The Coming Counterrevolution? Posted by The Editors

This guest post by Scott Bates, vice-president and senior fellow for national security at the Center for National Policy. Bates was the first senior policy advisor for the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee.

In 1848 popular revolution broke out in one European land after another, from the Netherlands to Serbia, Poland to Prussia. Monarchies tottered and the old social order appeared destined to the dustbin of history with the advent of new movements for an old continent: democracy and socialism.

Yet the “Spring of the Peoples” that dawned in Europe in 1848 was slowly reversed through a rolling counterrevolution that capitalized on the inability of revolutionary forces to quickly coalesce into governing majorities.  The passing of months and years without stability and clear direction allowed the former interests aligned with the status quo to counter attack against the revolutionaries of 1848. The masses that had supported democratic change in the revolution of 1848 became generally disillusioned fairly quickly and were not there to resist the counter attack of the old order. 

Historical determinism is only for the foolish brave, and Marxists. However the past can be a positive guide in reminding us that indeed the forces of change now unleashed in the Middle East are not automatically destined to neatly deliver democracy for all. As events continue to unfold, the United States should mobilize our democratic allies across the globe, and in particular in Europe, to be prepared to provide substantial and sustained long-term engagement and support to the positive forces of change now emerging in the Middle East. 

While the forces of democratic change unleashed in 1848 ultimately prevailed over absolutism in Europe, many decades of turmoil were to follow in getting to that place. The world can ill afford that kind of decades long conflict and chaos in the Middle East.

Congressional Moves to Get Out of Afghanistan Begin with a Whimper Posted by Jacob Stokes

As the world and the Washington foreign policy community focused on unrest in the Middle East for the last couple of weeks, some members of Congress moved to stop funding the war in Afghanistan. On the House side, Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA) introduced a bill that would “end combat operations in Afghanistan and limit funding to the safe orderly withdrawal of U.S. troops and military contractors.”

On the Senate side, Sen. Barbara Boxer, introduced the “Safe and Responsible Redeployment of United States Combat Forces from Afghanistan Act of 2011.” Along with the bills, Reps. James McGovern (D-MA) and Walter Jones (R-NC) wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post titled, “The solution in Afghanistan: Get out.” (Rep. Jones is also a co-signer on the Lee bill. Full list here.)

No doubt the bills come from the left flank of both parties, and completely de-funding the war represents probably the most ham-handed approach to ending American involvement. But it’s still amazing that, as far as I can tell, the House bill was mentioned in only one article by the San Francisco Chronicle, and the Senate bill was mentioned only by what appears to be a community blogger for the San Jose Examiner – and nowhere else that comes up in a Google news search. The House bill was dropped in tandem with Huffington Post op-eds from several representatives (here, here and here), Afghanistan Study Group member Matthew Hoh and Brave New Films’ Robert Greenwald. But those seemed to get lost in the shuffle as well in terms of broader coverage. Same goes for the McGovern-Jones op-ed.

At first glance, it seems weird how little attention two bills and an op-ed in the Washington Post received, given the high cost of the war, budget-cutting fervor and the increasing perception among Americans that the mission isn’t going well. Numbers suggest that these bills should be – and ostensibly are – rather popular pieces of legislation. As the San Francisco Chronicle story explains, “A recent CBS News poll showed 72 percent of the public favors a faster withdrawal; while a Gallup/USA Today poll this month showed majorities of Democrats, independents and Republicans favoring a speedier pullout.” 

But upon closer look, aside from the fact that the Middle East is taking up most of the foreign-policy-following public’s attention, the reason for this lack of attention is clear: Afghanistan is not really a priority. As Jamie Fly notes, “In a late October 2010 poll done by the Pew Research Center, only 12 percent of respondents said that the war in Afghanistan was the first or second issue most important to their vote, and only 9 percent cited terrorism.” 

Given the low priority placed on the war by voters, lawmakers who want the legislative branch to bring an end to American involvement in Afghanistan will have to be louder than this.

Raymond Davis Worked for the CIA . . . So What? Posted by Michael Cohen

So today we find out about Raymond Davis what many had suspected - that he was working for the CIA. However, even the details of his status remain highly opaque.

The New York Times is reporting that Davis "was part of a covert, CIA-led team of operatives conducting surveillance on militant groups deep inside the country;" the Wall Street Journal reports that Davis worked for the agency but "was not directly involved in spying operations." Finally Reuters is saying that Davis was a "protective officer" providing security to embassy officials and was not part of a CIA-team doing surveillance.

I'm not sure what to believe here - but to be honest it doesn't matter in regard to the issue of Davis's diplomatic immunity. If the Pakistani government accepted Davis's entry into the country with a diplomatic passport . . . then Davis has immunity. End of conversation.

That, in the nutshell, is the issue - and the focus on his occupation or agency affiliation is a distraction (and I would argue an intentional one).  Even today, when I was being yelled at by various Pakistani lawyers and journalists on Voice of America, there was one area of consensus - where Davis worked is irrelevant.

Don't believe me on this: as Pakistani columnist Raza Rumi argues,"We have missed the chance to demonstrate that we are a rule-based state, compliant with international law." 

But of course as we know the revelations of Davis's CIA ties will only serve to muddy the waters over his diplomatic status and give ammunition to those voices in Pakistan and elsewhere who want to use this incident as a means of making a larger political point.

Case in point, Glenn Greenwald's hyperbolic accusations today that the State Department has no credibilty "invoking lofty "rule-of-law" and diplomacy principles" because the "very same State Department that just got caught systematically violating that convention when WikiLeaks cables revealed that U.S. "diplomats" were ordered to spy on U.N. officials and officials in other countries."

The issue of diplomatic spying is a bit more complicated than Glenn would let on, but I'm surprised by the breezy dismissal of lofty rule of law claims on this issue. Is the fact that Pakistan has a legal responsibility to treat US diplomats by the letter of international law irrelevant? One would think not. Unless this is an invocation of the legal doctrine "two wrongs make a right."

And then there is this:

But what this highlights most of all is the extraordinary cost of occupying, interfering with and waging endless war in multiple countries around the world . . We relentlessly hear what a serious threat is posed to us by Terrorism, and gravely lament that Pakistan is such a hotbed for that activity and those who support it.  Yet -- as the people in that country hear every day -- we're occupying, bombing, droning, and otherwise trying to control what happens there. 

What happened in Lahore is part of an ongoing, continuous assault by American forces in that region.  They (but not we) hear routinely about the killing of their innocent civilians by Americans in their country.  

This is a complete distraction from the matter at hand. As any observer of the US drone war in Pakistan is well aware it is being carried out with the full knowledge, support and acquiesence of the Pakistani government. Indeed many of those being killed by US drones are enemies of the Pakistani government as much as they are enemies of the United States. Like this guy.

And to argue that the United States is trying to control what is happening in Pakistan would surely seem like a cruel joke indeed to US officials who have watched helplessly as Pakistan continues to support Afghan Taliban insurgents and provide sanctuary to jihadist terrorist groups. Moreover, the argument that the US is "routinely" killing Pakistani civilians is contradicted not only by recent reports that civilians casualties have dropped significantly but also work by Christine Fair, among others, that shows such casualty figures are greatly inflated by Pakistan. Finally, it needs to be stated that if the Times story is to be believed . . . the Pakistani government was well aware of Davis's CIA affiliation.

I take a back seat to no man or woman when it comes to my consistent criticism of the US government in regard to the war in Afghanistan and just earlier this year I wrote that the US needs to be more solicitous of Pakistani interests in Afghanistan.

But that notwithstanding if Davis has diplomatic immunity and was accepted by Pakistan under a diplomatic passport then he should be released immediately. On this point the United States stands on very firm legal and diplomatic ground - a point that all voices in this debate should be acknowledging.

If the Pakistani believe he was a CIA agent or engaged in covert activities than they should declare him persona non grata and kick him out of the country. But to continue holding him in a Lahore prison is a violation of basic diplomatic and legal norms. (That a Lahore provincial court determined the matter needs three weeks of investigation is a complete dodge; since the question of Davis's status is an issue to be resolved not by a provincial court only by the Pakistan Foreign Ministry. This is classic buck-passing.)

Whatever one thinks of the US war in Afghanistan or the US relationship with Pakistan the simple fact is that treaty obligations are treaty obligations and the rule of law is the rule of law; and in this case it would appear that the United States has the facts on its side. (Here is another Pakistani lawyer/writer making the same argument).

