Issue #1, Summer 2006

A City on a Hill

Neoconservatism has failed. Realism compromises our identity. Why exemplarism is the right choice for a post-Bush foreign policy.


On September 30, 2004, President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry met in Coral Gables, Florida, for the first debate of the presidential campaign. For months, the two had sparred about how to position America in a post–September 11 world, with Bush defending a preemptive, unilateralist policy and Kerry arguing for a greater reliance on the international community. Moderator Jim Lehrer asked Kerry and Bush whether the United States had the right to launch preemptive wars. Without hesitation, Kerry answered yes–with a qualifier. “But if and when you do it,” he said, “You’ve got to do it in a way that passes the test, passes the global test where your countrymen, your people, understand fully why you’re doing what you’re doing and you can prove to the world that you did it for legitimate reasons.” After a moment, during which he seemed almost to be cocking his fist for a roundhouse punch, Bush answered, “My attitude is you take preemptive action in order to protect the American people, that you act in order to make this country secure … My opponent is for joining the International Criminal Court. I just think trying to be popular, kind of, in the global sense, if it’s not in our best interest, makes no sense.”

Two days later, Bush deemed Kerry’s statement the “Kerry Doctrine.” Speaking before a convention of home builders, he declared, “[Kerry] said that America has to pass a global test before we can use American troops to defend ourselves… . Senator Kerry’s approach to foreign policy would give foreign governments veto power over our national security decisions.” A president, he added, should not “take an international poll … our national security decisions will be made in the Oval Office, not in foreign capitals.” In the weeks that followed, Kerry could not undo the damage. By Election Day, 86 percent of voters who cited “terrorism” as their top concern voted for Bush–a clear sign that Americans did not trust Kerry to keep them safe.

Kerry won the Democratic Party’s nomination as the candidate of national security strength. However, over the course of the general election campaign, he came to embody the broader failure of progressives to articulate a compelling foreign policy for a post–September 11 world. As Kerry’s loss demonstrated, progressives have not convinced the American people that they will do what it takes to defend the nation, that they have a clear direction for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy in a world of terrorist threats, and that they have core affirmative beliefs, rather than simply critiques of the errors of the Bush Administration.

But, despite their current disarray, progressives in fact have a rich history of just such a foreign policy paradigm, one that can be mined for hints of a way out of today’s morass. Indeed, they should return to these strengths and espouse a new doctrine of “exemplarism,” a marriage of American strength–both military and moral–and leadership. Exemplarism would value both strength and international prestige equally, seeing them not as mutually exclusive but rather as mutually reinforcing. America’s economic, political, and military strength, when deployed wisely, enhances our prestige around the world; that prestige, in turn, allows us to expand our influence and power by engendering the willing followership of other countries.

Exemplarism steers clear of the ideological blind spots that have plagued other dominant foreign-policy paradigms. In recent years, liberals have underestimated the importance of U.S. primacy, realists have ignored the power of moral idealism, and neoconservatives have scoffed at the necessity of prestige. Exemplarism would chart a course through these shoals, placing the United States in a community, but as its leader. It is a foreign policy for a time when meeting so many of the threats the United States faces requires not only international cooperation, but the cooperation of individuals around the world. And we’ve seen this approach work before–elements of exemplarism can be found in Franklin Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms, Harry S Truman’s Marshall Plan, John F. Kennedy’s Peace Corps, and Bill Clinton’s Kosovo intervention. The idea of exemplarism is uniquely American–and recognizes America’s singular status–while providing a vision of how a superpower can lead a multipolar world of interdependent nations.

American Exceptionalism Exemplarism is a militarily strong and morally ambitious version of American exceptionalism, or the notion that the United States is unique among the world’s nations. There is nothing new about American exceptionalism. It is, in fact, older than the country itself, an idea that draws on deep reservoirs of moral idealism and civic responsibility. America’s exceptionalism is also rooted in hard facts. As the international relations scholar Stanley Hoffman notes, the United States is geographically privileged, has the most successful representative democracy in the world, and has long held a distaste for the rule of force that was common to European colonialism, replacing it with an embrace of the rule of law. Such exceptionalism, as the human rights expert Michael Ignatieff explains, has manifested itself in four distinct ways: the realist, based on America’s unique power relative to other nations; the cultural, stemming from “an American sense of Providential destiny”; the institutional, rooted in America’s “specific institutional organization”; and the political, related to the distinctive conservative and individual character of America’s political culture.

Throughout American history, these different strains have emerged in various statements on America’s moral mission, from John Winthrop’s 1630 “City Upon a Hill” speech to Woodrow Wilson’s mission of spreading democracy. Exceptionalism is deeply and uniquely American, stemming from our essential national character–our generosity, our hopefulness, our ambition, and our sense of possibility.

