Via Twitter

Oh, how I wish I'd said that.

Random Thought

If this is the Arab version of 1989 in Eastern Europe, will there be a an equivalent of Nicolae Ceausescu's fate amid otherwise fairly smooth transitions?

If so, will we remember him with an umbrella?

Another Libyan Resource

Commenter The Familiar Strange suggests a Libyan Resource I hadn't seen, and it's the best I've seen yet: Libya 17 February 2011. That deserves my linking to his blog, which I first became aware of a few days ago. Blogrolling him too.

Great photos there at the Libya link.. Somebody today (CNN? ABC? Al Jazeera?) said the pilots who defected to Malta flew their "Russian-made jets" there. Wonderfully detailed shots at this site. Sorry, M. Sarkozy, but those are French Mirages. F-1s if memory serves.

The Total Qadhafi Speech in All its Glory(?)

Here in all its weird glory is Qadhafi's promised direct address to the Libyan people. If you don't understand Arabic you'll find it a couple of posts down, but watch it anyway: it won't take you long at all.



Question: Since he doesn't get out of the car (or whatever that vehicle is), why does he need the umbrella?

Question: Could "I was going to meet the demonstrators, but it was raining," be the "Let them eat cake" of this revolt?

And a final thought: Could that become the most famous umbrella since Neville Chamberlain's?

Saif''s Speech: "I Will Speak in Dialect," Fails

In the emerging theme of how Arabic diglossia is playing out in the fall of dictators (earlier posts on Tunisia here and Egypt here), the linguistics blogger Lameen Souag caught a great example. In Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's speech last night, he started out with this:

Today I will speak with you... without a written paper, or a written speech. (N)or even speak to you in the Classical (fuṣħā) Arabic language. Today I will speak with you in Libyan dialect, and address you directly, as an individual member of this Libyan people. And I will speak extempore. Even the ideas and the points are not prepared in advance. Because this is a speech from the heart and the mind.

And then he didn't. Lameen looks at that opening paragraph:

əlyōm saatakallam maʕākum... bidūn waraqa maktūba, 'aw xiṭāb maktūb. 'aw natakallam maʕakum bi... luɣa ħattā ʕarabiyya fuṣħa. əlyōm saatakallam maʕakum bilahža lībiyya. wa-sa'uxāṭibkum mubāšaratan, ka-fard min 'afrād hāða ššaʕb əllībi. wa-sa'akūn irtižāliyyan fī kalimatī. wa-ħattā l'afkār wa-nniqāṭ ɣeyr mujahhaza u-muʕadda musbaqan. liʔanna hāðā ħadīθ min alqalb wa-lʕaql.(YouTube - first minute; conspicuously dialectal bits bolded)

That's right: a prefix here, a vowel quantity there. It's hardly dialectal at all. As he notes:

Now the explicit association between dialect, extempore speech, and speaking as "one of us" is fairly obvious, if interesting. But the odd thing is that this paragraph, like the rest of the speech, isn't very dialectal at all; it seems far closer to Standard Arabic than to any dialect. Some dialectal features are present, but a lot of unambiguously Classical constructions are used; even something as basic as the first person singular oscillates between Libyan n- and Classical 'a-. What it looks more like is some sort of intermediate ground between dialect and standard - or, if you prefer, like the highest level of Arabic that he is capable of extemporising in at short notice.

At least he didn't have powerpoint slides. One of his commenters offers a magnificent parse (mild language warning):

John Cowan said...

Here's my suggested revision of your translation:

Today I'll speak with y'all... without a written document or a written text. I ain't even verbalizing to y'all in the Classical Arabic language. Instead today I will make my oration to you in Libyan colloquial dialect, and address you unmediatedly as an individual member of this Libyan populace. And I will speak out of my ass. Even the conceptualizations and the bullet points have not been prepared in advance. Because this is a presentation directly from the emotional side of me.

(In Ireland, this is called the "cúpla focal", the couple of words in Irish at the beginning of a speech otherwise entirely in English.)

And to think, Saif was the one popular in the West. Until last night.

Rained Out

Most of the Arab world was waiting when word came that Brother Leader Qadhafi was finally going to make a TV appearance.

It lasted about 22 seconds:

"I am in Tripoli and not in Venezuela," he said, under a large umbrella in the rain and leaning out of the front seat of a van.
Reports on Monday said Gaddafi had fled to Venezuela. Gaddafi, in his first televised appearance since protests to topple him started last week, said "I wanted to say something to the youths at the Green Square (in Tripoli) and stay up late with them but it started raining. Thank God, it's a good thing," Gaddafi said in a 22-second appearance.

Other reports say he denounced "dog radios" for their reporting. Someone has tweeted that he beat out even ‘Omar Suleiman for shortest political speech ever.

He may be massacring his own people, but he is still as unpredictable as ever. As is his choice of clothing.