Discussions about where Davis worked, his background, the US drone war in NW Pakistan and revelations from the Wikileaks documents are certainly matters of public import and should be discussed openly. But in the context of the Davis incident, they should be seen for what they are - a purposeful dodge from the issues of this case. 

How's That Strategic Partnership With Pakistan Working Out? Posted by Michael Cohen

Greg Miller in the Washington Post has a really interesting article about the success, or lack thereof, of the US drone war in Pakistan:

CIA drone attacks in Pakistan killed at least 581 militants last year, according to independent estimates. The number of those militants noteworthy enough to appear on a U.S. list of most-wanted terrorists: two.

Despite a major escalation in the number of unmanned Predator strikes being carried out under the Obama administration, data from government and independent sources indicate that the number of high-ranking militants being killed as a result has either slipped or barely increased.

According to New America Foundation, 94% of those killed in drone attacks, which cost more than $1 million each, are low-level militants. This makes the US war on terrorism the most expensive game of whack-a-mole ever invented.

But this sort of report begs a question; if the drone war is not bringing us any significant benefit in taking out top AQ leaders - and is being used instead to kill Pakistan Taliban or Afghan Taliban militants - what exactly is it worth to us?  How is it furthering the US national interest?

Keep in mind, in order to maintain this drone war we provide significant assistance to Pakistan of several billion dollars a year; we look the other way at Pakistani support for Afghan Taliban insurgents; we watch with frustration as the Pakistan government thumbs it's nose at the United States with the recent Ray Davis scandal; we barely raise a public stink over the fact that the man who killed 3,000 Americans has been living in Pakistan for about 9 years . . and what are we getting in return? 

Supposedly one item was the ability to fly drone aircraft in Pakistan's tribal areas - and now we discover that even that isn't much bringing the United States much gain. If you think about it the only thing we're getting out of this relationship - of tangible benefit - is the Pakistanis allowing us to use their country as a transit point for bringing materials into Afghanistan. So what we have here is a dysfunctional relationship with Pakistan that harms the US national interest but is maintained, in some measure, to allow us to continue fighting a war in Afghanistan that is tangential from US national interests.

Ladies and Gentlemen, your 2011 United States Foreign Policy!

Of course I'm being overly flippant: there obviously is an argument to be made that if the United States wasn't using drones in Pakistan it would enable al Qaeda to regenerate and began plotting and training for terrorist attacks against the United States. As a deterrent effect alone, the drones are a key element in degrading al Qaeda's capabilities. But if that's the case why are we spending so much energy and time killing low-level militants? I understand why we for a brief time ramped up the drone attacks; but why are we continuing to do so? Shouldn't the drone be focused largely on killing the top operatives and not wasting our time with small potatoes?

The Post quotes defenders of the drones program saying that "empirical evidence suggests that the ramped-up targeting of lesser-known militants has helped to keep the United States safe."

Not only does that seem very hard to believe (after all AQ was only successful on 9/11 because they had the money and masterminds to plot major attacks; the presence of low-level operatives was less vital) but it also seems to ignore the fact that there is a price to be paid for waging these attacks.

Already we've seen blowback from them, not only in the form of the attempted Times Square bombing last summer, but also in negatively affecting US relations with Pakistan (and most certainly US public opinion in Pakistan). One can imagine that the Raymond Davis incident would not be happening if not for the fact that the US was firing drones into NW Pakistan.

But here's the bottom line: the rationale for escalation in Afghanistan was that we had to fight al Qaeda. Part of that rationale rested on the idea that by being in Afghanistan we could more effectively wage the drone war in Pakistan. 

Now it turns out the drone war is barely even killing top al Qaeda lieutenants; we hear from Administration officials that AQAP in Yemen is actually a greater national security threat to the United States; and we have repeated examples that Pakistan has virtually no interest in being an effective US partner in the fight against jihadist terror groups and is actively fanning the flames of US hatred, in part because of a drone war that isn't really achieving its stated purpose.

Other than that the war in Afghanistan seems to be going swimmingly.

Jaw Jaw Is Better than Wish Wish Posted by Eric Martin

Ahmad Shuja has recently undertaken to hold an "e-jirga," whereby Shuja asks various Afghan professionals and students for their opinions on the wisdom of negotiating/reconciling with the Taliban.  The early responses are worth reading, and one hopes that more such discussion will be forthcoming, as a negotiation/reconciliation strategy is at least worth pursuing if nothing else but to gain a glimpse at what an eventual peace agreement would look like in order to assess the wisdom of continuing with the current strategy, or opting for an alternative.

Of the three responses thus far posted, two can be characterized as opposed to such outreach, while one offers a qualified, and caveatted endorsement. The objections are entirely understandable, with appeals to human rights concerns and demands for justice for atrocities committed by Taliban forces when they held power (and since).

Indeed, one of the difficulties that policymakers face in trying to unwind this conflict is that the uncompromising position seems the more morally satisfying one: it is far more inspiring to talk of creating a peaceful, democratic, Afghanistan whose government is relatively free of corruption and which recognizes and respects the rights of its citizens. Who wants to argue for the inclusion of the Taliban, a group whose brutality, especially toward women, is well documented.

However noble such a mission might be, though, the past decade has taught us that such a transformation might be beyond our ability as an outside power, and might prove elusive still to the Afghan people given the myriad competing factions pushing divergent agendas - including many within Karzai's government whose own human rights records mirror those of the Taliban.

Our policy in Afghanistan must be guided first and foremost by what is achievable given real-world resource constraints, and the reality of the various Afghan players, not what would be the most morally and ethically appealing in an ideal world.  Along those lines, this passages from Abdulhadi Hairan's response is telling:

So instead of wasting time [with negotiation] and pushing the country into deeper chaos, the government must think about something different, mainly containing election fraud, which President Karzai can start from himself, fighting corruption, which he can start from members of his own family and his top officials, and bringing war criminals to justice most of whom are his aides and close allies. The international community must do something to stop Pakistan’s support for terrorism.

There is little doubt that if the Afghan government, and international community, could achieve all of those things, there would be less need to negotiate with the Taliban. But that is an enormous, loaded, weighty "if."

Hairan calls on Karzai to, first, take action against his own past electoral fraud (or not repeat such fraud in the future?), a prospect whose odds approach zero.  Next, Karzai is expected to take legal action, including imposing criminal sanctions, against members of his own family and the close allies upon whom he relies to maintain power, all in an effort to fight corruption and punish war crimes. 

Again, expecting Karzai to undertake a process by which he undercuts his own power base is to misconstrue human nature in fundamental ways. Further, Hairan does not suggest where Karzai will be able to look for allies to replace those sacked and imprisoned, nor how Karzai will curry favor with a new set of prospective allies without the ability to dole out patronage goodies in a process that many would describe, with some level of accuracy, as corrupt.  

Lastly, Hairan appeals to the international community to "do something" to stop Pakistan's support for the Taliban.  Unfortunately, Pakistan has, rightly or wrongly, gauged that its vital interests are served by supporting the Taliban and opposing the consolidation of gains made by India in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban.

It is not clear what the international community could do, under what rubric, and incurring what costs, in order to change Pakistan's behavior, but what is clear is that the United States has been thus far unable to garner Pakistan's cooperation along these lines. The prospects for a change of course do not rate high, thus it is no surprise that the mechanism by which the international community is supposed to compel Pakistan to act directly against its perceived vital interests remains unidentified.

Hairan is almost certainly correct when he states that there would be little need to talk to the Taliban were corruption and electoral fraud eradicated, the justice system invigorated, criminals (including in Karzai's coterie) punished and Pakistan's support for the Taliban ended. However, given that such goals are almost certainly unattainable in any reasonable time period, for any reasonable price tag, there is little choice but to at least pursue what can be achieved through negotiation and reconciliation. 

More On Raymond Davis Posted by Michael Cohen

So there is a rather interesting article on the Raymond Davis controversy that quotes a number of Congressmen and Senators saying it would be a terrible idea to use US aid to Pakistan as a tool for winning Davis's release.

And generally I agree with this sentiment - but to be sure it's not as if aid is providing much of any leverage with the Pakistani government otherwise. Still, this quote from Lindsay Graham was sort of priceless:

Senator Lindsey Graham, the top Republican on Leahy's subcommittee, strongly warned against any roll back to assistance to Pakistan, citing the need for help in the war in Afghanistan and the hunt for suspected terrorists.

"Our relationship's got to be bigger than this," Graham said.

"This is a friction point, this is a troubling matter, it doesn't play well in Afghanistan. We can't throw this agent over, I don't know all the details, but we cannot define the relationship based on one incident because it is too important at a time when we're making progress in Afghanistan," he said.