Today, however, we see a messianic strain of exceptionalism powerfully realized in the presidency of George W. Bush. His constant, post–September 11 injunction that the United States should democratize the world at gunpoint posits an America not only above, but apart from, the world. His exceptionalism frames the United States as an exception to the world, rather than as an exceptional–meaning excellent–nation within it.

Issue #1, Summer 2006
 
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Joseph Libson:


Sigh.



Mr. Signer is doing so well for a few paragraphs. And then he just has to dive into Bush bashing (albeit somewhat mild compared with the common strains of BDS).



"Our belligerently unilateral approach to Saddam Hussein’s regime prompted China, Russia, and Germany actively to oppose our effort to invade Iraq during 2003; as a result, the United States was forced to shoulder a greater burden of troop deployments in the country, putting our soldiers (many of them members of the National Guard or Reserves) on two and even three rotations. "



Be honest. Was there ANY scenario where Russia, China or France/Germany (not sure why you left out France) was EVER EVER EVER going to support military action in Iraq? No. Of course not. We have documented evidence that France and Russia had compelling reasons (and had given assurances that they would) to block any UN (ptui) Security Council action.



I think that Exemplarism might be a perfectly plausible model of foreign policy. And it is refreshing to hear a progressive talk about American greatness. But you would be better off spending less time resorting to bashing a President who is *exacuting* a foreign policy in the real world (always messy, sometimes tragic, but possibly fringed with hope) when the progressive side has not even been able to formulate a vaguely plausible foreign policy in the perfectly controlled medium of ink and paper.



Come on.



Do better.



Thanks,



Joe

Jul 2, 2006, 1:06 AM
Charley Conrad:

What a concept: Exemplarism. Thanks Michael for an insightful and thought provoking article. It harkens back to the days when the United States did stand for all that is good in the country and in the world. We can get it back, but it will take so much hard work to repair (fix) what has happened since 2000. We have been tarnished by the lack of critical diplomatic engagement in the world community. At the very beginning in 2001 Bush's "hands off" policy in the middle east sent a very bad message to the middle east and the rest of the world. Look what we have now. Foreign policy by reaction. I look forward to the day when "exemplarism" is a policy ideal and not just an idea. Keep it up Michael.

Jul 7, 2006, 1:14 PM
Dan Kervick:

In his essay, Michael Signer introduces the term "exemplarism" and claims that the term refers to some sort of foreign policy doctrine. However, one struggles in vain to find anywhere in the essay a clear statement of what exemplarism is. If it's a doctrine, it might help if Signer had been willing to state the doctrine, and define it.



What Signer does instead is discuss some of the main components of state power, and reflect vaguely and abstractly on the importance and desirability of that power in the pursuit of national goals.



He thinks many neoconservatives have greatly underestimated the importance of soft power factors like prestige and admiration.



He thinks many progressives have underestimated the value of force, have refused to accept the reality of US primacy and leadership, and have inappropriately rejected the goal of perpetuating that primacy.



He thinks many realists have underestimated the the importance of moral ideals as a factor in state power. Some of them have failed to recognize that the enlightened pursuit of a nation's self-interest sometimes calls for the moral improvement of parts of the world that lie outside the state's boundary, since these improvements redound to the benefit of the improver.



And he thinks exemplarism -whatever it is - gets the balance jusssst right.



But clearly, since Signer's discussion only makes a general and abstract point about the need for a proper balance among various power factors, factors which all parties agree are factors in the exercise of power, there is no unique doctrine in evidence here. We simply have a classical didactic reminder of various prudential truisms. They are of this form: "Be feared, but don't neglect being liked; be liked, but don't forget the importance of being feared; lead, but also cooperate; cooperate, but don't be afraid to lead; to thine own self be true, but don't neglect ideals; pursue ideals, but don't neglect self-interest." Etc. Etc.



It appears, then, that one could become an "exemplarist" and it wouldn't help one bit in reaching a resolution on crucial foreign policy debates. The neoconservative can agree that prestige, popularity and admiration can be useful. The liberal can agree that sometimes it is necessary to act unilaterally and without regard to what others think of your actions. OK, so suppose two of these antagonists have secured this agreement. Does it help in the debate about Iraq, circa 2002/2003, and about whether to get another resolution or go forward alone? Not at all - because it says nothing about how much regard for the world's opinion, in those precise circumstances, would be too much, too little or just right.



A more important failure, however, is that the essay is all about means, and extremely vague characterizations thereof, and has nothing substantive to say about ends. Signer says nothing about what all this power is for. What ought to be the long-term aims of US foreign policy? What is the ideal sort of political and economic community? What kind of America does he want to build? What kind of world does he want to build? What does US self-interest, in the long term, actually consist in? If people follow the "exemplarist doctrine", whatever it is, what would the US (and the rest of the world) look like 50 years from now, 100 years from now, 150 years from now, 200 years from now?



