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Enclaves between India and Bangladesh

The land that maps forgot

Feb 15th 2011, 16:06 by T.J. | COOCH BEHAR

(Click here for an enlarged view of the map, courtesy Jan S. Krogh)

THOSE of us who keep an eye out for anomalies in the world’s maps have long held a fond regard for what might be called Greater Bengal. A crazed array of boundaries cuts Bangladesh out of the cloth of easternmost India, before slicing up the surrounding Himalayan area and India’s north-east into most of a dozen jagged mini-states. But the crème de la crème, for a student of bizarre geography, is to be found floating along the northern edge of Bangladesh’s border with India.

EVER since Bangladesh achieved its independence in 1971, struggles over territory and terrorism, rather than the exchange of goods and goodwill, have dominated its relations with its mega-neighbour. Forty years on, both countries appear to be nearing an agreement to solve the insoluble—by swapping territory.

The planned exchange of parcels of each other’s territory is concentrated around some 200 enclaves. These are like islands of Indian and Bangladeshi territory surrounded completely by the other country’s land, clustered on either side of Bangladesh’s border with the district of Cooch Behar, in the Indian state of West Bengal. Surreally, these include about two dozen counter-enclaves (enclaves within enclaves), as well as the world’s only counter-counter enclave—a patch of Bangladesh that is surrounded by Indian territory…itself surrounded by Bangladeshi territory.

Folklore has it that this quiltwork of enclaves is the result of a series of chess games between the Maharaja of Cooch Behar and the Faujdar of Rangpur. The noblemen wagered on their games, using villages as currency. Even in the more sober account, represented by Brendan R. Whyte, an academic, the enclaves are the “result of peace treaties in 1711 and 1713 between the kingdom of Cooch Behar and the Mughal empire, ending a long series of wars in which the Mughals wrested several districts from Cooch Behar.”

That was before the days of East India Company rule, before the British Raj and long before the independence of South Asia’s modern republics. These places have been left as they were found by both India and Bangladesh: in a nearly stateless state of abandonment. They are today pockets of abject poverty with little or nothing in the way of public services.

In a 2004 paper titled “An historical and documentary study of the Cooch Behar enclaves of India and Bangladesh”, Mr Whyte, in reference to the intractability of the boundary issues at partition, asks whether India is still “waiting for the Eskimo”.

When in 1947 Mr Feroz Khan Noon suggested that Sir Cyril Radcliffe should not visit Lahore for he was sure to be misunderstood either by the Muslims or the Sikhs, The Statesman wrote: “On this line of argument, he [Sir Cyril] would do better to remain in London, or better still, take up residence in Alaska. Perhaps however there would be no objection to his surveying the boundaries of the Punjab from the air if piloted by an Esqimo”.

Apparently the newspaper thought that anyone’s sorting this border dispute anytime soon was highly improbable. Sir Cyril’s success seemed as implausible—in those waning days of the British empire—as the notion of an Inuit flying an aeroplane. Most of a century later and a flying “Esqimo” seems like no big deal, while progress on the zany borders of Cooch Behar has made no progress at all.

There is now talk that a land swap might be sealed when India’s prime minister Manmohan Singh visits Bangladesh later this year. If it goes ahead, India stands to lose just over 4,000 hectares of its territory, or about 40 square kilometres. It has 111 enclaves of land within Bangladesh—nearly 70 square kilometres. Bangladesh has 51 enclaves of its own, comprising 28 square kilometres surrounded by India. The transfer proposed would simplify the messy boundary immeasurably—and entail something like a 10,000-acre net loss for India.

For India’s governing Congress party, making a gift of land to Bangladesh—in all an area equivalent to the size of 2,000 test-cricket stadiums—will not come easy. During a time of ideological waffle, it is an issue which India’s opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) can use to flaunt its nationalistic (oftentimes pro-Hindu, ie anti-Muslim) credentials and to attack Congress at a weak spot—its perceived softness towards illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, most of them Muslims. By many estimates, more than 15m illegal migrants have entered India from Bangladesh since 1971. The BJP has been trotting out the round figure of 20m for years.

