January 31st, 2011 by Naureen

On Monday, The Maghreb Center hosted a discussion at Georgetown University on the causes of the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and the role of the United States and France before, during, and after the revolution. Dr. Néjib Ayachi, founding President of the Maghreb Center and International Development Consultant at the World Bank, opened the discussion and introduced the panelists: Stephen King, Professor of Government at Georgetown University, Robert Prince, Lecturer in International Studies at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver, and Rust M. Deming, former Ambassador to Tunisia from 2000 to 2003. The event was moderated by Ahmed El-Hamri, Economist at the World Bank and Associate at the Maghreb Center.

To read full notes continue below, or click here for pdf.

Néjib Ayachi opened the discussion stating that the events in Tunisia were the result of a popular uprising led by young college educated people who were frustrated over unemployment, the lack of opportunities, nepotism and corruption. 50% of the Tunisian population is under 30 and 40% of them are unemployed, but unlike the rest of the Middle East many are highly educated with bachelor and masters degrees. And the corruption had gotten so far out of hand, Ayachi states, that Tunisians were forced to pay to get jobs. While this is a relatively new phenomenon it shows how desperate conditions were in Tunisia and helps to explain Mohammad Bouazizi’s self-immolation. And while his immolation occurred in an impoverished region, in a few days, protests spread through the whole country; laborers, members of the middle class, lawyers, and union organizers took to the streets to protest the conditions. Protesters were calling for democracy, human right and an end to the corruption of Ben Ali and the Trabelsi family.

Ben Ali presided over a police state where the police force was bigger than the military which was more of a republican and professional organization; in most other Middle Eastern countries the state controls the army. Under Ben Ali, members of the opposition, including Islamists—which have been described as moderate actors who seek to play by democratic rules—, were arrested, tortured, and repressed. The parties were in many ways just for show and the media was a “state puppet,” much like the media in North Korea. In the 2010, Press Freedom Ranking Report, Tunisia ranked 164 out of 178 countries.

So why didn’t we see it coming? According to Ayachi and Professor Stephen King, Ben Ali, the IMF, and the World Bank painted a nice picture: secular, highly educated, expanding middle class—and the largest in the region—, gender equality, economic development and reduction of poverty (at 7% it was one of the lowest in the region), 20 years of equitable growth which in recent years was at 5%. However, the problem is a structural one. In Tunisia, the largest industries, Ayachi says, were the tourism and textile industry which could not integrate the educated workers with graduate degrees. Weak job creation and de-industrialization, King says, were the only reservations the IMF and the World Bank voiced.

However, King says, his local level studies of Tunisia in the 1990s revealed that the 5% growth was not being shared equitably, especially in the rural farmers and among small enterprises. The privatization of land, he says, greatly increased inequality and led resentment among small farmers who saw land going to the rich; they felt pain, anger, confusion and saw that these neo-liberal reforms were not helping them.Privatization and de-industrialization took place across the Arab World and in places like Tunisia and Egypt where this occurred without a regulatory framework, private monopolies and crony capitalism emerged. Thus, a small number of people were holding a lion’s share of the assets; in Tunisia Ben Ali and his in-laws the Trabelsi family took control. Reports, including those from Wiki-leaks, show that nearly 50% of the Tunisian economy was in the hands of Ben Ali and his family.

King also looked at how the Jasmine Revolution fits into different political theories. According to the literature on regime transitions and authoritarian breakdown, most openings tend to happen from within the regime between hardliners and soft-liners. However, this was not the case in Tunisia, where the openings came from below in the form of a popular revolution. The literature also states that transitions tend to be more difficult in one-party regimes as the party and leaders become deeply rooted in society. According to King, this theory is, to some degree, holding up in Tunisia where members of the former RCD have co-opted the opposition and simply changed their policies and ideology. However, it is unclear how long the former RCD members can hold on as people in Tunisia seem to understand that their presence may lead to an authoritarian backslide.

King also states that the Tunisia is a classic example of a “fierce weak state,” which the literature states are vulnerable to popular revolutions. Political mobilization in Tunisia occurred because people stopped submitting to the theater of the regime; the cult of Ben Ali vanished. In the case of Tunisia, it is unclear whether the modernization theory can be applied. Twenty years ago many, King says, had high hopes of seeing Tunisia emerge as a modernized democracy as the country began to develop economically. However, maybe it’s happening now, 20 years later when the populous is more highly educated and the country is more developed because at such a state of development, the country can no longer sustain an autocratic regime.

King also states that while efforts towards democracy promotion by the United States and Europe have been low in the past, they need to be there now. He calls on governments to support democracy by tying it to aid; “it’s a good chance for us to use our influence.” The literature states that authoritarian breakdown allows for the emergence of virtue; the questions going forward are who the leaders of the movement will be and if they will take the opportunity for virtue. King states that while leaders of the Ennahda movement are coming back to the country, they have not been behind the revolution and are not the leaders. Not one Islamist slogan was raised in the whole protest.

Robert Prince began his discussion over the role of the U.S. and France by calling Tunisia a failure of the development model, the Washington Consensus policies, and the World Bank/IMF structural adjustment packages. In the 1980s, Prince asserted, Tunisia was on par with South Korea, and while South Korea took off in the 1990s, Tunisia stagnated.