This is where the rubber meets the road. For all the nice talk about means, and the need for US leadership, the fact is that Americans differ greatly with respect to their sought ends, with respect to their political and economic ideals, and with respect to the kinds of societies they would most want to live in. These differences lie at the very bottom of differences over US foreign policy. If one refuses to discuss these differences, one will never get anywhere. Telling us that neoconservatives, for example, have erred in underestimating the soft power importance of admiration and prestige helps not at all if one avoids the topic of what we want to do with those additional components of power.



"Consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people are upon us," is a charming poetic conceit. But it also a bland and non-committal counsel of virtue, and hardly the basis for a substantive foreign policy doctrine.

Jul 7, 2006, 7:59 PM
Ulrich Speck:

Some thoughts from a foreign - German - obsever.



Michael Signers attempt to reinvent a foreign policy for Democrats goes to the right point: what should be done with the amazing power that the U.S. has - rather unvoluntarily - assembled in 20th century?



Democrats are much more uncomfortable with America's role as a world ordering power than Republicans. To cite the former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer: They are not convinced. Not convinced that American power can be used, or is used, for good.



Republicans, by contrast, think that America is great. They are just debating what exactly is so great about America.



Now the Republicans are re-adjusting foreign policy. The Neocons had brought some idealism in, which they had inherited from the Democrats. As things in Iraq turn out to be harder than expected, neoconservativism has lost it's momentum. Nobody wants to be necon anymore - it became a four-letter-word. Fukuyama had to hurry to disengage.



The new mood is "realism". Thats what Condi stands for - she is willing to make deals. Look at the latest deal with Russia about the nuclear issue. Realpolitik at it's best.



That might be a good moment for the Democrats to step in. They could brand something like "democratic realism". The main point of it would be to overcome the false dichotomy between so-called realism and so-called idealism.



My problem with "exemplarism" is that it appears to be more concerned with "public diplomacy" than with the substance of foreign policy. More with the reactions of others than with the decisions.



America has to make good choices and than try to build support for them. A good leader shows leadership. He thinks that the main point are the choices he makes. Selling them only comes after.



The conflicts America has with other countries are only in part due to bad communication. The are mainly the result of political conflicts. Conflicts that are a consequence of Americas role in the world. A new foreign policy for Democrats must first of all come clear with the substance of this role.



My feeling is that Michael Signer somewhat overestimates the signification of world opinion. When public opinion in Arab countries is hostile towards the U.S., that does not mean that American foreign policy did something wrong. It can also be that the establishment in those countries feels threatened by democratization and tries to undercut the influence of those who support democracy. "America" has many meanings. And as everybody is Americas neighbour today, people have strong feelings.



The assumption with "exemplarism" is that when America is behaving well others will follow. That somehow underestimates the interests of others. They don't follow when America is doing the right thing. They follow when they think that it's in their interest to follow.



I think what Democrats should to is to re-invent realism. That means to get an understanding of reality. Realism in the interconnected world of 21th century is something completly different than realism in the 19th century (when this concept was invented). Re-inventing realism means, secondly, to redefine concepts like security, stability and prosperity.



I think you can do this without falling back into the world of 19th century power struggle (where some of the journal "National interest" want to go), and without going towards a naive idealism that is not grounded in solid self-interest.



"Exemplarism" might be a good start for that, but no more than a start.

Jul 10, 2006, 9:42 AM
Timothy Smith:

The devil in the details, as many responders here note. Yet, I think Signer is on to something that is being missed here. The process of decision making driven by 'exemplarism' is what is at stake. That process, in Signer's scenario, should be more effective, if less 'efficient', leading us to make decisions that do provide a better balance between love and fear, hard and soft power, security and freedom than do the alternative approaches of liberalism, realism, or neo-conservatism, all of which have clearly failed.



It is a matter of vision that we can and should be exemplary leaders in the world community by embracing and promoting the very checks and balances that have made our democracy as strong (and as weak, when they are lost) as it is.



We find ourselves now in a diminished postion in all senses. Our military, economic and political power is waning rather than waxing precisely because we have chosen fear over a more balanced approach to internal governing and foreign policy.



Being fearless means you are willing to do the hard 'working together' that we say we value in sports, business and in relationship in general. Why would we choose an approach that fails to honor the very things we say we stand for?



Examplarism seems to get us closer to that approach. I thank Mr. Sanger for an enlightening and inspiring peice.

Aug 24, 2006, 12:13 PM
Robert Gonzales:

Ithink what your fail to appreciate is that the U.S and the free world face real and dangerous enimies abroad and at home. some times if not often real srtengnth is all that will stop bilgerent nation or crazy leader or terrorist . So critsise me for not putting my trust into very intellectual reasons for peace at any cost. Like Kennedy said 'Peace at the exspense of freedom' R.G.

Mar 11, 2011, 3:39 PM

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