The Pew Research Center published a poll on Egypt’s political outlook on Tuesday, offering the “first credible” statistical insight of the political trends in post-revolutionary Egypt. Researchers conducted personal interviews with 1,000 Egyptian adults between 24 March and 7 April. Generally, the poll shows a highly favorable view of the military, and split support for the Muslim Brotherhood, the April 6 Movement and Ayman Nour’s Al-Ghad party. The New York Time’s coverage of the poll highlighted the optimism most Egyptian feels about the trajectory of the country. In contrast, Ahram Online, focused on the more than half of Egyptians who do not want to keep the peace treaty with Israel or maintain an Israeli embassy in the country, as well as the mere 36 percent of Egyptians who believe Coptic Christians should be able to freely practice their religion. Haaretz’s analysis emphasized that college-educated Egyptians are more likely to support the peace treaty than the working class.
A recent Financial Times op-ed underscores worries about Egypt’s liberal bloc, “Unfortunately, much of the energy of liberal Egypt seems to be focused on pursuing the old regime rather than preparing for the future.” The April 6 Movement announced its withdrawal from the Revolutionary Youth Coalition (RYC), citing the coalition’s interference in the movement’s internal affairs. April 6 seeks to create a comprehensive umbrella coalition that can participate in parliamentary elections.
Karen Leigh, writing at the Atlantic, articulates that the world has been privy to the reality of government sponsored violence and human rights abuses in Bahrain, but Bahraini citizens have not. Leigh asserts that there has been a clamp down on foreign press within the kingdom which has led to a monopoly by the state run television. “The narrative the government wants to put across, which is powerful, is that this is a sectarian conflict, different than what happened in Egypt and Tunisia. And the vehicle it chose to do that with is BTV, because it’s the only thing it had in its arsenal,” said Ali Al-Saffar, Middle East economist. The state run TV, according to Leigh, has planted weapons alongside protesters, faked footage of violence against police officers, and out rightly denied any use of violence by the government against protesters or those associated with the opposition. Leigh reports that officials from al-Wefaq, the Bahraini opposition party, have told her that they are “worried about similarities between BTV’s rhetoric and that of the Hutu radio stations that rallied Rwandan Hutus to slaughter their Tutsi brethren 17 years ago.” Leigh argues that there is a growing tide within Bahrain that the foreign media is lying about events taking place there which is increasing state TV viewership and anti-Shi’a public opinions. The long term effects of this shift are not entirely clear, but Leigh argues that in the short term Shi’ites will continue to be targeted by state security with greater support from the Bahraini public.
Abigail Hauslohner, writing at Time Magazine, questions what the fate of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, his sons, and other high ranking government officials will be in the coming months. Hauslohner asserts that some Egyptians want “clean, flat out revenge” and ”compensation for the billions of dollars they allege the regime stole from the public through corruption.” With a weak judicial system and a large web of former Mubarak connections still in power, Hauslohner questions the ability for members of the Mubarak family to receive a fair trial. On the issue of recovering funds, she asserts that officials who have been put in charge of this process are facing numerous impediments. These include exhaustive paperwork, vast international banking laws, and shell companies so the plundered funds can be hidden in off-shore bank accounts. With widespread calls for justice Hauslohner states that many believe that the military could set up “kangaroo courts” simply to appease the mob which would “not serve the cause of justice.” However, she argues: “the fact that a formerly untouchable class of wealthy and powerful politicians are now in prison remains, for post-revolutionary Egypt, one of the most surprising and shocking of developments.”
Laura Rozenwrites that the crisis in Bahrain is indicative of a reactionary swing in the Arab Spring. Drawing on comments from Professor and Obama advisor, Marc Lynch, and recent editorials by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon and former Ambassador Martin Indyk, she argues that the Washington policy establishment is torn between enthusiasm for the democratic movements and wariness over the regional balance of power against Iran. She also offers an alternative interpretation of Bahrain’s March 14th “invitation” of Saudi troops to contain the internal protests: the intervention sidelined moderates within the regime and empowered hardliners. On the other side of the coin, a University of Michigan graduate student offers research indicating that the moderate opposition in Bahrain may become discredited.
Yesterday, Yassin Saeed Noman, the leader of the Joint Meeting Parties and three other opposition leaders were slated to travel to Riyadh to meet with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). There, they were to discuss the timetable of a draft agreement from earlier this month which calls for President Ali Abdullah Saleh to transfer presidential powers to his deputy and leave office. It also gives him and his family immunity from prosecution. Senior Yemeni officials reported that the United States, European Union and GCC are pushing for Saleh to “hand over his powers immediately and formally leave office within the next three months.”
At an event earlier this month, the National Democratic Institute’s Les Cambellremarked that there was a rift between the traditional opposition and the youth protesters over the extent of their demands, including bringing Saleh to trial. Ali al-Jaradi, a spokesperson of the al-Tagheer Square protesters, criticized Saudi Arabia’s mediating role, citing the kingdom’s part in installing President Saleh in power in 1978.
