Turkey on The Huffington Posttag:huffingtonpost.com,2011:/tag/turkeyThe Huffington Post Recep Erdogan, Turkish Prime Minister: Israel Must Remove Avigdor Lieberman, Foreign Ministerhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/13/recep-erdogan-turkish-pri_n_808425.htmlThe Huffington Post News Teamhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-news/
CAIRO — The prime minister of Turkey, whose ties with Israel have been badly strained over the past year, has called on the Jewish state to remove its hawkish foreign minister who he says poses an obstacle to Middle East peace.<br />
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Avigdor Lieberman is a polarizing figure in Israel and outside, with his outspoken skepticism about peace with the Palestinians and his questioning of the loyalty of Israel's Arab minority.
<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/recep-erdogan-avigdor-lieberman">Recep Erdogan Avigdor Lieberman</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey-israel">Turkey Israel</a>, <a href="/tag/israel-flotilla">Israel Flotilla</a>, <a href="/tag/avigdor-lieberman">Avigdor Lieberman</a>, <a href="/tag/israel">Israel</a>, <a href="/tag/israel-middle-east-relations">Israel Middle East Relations</a>, <a href="/tag/avigdorliebermanturkey">Avigdor-Lieberman-Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/recep-erdogan">Recep Erdogan</a>, <a href="/world">World News</a></p>
Melissa Biggs Bradley: Four Hot Spots to Visit in 2011http://www.huffingtonpost.com/melissa-biggs-bradley/hot-spots-for-2011_b_807924.htmlMelissa Biggs Bradleyhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/melissa-biggs-bradley/
Given how much I travel, some people might think that I would tire of getting back on a plane. But even as I explore destinations -- in 2010, I traveled for the first time to Chile, Colombia, Croatia and Montenegro -- and return to favorites like Turkey and Morocco, I find that my must-visit list of new spots and old favorites keeps growing.<br />
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Here are some places I hope to see in 2011.<br />
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<strong>For a Style Fix: Beirut</strong><br />
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Yes, the State Department recently issued a strong warning against Americans traveling to Beirut, Lebanon, but I am still dying to go. In fact, when I recently asked a friend who had just returned how she felt, she said, "I felt stupid, ugly, provincial and poor, but I never felt unsafe. Everyone is so worldly, glamorous and rich that I simply felt inadequate." Another friend, who is Lebanese, swears that Dubai is done and Beirut is the real heartbeat of the Middle East at the moment. I'd like to see for myself.<br />
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<strong>For Global Perspective: Beijing</strong><br />
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When I visited Beijing, more than a decade ago, bicycles dominated the streets and wise travelers avoided eating meat if they didn't want to try mutt for dinner. Since then, the city has changed at warp speed and now has an estimated 150,000 millionaires in residence. I just came back and was amazed to see the new art, architecture and ambition against the backdrop of splendors like the Forbidden City, Summer Palace and the Great Wall. I would love to bring friends and introduce them to some of the fascinating people and places I discovered.<br />
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For Sensory Overload: India</strong><br />
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Nowhere I have visited stimulates the five senses in such a vibrant way as India. The riot of sounds, the richness of colors, the variety of smells, even the complexity of languages and religions add to such layering of life that this year I would like to return with a small group for a trip with special palace and artisan visits.<br />
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<strong>To Totally Drop Out: Fiji</strong><br />
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I would love to get to Laucala Island in Fiji, which was the Forbes family's private escape. The founder of Red Bull has bought it and upgraded everything to create the ultimate tropical fantasy island. Our members who have visited already swear it's the most stunning beach escape ever. I would like to see if it lives up to the hype and the photos.<br />
<em><br />
<a href="http://www.indagare.com/passions/8/departments/171/10595" target="_hplink">Read the rest of the list and to tell us what's on your list for 2011</a> Send us an email explaining where you want to go and why, and we will choose our favorite inspired answer and send you a Smythson passport holder and a gift membership.</em>
<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/beirut">Beirut</a>, <a href="/tag/india">India</a>, <a href="/tag/travel">Travel</a>, <a href="/tag/beijing">Beijing</a>, <a href="/tag/where-to-go-2011">Where to Go 2011</a>, <a href="/tag/fiji">Fiji</a>, <a href="/tag/montenegro">Montenegro</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/morocco">Morocco</a>, <a href="/tag/croatia">Croatia</a>, <a href="/tag/dubai">Dubai</a>, <a href="/travel">Travel News</a></p>
Alon Ben-Meir: Iran Is at the Core of the Turkish-Israeli Rifthttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/alon-benmeir/iran-is-at-the-core-of-th_b_806980.htmlAlon Ben-Meirhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/alon-benmeir/