Meanwhile, construction of a border fence, 2.5m high, on India’s 4,100km border with Bangladesh, the world’s fifth-longest (due to all its zigging and zagging), continues unabated. It is a bloody border, too. Indian soldiers enforce a shoot-to-kill order against Bangladeshi migrants caught making their mundane way from one side of the line to the other.

But what’s in it for India? Its broader desire to clarify its fuzzy borders with all its neighbours provides one attraction. The dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir has eluded resolution. China’s claim of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh remains an open sore. Drawing one steady borderline in the east looks comparatively easy.

India must also hope that its generous co-operation in the territorial dispute might help Bangladesh’s prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, secure popular Bangladeshi support for a rapprochement with India. Her Awami League (AL) government has proven itself a willing partner: working to deny Bangladeshi territory to the insurgent groups who challenge Indian sovereignty in its north-eastern states; and cracking down Bangladesh’s homegrown Islamic-extremist fringe. But as many of Sheikh Hasina’s fellow citizens see things, India has yet to reciprocate following their government’s consent last year to allow India to use Bangladesh’s ports and roads. The main opposition party, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), whose leader likes to say that no foreign vehicles should be allowed to use Bangladesh’s territory, scents blood.

Indian diplomats know this. A diplomatic cable from the American embassy, leaked to the world by WikiLeaks, summarises discussions held in 2009 between India’s then High Commissioner to Bangladesh and the American ambassador. India, the Americans thought, would like to establish a bilateral agreement with Bangladesh on counterterrorism, but was impeded by its understanding “that Bangladesh might insist on a regional task force to provide Hasina political cover from allegations she was too close to India”.

Such international intriguing tends to ignore the people who actually in the enclaves—150,000 by some estimates—who are left waiting. Their chief grievance is a complete lack of public services: with no education, infrastructure for water, electricity etc, they may as well not be citizens of any country. NGOs are barred from working in the enclaves. The question of their citizenship is a major obstacle in resolving the problem: referendums are out of the question, as India does not want to create a precedent which could inspire Kashmiris or north-easterners fighting for independent statehood.

The people who actually live in enclaves (and counter-enclaves) in a certain sense “don't see” the borders. They speak the same language, eat the same food and live life without regard to the politicians in Dhaka, Kolkata and Delhi. Many of them cross the border regularly (the bribe is US$6 a trip from the Bangladeshi side).

A few years ago, away from Cooch Behar, on the eastern border with India, I met a man who lived smack on the border between Tripura state and Bangladesh. His living room was in Bangladesh, his toilet in India. He had been a local politician in India, and was now working as a farmer in Bangladesh. As is typical in such places, he sent his daughters to school in Bangladesh, and his sons to India, where schools, he thought, were much better. To his mind, the fence dividing the two countries was of little value. But, he conceded, “at least my cows don’t run away anymore.”

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1-18 of 18
Cloudwarrior wrote:
Feb 17th 2011 9:30 GMT

I have no doubt this would have to be one of the most interesting borders in the world!

RSCS wrote:
Feb 17th 2011 10:24 GMT

India stands to loose just over 4,000 hectares!!

Is "loose" acceptable nowadays? More and more people are using it but surely it should be "lose"?

No Mist wrote:
Feb 17th 2011 10:58 GMT

what was radcliffe smoking when he left this mess of a border as it is in 1947 ?

tazidevl wrote:
Feb 17th 2011 11:15 GMT

If India doesn't "loose" these lands, perhaps Cooch could at least "loose" an 'o'.

@RSCS no it's not acceptable nowadays.

Feb 17th 2011 11:57 GMT

I believe this will give huge boost to popularity of Sheikh Hasina as she can show that India is truly a reliable friend and not a overbearing one. This will also a send out a message to other countries that India not only takes but also gives.

Deepak Gupta wrote:
Feb 17th 2011 12:03 GMT

The author is quick to cite what Mr. Whyte thought of India's perceived negligence of the border dispute (waiting for Eskimo, eh?), but conveniently ignores the fact that in 1982, India "gifted" Teen Bigha region so as to link two Bangladeshi enclaves - Dahagram and Angarpota - with Bangladesh proper. India has in the past made several goodwill gestures to Bangladesh (including economic aid) but Bangladesh's friendliness towards India changes every election season. Therefore, no logical person would expect India to repeatedly make concessions to Bangladesh (especially given the extremely hostile language of the Islamist BNP).