On Friday, the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID) held their 12th Annual Conference under the theme “Tunisia’s and Egypt’s Revolutions and Transitions to Democracy.” CSID President Radwan Masmoudi opened the conference by giving special attention to discerning real and fake stability and development in Egypt and Tunisia.
The first panel, chaired by George Washington University Visiting Scholar and Program Committee Chair for the event, Radwan Ziadeh, was entitled “The Jasmine Revolution’ and Transition to Democracy in Tunisia: Why and How?” Jaloul Ayed, the Tunisian Minister of Finance, opened the panel following a brief introduction by Tunisian Ambassador Mohamed Saleh Tekaya.
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In two similar pieces, Marc Lynch and Joseph S. Nye, lament budget cuts to U.S. State and Foreign Operations, defending the efficacy of soft power. Nye defends the relevant instruments of soft power, the term he coined: “public diplomacy, broadcasting, exchange programs, development assistance, disaster relief, military-to-military contacts.” He argues for an overarching governmental structure to coordinate these similarly minded efforts. Lynch focuses on public diplomacy particularly. Lynch vindicates the Obama administration’s use of it in the Middle East and applauds the administration’s early focus on youth, entrepreneurs and technology. This, he argues, gave it important out-of-the-mainstream contacts in the region during the protests. However, he faults the lack of a macro public diplomacy policy for the administration’s failure to better convey its “finely calibrated” positions on Libya and Egypt.
Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Salehrejected a mediation offer by Qatar and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) calling it a “blatant interference in Yemeni affairs.” Yemeni Foreign Minister, Abu Bakr al-Kurbi in a statement on Friday said that the government was in fact studying a proposal by Gulf Arab states to help end the unrest in the country. Tens of thousands of people gathered in Sana’a to continue their call for Saleh to step down and at least two have been killed so far in demonstrations in the flashpoint city of Taiz.
Bahrain’s main Shi’ite opposition party al-Wefaq has stated that security forces have recently stepped up their campaign to arrest activists and Shi’ites in the country. The party puts the number already arrested at 302 people and expects that number to reach 400 soon if the rate of arrests continue. An influential Bahraini internet activists has reportedly been arrested. Mahmood al-Yousif runs several websites including Just Bahraini, an anti-sectarian website that advocates for Sunni/Shi’ite cooperation, and Mahmood’s Den, which is an information portal for other bloggers. He reportedly tweeted on March 29th that he had been arrested and the arrest has been confirmed by his son and brother.
David Ignatius, writing in The Washington Post, argues that President Bashar Al Assad is, ”attempting a new survival tactic in this Arab Spring — organizing what looks like a coup against his own government.” With his dismissal of the government and his support for massive protests, Ignatius believed that Assad was gearing up for a major statement on reform today. Although this major statement did not come in explicit terms, Assad’s claims to reforms will be ineffective according to Ignatius if Assad fails to reign in both the economic and military power of members of his family. Ignatius concludes: “Some pro-reform members of the Assad government have referred to the dead protesters as ‘martyrs,’ a sign of their eagerness to connect Assad with the wave of change that is sweeping the Arab world.”
Writing at The New York Times, David W. Lesch,questions whether Assad will go the way of his father and allow the security apparatus to suppress dissent with continued brutal force or will he, “see this as an opportunity to take Syria in a new direction, fulfilling the promise ascribed to him when he assumed the presidency.” Lesch believes that Assad’s speech “totally denies the genuine socio-economic, political and personal frustration of ordinary Syrians that generated the protests to begin with.” He concludes that it would take an enormous amount of bargaining “to get anything done” in Syria in terms of reform, but that he failed to “build up a critical mass of public support for reform” and now future statements could simply be, “too little, too late.”
On Wednesday, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted Moroccan Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri, who delivered King Mohammed VI‘s message of reform. Minister Fihri’s appearance marked the first Washington visit by an Arab foreign minister since the fall of Mubarak. Minister Fihri discussed reforms and the challenges facing the wider Arab world today. Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.
On Thursday, March 24th, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Michael Posner will deliver the keynote address, “The Four Freedoms Turn 70: Ensuring Economic, Political, and National Security in the 21st Century” at the American Society of International Law’s 105th Annual Meeting. Assistant Secretary Posner has recently returned from a week in Egypt and will discuss how the slogans from Tahrir Square echo President Franklin Delano Roosevelt‘s “Four Freedoms” and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Posner will also speak about the Obama Administration’s approach to human rights and the relationship between national security and economic, social, and political rights.
