would go a long way in creating the needed
knowledge base on Capitol Hill.
[See Book Recommendation #7] -
The
bioweapons-related scientific and technical talent resident in the WMD
complexes in the states of the FSU must be effectively engaged and
leveraged. This can be done by channeling government programs to meet
mutually identified needs, as well as by undertaking a serious effort to
create an appropriate incentive structure to engage potential
employers, i.e. private industry actors. The emphasis of existing
programs on scientific collaboration or technology development only too
infrequently creates sustainable employment.
[See Book Recommendations #8 and #23] -
BII
has confronted substantial limitations in its ability to systematically
generate commercial opportunities for the bioscience community in
erstwhile weapons institutes. The focus on the institutes as the place
of continuing employment for these scientists would appear to create
significant impediments to industry's potential involvement in creating
sustainable opportunities. Similarly, while an emphasis on "conversion"
of existing facilities may be valid in exceptional cases, this approach
is tremendously expensive and may, in certain cases, be less efficacious
than incentivizing green fields investments that would draw the
scientific capacity into a commercially viable enterprise outside the
weapons complex. BII should consider approaches that may enhance the
probability of sustainable redirection.
[See Book Recommendation #24]
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Endnotes
[1] Ken
Alibek, Biohazard (New York:
Random House, 1999): 270-279.
[2] Amy
E. Smithson, Toxic Archipelago:
Preventing Proliferation from the former Soviet Chemical and Biological
Weapons Complexes, (Washington: The Henry L. Stimson Center,
1999), accessed at: http://www.stimson.org/cbw/pdf/toxicarch.pdf.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ken
Alibek, "Behind the Mask: Biological Warfare" Perspective Vol. 9, No. 1 (Sept.-Oct. 1998), Institute
for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy, accessed at: http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol9/Alibek.html.
[5] Col.
Jim Davis and Anna Johnson-Winegar, "The Anthrax Terror: DOD's
Number-One Biological Threat" Aerospace
Power Journal (Winter 2000), accessed at: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/win00/davis.htm.
[6]
BioIndustry Initiative, "Profiles of Russian Partner Institutions,"
accessed at: http://biistate.net/docs/profiles.php.
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Last Updated on May 30, 2007