Secondly, the author very conveniently suggests that the British Raj had no role to play in this entire mess. The Radcliffe Commission was utterly incompetent while drawing the border between India and then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). The only criteria it seemed was that Hindu- and Muslim-majority villages should go to India and Pakistan respectively while the Commission completely disregarded geographic complexities.

Feb 17th 2011 1:22 GMT

You missed one level of complexity in your description of the counter-counter-enclave.

#51 is a piece of India
inside patch #19 of Bangladesh
that is surrounded by Indian territory #47
which is in turn surrounded the main part of Bangladesh.

nkab wrote:
Feb 17th 2011 2:58 GMT

"India stands to lose just over 4,000 hectares of its territory, or about 40 square kilometres."

Considering what it has appropriated in Kashmir, Sikkim, Bhutan and Zan Nan of questionable legality or pretext, these 40 square kilometers amounts to nothing.

Ronbark wrote:
Feb 17th 2011 5:50 GMT

RSCS:
No, its not acceptable. Its the attention to spelling that's getting "loose".

No Mist wrote:
Feb 17th 2011 6:08 GMT

Good move by India, remedies some of the wrongs of partition. Next I think it is China's turn to stop behaving like the overgrown but mentally stunted savage and relinquish Tibet Aksai Chin and Taiwan. And the numerous islands it lays claims to whenever its mind spins too hard on grass.

MoveBucket wrote:
Feb 18th 2011 6:41 GMT

This has nothing to do with India or Bangladesh, but the common aspirations of The Bengalis living in West Bengal, East Bengal (aka Bangladesh which literally means Country of Bengalees) and Tripura to reach amicable solution.

Both Hindu and Muslims speak same language and same culture barring religious differences and celebrate Bengali New Year and share the same National Poet (The Great Bengalee Rabindranath Tagore).

The case of Kashmir is different. The some fundamentalist Muslims has driven out Hindus from Kashmir Vallye and sent to exile in Delhi.

Unlike the province of Punjab (Divided into Muslim majority Western or Pakistani Punjab, Sikh majority Eastern or Indian Punjab and Hindu majority Indian states of Haryana and Himachal Pradesh) and Bengal (Divided into Hindu majority West Bengal and Muslim majoirity East Bengal aka East Pakistan aka modern Bangladesh), Kashmir is totally different basket case.

manbearpiggy wrote:
Feb 18th 2011 6:54 GMT

@nkab:
"Considering what it has appropriated in Kashmir, Sikkim, Bhutan and Zan Nan of questionable legality or pretext, these 40 square kilometers amounts to nothing."

The nkab I'm used to in these forums is usually more sensible than this.

Sikkim was a protectorate of British India, and in 1947 became a protectorate of India. The government of Sikkim requested India in 1975 that it be incorporated as a state in India. A referendum was held and a majority voted to become part of India. Where do you see appropriation, questionable legality or pretext?

Bhutan is an independent nation. What appropriation?
Kashmir: Questionable legality and pretext by all three parties to the dispute.
Zan Nan: Huh?

No Mist wrote:
Feb 19th 2011 4:07 GMT

@nkab and @manbearpiggy

maybe it is time for nkab to start reading some books rather than propaganda material. wikipedia is a good start. give it a try

Feb 21st 2011 1:07 GMT

The article leaves out most important piece of information. Thus, Spreading mis-information.

First Fact, India's northern border with Bangladesh is like a thin slice of cheese between nepal and bangladesh. This thin slice of cheese is India's only geographical connection with NE India. Hence,Is a major constraint in gifting more land to Bangladesh. Economist omitted this fact and It's carefully edited map cleverly hides it.

Second Fact, Economist should have mentioned India's past gifts to bangladesh in teen bigah border settlement of 1982.

Third Fact, Economist hides the fact that In 1972 Bangladesh was East Pakistan. India conquered East Pakistan and gifted it to Bengali Muslims. Can there be a bigger gift then that ?

Fourth Fact, Economist should have also suggested alternate solution like exchanging land which would also solve India's thin cheese slice problem.