This is sort of a prefect encapsulation of the dysfunction at the heart of the US-Pakistan relationship - and the failure of US policymakers to recognize it as such. First of all, we're not really making progress in Afghanistan, but that notwithstanding if we were making progress it wouldn't be because of Pakistan . . it would be despite it. Perhaps Senator Graham has some unique insight into US-Pakistan relations, but it sure does seem as though Pakistan is actively supporting and giving sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban insurgents that are killing US soldiers and have repeatedly rejected US demands/inducements to turn against their nominal allies.

And a good part of the reason for this dysfunction is that we are not only trying to convince the Pakistan to do something they don't want to do but we are overestimating our own leverage and influence with Islamabad (hint: it's marginal at best).

As I wrote a few weeks ago in World Politics Review, there might actually be a better way:

It is small wonder that, despite years of American cajoling and demands that Pakistan break ties with the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistanis refuse to do so. Why should they? There is no incentive for them to take the steps that the U.S. wants them to, especially since they can be fairly confident that the United States will not cut off aid to Pakistan anytime soon. After all, considering how many NATO supply trucks wind their way across the Pakistani border to Afghanistan, the U.S. needs Pakistan just as much as Pakistan needs the U.S. And since the Pakistanis are no doubt aware that at some point in the near future the United States and NATO will leave Afghanistan, they have even less reason to be compliant with U.S. demands.

So what would be a better approach? It begins with recognizing that, to be effective, U.S. policy in Afghanistan must work in concert with and not in opposition to Pakistan's interests. Instead of seeking to marginalize or even eliminate the Taliban in Afghanistan, the United States and NATO should adopt a political strategy that ensures that the Taliban -- and in turn Pakistan -- have a political voice in Afghanistan's future. This is not necessarily an ideal solution, but it's certainly a more realistic one. Adopting such an approach, might also pay dividends for the U.S. in getting Islamabad to devote resources to taking on jihadist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Haqqani network and, of course, remnants of al-Qaida. Continuing the current strategy will only ensure that U.S. and Pakistani policymakers will remain at loggerheads, and that progress in Afghanistan will remain uncertain.

What the Raymond Davis Incident Says About the US-Pakistan "Strategic Partnership" Posted by Michael Cohen

For more than a year and a half supporters of the war in Afghanistan have steadily peddled the argument that one of the reasons that the US must stay militarily engaged in the region (and especially in Afghanistan) is to support Pakistan, particularly in its fight against radical extremists. The Obama Administration has even hailed a new strategic partnership with Islamabad. 

But the latest twist in the Raymond Davis saga should throw some mighty cold water on that notion.

For those who haven't followed the Davis story closely he is a US diplomat who was arrested several weeks ago for shooting two Pakistanis, allegedly in self-defense. Here's the problem, Davis is a member of the US embassy's technical and administrative staff, which means that he has fairly absolute diplomatic immunity and should be released from prison.

Yet, this hasn't stopped Pakistan from charging Davis with murder and detaining him and just yesterday the provincial court that has jurisdiction over the case has said it will be holding Davis for another three weeks until the issue of his immunity is resolved.

Let's put aside for a second that this case seems to represent a fairly clear cut violation of international law. Pakistan is one of America's largest foreign aid recipients and one of our supposedly most important allies in the region; just this week the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee John Kerry traveled to Islamabad to try and resolve the issue - and was rebuffed; and the Obama Administration has steadily escalated the issue even threatening a downgrade in US-Pakistan relations in order to resolve the dispute.

Yet, Pakistan still refuses to release Davis. Indeed the announcement, even after Kerry's visit, that the matter will need another three weeks of consideration is a huge diplomatic slap in the face to the United States and especially this Administration.

Now I understand that the Pakistan government has some issues with anti-US attitudes in the country (clearly through some fault of their own) . . . and I know that Pakistan allows NATO supply trucks to transit the country and it allows US military drones to attack suspected al Qaeda terrorists (as well as those Pakistan Taliban groups that threaten the Pakistani state). But shall we catalog for a moment all the ways in which Pakistan is not just a lousy ally, but is actually undermining US interests.

1) Is home to Osama bin Laden and other top al Qaeda lieutenants (and has been for 9 years) and has made little effort to deal with the issue.

2) Is home to terrorist training camps like one where the Times Square bomber was trained - and also has made little effort to deal with that issue.

3) Is actively supporting an insurgent group in Afghanistan that is killing US soldiers on a regular basis.

4) Provides safe haven to that same insurgency and even after repeated US demands/requests/inducements has offered no indication they are willing end its support for these groups.

5) Has created a diplomatic incident with the United States over the arrest of a protected US diplomat.

Does this sound like the behavior of a country that is interested in a strategic partnership with the United States?

Now granted I understand that it can be a long and drawn-out process of improving relations, but after 9 years shouldn't it be obvious that the United States has made virtually no progress in turning Pakistan into a true strategic ally of the United States. If Islamabad feels little compunction about openly violating international law and US diplomatic demands does anyone really believe they will suddenly turn around and be of assistance against the Taliban or even jihadist groups that threaten America?

Pakistan will support the US only insofar as it bolsters Pakistani national interests - and as we've seen repeatedly the Pakistan government is either too weak to be a strategic partner of the US or is simply not interested. Or even worse, they understand that no matter what they do; no matter how many sharp sticks they put in the eye of the United States there will be little to no consequences because we need Pakistan a lot more than they need us. How many more pieces of evidence do we need before it becomes abundantly clear that Pakistan is not interested in doing anything to help the US that would even slighly undermine Pakistan's own interests? 

If the Davis incident shows us anything it is a reminder of how little leverage we have with Pakistan, what little ability we have to shape Pakistan's behavior and how tenuous US-Pakistani relations remain. At what point will US policymakers wake up to that reality and respond accordingly?

Defending Strategy, Not “Defending Defense” Posted by Jacob Stokes

Washington’s entrenched defense budget hawks are either clueless or willfully ignorant. Following, the release of the fiscal year 2012 budget Monday, the “Defending Defense” trio of The Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute and the Foreign Policy Initiative released a statement. The first line was “strategy should always guide the defense budget, not vice versa.”

True enough. But looking at the group’s proposals, there’s no strategy involved. Strategy involves identifying threats, establishing what’s needed to combat those threats and then budgeting to ensure those capabilities. The Defending Defense group makes no such efforts. Instead, they use as their yardstick defense spending as a percentage of GDP. GDP tends to continually rise – which is, for them, exactly the point. If the defense budget is pegged to GDP, it keeps rising. 

They’re a wily bunch, though, so they have seized on the quip Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made about the presidential deficit commission’s proposals for cutting defense – Gates called the proposals “math, not strategy” -- to paint any cuts as dangerous to our national security. The reality is that no one is seriously calling for blindly implementing the deficit reduction commission’s proposals. And the other oft-cited proposal, Rep. Barney Frank’s Sustainable Defense Task Force, gave a menu of options that combined would equal $1 trillion in cuts over ten years. Some members support the full menu; others only support only some parts. 

The reality of who’s guilty of “math not strategy” is that Defending Defense has no strategy. In fact, there’s strong strategic rationale for cutting beyond what Secretary Gates has asked for. Even mainstream Washington voices such as the Center for a New American Security have called for proportional cuts to defense as part of a broader deficit reduction plan. CNAS goes even further than Secretary Gates, whose “cuts,” to be clear, are cuts to projected spending, not actual spending.

The Blindness of Moral Clarity Posted by David Shorr



Please join me in a thought experiment. I'm going to pinpoint what I consider the central falacy of the ultra-conservative foreign policy argument / critique. See if you agree that this theme -- blind spot, I'd say -- runs through a big proportion of what the hard-right says about the stance the United States should take internationally.

As David Kurtz of Talking Points Memo and Greg Scoblete over at RealClearWorld Compass blog have both noted, the Obama-botched-Egypt meme rests on an inflated notion of US leverage. An impulse that always assumes an American president can make world events come out the way he wants. Actually David's post flags a comment President Obama made in his news conference, pushing back against that idea of American omnipotence.

My hypothesis about administration critics adds one key element: moral clarity (aka 'resolve' or 'certitude'). Sound familiar? The critics love to talk about the president's supposed lack of principles, but let's talk about what self-absorbed self-righteousness gets you in the real world -- i.e. what can really be accomplished through moral clarity. In other words, I don't think the partisan foreign policy divide is about America's international objectives or our moral values; sensible Democrats and Republics largely agree about those. I think it's really a debate about persuasion and pressure versus bluff and bluster.

