Seven lessons in managing an uprising

The management of the demonstrations by the Mubarak regime was a textbook example of how not to behave in a crisis, says Mohamed Anis Salem*

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Looking back at the events over the 18 days of protests in Tahrir Square in Cairo, the actions by the demonstrators and the responses from the government have yielded a choreography that is rich in lessons for crisis managers.

A crisis involves four elements: a major threat to the status quo; an element of surprise; and a short decision time. According to one expert, a "crisis is a process of transformation where the old system can no longer be maintained." Therefore, the fourth defining quality of a crisis is the need for change.

Time after time in the present crisis, the Egyptian regime misread the objectives of the young people on the streets, and then it responded with late and piecemeal concessions and often with the wrong actions and instruments. "They are responding to Twitter with the mentality of the silent movies," one friend said.

On the eve of the protests, the government held a winning hand. It had a legendary intelligence-gathering capacity coupled with a huge police machinery almost 1.5 million strong. The ruling party apparatus, with over 2.5 million members, seemed well ahead of its competitors in terms of resources, organisational capacity and outreach, and all of this was supported by a formidable communications network of multiple TV and radio stations and newspapers.

A spoils system awarded loyalists prime plots of land, property, jobs, contracts and licences. Yet, all of this turned out to be a house of cards that collapsed in a few days when challenged by a movement generated by young bloggers and Facebook activists. What are the lessons that can be drawn from the mismanagement of the uprising?

Lesson one is to read the writing on the wall. Much of the work of crisis management starts long before that midnight wake-up call. Usually, there will be an exercise of "contingency planning", listing possible future scenarios, assigning roles to different people on a crisis- management team and defining the strategies and activities that should be implemented for each situation.

It would be difficult to believe that there was no such plan in place for the Egyptian government. However, there is also another requirement called "signal detection", being the stage in a crisis at which leaders should, but do not always, sense early warning signals (red flags) that suggest the possibility of a more serious situation developing. So what went wrong?

Strategically and tactically, the government misread the signals. For many years, there was official self-delusion concerning the level of satisfaction in the country and developments in the region, as well as immediate facts on the ground.

True, Egypt had seen economic growth of seven per cent a year, and even when that slackened the economy was able to weather the worst effects of the global economic crisis. There were also reassuring government opinion polls, with the prime minister referring to the increased number of owners of cars and air conditioners.

However, there was also the unequal distribution of wealth, the continued misery of the poor (some 25 per cent of the population earning under $1 a day and 40 per cent under $2 a day), and perhaps even more importantly there was the manner in which money was flaunted: page after page of newspaper advertisements for multi-million dollar luxury houses and sea-side chalets; golf courses sitting next to slums; and story after story showing the marriage of wealth and political power.

In early 2011, as the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia made the headlines, the government media went into denial, finding one thousand and one reasons to explain why Tunisia's experience was irrelevant to the Egyptian situation.

Tactically, the Tahrir demonstrations were also initially underestimated by the government media, which sneered at the very idea of protests on Police Day on 25 January. The following morning, the main government newspaper focussed on protests in Beirut. When the police used force to disband the young people on the streets, there was an underestimation of the reaction this would cause, making these young people yet more insistent on staying the course and indeed raising their demands.

Lesson two of the recent crisis is to listen well. Once the genie is out of the bottle, it is vital to look the facts in the eye and hear the demands of the other side without presumptions. This facilitates "perspective-taking", in other words the ability to consider another person's or group's point of view, which, in turn, will help better design responses.

The turn-out for the demonstrations, their intensity and the county-wide response were a surprise to all, including the young organisers themselves. Yet, rather than engaging the protesters in a participatory process, there was a complete absence of political action to address the situation on the part of the regime. And the rigidity of the regime, some would say its arrogance, did not stop there.

When the president spoke on the night of 28-29 January, he did not connect with what had become a critical set of popular demands, including leadership change, lifting the emergency law, genuine democracy, constitutional reform and ending corruption and cronyism. As one after another of the new government appointments were announced, the reaction on the street was, predictably, a mix of dissatisfaction and disappointment. Signs in Tahrir asked: "What language do you understand?" Taken together with the government's inability to read the situation, this increased the estrangement between both sides.

Lesson three is that time is of the essence. Perhaps the most critical element in crisis management is to respond rapidly to developments. In theory, this should not be difficult, provided the homework has been done, the crisis team is in place and the resources are available. In reality, there is a great deal of "noise" that can interfere, including sudden events, differences of opinion and outside intervention.

Yet, these things should never be allowed to lead to a loss of momentum that can frustrate those pressing for change and, indeed, the crisis-management team itself. Worse, wasting precious time may mean that responses become irrelevant and in need of continuous updating.

