I think another point is the ability to gauge accurately, the levels of support/ambivalence/resistance in the population vis-a-vis the regime. Though we tend to express the situation in terms of the dictator vs the population, of course the population is hardly monolithic in its desires, its fears, or its commitment to either.

These 'jasmine revolutions' are driven in large part by the youthful demographic of the Arab world but there are obviously other sectors of the population who are truly supportive of the regime or politically ambivalent. Arab dictators, especially, maintain a delicate matrix of tribal or clan support, political patronage, and sophisticated methods of social inclusion and favouritism to balance themselves atop their heterogeneous populations.

The dictator must be able to weigh whether the youth, their desires, and concerns, can be successfully isolated from the remainder of the population's direct support. With populations roughly breaking down into 3 distinctive groups, the disaffected, the supportive, and the ambivalent, the dictator must take care not to radicalise the ambivalent or take actions which could in turn cause regime supporters to reconsider their allegiance.

These revolutions, contrary to the uplifting media portrayal, are never as simple the dictator contra his entire population...millions upon millions cried upon hearing of Stalin's death.

I think another point is the ability to gauge accurately, the levels of support/ambivalence/resistance in the population vis-a-vis the regime. Though we tend to express the situation in terms of the dictator vs the population, of course the population is hardly monolithic in its desires, its fears, or its commitment to either.

These 'jasmine revolutions' are driven in large part by the youthful demographic of the Arab world but there are obviously other sectors of the population who are truly supportive of the regime or politically ambivalent. Arab dictators, especially, maintain a delicate matrix of tribal or clan support, political patronage, and sophisticated methods of social inclusion and favouritism to balance themselves atop their heterogeneous populations.

The dictator must be able to weigh whether the youth, their desires, and concerns, can be successfully isolated from the remainder of the population's direct support. With populations roughly breaking down into 3 distinctive groups, the disaffected, the supportive, and the ambivalent, the dictator must take care not to radicalise the ambivalent or take actions which could in turn cause regime supporters to reconsider their allegiance.

These revolutions, contrary to the uplifting media portrayal, are never as simple the dictator contra his entire population...millions upon millions cried upon hearing of Stalin's death.

(2) and (3) seem useless as "discriminators" - every dictator has a patronised inner coterie, and enough imagination to be able to suggest a scapegoat. (America is a popular one). (4) is suspect too - every dictator will choose his own survival over bad international publicity. We are down to (1) - how much muscle does a dictator have? - but that's hardly a deep insight.

I think there are a number of factors but I also think it's important to look at violence as a number of tools available to an autocrat - or even a democratic government (The U.S for example has used violence to disperse protests).

I think perhaps it simply does come down to what tools decision makers have available to them. For example I think when regimes, internal or external lack the tools to compel the population/actors (state and non-state), they resort to violence. There is of course nothing new about this at all.

I think, in respect to Mubarak, he at first tried offering political and economic concessions. These were simply not enough to placate the masses and he was forced to abdicate.

Qaddafi however, doesn't really have any economic cards left to play nor is he willing to concede any political power. I think this attributable to his ego; it is certainly had to gauge whether the man can make a rational cost/benefit analysis.
I think his gambit hinges on how long the population will remain defiant - not just in Libya but in the Middle East. Once populations reach that tipping point, they often will not settle for anything less than complete regime change.
This leads to another point that LaContra made - uprisings are often not monolithic. Whether these populist uprisings can maintain enough unity and momentum to overthrow their regime is often uncertain. The Green Movement's protests in 09 were a good example - they did not have enough momentum to topple the leadership. In the case of Libya, it seems the uprisings are very committed to revolution - but is this going to be the case in Iran, Yemen, Jordan or Bahrain?

I think the propensity to use violence comes down to a simple analysis of whether there are other options: economic reforms, political, judicial and civil concessions (i.e carrots) and also whether less violent methods of dispersing protest are proving effective (like crowd dispersal techniques that Western nations seemed to have honed to a fine art)or less visible methods like repression and individual detention are preferable(i.e sticks). If an autocrat finds he has none of these tools available to him, or are too subtle for his taste then it is highly likely he will resort to the biggest stick in his arsenal.
Wholesale violence I believe is generally undesirable as it is one of the crudest tools a leader has to maintain social order and resorting to it usually indicates the beginning of the end for a leader.

One significant issue is the variable willingness in the army to use violence againts the populace, which in turn can be influenced by the involvement of the army in counterinsurgency. The historian Mary Callahan pointed out that the repression of the pro-democracy movement in 1988 in Burma was carried out particularly by units brought into Rangoon who had previously fighting ethnic insurgent groups. She contrasts this to Indonesia in 1998, where the military had deeper local roots due to its territorial structure and hence seemed less willing to directly use violence againts the populace.

Of course Indonesia had both its own insurgency problems and its share of violence during the transition from Suharto, but I think there is something to the argument.

Two more things to add to the pot:

1. Whether the the patronised elite identify a viable alternative to the incumbent dictator. I think the Egyptian elite may have identified the army as a viable alternative to Mubarak's rule, so they were happy to dump Mubarak and, as they believe, carry on regardless with a substitute leader.

2. The threat of violence is likely to be counter-productive. The rebels understand there is nothing to lose by going all out, but the consequence of pulling back is harsh retribution.

Dictatorial Power?

The Dictators power is dependent on those around him. The only means by which a dictator can rule is by fear otherwise they'd be called something other than a dictator.

Understanding this makes recognizing that the underlings supporting the dictator are likewise ruled by fear. Should one of them realize this they would also realize that the other underlings will cow to his actions should he dispose of the dictator. Furthermore, said individual having found righteousness might even be considered a hero by the people for their liberation.