Here's a useful definition of strategic thinking from an excellent new book, The End of Arrogance by Bruce Jentleson and Steven Weber:

In a complex and rapidly changing environment it does not work well to repeatedly reinforce who we are and what we stand for. We know those things, and we know how they shape what we do, how we act, how we respond. Strategy is ultimately about how we influence what others do.

This is the burden of proof I'd put on the proponents of moral clarity. How will the defense of virtue get others to do what we want, and what's your basis for believing this cause-and-effect relationship? Can loud moral forthrightness ever backfire? Does it ever have unintended consequences?

Don't get me wrong; I don't deny the role of moral principles in international affairs. I'm a big believer in the importance of staking the moral high ground in diplomacy -- it's something on which I've based many of my own policy arguments. But I feel just as strongly that the claim of moral authority must be based on more than an assertion of principle or a belief in the nation's exceptionalism (which I actually share, to an extent). It matters crucially how others respond. As Weber and Jentleson remind us, the question of influence and legerage isn't a question of being true to ourselves but convincing to others. A leader without followers is just someone out for a stroll.

That's what I think the foreign policy debate is really about. Now coming back to that thought experiment, as you've observed national debates about foreign policy, how strong of an undercurrent is this?

America's Budgetary Delusions Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at AOL I have a new piece up on the dueling Republican and Democratic budget proposals . . . and it ain't pretty

With the Republicans' latest budget proposal -- and to a lesser extent Obama's -- both parties seem intent on furthering the charade that Americans need and want a smaller government, without making any real effort to get us there. It's the least of both worlds, combining pandering and ineffectiveness.

But those inclined to engage in typical Washington bashing should look inward. Americans have no one to blame but themselves for this situation. If they continue to remain blissfully unaware of how their own government operates and oblivious to the contradictions in their expectations for it, is it any wonder that politicians treat them like children?

You can read the whole thing here

Trends in Multilateral Cooperation - Part II Posted by David Shorr

I had an idea once that the noun United Nations (and its acronym) should always be used in the plural. We should say "the United Nations are," not "the United Nations is."  It's a difficult grammatical discipline, and perhaps impractical. But the point remains: the UN isn't really an entity unto itself, but instead an instrument of the 192 nation-states that comprise its membership. I think a lot of the discussion about the UN merely sets up the world body as a scapegoat and diverts attention from the political tug and pull between member states.

Sometimes I say that the United Nations works best when nations actually unite. In the struggle to address big international challenges like climate change or nuclear proliferation, the power of diplomatic alignment is a sight to behold, yet we see such consensus-building far too rarely. There's a very simple reason the UN has tended to produce lowest-common-denominator outcomes -- the way the UN diplomacy game is played, obstructionists have the upper hand. The UN's traditional diplomatic norm of trying to keep everyone happy has given a handful of countries tremendous blocking power. Often this has meant that New York is a place where urgent international matters disappear into a vortex of deadlock. And the problem is especially bad in UN global conferences, which have followed a consensus rule under which a single nation can prevent a communique or report from being adopted.

With all that as (extremely jaded) background, I think I glimpse very hopeful signs that the dynamic has begun to re-tilt away from obstruction and toward constructive action. Looking back at experts' post-game analysis of last year's key UN conferences on climate change and nonproliferation, they tell a story of dwindling tolerance of the obstructionists.

Let's start with Andrew Light's Cancun read-out over at Climate Progress. According to his narrative, an original hard-line coalition of Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Sudan dissolved over the course of the Cancun conference and left Bolivia standing alone. With Bolivia as the unstinting holdout, Light recounts the heroic leadership of conference chair Mexican Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa, ultimately rolling right over Bolivia's objections. I'd be interested to hear more from UN experts about the technical grounds for overruling a holdout; or is it simply a matter of common sense? (Also recommended: Michael Levi of CFR arguing in Slate why the Cancun and Copenhagen conferences shouldn't be given short shrift, as well as Levi's outline in WSJ of a diplomatic strategy to outflank China, which I suspect US negotiators used.)

Then there was the every-five-years Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference last spring, cogently explained by Rebecca Johnson of Acronym Institute in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. In that case, Johnson highlights the role of the Egyptian government -- with the help of Russia and others -- in pressing Iran to back down and go along with consensus. Obviously recent events give this story a new cast; I would just add that the Egyptian regime's traditional UN stance has been to join with obstructionists as a way to counter an image of being subservient to Washington.

Recently I was talking with a UN delegate about the question of obstructionism, and this diplomat referred to "the moderate countries." I think the emergence of such an identity among developing and middle income nations could change the dynamic within the UN. The key to breaking deadlocks in the past has been either consensus among the P5 in the Security Council, bridge-building Western middle powers like Canada or the Nordic nations, or entrepreneurial small countries trying to make a mark with one issue. If moderates started to act as a counterweight to the traditional obstructionists, we might see "nations actually unite" a lot more often.

The GOP's Budget Fiasco Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

The best part about the GOP’s budget day freak-out is that there is concrete proof that conservatives have no alternative vision or plan.  And given the civil war that’s currently playing out on the right, that’s not likely to change anytime soon.

The federal government is currently being funded through a Continuing Resolution, which is set to expire on March 4. So before Congress can get to the 2012 numbers, they have to first pass another CR to keep the government running for the next seven months.  Republicans are hell-bent on slashing the budget, but have yet to articulate an actual strategy for these cuts. 

Last week, Harold Rogers, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, heralded his committee’s plan to trim $74 billion from the 2011 budget, proudly proclaiming, “Never before has Congress undertaken a task of this magnitude.”

Unfortunately for the GOP leadership, the tea party immediately denounced this plan and sent the leadership back to the drawing board, insisting that they live up to their pledge to slash $100 billion from the 2011 budget. Without holding a single hearing or seeking any actual analysis, Rogers announced less than 24 hours later that they would “reach a total of $100 billion in cuts compared to the President’s quest immediately—fully meeting the goal outlined in the Republican ‘Pledge to America’ in one fell swoop.” The $100 billion, of course, is merely a symbolic number since it’s based off of the President’s FY11 request, which was never actually passed.  But hey, who has time for details?   

Bruce Bartlett has an excellent post on why the GOP hack-job is reckless and well, ineffective:

The point is not that there are no government programs worthy of cutting, but rather that this is a really stupid way to do it. The vast bulk of government spending, which goes to mandatory programs such as Social Security and Medicare, is completely exempted. And Republicans have effectively exempted the departments of Defense, Homeland Security and Veterans Affairs from cuts. This leaves only 16 percent of the budget from which they will extract their pound of flesh to satisfy voters who demand huge budget cuts but also oppose cutting just about any program except foreign aid.

So to the extent that there is a plan, it’s clearly not one that’s well thought-out. President Obama, meanwhile, has presented a budget, and an overarching strategy, for balancing the current economic climate and need for economic stimulus with the long-term priority of reducing the deficit. Even in areas where the administration could have gone further—the defense budget, for example— conservatives defied logic and decided to fund unwanted, unnecessary defense programs like the JSF alternate engine, which Secretary Gates called yesterday “an unnecessary and extravagant expense.” To top it all off, the F136 funding is “money that looks, feels, and smells very much like an earmark,” and for John Boehner, of all people. 

Politico’s David Rogers included a few side by side comparisons of President Obama’s FY12 budget request and the GOP’s sporadic proposal for the CR, noting:

“Even in areas where both parties have come together in the past, the differences are now measured in billions, not millions. Obama is proposing almost $7.8 billion for the National Science Foundation, for example; House Republican cuts would take the NSF back to about $6.5 billion. And the almost $10 billion gap in foreign aid and State Department funding represents a real retreat by the GOP from the activism of President George W. Bush, let alone Ronald Reagan.

The GOP’s proposed cuts the foreign aid budget have criticized by Republicans and Democrats alike:

“I think it’s short sighted,” said former Rep. Jim Kolbe (R-Ariz.), who oversaw the foreign aid budget for years. “I’m someone who believes it is absolutely vital to get control of our spending, but at a time when we are pulling back militarily, when China is active in Africa, this soft power is vital.”

“Cuts of this magnitude will be devastating to our national security,” Clinton wrote, yet the GOP has also included the National Nuclear Security Administration in its definition of “non-security” spending. Thus non-proliferation programs face reductions alongside those for water projects, and the GOP is backtracking on plans to update the U.S. nuclear stockpile—a major issue for Senate GOP Whip Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) in the recent START treaty debate.

As the budget debate rolls on, it’s clear that the GOP budget fiasco is indicative of the fact that conservatives are split and simply don’t know which direction to take the party, let alone the country.