At the core of the tensions between Turkey and Israel is their disagreement over Iran. Whereas Israel sees Iran as a major existential threat, Turkey, although purporting to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons, does not view a nuclear Iran as a direct threat to Turkey or even to the Middle East. From the Israeli perspective, Turkey's equating Iran's nuclear ambitions with Israel's latent program, its seeming embrace of Hamas, its efforts to broker agreements that serve to diffuse pressure on Tehran, and its opposition to international sanctions all demonstrate that Ankara has made a strategic shift toward Israel's avowed enemy.<br />
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The Israelis are convinced that Turkey has paid no heed to their country's national security concerns in fostering close ties with Iran and its proxies. Turkey's economic and energy ties with Iran are well-known. Many Israelis insist that had Turkey decided to play a constructive role in addressing Iran's nuclear ambitions in order to safeguard these interests, as well as regional stability and peace, it would have been viewed positively by Israel and the global community. However, its embrace of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hamas, and its characterization of Israel as the greatest threat to the Middle East, has convinced Israelis that Turkey's shift toward the East is not merely due to Turkey's economic and energy needs. To support peace and stability in the region requires rejecting the radical and violent rhetoric and actions of extremist states and groups. Israel insists that one can't be a friend of Iran and an enemy of Hamas and Hezbollah. For Israel, all three represent an existential threat.<br />
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As the Israelis see it, Turkey's reluctance to sufficiently recognize and address the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon is deeply distressing. The recent Wikileaks release of thousands of U.S. diplomatic cables paint a clear picture: the global community, and particularly the leaders of the Arab world, recognize-and are threatened by-Iran's dogged pursuit of nuclear weapons. According to leaked cables, the Saudi ambassador to Washington, Adel al-Jubeir said that Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah told the Obama administration "to cut off the head of the snake," while Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak called Iran's nuclear pursuit, "The biggest threat to non-proliferation efforts since the Cuban missile crisis." Also reflected in numerous cables is the clear skepticism of American diplomats that Turkey fully understands the terrifying ramifications of a nuclear-armed Iran, be that in the form of nuclear arms-race or the potential of nuclear regional conflagration.<br />
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The result of the perceived Turkish shift toward Iran further undermines Ankara's ability to serve as a mediator in the region. Rather than being seen as contributing to playing a useful role in curbing Iran's nuclear pursuit based on its ability to serve as a bridge between Iran and the West, Turkey is instead viewed by many Israelis as an enabler of Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions. This perception, Israeli officials argue, was made more acute with the Turkish-Brazilian deal with Iran to swap nuclear fuel last spring. The deal largely mirrored the arrangement that the P5+1 had offered Iran in the fall of 2009, in which Tehran was to send four-fifths of its low-enriched uranium, about 1,200 kilograms, to Russia to be converted to fuel rods to be used for medical purposes. But by the time the Turkish-Brazilian deal was reached, Iran had nearly doubled its enriched nuclear stockpile. Sending the same amount or even half of Iran's low-enriched uranium out of the country at that juncture would have left a sufficient amount (more than 1200 kilograms) inside Iran to enable further enrichment toward a nuclear weapon. Even worse, Iran was essentially given the option to end the arrangement at any time it wished. For Israel, the deal was nothing less than an effort by Turkey to cast a shadow over Iran's nuclear program and present Iran as a nation focused only on peaceful use of nuclear technology, rather than for nefarious purposes. Of course, the plan was subsequently rejected by the international community.<br />
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This summer, with the Turkish-Brazilian deal rejected and engagement efforts stalled, Turkey's rejection of international sanctions against Iran at the United Nations solidified concerns in Israel that Ankara has become an obstacle to peace and stability in the region, rather than a conduit. The U.N. vote was not just about economic sanctions; it was about mobilizing the international community against a nuclear Iran. Turkey's opposition, which has enraged the Israelis, was not only in defiance of the American-led international campaign, but also a blatant attempt by Ankara to paint an image of an Iran as a peace-seeking country that is not consistent with the evidence or global consensus to the contrary. The explanation given by Turkey-that they wanted to leave the door open to diplomacy-left much to be desired. As one high Israeli official put it, by ignoring the growing Iranian nuclear threat, and even serving as an impediment to international efforts to halt its nuclear pursuit, Turkey has shown that it is operating in a short-sighted manner that leaves the door open not to diplomacy, but to greater conflict in the region. Meanwhile, today, Iran continues to refuse to answer critical questions from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and refuses to allow unfettered and full inspections of its nuclear sites. It has reported that it now has 30 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium-a sufficient amount to bring Iran much closer to developing crude nuclear weapons.<br />