When looking at the role of the U.S. and France there are certain themes which emerge, Prince says. Neither of the countries said anything about the protests in the three weeks prior to Ben Ali’s departure, in contrast to the immediate response by both counties to events in Iran a year ago. While Clinton offered confusing statements urging restraint on both sides, France seemed to weigh in on behalf of Ben Ali and how foreign intervention could help security forces. Political paralysis seemed to reign in both Paris and Washington, Prince says, as different government officials favored different policies. The administrations couldn’t make up their minds. Responses emerged after Ben Ali resigned, with Obama strongly supporting the revolution and France refusing Ben Ali entry into the country and stating they did not realize how frustrated citizens were.

The U.S. and France have been competing in Tunisia since the end of World War II, when the U.S. supported Habib Bourguiba’s aspiration to make Tunisia and independent state. France is much more closely linked to the country both culturally and economically with over 400 French companies operating there. Their economic relationship is, structurally, the same as it was during the colonial period; Tunisia is still acting as a French periphery and this may have helped lead to its economic crisis. The U.S., on the other hand, has limited corporate interest in the country and under Ben Ali’s reign received $637 million dollars to the country to help promote U.S. strategic interests in the region like the Palestine-Israel conflict and counterinsurgency among others. U.S. interest in Tunisia is much more modest than it is in other places, including Algeria. Thus Prince remarked, if the US and France feel that their broader interests in the region will be damaged they will not intervene on the side of the opposition.

Former Ambassador to Tunisia from 2000-2003, Rust Deming, began his remarks by saying that the United States was the second country, after Morocco, to accept Tunisia’s independence. We had great sympathy for Bourguiba who was liberal minded with gender equality and economic reforms and who was moderate and saw the realities surrounding Israel’s role in the region. After the first Gulf war he says, our relationship with Tunisia began to shift as Tunisia sided with Saddam Hussein.

On average, he says the US has given the country $20 million in aid each year which has mainly gone towards military training and buying planes. Our economic relationship with Tunisia does not compare to France and EU, as US concerns of crony capitalism were high and as investors found it difficult to invest in the country unless they were willing to go through the Trabelsi family. US firms, including McDonalds, went elsewhere. Additionally, Tunisia did not agree to a Free Trade Agreement with the states.

Additionally, Deming says, the U.S. was concerned with human rights violations in the form of crackdowns on NGOs and activists and changes to the constitution which let Ben Ali run again. Furthermore, officials in Tunisia used the events of September 11th as license to put pressure on Islamists and secular opposition; they pointed to the attack as an example of what would happen if the Islamists came to power. Overtures to the Tunisian government to address these issues were ignored. Thus, the U.S. attitude towards Tunisia became, “wait out Ben Ali.”

William Hudson, former Ambassador to Tunisia from 2003-2006, was also present in the audience and stated that the central government became increasingly isolated to such an extent that by 2006, few Foreign Service officers in the embassy were able to directly deal with ministry officials. The way the ministry was locked down it is possible that Ben Ali did not see the revolution coming. He also stated that it will be interesting to see how the opposition will operate given its perpetual weakness and their pre-revolution support for Ben Ali seeking a new term; there is uncertainty as to how credible these opposition leaders will seem to Tunisians. Currently, there is a large power vacuum in the country.

Alluding to an article in the Washington Post by Eric Goldstein, an audience member asked whether reconciliation commission, like that in South Africa, is needed here. The panelists stated that it is uncertain whether such a reconciliation framework will be set up. Prince called Goldstein’s characterization of the revolution inaccurate as he stated it was a middle class movement when in reality the revolution began in the heart of the country in one of the poorest villages and then emerged to incorporate the middle class and wealthy members of society. Tunisia, he said, has a large respect for the rule of law; it was being violated by Ben Ali and this led to the revolution.

When asked whether the lack of a single dominant leader translates into a greater likelihood for democracy, the panelists stated that it was unclear who will emerge as a leader as many activists had been exiled and tortured by Ben Ali’s regime. Within the next two months we will see if a consensus among the opposition groups will emerge and if true democracy is possible.

When asked about a possible “domino effect,” the panelists said that the other Arab countries are watching Tunisia very closely and that he potential is out there. King stated that there is also an international factor here, as the community backed off democracy promotion in the region in 2005 after Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood came to power. “I hope the international community can see that the status quo in the Middle East is gone now,” King said. Ayachi also remarked that the denouncement of Ben Ali in the State Department cables, made available by Wiki-leaks, came as a surprise to many Tunisians who thought that the U.S. supported Ben Ali and the status quo.

Addressing a question about what factors made Tunisia explode right now, Prince stated that aside from the high unemployment, wages, oppression and impressive corruption by Trabelsi and Ben Ali’s family, the immolation was a catalyst. Additionally, there were attempts to change the constitution to make Ben Ali’s wife Leila the vice president so that she could succeed him; this solidified to many the corruption in the regime. He went on to say that no one could have predicted the revolution or the effect Bouazizi’s immolation would have had; prior to his immolation, 15 people were on hunger strikes and others had been immolating and electrocuting themselves. His story just happened to capture attention with the wake of the Wiki-leaks as well.

What then are the lessons for U.S. foreign policy in the region? Our interests, the panelists said, vary depending on the country; we cannot manipulate the situation. These revolutions have to come from the bottom. The major factors in our policy will be helping prevent the country from backsliding; they will need U.S. assistance, especially as countries such as Libya attempt to destabilize it.

Posted in Democracy Promotion, Event Notes, Human Rights, Islam and Democracy, Islamist movements, Political Parties, Protests, Reform, Tunisia |