The Pentagon Always Wins Posted by Michael Cohen

So there seems to be some argument going around that the Pentagon has engaged in some serious belt-tightening with its latest budget request. Honestly, I don't even have to read Gordon Adams take on this to know that is almost certainly not true, but the man's got the goods:

$78 billion in savings is a myth.  Six billion don’t happen until 2015 and 2015, the mythical budget years, when DOD says the Army and the Marines will start to roll back part of the 92,000 person increase that happened over the last decade.  Four billion comes from stretching out the schedule for the F-35 fighter, which could easily not happen. $12.5 billion comes from pocketing the White House decision to freeze civilian pay for the next three years, credit for a decision the Pentagon did not make.  $41.5 billion comes from “efficiencies” in what are called “defense-wide,” a mystery the Secretary has yet to unravel. And $14 billion is a truly “magic” number. It comes from revising downward DOD’s estimates of future inflation, a hardy, perennial argument between DOD and OMB.

Ezra Klein takes thinks a step further, by pointing out that $78 billion over 10 years really ain't that big of a deal when you consider that "domestic discretionary spending -- that's education, income security, food safety, environmental protection" gets a $400 billion haircut. In all the DoD base budget, not including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, actually increases by 6% in 2011. But then again it's not as if someone has gone out and actually found a trillion dollars in savings from the Pentagon budget over ten years . . . oh wait a minute.

It's hard to believe that during the Truman and Eisenhower years, these presidents calculated defense spending by using the "remainder method" - namely taking tax revenues, subtracting domestic spending and whatever was left over went to the Pentagon. Now we have the exact opposite situation with military expenditures taken up an astounding and indefensible 60% of the discretionary budget. (Imagine how much a greater a health care system, education system and infrastructure we'd have if we reversed these ratios).

The problem, however, isn't even the money and the competely non-serious reduction in defense spending.

The problem is the starting point from which these cuts are made - with an eye toward reducing the deficit rather than actually contemplating what our miltiary priorities should be (and to be clear the numbers being cut from the DoD budget are a mere rounding error in the context of more than $1 trillion deficit).

Instead of asking the questions: what is that we want the US military to do; what military capabalities should we prioritize; how should the US military support the country's larger foreign policy goals etc . . . our defense spending decision-making begins from the starting point that we need a really big military, the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines should get support for most of their pet weapons programs and to cut defense spending when the country is at war would be to put American security at risk.

At no point does it appear that Pentagon officials sat down and said "what do we really need to keep the country safe." Instead, the discussion seems to have been "how do we shave a bit off the budget here and there to make it look like we're being fiscally responsible, but all the while prevent a more serious examination of our bloated defense budget." I don't blame the Pentagon at all for this; every other agency if they had the luxury would do the same - the problem is that no one from the White House or Congress demands that they do it.

To be clear, this doesn't mean that we must have reductions in Pentagon spending (although it's hard to see why not); it means we should think about whether the hundreds of billions we dole out to the Pentagon every year is keeping America secure and is in the nation's best interests. It's a conversation that we haven't even tried to have in more than 30 years. Instead we just pile more defense spending upon more defense spending . . . and demand that every other government agency think more judicously about how it spends the taxpayer's hard-earned dollars.

Threading the Elections Needle in Egypt Posted by Jacob Stokes

As the revolution moves out of Tahrir Square and into the halls of power, it makes sense to look at historical examples for how a military-backed authoritarian government can transition to democracy. Enter this solid piece in the Wall Street Journal today that looks at Indonesia as model for making that move. The piece illustrates an important point that should inform the discussion about the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian politics. It shows that broad participation of Islamists parties in the system resulted in a relatively small base of support:

Karen Brooks, who helped oversee Indonesia policy in both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, says post-Suharto governments were particularly successful because they co-opted Islamist parties that emerged following the dictator's fall. 

One of these parties, which has ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, campaigned as being untainted by the corruption of the Suharto years. That party, the Prosperous Justice Party, controls 8% of seats in Indonesia's legislature. Islamist or Islam-inspired parties in total hold 28%.

The article goes on to say, “‘Thirteen years into Indonesia's democratic transformation, the Islamist parties appear to have maxed out their popular support,’ Ms. Brooks says. Their inclusion in Jakarta's political process seemed to have ‘demystified’ their allure, she says.”

The American mainstream is capable of this kind of thinking. Just a few weeks ago, CFR President Richard Haass said that, “You want to make sure that the political space opens, because if the political space opens, the Muslim Brotherhood will have to compete and, based on everything I know about Egypt, it will have an element in the vote, but it will not be a majority.” 

Credit Where Credit Is Due, Obama Played This Beautifully Posted by Michael Cohen

First things first; this is an extraordinary day and while it's a bit trite to salute the people of Egypt . . . I salute the people of Egypt. I think President Obama summed it up best in his remarks today:

The word "tahrir" means "liberation." It is a word that speaks to that something in our souls that cries out for freedom. And forevermore, it will remind us of the Egyptian people: of what they did, of the things that they stood for, and how they changed their country, and in doing so changed the world.

Yup. And now a word about the Obama Administration. At times I've been fairly critical of this president's handling of foreign policy, but credit must be given - this Administration handled this situation about as deftly as possible. This was truly an American diplomatic tour de force.

From the beginning the White House was caught betwixt and between - not wanting to be seen supporting the status quo, particularly when the winds of change seemed to be blowing in the direction of reform and yet at the same time not be seen as throwing a key ally under the bus. 

And while obviously critics can point to individual mistakes (Wisner's wandering off the reservation, Panetta's bizarre comment yesterday in congressional testimony that Mubarak was out the door) on the whole this Administration did a really excellent job - sending public signs that a crackdown would not be acceptable, working the military behind closed doors, trying to ensure a soft landing that wouldn't lead to violence, but still never backing down from the public position that an immediate transition to democracy (and not one in September) was the only acceptable course. (I'll be curious to see the impact of Obama's statement last night on Mubarak and the Egyptian military, but it was absolutely spot-on).

In a sense we helped throw Mubarak under the bus without directly delivering the push (a fact that I'm sure will leave many a non-democratic US ally a tad less secure this evening - which is good).

As Marc Lynch wisely points out the Administration basically followed the lead of the Egyptian people and didn't try to get too far ahead of what was actually happening on the ground.

To this point they didn't overplay their hand or overstate their own influence or demand too much from the government or the protesters. They played it about as well as can be expected, calibrating public and private pressure - and all this while being cognizant of the host of obvious constraints on US actions and words. They seemed to understand something that a lot of the armchair pundits couldn't quite grasp; this wasn't about us and we were, if anything, a bit player in this drama.

And then after all that, President Obama delivered a speech today that was absolutely pitch perfect - one of the best of his presidency (Ben Rhodes take a bow). Most deftly, even though we've supported the Egyptian regime for more than 30 years Obama was able to place the United States, rhetorically, on the same side as those in Tahrir Square - and it actually seems to ring true.

From a diplomatic standpoint this section of Obama's speech was particularly smart:

The military has served patriotically and responsibly as a caretaker to the state, and will now have to ensure a transition that is credible in the eyes of the Egyptian people. That means protecting the rights of Egypt's citizens, lifting the emergency law, revising the constitution and other laws to make this change irreversible, and laying out a clear path to elections that are fair and free. Above all, this transition must bring all of Egypt's voices to the table, for the spirit of peaceful protest and perseverance that the Egyptian people have shown can serve as a powerful wind at the back of this change.

This is exactly the right tone going forward; praising the military but at the same laying out the expectation that their stewardship of the country will be temporary and will lead to a democratic transition. 

Of course, none of us know what will happen in the weeks and months to come, but for at least one day this Administration and his advisors should take a victory lap. 

 

Don't Believe the Hype: The Surge as a Sequel Posted by Eric Martin

While myth-making and propagandizing can be useful tools in political contests, such embellishments can pervert policy if taken literally. As a general rule, it is best not to believe the hype - even your own.  One recent example of this type of credulity is the conventional wisdom that has coalesced around the "Surge" in Iraq and the supposed benefits that resulted therefrom.

According to the myth, the brilliant visionary, General David Petraeus, shifted US forces in Iraq to a counterinsurgency (COIN) footing based on the COIN manual he wrote and that switch, together with an influx of 20,000 additional troops, led to victory in Iraq.

