POMED Notes: “Unfinished Business: An American Strategy for Iraq Moving Forward”

The Brookings Institution held an event on Thursday to mark the release of the analysis paper “Unfinished Business: An American Strategy for Iraq Moving Forward.” The event’s participants were all co-authors of the paper and included Kenneth M. Pollack, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, J. Scott Carpenter, the Keston Family Fellow at the Washington Institute and director of Project Fikra, and Sean Kane, a program officer with the United States Institute of Peace’s Iraq Programs.

 (To read full notes, continue below the fold or click here for pdf.)

Pollack began by describing the paper as an effort to think about U.S. goals and priorities in Iraq for the long term. He called the paper a “consensus document,” saying that the authors had found they agreed on a surprising amount in spite of their different backgrounds. Pollack said that the most important point the authors wanted to convey to policy makers and the public was the need for a “ruthless prioritization of goals” with respect to U.S. policy in Iraq. Iraq is different now and the ability of the U.S. to influence events there has also changed. This, in turn, should affect the goals the U.S. seeks to achieve there. Iraq is now “fully sovereign,” the drawdown of U.S. troops continues apace, and the Iraqi people’s perception of the role of the U.S. and their own government is changing as well. Pollack and his co-authors argue in their paper for three main objectives:

1.) Prevent a civil war. This should be the “paramount” goal of U.S. policy going forward according to Pollack. The ethno-sectarian conflict was hugely damaging to the country and Pollack argued that research shows that ethno-sectarian conflicts tend to re-ignite. Pollack believes that if Iraq fails to “muddle upward,” it is more likely to slip into civil war than to “muddle downward.” He also warned that “these types” of conflicts often “spill-over” into neighboring countries, possibly sparking a regional conflict.

2.) Prevent the re-emergence of an aggressive Iraq. The idea of an aggressive Iraq might seem unlikely in 2010, but in the long term there are no guarantees. Pollack described U.S. policy making as “generally short term,” reminding the audience that the U.S. armed Saddam Hussein as a balancer to Iran in the 1980’s, and saying that policy makers need to think about what kind of government will be running Iraq in the years to come.

3.) The U.S. ought to help create a strong, prosperous Iraq that will be an ally in the region. Pollack called this an “aspirational goal,” and warned that there could be potential problems in pursuing it. He stressed that the first two goals were more important, and that the achievement of the third goal must not undercut the first two.  

Pollack called the prevention of a civil war and instability a “tall order.” He said the U.S. should help to create a functional democracy not because it “likes” democracy, but because it is in the long term interests of the U.S. for Iraq to become a functional democracy. The U.S. cannot depend on a “nice Mubarak” to come along and take over; that will not work. Getting the domestic politics right gives hope to the Iraqi people, but if the political situation deteriorates, no amount of oil money and no number of troops will be able to fix it. Pollack concluded by pointing out that military and aid missions have fundamentally changed in the last few years. The role of the U.S. military now is to train their Iraqi counterparts and be part of a “presence” mission. Pollack argued that American troops would need to be part of this mission for some time to come. The role of U.S. aid has shifted from trying to rebuild infrastructure in order to maintain Iraqi popular support, to a situation where Iraqis look to their own government to provide services.

Carpenter began by saying that it was important to “shine a light” on Iraq because, in his opinion, Iraq is more important to American interests than Afghanistan. Carpenter focused on the “concept of conditionality” and how to use conditionality to achieve the goals laid out in the paper. He agreed with the idea of “subordinating” all other goals to further political agreement, but also said that “the U.S. is interested in a partnership, not a suicide pact.” What this means is that if the Iraqis head away from U.S. interests, and their own constitution, the U.S. should withdraw support. In other words, the U.S. should use the leverage afforded it; economic assistance should be conditional upon the implementation of oversight rules and accountability measures.

Carpenter also advocated using leverage in the negotiations on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that will likely be renegotiated as the U.S. prepares to fully withdraw at the end of 2011. He suggested several criteria moving forward, including preserving the ability of the U.S. to remain peace keepers and “guarantors” of the rule of law, and that the U.S. must be ready to “walk away” altogether if the Iraqis are unwilling to go along with key points. He stressed that the U.S. cannot “want a SOFA more than the Iraqis do,” and that any Iraqi government that does not want U.S. troops past 2011 “probably isn’t worth supporting.” Carpenter concluded by reiterating that the U.S. should stand ready to help the Iraqis with any problems, but that help should be used as leverage to positively influence domestic political development.

Kane focused on the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) and the constitutional politics of Iraq, taking a long-term approach to a subject that he described as being concerned primarily with “personalities” and who-gets-what-ministry talk. He agreed with his co-authors that the U.S. is no longer in a position to control the course of events in Iraq, and added that Iraqi nationalism is “strong,” something to remember when the U.S. is still viewed as an occupier in some corners of the Iraqi polity. Kane argued that in order for the U.S. to influence Iraqi politics, the SFA had to “deliver” for the Iraqis. The SFA, which Kane said was a “big deal” for Iraq, needs to be “fleshed out” and “fully actualized.” Kane used the agricultural sector, traditionally the largest employer in Iraq, and the water sector, where Iraq faces huge shortages due to poor infrastructure and perennial problems with its upstream neighbors over usage rights, as examples of where the SFA could be expanded and used to further cooperation.

Diplomatically, the U.S. should continue to help Iraq settle its debts with its neighbors (i.e. Kuwait reparations) and assist Iraq’s ascension to full U.N. and WTO status. Internally, the U.S. could act as a kind of arbiter or advisor in working with the Iraqis to settle some of their constitutional issues. The document was “rushed” and there are “gaps” and “contradictions” Kane said. Not surprisingly, the government has not always strictly abided by the constitution. This is a source of concern because the constitution not only sets out the power relationships between and within the branches of government, it was also meant to be a “peace treaty” between Iraq’s ethnic and religious communities.

Kane also addressed the issue of federalism, saying that Kurdistan should be on a “single track” and that other provinces should be dealt with separately. With respect to separation of powers, Kane said the newly created Council of Strategic Studies is a “new” concern, but later in the Q&A more or less dismissed it by saying that there was “not a high level of expectation” that the council would have any power. He concluded by noting that these are “sensitive and sovereign” issues, and that the U.S. could, and should, play a role in helping to resolve them.