Thoughts on Libya's Carnage

It was probably inevitable that an Arab regime, faced with the revolutionary upheavals already seen elsewhere, would be prepared to go all out in crushing opposition by using all the force at its disposal. Amid reports of use of military aircraft to strafe and bomb protesters, and the use of machinegun and even antiaircraft weapons against the demonstrators, the Libyan regime has thrown down the gauntlet. Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's pledge to fight to the last bullet shows a ruthless determination that has punctured his reputation as the moderate face of his father's regime.

Although there are many reports of Army officers and units refusing to attack the crowds, and two fighter aircraft defected to Malta rather than strafe demonstrators, the Libyan Army probably lacks the sheer clout to do what the small Tunisian and huge Egyptian armies were able to do: tell the leader his time is up. Qadhafi has relied on special elite units with tribal and family links to himself for his own protection, while keeping regular army forces rather limited. Over the past few days there have been many reports of apparent mercenary troops — sub-Saharan Africans or North Koreans, allegedly — being used against demonstrators. Such outsiders could have little scruple about firing on civilians.

Libya also has few of the institutions of civil society which helped serve as centers of organizing in Egypt, and other than the military there is no obvious institution that could replace the regime. Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, where elements of the old regime continue to hold positions in the transitional government, the decision to wage open war on the demonstrators more or less guarantees there can be no soft landings here. Either the regime will crush the demonstrators and reimpose the strictest controls, or they will sweep it away with little certainty about what might replace it. Either way, the regime's decision to use the most brutal force has made the stakes enormous.

Egypt to Name Interim Cabinet

Egypt is said to be about to name an interim Cabinet containing a number of opposition figures as a transitional body until elections. As leaked so far it would continue to be headed by Ahmad Shafiq, though many supporters of the revolution oppose him. The current Foreign and Justice Ministers weould also be retained. Interestingly, the Information Ministry would be abolished, giving credence to promises of a genuinely free press. Several ministers are from existing opposition parties and there are several Copts.

Still, there is pressure to replace Shafiq. The story is just beginning.

Libya

Today is the US President's Day holiday. Sometime later today, however, I will post on Libya. Given the difficulty of discerning what is really going on (are the horror stories of massacres, snipers, and mercenaries from outside attacking demonstrators true?) versus the government's apparent uncompromising position (Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's warning that the government will fight to the last bullet — and Saif is the good cop in the regime — suggests they're prepared for a full Tienanmen if need be) we're in one of those rare vacuums in a connected world. Until I have time to post my own thoughts, follow the British blog Enduring America, which (despite its name) is liveblogging news, posting videos from YouTube and stills from Flickr and other sources, and is a good daily resource for the Middle Eastern revolutions ongoing.

And, of course, follow #Libya on Twitter, and of course Al Jazeera's live stream.

Bahrain: the US Dilemma

What to say about Bahrain? Unlike Egypt or Tunisia, my knowledge of the country is superficial. But even more than in Egypt, the growing violence in the country and the bloody response of the authorities produces a dilemma for US policy. Not only is it unclear whether this will end well for US interests; it is unclear whether it can end well. The contradictory elements within the strategic gambles the US has made in the region, but particularly in the Gulf, may finally be coming home to roost, and the fact that Bahrain is in question involves not only critical US interests in the island nation itself (the base of the US Fifth Fleet), but also the elephant in the living room: Bahrain's neighbor at the other end of the King Fahd Causeway. And that goes to the heart of US policy in the Gulf. American sympathy for protesters demanding democracy, unarmed protesters being fired on with live ammunition, is in direct conflict with two countervailing US interests: diminishing Iranian influence on the Arab side of the Gulf, and maintaining the crucial relations with Saudi Arabia, the cornerstone of US Gulf security policy since the fall of the Shah 32 years ago this month.

This is not a partisan US issue. The Saudi relationship was a cornerstone of US policy under both Democratic and Republican Administrations. It still is. Dating as it does from the fact that it was American oil companies (as opposed to British elsewhere in the Gulf) that controlled the Saudi concessions, the Saudi relationship has been sound since FDR's day. That the Bush family, including both Bush Presidents, were close to the Saudis is well known, but it was that human rights crusader Jimmy Carter who, toasting the Shah not long before his toppling, praised Iran as one of the Gulf's twin pillars of stability. The Clinton and Obama Administrations have upheld the centrality of the Saudi relationship to US strategic interests in the Gulf.