In reality, hundreds of Iraqis are still dying each month in political violence, though that tragic figure is far lower than the thousands per month that preceded the Surge.  Serious obstacles still remain on the political front as well, with potential for violence to erupt in the future along several existing fault lines.  Further, Petraeus didn't write the COIN manual, in either the literal or figurative sense.  More importantly, though, it was not the influx of additional soldiers, or implementation of COIN doctrine, that played the most important part in leading to a reduction of the violence in Iraq. 

Rather, the causal factors were indigenously conceived: First and foremost, the bulk of the Sunni insurgency made the decision to adandon insurgent activities, pursue political avenues and cooperate with coalition forces in targeting al-Qaeda elements (with such a turnabout commencing prior to the Surge, or Petraeus' arrival on the scene).  In addition, Moqtada al-Sadr, putatitive leader of the largest Shiite insurgent faction, also changed course, ordering his loosely organized militia to stand down. 

In essence, the main combatants comprising the insurgency opted to pursue their interests primarly via the political apparatus, and abandoned attacks on coalition and Iraqi government targets (in addition to the fact that the population transfers reduced sectarian tensions, and general exhaustion from fighting pervaded).  To Petraeus' credit, he was quick to seize on the outreach from insurgent groups and the extra soldiers likely enhanced our capacity to take the fight to al-Qaeda with our new Sunni allies. In summation, he deftly took advantage of the opportunities presented by both the Sunni detente and Sadr's stand down. 

What the Surge taught us, then (or rather, reminded us of), is that insurgencies can be wound down when the vast majority of the combatants join the political process and abandon violence, and that we should seek to encourage and facilitate such developments when doing so is consistent with our overarching interests.

Unfortunately, the Obama administration seems to have bought in to the mythologized version of the Surge, and has attempted to recreate in Afghanistan the successes realized in Iraq by simply adding additional soldiers, and shifting to a COIN-infused approach.

Predictably, the fighting continues: insurgent attacks are occurring at an accelerated pace, with estimates of Taliban numbers remaining constant during the recent escalation.  Despite a coordinated effort by military leaders to put recent events in Afghanistan in a positive light, tangible gains using any observable metric remain elusive. 

Perhaps, then, it is time to pay closer attention to the reality of the Surge, and test available opportunities to wind down the conflict through the political inclusion of the main group comprising the insurgency: the Taliban.

As Michael Cohen noted, a recent report by Alex Strick Van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn explores the possibility that the Taliban and al-Qaeda could be separated as part of a negotiated political settlement with the current Afghan government, and US/NATO forces.  Although admittedly optimistic, the report even includes this tantalizing prospect for military cooperation akin to that enjoyed by US forces working in tandem with Sunni groups in Iraq:

One such vision – recently suggested in private by a senior Taliban political strategist – is that Taliban forces could conduct counterterrorism operations, including joint operations together with U.S. Special Forces, against al-Qaeda and possibly its affiliates along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

That level of cooperation may never materialize, but something short of that could still be invaluable.  Given that our primary strategic objective in Afghanistan should be to disrupt al-Qaeda and deny that group a base of operations, we should pursue negotiations with the Taliban to test the feasability of at least a separation of the two groups.  Such a settlement might involve including groups whose human rights record we might find noxious, but it is important to note that there are current factions within Karzai's government with equivalent records.  We must engage the players in Afghanistan, regardless of what our ideal outcome would look like.

Unfortunately, our current strategy might be forcing the Taliban to rely more and more on al-Qaeda, sowing mistrust and giving rise to a younger, more radical crop of Taliban leaders who are taking the place of senior commanders killed or captured.  Pursuit of negotiations would require a more consistent approach, without various tactics working at cross-purposes and proving counterproductive to what should be the strategic imperative.

While there is no guarantee that a negotiated settlement with the Taliban would be possible within parameters that satisfy our interests, or that enough Taliban elements would be willing to abandon al-Qaeda at an acceptable price, it is essential that we explore the possibilities further. What the Surge taught us is that the quickest way to wind down an insurgency is to turn the insurgents into allies and political participants, not rely on superstar generals or over-hyped tactical approaches.

Back to the Top of the Slide Posted by Eric Martin

While it is understandable that there is a reluctance on the part of the Department of Defense to use bodycounts to measure progress in Afghanistan, Joshua Foust took note of a pretty damning announcement regarding insurgent numbers from the Afghan Ministry of Defense:

The strength of Taliban insurgents and other anti-government elements estimated to be between 25,000 to 35,000 in the militancy-hit Afghanistan, Afghan Defense Ministry spokesman Zahir Azimi said on Wednesday.

The reason those numbers should cause concern is that the estimate of Taliban/insurgents strength bears a striking resemblence to estimates in 2009 and, in fact, 2001 at the onset of the conflict.

Though estimates of Taliban strength dipped considerably in the years immediately following the onset of the US military intervention, that the figure has returned to the status quo ante, and remained fairly constant throughout the past few years, despite rather significant fluctuations in US/allied troop levels and shifts in tactical approaches, points to a list of possible conclusions - all of which are unsettling in their own right. As Foust notes:

• We have no idea who’s out there, or in what numbers;
• An enormous, expensive build-up in troops has not noticeably diminished the numbers of Taliban (or, in a worst case scenario, created 10,000 more);
• There was initial success in diminishing the Taliban, but their numbers have grown; or
• The Taliban are recruiting new people far more quickly than we can reconcile or kill off.

Each of those options militate in favor of pursuing a different strategy.

That Wacky, Wacky Krauthammer Posted by Michael Cohen

It's been awhile since I've done a post examining the wackiness of Charles Krauthammer but the man's latest missive in the Washington Post has woken me from my slumber.

Krauthammer extols George Bush's Freedom Agenda as well as the virtues of democracy in the Arab World - and helpfully welcomes liberals abroad the neo-con democracy bandwagon:

Today, everyone and his cousin supports the "freedom agenda." Of course, yesterday it was just George W. Bush, Tony Blair and a band of neocons with unusual hypnotic powers who dared challenge the received wisdom of Arab exceptionalism - the notion that Arabs, as opposed to East Asians, Latin Americans, Europeans and Africans, were uniquely allergic to democracy. 

Now it seems everyone, even the left, is enthusiastic for Arab democracy. Fine. Fellow travelers are welcome. But simply being in favor of freedom is not enough. With Egypt in turmoil and in the midst of a perilous transition, we need foreign policy principles to ensure democracy for the long run.

This makes a lot of sense because traditionally liberals have been skeptical of democracy and supportive of authoritarian regimes - while conservatives have never wavered in their commitment to democratic principles. But as I was reading this article I thought to myself "I wonder if Krauthammer will reconcile his call for democracy with the fear of many neo-conservatives that Islamists will come into power if democracy is actually allowed to flower."

Luckily I didn't have to wait long:

As the states of the Arab Middle East throw off decades of dictatorship, their democratic future faces a major threat from the new totalitarianism: Islamism. As in Soviet days, the threat is both internal and external. Iran, a mini-version of the old Soviet Union.

Bingo! And there's more

Just as during the Cold War the United States helped keep European communist parties out of power (to see them ultimately wither away), it will be U.S. policy to oppose the inclusion of totalitarian parties - the Muslim Brotherhood or, for that matter, communists - in any government, whether provisional or elected, in newly liberated Arab states.

Beyond the obvious question as to whether one can have democracy in the Arab world if one tells Islamists they need not apply - it's worth remembering that this tension between democratic aspirations and 'keeping Islamists out' is precisely why Bush's Freedom Agenda failed. The Bush Administration supported free and fair elections in Gaza, was shocked when the Palestinian people embraced an Islamist party (Hamas) and refused to recognize it - which effectively made clear the hypocrisy of our policy: we only wanted democracy in the Arab world if our guys won.

That is, of course, an untenable standard - and back in his Cairo speech of June 2009 I think Barack Obama laid out a more effective one:

America respects the right of all peaceful and law-abiding voices to be heard around the world, even if we disagree with them. And we will welcome all elected, peaceful governments – provided they govern with respect for all their people.

This doesn't preclude the role of Islamists in Arab governments - and doesn't draw the conclusion, as Krauthammer seems to be doing, that any Islamist party is a totalitarian one. After all, you have an Islamist party in charge in Turkey and Islamist parties in Iraq. Indeed, one could argue that Turkey is as 'democratic' under its current leadership than any previous government in the nation's history.

Now in fairness to Krauthammer he makes clear that we probably lack the leverage to keep the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt out of power and that we should be supporting secular, democratic movements. That seems fair; but only up to a point. If we embrace democracy for the Arab world then we must embrace all parties that are willing to play by democratic rules - and that includes the Islamists.  