During the Egyptian crisis, official responses suffered from repetitive time delays. It seemed that the regime was taking forever to internalise the facts on the ground and recognise the seriousness of the demands it faced. Even more time was taken in formulating an official position, which came first in the president's speech in the early hours of Saturday, some 80 hours after the first demonstrations materialised.

Most analysts agree that an alternative scenario would have yielded very different results. Had the government taken action in the first 24-48 hours of the crisis with a comprehensive and genuine set of reforms, it would have been able to regain the initiative.

Lesson four of the crisis is to recognise and engage the other side. Ignoring adversaries is dangerous. There is a need to avoid the misinterpretation of their views, which may be distorted in transition. Also, not bringing the other side into the room may mean that it stays out on the streets, expressing escalating ire at being overlooked.

Once the protesters had occupied Cairo's main square, it was important to recognise them as political actors and engage them in a negotiation process, either directly or indirectly through mediators. What happened in the government decision-making machinery over the next three days remains unclear, but it was manifested in a sense of disappointment by the protesters.

At best, the government media treated them as insignificant; at worse, they were labelled as traitors driven by a foreign agenda. This may have reflected the Arab culture of dealing with differences by khisam : choosing not to talk to adversaries, instead of applying a modern conflict-management and negotiation tool-kit.

Lesson five regards the need for comprehensive action. Having internalised the challenges being faced, there is a need to regain the initiative through a dramatic and comprehensive package of actions. Skill in presenting such a set of responses should create a movement towards resolving the crisis, leading to a different phase of constructive work that can redefine the roles of the different sides involved.

The piecemeal manner in which the president made concessions, dividing them between his two speeches, statements by the new vice-president and subsequent daily doses of changes confirmed the fact that the regime had failed to understand the demands it faced. He failed to take the initiative by presenting the challenge to the regime as an opportunity for rebirth and accelerated reform.

Lesson six is all about communication. One expert advises that "one thing to remember that is crucial in a crisis is to tell it all, tell it fast and tell the truth. If you do this, you will have done all you can to minimise the situation. If you ignore the situation, it will only get worse."

Throughout the recent events, the government failed miserably to manage its media assets. TV stations belonging to the Egyptian Radio and TV Authority insisted on ignoring the 25 January demonstration and then, as the whole world watched, tried to tarnish it with conspiracy stories.

International and Arab TV stations were accused of exaggerating the size of the demonstrations and harbouring a plot against Egypt's stability. Only pro-government callers were allowed on the air. Journalists covering the events were harassed and attacked by thugs. No official communications strategy was put in place: no clear messages were given; there were no spokespersons; and there were no clear responses to the multitude of accusations and rumours.

Heavy handed, old-fashioned measures were not in short supply, including suspending mobile-phone services, blocking Internet access and reacting nervously to Arab TV stations by closing their offices and taking them off national satellite services (in the case of Al-Jazeera) or threatening them (Al-Arabiya). Suddenly, we seemed to be in North Korea. Naturally, there were calls for dismissing the minister of information and abolishing his function.

Lesson seven is to avoid counterproductive actions. The last thing a crisis manager would want to do when facing a crisis is to waste valuable resources (time, energy and credibility) by taking the wrong actions. There is a need to develop a strict critical path to prioritise and guide actions that address the demands facing decision makers.

During the Egyptian crisis, there were many irrelevant and counterproductive measures taken by the regime, including using disproportional and systematic violence against the demonstrators and, later, against the media, stopping Internet and mobile-phone services and using F- 16 planes to fly over the demonstrators.

Any positive effect that the president's second speech might have had was short-lived. As large groups of organised thugs attacked the protesters in Tahrir Square on live television, the world watched in horror as men on horseback and camels ran at the crowds, while others attacked them with an assortment of weapons. In the ABC of Egyptian politics, none of this could have happened without official condoning.

Soon thereafter, the newly appointed prime minister apologised for the attack and promised an investigation. Apart from the tragic transgressions, the overall impression was one of disintegration, internal contradiction and the collapse of the regime's machinery that had looked invincible only a few days before.

Mubarak's third speech, for the first time after 17 days of demonstrations, sympathised with families that had lost their daughters and sons in the uprising and recognised the contribution of the young protesters to building democracy. However, he did not resign, despite a flurry of government statements raising that expectation.

This speech and other mistakes may have been simply managerial errors that the regime hoped to improve upon in later stages of the crisis. But they probably also reflected the deeper problems of stubbornness and the arrogance of power that were endemic to the system.

* The writer is director of Development Works in Cairo.