But there may be no country in the world — and I explicitly include Israel here — where US and Saudi interests potentially might conflict more than in Bahrain. The Saudis backed Husni Mubarak to the end, but they've had disagreements with Egypt before, especially in the Nasser era. But for the Saudis, Bahrain is literally too close to home. It is both an outlet (where a Saudi can get a drink and enjoy other pleasures unavailable at home by driving across a causeway) and a potential blowback threat: if Bahrain's Shi‘ite majority were to take power from the Sunni monarchy, the substantial Shi‘ite population in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province might become restive, as they did in 1979 after the Iranian Revolution. And the Eastern Province is where the oil, the refineries, the pipeline heads, the oil ports, almost all of the industry, is based. The Saudis are likely to back the King of Bahrain to the hilt, but unless there is some progress towards dialogue and away from bloodshed in Bahrain, the US may face an insoluble dilemma.

If Bahrain's Shi‘ite majority were to actually control the country's policies (with or without continuing the Sunni monarchy), that would not automatically mean it would become pro-Iranian; while some Bahraini Shi‘ites are of Persian origin, the majority are Arab. But implacable Saudi hostility to a Shi‘ite-dominated Bahraini government might give a representative government nowhere else to turn. The Shi‘ite government of Iraq has its own problems. Forced to choose between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the US would have little choice but to side with the Saudis, however unpopular such a choice would be.

Finding some formula for negotiations and genuine liberalization that does not overtly threaten the Saudis' own security would be the ideal policy to pursue in Bahrain, but little of what has happened in the last 48 hours suggest any eagerness on the part of the King to do so. And he is no doubt hearing frequently from the neighbors across the causeway urging him to hang tough.

This will be a three-day holiday weekend in the US, with Monday off. I doubt if events will wait till Tuesday, but weekend posting will be limited to critical events.

Victory Lap

Unrest continues throughout the region, but demonstrators gathered en masse in Tahrir both to celebrate victory a week ago and to show their continuing strength to the Military Council. TV preacher Yusuf al-Qaradawi led Friday prayers in Tahrir after years living abroad. It looks as if they succeeded in drawing a large turnout.

A Timely Encounter with Kushary

A personal anecdote, if I may, with a bit of fortuitous synchronicity: last night my daughter's school had an "international cuisine night." Parents were urged to share national dishes from their countries of origin, wear native dress, etc., and there was music and dancing from various parts of the world. As we live in a rather multi-ethnic neighborhood in northern Virginia, we expected there to be a good variety, and there was. Though my daughter herself comes from China, none 0f us are good at Chinese cooking, so we toyed with something Middle Eastern, and while I can whip up some good Middle Eastern dishes, it isn't really our cuisine, so we settled on being one of the few families attending to come up with something American, and made my wife's chili. (My own chili is better, in my opinion, but since it causes bleeding gums and requires extensive liquid refreshment afterward, if not resuscitation, we went with the mild stuff.)

It was crowded and chaotic and though the foods were supposed to be labeled, most weren't. I was pleased that among the many flags on the wall, one was Egypt's, since obviously many of us are cheering on Egypt in the first week without Mubarak. When we got to the serving table there was a lot of Middle Eastern, Latin American, and African food, though surprisingly little East Asian since there are many Vietnamese and Korean families in the area, though perhaps not in the school.

Anyway, I filled my plate with lamb couscous and Latin rice, curried lentils and some kind of kifta, and then came to an unlabeled plate.

Hmm. Noodles, macaroni, sauce, lentils, maybe a little rice, and chickpeas on top. Sounds like ... OMG, Kushary!

Now, Kushary is Egyptian street food. Like ful mudammas and ta‘amiyya, (the former is fava beans; the latter is a version of falafel made with fava beans instead of chickpeas), it is a distinctively native Egyptian dish. It can be found elsewhere, but most commonly where there's a big Egyptian expatriate population, such as the Gulf. It is sold in street carts or small, specialized kushary restaurants.

Of course, I took some. To be honest, kushary was never my favorite Egyptian specialty, but it is so typically Egyptian that I couldn't not eat it as we approach the first week since the fall of Mubarak. A nice little bit of synchronicity.

We've Heard of This Facebook Thing the Young Folk Like; Sounds Like a Good Place for Press Releases

Egypt's Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is, whatever else you may say about it, trying to understand the new world in Egypt. Unfortunately, it's sounding more and more like one's aging parents who keep using 50's hipster slang to sound like they're in tune with the times. Its use of SMS messaging to send out uninformative press releases has drawn a lot of complaints, so now they have gone and started up a Facebook page, to show they get it. Unfortunately, they don't. (Website in Arabic.) It's more like, "Hey, now that we're hip to this groovy new thing the young folk like, let's use it to send out what we were sending out on the fax machine."

Points for effort, but a misfire so far. Via Zeinobia.

The Bloodshed in Bahrain and Benghazi

Having been tied up through the afternoon and evening, I haven't said much about the bloodshed in Bahrain and in Benghazi, Libya. The early morning attack on the demonstrators' tents in the Lu'lu' (Pearl) traffic roundabout led to several dead, and the security forces struck when most demonstrators were asleep. Nevertheless, the authorities claim they were ambushed. Sleeping people in tents are the sneakiest kind of ambush when you're an armed security force.