Our fear of Islamic political movements has led the United States, for years, to support authoritarian and dictatorial regimes - like Hosni Mubarak's - with predictably disastrous results. And contrary to Krauthammer's crowing for the Freedom Agenda, George Bush was guilty of the same crime, particularly in regard to Egypt where he backed away from calls for democracy when the US government decided we needed an un-democratic Mubarak more than an actual democratic process. 

We can't have it both ways - we can't support democracy and then reject political Islam. So long as Islamist groups are willing to abide by the tenets of democracy and participate in free and fair elections we should welcome their inclusion. To do otherwise . . . well it wouldn't be democratic.

A Defiant Mubarak and What Obama Should Do Next Posted by Joel Rubin

Embattled Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak refuses to go.  Protestors in Tahrir Square are in agony. The Obama administration has just been called out. Now what?

According to Mubarak, the issue is no longer a choice between stability and chaos, but instead one of national pride as embodied in the life story of Hosni Mubarak.  To give in to pressure and leave power now would, according to Mubarak, be an insult to all Egyptians.  True, the youth of Egypt are to be listened to, but, according to Mubarak, they do not understand what they really need. To him, they’re children.

Mubarak is raising the stakes, daring the Americans to push him out, appealing to patriotism and staring down the protestors.  While he verbalized certain concessions that the U.S. has been calling for – although he made sure to say those concessions would only follow after restored stability – it’s clear that he has rebuffed President Obama’s call earlier in the day for a “genuine transition to democracy.” Mubarak’s reputation, which could have been rescued, will now likely be in tatters.

While President Obama should continue to stress that there should be no violence, that there should be a respect for universal human rights, and there should be an immediate political transition, the situation is more dire on the ground now than even a week ago.

Therefore, here are the key questions that the White House needs to ask if it hopes to rescue the situation, with whatever remaining leverage it has at its disposal:

1. What is the Army doing?  Will they follow Mubarak? There were rumors earlier in the day that the military would push out Mubarak, call for martial law and make steps to democracy. That scenario appears dashed.  The Administration needs to press all its contacts for real answers.

2. What will the protestors do?  Will more come out tomorrow? The protestors were planning on one million marchers for tomorrow.  Now how many? If they needed anything else to fuel their rage, Mubarak just gave it to them.

3. Is an “orderly transition” to democracy really possible with Suleiman or any other remnant of the Mubarak regime in charge? Mubarak said that he will transfer power to his vice president, Omar Suleiman, and will support changes to the Constitutional amendments, as well as move to end the Emergency Law -- but that has been said before, and Mubarak insisted changes would be made only after stability has been restored, which, after watching the chants from Tahrir, doesn’t seem likely. There’s a credibility problem here.

And here are some recommendations for the White House:

1) Stick to core principles: The White House needs to strongly reiterate its three key points of “no violence,” “respect for human rights,” and “credible transition to democracy”

2) Seek new leverage: The White House needs to explore new routes to sway the behavior of Mubarak and his cohorts.  The stale arguments about levels of whether to explicitly call for Mubarak’s resignation or whether to suspend military aid are clearly not enough to sway him.  The White House should consider fresh ways to show common cause with the protestors.

3) Stay on the offense: President Obama has been strong in his public statements.  Now is not the time to let up, just because Hosni Mubarak said so.  Now is the time to keep the pressure on and seek more concrete and viable changes in Mubarak’s decisions.



Shifting Deck Chairs on the Titanic Posted by Michael Cohen

I'm a little late in posting this to DA, but I have a new piece up at Foreign Policy making the case that recent signs of military progress in Afghanistan cannot mask the underlying strategic impediments in our current strategy:

Without tangible improvement in creating a capable and effective Afghan security force; without a competent and legitimate central government able to provide good governance to its people; without a choking-off of the supply of arms and fighters from across the border in Pakistan, the tactical gains being made by U.S. troops cannot be sustained and, quite simply, the war in Afghanistan cannot be won.

All the elements of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan -- political, diplomatic, and military -- must be working if the effort is to be successful, not just the latter. But instead of recognizing these failures and shifting course, there is abiding resistance to any change among policymakers. Proposals to begin the process of political reconciliation with the Taliban are pushed aside because on the ground, after all, the insurgents are back on their heels. So why negotiate?

But this mindset creates a misleading sense of optimism that precludes any serious examination of the current strategy. 

Long overdue in Afghanistan is a sobering recognition by political and military leaders that the current U.S. and NATO strategy is failing, has little chance of success, and must be reformulated immediately. That is the public discussion that needs to be taking place. But none of that will happen so long as the U.S. president and his military commanders ignore the many signs that America is losing the war in Afghanistan -- choosing instead to focus their public rhetoric solely on rosy assessments of military progress.

You can read the whole thing here

The Progressive National Military Strategy Posted by Jacob Stokes

If President Barack Obama had said in his State of Union address last month that U.S. military policy will “emphasize mutual responsibility and respect” or even hinted at “shifts in relative power,” his political enemies would have wiped the floor with him. But those concepts frame the U.S. National Military Strategy, a document put together by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that was released on Feb. 8. The document is indicative of a profound trend in U.S. foreign policy: that of the military adapting ideas American progressives have long advocated for.

The most of prominent of those ideas is what’s known as a “whole-of-government” approach, or the idea that problems should be solved using a combination of diplomacy, economic incentives, development aid and military power. Conservatives eschew this concept. Figures such as Mitt Romney continue to push for outsourcing all U.S. foreign policy to the Department of Defense and Republicans in Congress are making every effort to eviscerate civilian diplomatic and aid agencies by cutting their funding. 

Compare that to the NMS, which says the relative shift in power politics “requires America’s foreign policy to employ an adaptive blend of diplomacy, development, and defense,” explaining that, “leadership is how we exercise the full spectrum of power to defend our national interests.” That differing concept of how to use the various tools of American power dovetails with the NMS’s more modern conception of the strategic environment, which it says is “characterized more by shifting, interest-driven coalitions based on diplomatic, military, and economic power than by rigid security competition between opposing blocs.” Both the realization of need to integrate the tools of power and the realization of a new strategic environment reflect an understanding that military power alone won’t fix most 21^st-century problems.

UN Bashing Redux Posted by David Shorr

In the category of right wing retreads, guess what's near the top of the agenda for the House Foreign Affairs Committee under its new Republican management. Did you guess witholding the dues our country pays to the big bad anti-American United Nations (subject of a January 25 hearing)? No? Well, it does have an eccentric pet peeve feel to it, to be sure. Not to mention serious tone-deafness about the United States' international image. But some Republicans just loooove to beat up on the UN, can't hardly help themselves.

In all seriousness, though, this is an issue that highlights a genuine contrast of perspectives. Those who support or oppose witholding America's share of the UN budget represent distinct ways of looking at the world body -- and the US international role, for that matter. Look at what Committee Chair Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen said in her opening statement at the recent hearing (in the first para she's quoting her own earlier statement):

‘With significant leadership by the United States, the United Nations was founded on high ideals. The pursuit of international peace and development, and the promotion of basic human rights are core, historic concerns of the American people. At its best, the U.N. can play an important role in promoting U.S. interests and international security, but reality hasn’t matched the ideals.’

Accordingly, U.S. policy on the United Nations should be based on three fundamental questions: Are we advancing American interests? Are we upholding American values? and are we being responsible stewards of American taxpayer dollars?

Translation: has the UN proven itself worthy of our support? Unless the global forum is meeting the United States' expectations, we shouldn't have to pay. The argument combines "what have you done for me lately" with "I'm taking my bat and ball and going home."

Over at the Heritage Foundation's Foundry blog, Brett Schaefer kept the debate going by taking issue with a speech on the subject by Assistant Secretary of State Esther Brimmer. (She spoke at Brookings on February 1 partly to respond to the House hearing.) Here's part of the quote Brett cited:

No longer can our adversaries at the UN change the subject to our arrears when we press them on an important policy matter, as they did for so long. The President’s decision to pay our UN assessments in full means that we have had more political capital to galvanize support from allies, partners, and others for achieving our goals at the United Nations.

Where Ros-Lehtinen and Schaefer see a scandalously wayward culprit due for behavior modification, the Obama administration sees a vital diplomatic arena (e.g. Iran sanctions) where the United States has to be mindful of its reputation. In his post, Schaefer argues that for Brimmer to characterize witheld US dues as hindering diplomatic efforts merely shows a lack of confidence in the administration's own diplomatic effectiveness. In response, I'd say Brett shows a lack of appreciation for how effective American heavy-handedness is in arousing international resentment and resistance.