Feb 22nd 2011 11:14 GMT

@ NonPseudo Secularist - Speaking of Misinformation.
Fact #1 - India's "thin slice of cheese" is not in the areas under discussion for the land-swap deal. You have mistook Cooch-behaar and Jalpaguri, for Goshpukur (in Darjeeling). India's territorial borders within the areas of Jalpaguri and Cooch-Behaar are more than 30-40 kms in width, while those in Darjeeling are less than 10 kms.

Fact #3 - The war of 1971 was fought by the allied foreces of the Indian Army as well as the Mukti Bahini, not the Indian Army alone. Also the subsequent handover of Bangladesh to the bengali muslims was more of a strategic intiative by India, rather than an act of benevolence. So, I would hardly classify it as a gift.

Fact #4 - This is the most glaring of all! Are you saying that India stands to lose strategic land inside the enclaves through the land swap deals? The land-deal, if anything, would provide us with more important strategic land in the areas that matter (which is within the actual borders of India)! What's the point of having a small tract of land completely surrounded by another country? The land deal, if anything, would give us more land within the areas where we could safeguard our borders more effectively.

Unfortunately, much of the people making the democratic noise in India fail to understand that Nationalism should not come at the expense of common sense. And this is best exemplified, time and again, by our friends at the Bharatiya Janata Party.

Feb 25th 2011 12:14 GMT

Eapen Alexander:
Fact #1 Check the maps carefully. The whole area, from Siligauri to Brahmaputra river, is security sensitive. It is like a slice of cheese with thickness varying from 10km to 40km between bangladesh, bhutan and nepal.

Fact #3 Which ever way you slice and dice it. The fact is East Pakistan was under Indian Control. Bangladesh would not exist without Indian army handing over conquered E. Pakistan to locals. It may not be a 100% unselfish act but it is the biggest gift one can give.

Fact #4 I am not saying that India stands to loose in an exchange because I don't know enough of it. All I am saying is that economist failed to explore alternatives based on border security.

Feb 26th 2011 11:41 GMT

This turns out to be a real problem in attempts to digitize boundaries for GIS applications: http://agro.biodiver.se/2007/09/enclavism/

indica wrote:
Feb 27th 2011 1:28 GMT

@Eapen Alexander

In the India-Bangladesh relationship, the full picture shows that it has so far been 'one way traffic' - concessions flowing from India to Bangladesh.
Despite that, India experienced considerable hostility from the Khalida Zia government. It is now getting better.

On the other points:

# You may be right in saying that with the exchange of territories, India can defend her new border more successfully. Without a detailed knowledge of the topography of the areas, it is hard for us to judge this point one way or the other.

# But 'Non-pseudo-secularist' is right in saying that the borders in the NE of India do not afford much hiterland for India's security forces in the event of any hostile military action from any powers in that area.

# During the 1971 war, the Mukti Bahini of B'desh did help the advancing Indian forces, mostly with useful information, but the actual hard fighting and dying was by the Indian army.

# The Inspector General of the State of Meghalaya has issued a Press Statement earlier this month that illegal immigration of Bangladeshi Muslims is encouraged (by some political parties) 'for VOTE BANK reasons'. This IG of Police is, I am told, a Christian, as most people of Meghalaya are.

# I accuse the Congress Party of having inaugurated this phenomenon in the 1960s. In Assam, for instance, where they were ruling, it is well known to the local Assamese (both Hindus and Muslims) that the new arrivals were given 'Ration Card' and 'Voter ID papers' sometimes within three months of arrival.

# The separatist movement United Liberation Front of Assam started because the native Assamese found themselves a minority in many border districts of Assam.

# Most of the NE Tribes of India, most of them Christian, are finding their traditional lands taken away by Bangladeshi Muslims

# The Burmese have taken to evicting their B'deshi illegal immigrants, some of them known as Rohingyas, by force - which I don't support. Families are families, whatever their nationality or religion and one cannot treat them that way.

#BUT it is India and not Bangladesh which is paying the price for this 18 million illegal immigration!! The Nagas, Bodos, Assamese and Tripurans are all up in arms. Indian security forces are laying down their lives because of the Congress Party's politically corrupt move in encouraging illegal immigration from B'desh.

Please visit the NE of India and talk to ordinary Assamese, Bodos and Nagas.

# Illegal immigration from B'desh into India has

1-18 of 18

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