You see. Power is an illusion. The shadow that looks like a giant snake is in fact a rat. The rat feasts upon the dead but has no power in and of himself. Where is Brutus?

It must all come down to how much of a Machiavelli are you deep down inside. Are you willing to sell your soul to retain power? To kill any number of people, both your countrymen and foreigners, both friends and foe, and go down in history as a villain and a tyrant for a thousand years? Would you rather let everything burn around you than to see yourself lose power? Are you, in Orwellian terms, concerned not with the comfort and prestige that power provides, but the feeling of raw power itself, the ability to crush or raise people at your whim?

If you are able to answer yes to the above questions, than you are a dictator who will go a long way. Hussein was one, Qaddafi is rapidly proving to be like him. But I think Kim Jong-il and Robert Mugabe are really the villains who are in a league of their own on this criterion.

Is it an Alice-in-wonderland thought that the public in the USA might see in the unrest and overthrow of leaders and politicians in the arab world, (who also no longer represent their populations aspirations), a reflection of their own society?

Is the USA where half the people don't even register to vote and less than half(?) of those who do don't vote considered democratic?

The political system is so obviously broken. It is dominated by money and corporate lobbyists and supports an enormous military conglomerate.
Perhaps a jasmin revolution would not be out of place here. In the past Americans were good at revolutions against much less repressive regimes than this one

The role of the armies seems crucial. So Iran is interesting; there is an army which seems military, but also the 'revolutionary guard' which seems corrupt and directed against opposition in the manner of a secret police. So is the Iranian army strong enough and popular enough to contain the RG?

willstewart

A common error in analysing the role of the military is failing to identify the military hierarchy as part of the entrenched elite. Of course it is improbable that enlisted troops from the cities and towns would open fire on the protesters...the military command understand this. So refusing to engage the protesters is not a blow for democracy as much as recognition of the reality.

Th Egyptian military will now deal with the 'democrats' who offer a continuation of Egyptian military power and protect the entrenched financial interests of the military in society. Infrastructure construction, house building, transportation, banking, retail, import/export, hell the military even own 2 of the major hotel resorts in Sharm El Sheik on the Red Sea! Before we sing the democratic ideals of the military we should recognise that they are looking after their own interests first and foremost.

Iran is a different case altogether. Its the Republican Guard which is not only ideologically synchronised with the theocratic regime overseeing all facts of internal state security, intelligence, and the nuclear program, but is also entrenched as a separate financial actor. The RG has separate financial interests in oil, transport, import/export, and construction within Iranian society.

The Iranian military doesn't have the independence, the financial clout, or the standing in society to oppose the Republican Guard, and RG interests are synonymous with the interests of the regime.

'The people get the government they deserve'.

Ultimately it's all down to determination. If the dictator is truly determined to stay in power and has the energy for it, then he'll be as brutal as he can get away with. If brutality has been a characteristic of his regime then he's highly likely to be killed if he doesn't prevail, likewise all who colluded in his brutality.

But not always. The example of Stalin has been quoted. His outstanding virtue in the eyes of his people was that he brought stability and peace - for a while - out of the chaos of the revolution and the musical-chairs leadership which followed Lenin's death. The Russians expected their leaders to be brutal, 300 years of serial brutes have conditioned them to expect nothing less. But Stalin brought order, and later prestige, almost leadership in the World. And that for the Russians was enough.

So, what also matters is the democratic tradition of a country, or more accurately the degree of democratic deficit which has been the norm. Alas in too many of these countries this deficit has been pretty dire, so their expectations are low and they won't be mad enough to give what is necessary, in the Churchillian sense, to topple the big man.

And if he doesn't go, forces a stalemate, or worse? Then the whole place becomes a powder keg in the face of the inevitable additional screw of the deficit stopcock. Latterly Saddam Hussein used never to sleep in the same bed on any two nights, often changing his address several times a night. How long can you live like that without a breakdown?

I'm not at all surprised that the economist is publishing defamatory false remarks. The MEK were never involved in supressing Kurds or Shias, they always had the Iranian regime as their focus of attention. So that mistake in the article really needs to be corrected. It is slander.

hannah11

Actually its not slander...if its the written word its libel.

But of course its not libel either because it is true.
MEK fighters assisted the Iraqi RG in the battle and suppression of the Kurds in Irbil in northern Iraq (Kurdistan) March-April 1991.

Originally they tried to manipulate Saddam's regime using his funding and support to strike at the Islamic regime in Iran from their HQ in Iraq (from 1986)....But after having been the deceived by Saddam that he would support their 'invasion' of Iran in 1988 as the National Liberation Army of Iran (who Saddam abandoned after the invasion in a Bay of Pigs fashion), the remnants of the MEK were eventually (by 1990) thoroughly compromised and infiltrated by Saddam's Republican Guard and were co-opted to assist in paramilitary actions against the Kurds, and possibly the Shia in Basra.

The MEK cannot even be considered mercenaries...they did the dirty work of the Iraqi RG to save themselves after Saddam threatened to turn them over to the Iranian RG....

This article is full of lies about Mojahedi-e-Khalge.

The writers seem to be biting round the bush to just declare that Mujahidin were helping Sadam to stay in power. The quotation about Maryam Rajavi, in this article, is also a blatant lie. All these accusation were branded as utter rubbish by 7 credible courts in the UK and EU in 2008.

I think Economic Editor is allowing himself to be manipulated but the mullahs’ intelligent agency. This smearing campaign could ultimately lead to an expensive liable suit against the magazine. Unless, of course, the mullahs’ have paid the Economist a colossal amount for such utter fabrication to be printed, in which case the Economist has only its reputation to lose.