I should add that over the years, I've found Brett to be a conscientious partner in bipartisan dialogue. I would probably endorse many of the criticisms he makes in his written testimony for the recent hearing in the House. I would never claim that the UN has a stellar record of effectiveness, and to his credit, Brett acknowledges that the UN can claim some important contributions. The question here is one of proportion. For Republicans to devote one of their very first hearings to the UN's deficiencies and threaten to withold our dues hardly keeps things in perspective -- never mind the lack of self-awareness about the effects of American bullying.

The Taliban/Al Qaeda Link & the Facile Reasoning of Afghan War Supporters Posted by Michael Cohen

Over the past 18 months one of the key rationales that has been used to justify the US military presence in Afghanistan is that if the Taliban are somehow allowed to return to power in Afghanistan they will once again provide a safe haven to al Qaeda. Indeed, President Obama, when he announced a troop surge in December 2009 made this exact argument to justify the increased US military presence in Afghanistan.

However, this has always been something of a dubious argument, both on strategic grounds, but also basic common sense - after spending ten years to get back into power would the Taliban really allow the same organization that caused their demise to set up shop again as if nothing had happened and thus open themselves up to US military attack? 

Now thanks to Kandahar-based researchers Alex Strick Van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn we have a bit more meat on the bones of this argument - a new report that suggests the links between the Taliban and al Qaeda are not permanent and can be exploited for US political and military gain.

1. The Taliban and al-Qaeda remain distinct groups with different goals, ideologies, and sources of recruits; there was considerable friction between them before September 11, 2001, and today that friction persists.
2. Elements of current U.S. policy in Afghanistan, especially night raids and attempts to fragment the Taliban, are changing the insurgency, inadvertently creating opportunities for al-Qaeda to achieve its objectives and preventing the achievement of core goals of the United States and the international community.
3. There is room to engage the Taliban on the issues of renouncing al-Qaeda and providing guarantees against the use of Afghanistan by international terrorists in a way that will achieve core U.S. goals.

I won't try to summarize the entire report, but I recommend taking the time to read it. It provides and important basis for understanding why the foundation of the US mission in Afghanistan - preventing an return to al Qaeda in Afghanistan - is not only wrong, but actually might be self-perpetuating. In other words, by continuing the current strategy we may be strengthening the adversary our war is nominally geared toward weakening.

At the same time, if one wants to understand the intellectual bankruptcy of those who fervently and unthinkingly support continuing the current mission read what Max Boot has to say about this report:

It is worth noting that the authors have collaborated with a leading Taliban figure on his autobiography and have publicly opposed the American-led war effort in Afghanistan. Their “report” reads suspiciously like the Taliban propaganda line.

There is no doubt that the Taliban and al-Qaeda are distinct organizations. But there is also no doubt that they are closely linked — even more so now than they were in 2001, when the Taliban could have remained in power if they had simply handed over Osama bin Laden to the United States. Mullah Omar refused to do that, and he has steadfastly refused to renounce al-Qaeda in the years since, when it would be very much to his advantage to do so. Why would Mullah Omar & Co. suddenly turn on al-Qaeda if they were back in power? Talk about wishful thinking.

A couple of things here. First of all the authors worked on a memoir of a former Taliban, Mullah Zaeef - an important read if you want to get a better understanding of what motivates Taliban fighters. But of course in Max Boot's world seeking to understand the Taliban is akin to supporting them (and of course the none too subtle effort to link Alex and Felix to the Taliban - "collaborated" - is a grubby and obvious effort to invalidate their work. Classy as ever Max). Second, I'm not aware that Alex and Felix have publicly opposed the war in Afghanistan - but so what if they did. Can only those who support the current war effort actually criticize it? By this measure no one should take seriously anything Max Boot has to say because he is a knee-jerk war supporter.

But the worst part here is Boot's simplistic and unsupported reasoning for why this carefully researched report is wrong. He claims there is no doubt the Taliban and al Qaeda are closely linked - but actually provides no evidence, except the bizarre notion that Taliban thinking remains unchanged over the past ten years. He bemoans the fact that Mullah Omar won't trade away the chit of collaboration with al Qaeda - but why would he do such a thing before any serious negotiations with the US and/or the Karzai government?

By this argument America's enemies are not only incapable of strategic and pragmatic behavior, but should unilaterally disarm and rely on the good graces of the United States and its allies. Lastly, is it really impossible to recognize that the Taliban might have reason to turn on al Qaeda if they are returned to power - especially since the limitations on the use of US force that existed pre-9/11 certainly do not exist today and because al Qaeda would provide almost no benefit to the Taliban. At the very least isn't this a potential cleavage that we should be trying to exploit instead confidently declaring that the relationship between two organization with very different orientations and grievance structures is inviolate for all time?

Honestly, it's not a big surprise that war-addled correspondents like Boot would make this sort of argument - what's troubling is that this sort of shallow and facile reasoning actually shapes US policy in Afghanistan.

Running Out the Clock in Egypt Posted by Jacob Stokes

As the heady early days of the January 25 movement start to drag into the dull work of figuring out what’s next, the standoff between protestors and the government has turned into a waiting game. The regime wants to wait out the protestors, ceding as few concessions as possible along the way. The protestors, meanwhile, must struggle to keep up the momentum and pressure they’ve accumulated to exact real political change.

Joshua Stacher, writing in Foreign Affairs, makes the argument that the regime – of which the Egyptian military, although a highly respected institution, is still very much a central part – is playing both “the arsonist and firefighter” in this waiting game. That is, the police are seeding chaos in the streets, and creating an opening for the army to bolster its public support by returning stability. 

By employing this two-pronged strategy, Stacher argues, the regime is making life very difficult for the part of the Egyptian citizenry who aren’t the hardcore protestors lying in front of tanks in Tahrir. Stacher explains the growing exasperation of many Egyptians: 

Although some of these citizens may have sympathized with the protesters initially, their mood appears to be shifting. People are tired of being cooped up in their apartments, made anxious as their stockpiles of food and money decrease, and they are ready for a sense of "normalcy" to return. Ironically, the normalcy they pine for resembles the police state so many tried to banish just thirteen days ago. This method of wearing down the non-protesting public seems just as strategic as the violence employed on those airing their grievances in the streets. 

Steve Cook of CFR, who wrote a book on the Egyptian military, predicted this strategy back on Jan. 31:

New START Enters Into Force Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

New START formally entered into force this past weekend when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov exchanged instruments of ratification on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference.  U.S. and Russian inspectors will soon exchange data on missiles, launchers, heavy bombers and warheads and in less than 60 days, inspections will resume.  According to my math, this means that by April 6, 2011, inspectors will once again be able to conduct on-site inspections.  My fellow arms control wonks will appreciate the timing:  President Obama gave his historic Prague speech on April 5, 2009 and signed the New START agreement with Russian President Medvedev a year later on April 8, 2010.  When inspections resume this April, the New START process will have come full circle.       

U.S.-Russian inspections ended in December 2009 when the original START agreement expired.  Since that point, the U.S. has only been able to use National Technical Means to monitor Russia’s nuclear arsenal.  National Technical Means, or NTM, is of course, just the polite way of referring to spy satellites.  As Mary Beth Sheridan explained in a piece last summer, however, reconnaissance satellites only go so far.  “For example, a satellite cannot peer into a Russian underground silo and see whether the missile inside is carrying one nuclear bomb or 10, officials say.”

“One of our dirty little secrets is, when the [Berlin] Wall went down, the United States reoriented a lot of intelligence capacity away from the Soviet Union and Russia. To some fair degree . . . the IC [intelligence community] was relying on U.S. inspectors to be on the ground," [Frank] Miller said.

The "boots on the ground" include people such as Phil Smith, a former Air Force crew chief for nuclear-tipped missiles. He has made about 20 inspection visits to Russian nuclear facilities.

"We have 15 years of experience under START, understanding where everything is. We've been through these sites multiple times," he said in an interview.

The U.S. teams typically arrive at Russian bases with only about a day's notice. Many of the inspectors' methods are surprisingly low-tech: They stretch tape measures along missiles and poke flashlights into trailers. The inspections allow each side to count nuclear weapons on a sampling of missiles, bombers or submarine launch tubes and look around one another's maintenance facilities and test ranges.

"If something is atypical . . . I will not be bashful about saying, 'Okay, we need to take a closer look at this one.' That's the kind of dynamic you have on the ground that you wouldn't have with a satellite," Smith said.

For more on New START’s inspection regime, it’s worth revisiting Ken Myers’ testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last June (pdf).  Myers is the head of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which is responsible for implementing New START’s inspection and escort provisions.