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Finally, Turkey's linking of Iran's nuclear pursuit to Israel's nuclear program has further discredited Turkey in the eyes of Israelis. From the Israeli perspective, the prospects for a nuclear free Mideast, as adopted by a U.N. resolution last May with support from the United States-much to Israel's dismay-creates a false equivalence between Israel, who has never threatened any country and Iran who has repeatedly threaten Israel existentially. As the concerns illuminated by Wikileaks demonstrate, it is Iran and not Israel that poses a threat to global and regional peace and stability. Turkey's championing the notion of a nuclear free Middle East therefore further undercuts its once long-held relationship with Israelis. As the Israelis see it, whereas Turkey could have continued to serve as a mediator between Israel and Syria and to use its influence to moderate Hamas' behavior, Turkey has discredited itself in the eyes of the Israelis and given up its potential to again become an intermediary between the two sides.<br />
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Despite these developments, Turkey still has an opportunity to play a constructive role in joining the international community's effort to halt Iran's nuclear weapons program. The global concerns made public by Wikileaks documents makes Iran's weapons pursuit impossible to ignore. This fact, coupled with renewed efforts by the P5+1 to engage Iran as they have in November and plan to again in Istanbul on January 21-22nd, offer Turkey a chance to revise its posture. In this sense, these developments could serve as face-saving opportunities for Turkey. As the P5+1 revisits the notion of a nuclear fuel swap that would fill the gaps and provide the assurances that the Turkish-Brazilian deal is not completely ignored, Turkey should stand in support of these efforts. As one of the few countries that speaks directly with Iran, and has established trust with its leadership, Turkey can play an essential role in communicating incentives and potential consequences to Tehran. In so doing, Turkey would also indirectly ease its tensions with Israel. Supporting international efforts to halt Iran's nuclear program, while disabusing itself of the notion of a nuclear free Middle East in which Iran and Israel are to be equated, would be a significant step toward re-establishing trust with Israel. Ankara, top Israeli officials insisted, must accept the fact that Israel will not under any circumstances discuss its nuclear posture before a comprehensive regional peace is established that will include Iran. Furthermore, some Arab diplomats suggested that while Turkey might be under the impression that it has been gaining influence and esteem on the Arab Street, its embrace of Tehran is diminishing its credibility in Arab capitals. If Turkey wants to exhibit regional leadership, it must demonstrate that it stands completely opposed to an Iran with nuclear weapons.<br />
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Even more than the heated rhetoric that has been exchanged between Israel and Turkey, or the fatal flotilla incident, Turkey's posture regarding Iran has left no doubt among Israelis that Turkey can no longer be trusted. That is why Turkey needs to publicly recognize the importance of reaching an agreement acceptable to all parties concerned about Iran's nuclear program, while actively joining and assisting international efforts to that end.<br />
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Such a change of posture would have meaningful benefits for both Israeli-Turkish relations, and help in reducing the prospect of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, which Turkey wants to thwart just as much as Israel does. Doing so would also demonstrate that Turkey's regional leadership will neither be short-sighted nor short-lived. <br />
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<em>A version of this article was previously published in Jerusalem Post on 12/10/2010, and can be accessed at http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Features/Article.aspx?id=198677</em>
<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/iran">Iran</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/israel">Israel</a>, <a href="/tag/iran-nuclear-weapons">Iran Nuclear Weapons</a>, <a href="/tag/binyamin-netanyahu">Binyamin Netanyahu</a>, <a href="/world">World News</a></p>
Sharmine Narwani: The New Middle East Narrative -- Is Washington in or Out?http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sharmine-narwani/the-new-middle-east-narra_b_788703.htmlSharmine Narwanihttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/sharmine-narwani/
Picking up a copy of the English-language <em>Daily Star</em> in Beirut this summer, I was struck by the lead story. A photo of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, flanked by his Arab counterparts, accompanied this huge headline: "Arab Nations Applaud Turkey's Erdogan for Tough Stand on Israel."<br />
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What a truly pitiful sight it was. <br />
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What is it about the psyche of Arab leaders and nationals that prevents them from making the same "stand," I wondered?<br />
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In part, just as an observer, it is clear to me that there is still a strong stench of "defeatism" that lingers heavily in the air around much of the Arab Mideast -- a negativity that has been canonized in works of literature and has become deeply embedded in Arab public discourse, including commentary, mass media -- and even academic conferences, where more critical thinking should prevail. <br />