Issandr El Amrani, writing at Time, asserts that the passing of the referendum by 77.2% of those that voted is “a vote for stability, a return to normalcy after the biggest political upheaval in decades.” For those who voted no he states: ” They saw it as a victory for counterrevolutionary forces, a plot by the military to ram through a rapid transition plan that will not give new political forces time to get their footing.” He argues that there is reason not to give the military the “benefit of the doubt” due to the violent ending of the occupation in Tahrir as well as reports of torturing protesters, but that they seem committed to a transfer to civilian government. El Amrani concludes: “Even if one did not like the outcome or the rushed manner in which the referendum was held, there was a national recognition that a rare moment of genuine political participation had taken place.”
Steven Cook, argues that following the referendum: “You can certainly expect to see a flowering of politics in Egypt, and the emergence of all kinds of different groups.” Voice Of America’s Cairo Bureau Chief, Elizabeth Arrott, states that the results pave the way for the proposed timetable of parliamentary and presidential elections within 6 months which is exactly what many in the opposition feared. She asserts that fears of the Muslim Brotherhood and National Democratic Party gaining the upper hand in a rushed election schedule “seem to have been borne out to some extent by the results we saw on Sunday.” Richard Howitt reiterated this claim warning, “that the new parliament could be dominated by militant Islamism or remnants of the former dictatorship” and called for the EU to pledge greater support to promote democracy in Egypt. Pope Shenouda III, head of Egypt’s Coptic Christian Church, has also suggested the modification of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution, which declares Islamic law as the main source of civil legislation in Egypt which was not addressed in the referendum and will be sure to spark debate in the future.
Writing in Foreign Policy, Marc Lynch argues that there is “both more and less to this Arab support [for the no-fly zone] than meets the eye.” He states that there is deep concern among Arab leaders and populace over the situation in Libya, “when it comes to military intervention, however, this deep identification with the Libyan protesters intersects uncomfortably with the enduring legacy of Iraq.” He states that the invasion and occupation of Iraq is “a gaping wound in the Arab political consciousness which has barely scabbed over” making an Arab audience suspicious of America’s military involvement. Lynch argues that “any direct American military presence in Libya would be politically catastrophic” and cautions that a no-fly zone “isn’t a costless, easy alternative to war… it is more likely the preface to deeper military involvement.”
On Wednesday, the Middle East Institute hosted an event focused on the public opinions of Egyptians in the wake of Mubarak’s fall from power, entitled, “After Mubarak: What do the Egyptian People Really Want?”The Middle East Institute hosted two speakers; Steven Kull, Middle East public opinion expert and director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland, along with, Shibley Telhami, the Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland and Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Saban Center of the Brookings Institution.
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Marc Lynch, writing at Foreign Policy, states: “It’s hard to exaggerate how bad Hosni Mubarak‘s speech today was for Egypt.” With the rumors of Mubarak stepping down from power attracting the attention of the world, Lynch argues that Mubarak instead gave a “vague” and “meandering” speech, eluded to constitutional change and slipped in his delegation of power to Omar Suleiman. Lynch believes that Suleiman’s speech that followed made things even worse due to his inflammatory comments against the foreign media and advising Egyptians to go home. This, Lynch argues has tied Suleiman’s fate to that of Mubarak. Lynch outlines the apparent disarray within the Mubarak regime with the military, government officials and Egyptians questioning what is going on with Mubarak, who is seemingly “out of touch.” With the many references to foreign interference in both speeches, Lynch asserts that this is in direct opposition to Obama and serves as potential proof of how hard the administration has been pushing for Mubarak to step down.
On Monday, a Facebook group entitled “I Authorize Wael Ghonim to Speak On Behalf of the Egyptian Revolution” was formed. The group has accumulated over 144,000 supporters since formation, 19 hours ago, and is growing by the minute.
Thousands of protesters took to the streets of Cairo, Tuesday, showing that protests would indeed continue. Tuesday’s protests mark the 15th day of protests in Tahrir Square and show a renewed spirit that many have reported is due to the impassioned interview of Google executive and youth activist, Wael Ghonim. Al Jazeera reports that this new wave of optimism has been felt throughout the country and amidst the protesters, many who have joined the protests in Tahrir for the first time.
Nona El-Hennawy, writing for AlMasry AlYoum, says that vocal disapproval of continued anti-government protests is rising out of concern for security and economic stability. She traces the split in opinion on continued protests to Hosni Mubarak’s speech on Tuesday that he would not seek another term in office. Nona al-Sawy, a 39 year old resident of the upper middle class Mohandessin neighborhood in Cairo said: “I went to the demonstration because I wanted stability. Enough with protests; the country is collapsing [...] What they [anti-Mubarak protesters] asked for has already been achieved.” That al-Sawy comes from an upper middle class neighborhood may not be a coincidence. El-Hennawy quotes Ashraf al-Sherif, a political scientist at The American University in Cairo, who argues that the Mubarak regime initiated a “counterrevolution” amongst the higher classes of Egyptian society whose interests depend heavily on the stability of the Mubarak regime.
