POMED Notes: “The Realities of Power Sharing in the Next Iraqi Government”

The Middle East Institute (MEI) held an event on Tuesday titled “The Realities of Power Sharing in the Next Iraqi Government” with Reidar Visser. The event was held to mark the release of Visser’s new book, “A Responsible End?: The United States and the Iraqi Transition, 2005-2010.” Visser was introduced by Kate Seelye, the Vice President of Programs and Communications at MEI.

(To read full notes, continue below the fold or click here for pdf.)

Reidar Visser began his remarks by stating that not only will power sharing be problematic in the next Iraqi government, but that the “basic idea” of trying to achieve power sharing in Iraq is problematic. Visser described Iraq as being in the middle of a “constitutional transition.” The current government is a power sharing consociational government where power and influence are distributed among players. This system is associated with the presidency council, a tripartite formula meant to include one Sunni, one Shi’ite, and one Kurd that would hold veto power. The consociational model was meant to operate for a transitional period only. It is now “history” according to Visser. The election of Jalal Talibani on November 11^th to the “regular” presidency officially ended the tripartite presidency council. The “regular” presidency has no veto power and does not have the same “majority requirements” as the transitional model. The prime minister is now the most powerful position in the government, with the presidency fulfilling a largely “ceremonial role.”

This change indicates a move towards a more “majoritarian” form of government. Visser said that his main concern about the next government was the “dissonance” between the constitution, which he described as being based on a majoritarian model, and the current debate around power sharing in the Iraqi government. Visser said the likely outcome would be that the parties in power would pretend to share power while actually governing in a majoritarian fashion. In some respects, the U.S. was a part of this problem. For example, the newly created National Council for Strategic Planning is not recognized by the Iraqi constitution, but was insisted upon by the U.S. to fulfill a power sharing deal between Maliki’s State of Law and Allawi’s Iraqiyya. According to Visser, this council is “only an acronym” whose name keeps changing because “the Iraqis don’t believe in it.” He argued that power sharing along ethno-religious lines is not dictated by Iraqi history and that, in fact, the opposite has been true through much of that country’s history.

Visser explained that there are two main external powers pushing for a power sharing government in Baghdad: Iran and the United States. He pointed to what he called a “straw man” argument that has been made in Washington that the Iranians wanted to exclude the Sunnis from the next government. This argument is incorrect, according to Visser, because the Iranians have a vested interest in sectarianism becoming the new norm in Iraq. The numerical superiority of the Shi’ites in Iraq makes this outcome desirable for the Iranians. What Iran truly fears is that “Iraqis will one day begin calling themselves Iraqis.” As long as the U.S. continues to push for a power sharing government based on sectarian identity it is “playing into the hands of the Iranians.” The alternative to a power sharing system would be for Iraqiyya to go into opposition and reposition itself as an “Iraqi nationalist” party. He concluded by saying that power sharing as the “sole goal” only rewards the Iranian’s strategy, and that it is not a “magic bullet.” The history of Iraq shows that there are other, informal ways to make sure that country’s various groups feel represented.

The floor was then opened for questions. The first questioner asked what the role of the U.S. should be during the transition phase Visser mentioned. He answered that the Obama administration had a chance five months ago to encourage Maliki and Allawi to reconcile and form a strong, but not all inclusive, government. They feared having players “outside the tent” and pushed for an all inclusive government. The U.S. “needs to wake up and see the realities of the power sharing agreement,” Visser said. If the National Council for Strategic Planning does not work out, maybe power sharing should be dropped. He said that the U.S. should not worry if Iraqiyya chooses to go into opposition. In fact, Iraqiyya can use the speakership of the parliament as a vantage point to present itself as an “Iraqi” party, which Visser sees as a long term positive outcome.

The next questioner asked about the Sadrist’s and their influence in the next government after helping to secure the prime ministerhsip for Maliki. Visser pointed out that Maliki is in debt to the Sadrists for consolidating the Shi’ite vote behind him, but that Kurdish support guaranteed the prime ministership. He did say that there was an “evident” shift at one point in the Sadrist position away from an “explicitly” anti-Maliki stance that Visser said most likely had something to do with the Iranians. He said that the narrative that the Sadrists “colonize” ministries is well known in Iraq and that Maliki knows this and will try to “head them off.” There have also been rumors that the Sadrists were promised governorates, including the governorate of Maysan in the south of the country, which are supposed to have popularly elected councils choose governors. The Sadrists aside, Visser said that the increasing differences between how individual governorates are governed are already becoming issue.

Another questioner said that his impression was that the U.S. “exerted a great deal of pressure” to get Maliki and Allawi to form a government together, and he asked why Visser thought they had not. He answered that they “did it in the wrong way.” The U.S. “never planned” on excluding the Iraqi National Alliance (Shi’ite and led by the Sadrists) and the Kurds. The U.S. also failed to convince the two to drop their personal issues, which Visser called “quite considerable.” The Obama administration could have created an “eye opener” by fully supporting the majoritarian option but instead focused too much on power sharing, particularly for the Kurds sake.

A questioner asked if it would be unconstitutional to keep the presidential council, causing Visser to promptly signal in the affirmative. But, the questioner pressed, wasn’t the election of Talabani to the presidency itself unconstitutional? Visser replied that, yes, the election of Talabani was technically unconstitutional. He explained that in order to revive the tripartite council the constitution would have to be amended, meaning that a law would have to be written in the parliament and then approved by a national referendum, an unlikely scenario. In the case of Talabani, the constitution specifies that the president receive a 2/3 majority, or win a run-off election. Talabani’s election did not go “according to the book” in this regard. Visser said that Iraqiyya would have a “legitimate” case in challenging Talabani’s election, which, if successful, would have the added benefit of making Maliki’s nomination to the prime ministerhsip invalid. He said that it was “strange” that no one had tried to challenge the president on this point.