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Knowing that the Arabs are busy creating their own cages, the increasingly right-wing and militant Israeli political body seems to eke out its latest appalling policies a little at a time to train us collectively to accept a new bar for bad behavior. Arabs protest in one loud shout, then defeatedly scurry back to an ever-shrinking existence.<br />
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<strong>Non-Arab Turkey and Iran</strong><br />
This condition does not afflict the Iranians or the Turks. Innovative and proud in the face of western attempts to isolate it, and US/Israeli attempts to define it, Iran has managed to forge its own path based on perceived national interests, and churns out world-class achievements in many fields:<br />
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A 2010 Canadian report on "geo-political shift in knowledge creation" claims scientific output has grown <a href="http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn18546-iran-showing-fastest-scientific-growth-of-any-country.html" target="_hplink">11 times faster in Iran</a> than the world average, faster than any other country (Turkey ranks high in the data, too). <a href="http://english.irib.ir/radioculture/science-a-technology" target="_hplink">Progress</a> in science, medicine and technology outpaces most developing nations -- whether in <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ml6sW5vh8IU" target="_hplink">AIDS research</a>, nanotechnology, biotechnology, genetics, nuclear technology or aerospace. Iran's remarkable film industry generates award-winning art films the world around -- in Venice, Cannes and Toronto. The Islamic Republic of Iran has crafted such a creative healthcare system to deal with critical problems like infant and maternal mortality that the <a href="http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6962844.ece" target="_hplink">state of Mississippi</a> has requested special permission from the US Department of State to bring in Iranian experts to teach them how to do the same. When sanctions are slapped on Tehran, Iranian entrepreneurs manufacture the banned goods themselves. When the Afghani and Pakistani drug trade seems to overwhelm Iran's borders, the Islamist government shrugs off religious myopia and sets up needle exchange programs, free methadone prescriptions, and the distribution of condoms to promote safe sex. Proactive, self-preserving behaviors serving a self-defined national interest -- not something you see often in the Arab world.<br />
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Turkey defies all stereotypes as a Muslim-majority country on the edge of the Middle East. A staunchly secular nation as defined by its constitution, it has nevertheless demonstrated genuine democracy by allowing the participation of a progressive, Islamist-leaning political party. It is ironic that this party has been the one to make the groundbreaking, democratizing improvements in its political structures to facilitate its bid to join the EU, an effort backed by Washington. Turkey is as much at ease with the US, Russia and China as it is with Iran, Brazil and India, and has redefined the possibilities of global diplomacy as it inserts itself proactively into power-brokering conflicts the world around. A major tourist destination and now a real economic hub in the various regions it borders, Turkey too has carved its own destiny, independent of others, yet in tight cooperation with all.<br />
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So what happened to the Arabs? Is it the use of the collective term "Arab" that waters down this ethnic group's possibilities? Surely if they were only defined as Algerians, Lebanese, Tunisians, Kuwaitis, Jordanians, it would be easier to break out of a pack malaise? Or do they have to get even smaller -- Bedouins, Hashemites, Christians, Druze, Alawites, etc.?<br />
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Assassinated Lebanese journalist Samir Kassir once wrote that Arabs are "haunted by a sense of powerlessness":<br />
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<blockquote>Powerless to be what you think you should be. Powerless to act to affirm your existence in the face of the Other who denies your right to exist, despises you and has once again reasserted his domination over you. Powerless to suppress the feeling that you are no more than a lowly pawn on the global chessboard even as the game is being played in your backyard.</blockquote><br />
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And this is the crux of the matter. The <em>Arab</em> has been defined by the <em>Other</em>. So successfully in fact, that most Arabs speak amongst themselves using a narrative that has been constructed by others, external to the region.<br />
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To be sure, there is a local defeatist industry that has sprung up organically from lost wars, corrupt systems and bad leadership, but it is perpetuated by the impotence that comes from this Other narrative.<br />
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What do I mean? Let's focus on the discourse surrounding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a prime example:<br />
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<strong>Language to Tame and Control</strong><br />
The United States and Israel have created the global discourse on this longstanding and contentious dispute. They have set stringent parameters that grow increasingly narrow regarding the content and direction of this debate. And anything discussed outside the set parameters has, until recently, widely been viewed as unrealistic, unproductive and even subversive.<br />
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Participation in the debate is limited only to those who prescribe to the tenets of the discourse -- in this case, it is the Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas, the Jordanians, Egyptians, Saudis, and a smattering of other "defeatist" Arab leaders who are happy to serve our interests over theirs.<br />