At least 14 are said to have died in Benghazi, which means the real total may be higher. Libya's east, the area around Benghazi (the region called Cyrenaica in the colonial era) has long been the most disaffected region against Qadhafi, but open defiance is unusual.

As we've already seen in Iran, when a regime is willing to shed blood, and is united in its determination, protests can be bloodily crushed. What kept Tahrir Square from becoming Tienanmen Square was the refusal of the Egyptian Army to fire on the demonstrators; even so, the death toll in Egypt officially stands at over 300 and may be higher.

Instinct tells me that Libya will crack down hard and the regime will weather the storm, but instinct told me Ben Ali and Mubarak would survive, too, and those are two countries I know well, while I've never set foot in Libya.

A large number of Libya videos can be found here.

Egypt's Military Sector of the Economy: A Dissenting View

I must confess that I myself, in this blog and in interviews, have contributed to the widespread view that Egypt's military controls its own huge chunk of the manufacturing sector of the economy, with estimates that this could amount to a third of the entire economy. I also must confess that much of my experience in the matter dates from the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Jonathan Wright offers a strong dissent to this received wisdom. I can't say for certain that he's right, but I can say that his information is much more current than mine, or many of the other Egypt hands who've been pontificating. I'll defer to him unless other information is forthcoming.

Farouk al-Baz; Egypt's Youth Deserve Nobel Peace Prize

Farouk al-Baz may be the most famous of all expatriate Egyptian scientists, a longtime stalwart of the US' NASA (in at least one old Star Trek there's a shuttlecraft named al-Baz), and his brother Osama was long Egypt's greatest diplomatic eminence grise (called "Egypt's Kissinger" way back when Kissinger was our Kissinger). Farouk al-Baz has told Al-Masry al-Youm he wants to rally Egyptian intellectuals to nominate Egypt's youth for a collective award of the Nobel Peace Prize.

Farouk al-Baz is 73. I find this encouraging for some reason.

The Spreading Winter of Discontent

With unrest simultaneously in Yemen, Bahrain, Libya and Iran, still simmering in Algeria and starting to stir in Iraq, it is almost amusing to watch how the international news agencies find themselves trying to cover all the bases. Certainly a single blogger can't cover it all. I've primarily specialized in Egypt and know Tunisia pretty well, so paid a lot of attention to those dramas. But I can't cover them all. Even the networks are stretching thin. And I do have a Journal to edit.

As I've said before on this blog, even those of us getting calls to explain it all are at a loss; everything we've learned about the region has been turned on its head. We really don't know what's going to happen, even in Tunisia and Egypt where the old leaders have already fallen. Forty years of experience and I find myself as unsure of the future as the newest student in the field.

I do, however, think it is important to keep the national differences in mind, as well as the potential consequences. We've seen the unrest in autocratic republics (beginning with Tunisia and Egypt), monarchies (Bahrain and Jordan), and a Jamahiriya (Libya's self-proclaimed system); in a wide range of Sunni countries but also in Shi‘ite Iran and mixed Sunni-Shi‘a Bahrain and Iraq. Oil states (Algeria, Iraq, Iran, Bahrain) and non-oil states have been hit.

Nor are the consequences the same across the board. These revolutions and uprisings are not about the United States and the US has limited ability to control events. But the US would welcome a change of regime in Iran and probably not mourn too much a change in Libya, while Bahrain might be another matter, since the US Fifth fleet is based there.

And I suspect the roller-coaster ride is just beginning.

Mawlid al-Nabi

I'm a little late noting the Prophet's birthday this year, which was yesterday.

Shoot the Messenger, Part Three

Ben Ali blamed sinister foreign media, while his controlled press targeted Al Jazeera by name, at a time when Al Jazeera didn't even have a bureau in Tunis. Mubarak's police raided the Al Jazeera offices and forced then nearly underground. Now, between Tunisia and Egypt, in Libya, where major demonstrations and clashes occurred in Benghazi yesterday, state TV has been showing people denouncing Al Jazeera, blaming it for subverting the great Jamahiriyya, and, well, just because.

Shoot the messenger: the first recourse of the trembling tyrant. Having grown up in a border state during the Civil Rights revolution in the US, I'm quite familiar with the line that all the troubles are caused by "outside agitators." Al Jazeera; the Amir of Qatar's plot to spread democratic revolutions? (Now the King of Bahrain, with his island's historic dynastic rivalry, might have a case, but the Brother Leader of the Revolution in Libya?)

A wise man, in fact a Middle Easterner, once said that ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free. Al Jazeera doesn't always get it right, but the more scared you are of a free media, the more we suspect you have to hide.

Tariq al-Bishri

Here's a useful profile of Tariq al-Bishri, the respected former jurist who's heading the committee to propose changes to the Egyptian constitution.