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These tenets include the acceptance of Israel, its regional hegemony and its qualitative military edge, acceptance of the shaky logic upon which the Jewish state's claim to Palestine is based, and acceptance of the inclusions and exclusion of certain regional parties, movements and governments in any solution to the conflict.<br />
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<strong>Words are the Building Blocks of Psychology</strong><br />
The language parameters that come into play to shape the discourse are largely based on these three tenets, although undoubtedly there are others. Words like dove, hawk, militant, extremist, moderates, terrorists, Islamo-fascists, rejectionists, existential threat, holocaust-denier, mad mullah determine the participation of solution partners -- and are capable of instantly excluding others.<br />
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Then there is the language that preserves "Israel's Right To Exist" unquestioningly: anything that invokes the Holocaust, anti-Semitism and the myths about historic Jewish rights to the land described as Eretz Yisrael. This language seeks not only to ensure that a Jewish connection to Palestine remains unquestioned, but importantly, seeks to punish and marginalize those who tackle the legitimacy of this modern colonial-settler experiment. <br />
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And finally, there is the language that suggests Israel's "value" to the world: Americans often cite "common" or "shared" values, or "Judeo-Christian" values, the "only democracy in the Middle East," a bulwark against Islamism (which increasingly addresses all Muslims), tyranny, autocratic rulers and native savagery -- for which many other terms and nefarious concepts are invoked, i.e., suicide-bombers, Palestinian lack of value for life, willingness to sacrifice their children, human rights violations rampant in the Arab and Islamic worlds, etc.<br />
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Further to these three main areas where parameters have been effectively set, there are concepts and language that have been institutionalized through international agreements and conditions determined by the "powers that be." Whether it is refusing to deal with parties who do not accept Israel, Quartet principles, renunciation of violence -- or -- the stream of US-brokered agreements starting from Madrid to Oslo, Annapolis and so forth -- these concepts create further hurdles that seem impossible to counter, so often are they repeated in Washington, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Riyadh, Cairo, Amman and elsewhere.<br />
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In effect, the US, Israel and a small, largely powerless coterie of others have created insurmountable parameters in dealing with the Palestinian-Israel issue within the international arena. Yes, that means no peace ever, just a pressure-free Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. This is the only "game" in town.<br />
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<em>But that is only so long as this narrative is allowed to continue.</em><br />
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<strong>The New Middle East</strong><br />
And suddenly that change is here. The handful of Arabs that have <em>raised a new vocabulary</em> are a mixed lot, with different political leanings, historical experiences and religious traditions. But they bring with them a psychology of <em>potential</em> -- or as we may call it, the "audacity of hope" -- the first time since the nationalist leadership of Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser that the views of influential Arab leaders actually resonate with the public masses. <br />
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<em>It is the first transformative post-Cold War shift the region has seen in its centers of influence and power. </em> A development almost entirely lost on think tankers and policy wonks in Washington -- and within the Middle East's old guard who cling to yesterday's narratives for their very legitimacy.<br />
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From Qatar to Hezbollah to Syria, we are now seeing a language of "pride" -- a desire to forge a new narrative of possibilities. These entities are not complaining about the status quo -- economic, political, social stagnation -- they are <em>offering solutions</em>. <br />
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And not grandiose, hard to live up to remedies, but incremental, one-foot-in-front-of-the-other problem busters. They are crossing borders to solicit assistance, utilizing public and private diplomacy to characterize their new direction, and employing collective strategies to strengthen their hand.<br />
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Trade is increasing with "value" partners -- like-minded nations interested in creating clout through commerce and broadening political independence through market diversification.<br />
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Take a look at Qatar. A tiny Arab nation in the Persian Gulf with a native population of less than 300,000 and huge gas reserves, Doha has done the unthinkable. The largest US military base in the region is stationed there alongside arguably the least censored major media outlet in both the East and West, <em>Al Jazeera</em> -- <em>and</em> it will be hosting the first World Cup in the entire Middle East in 2022. Outpacing staunch US ally Saudi Arabia in leaps and bounds, the Qataris have adopted women's suffrage, introduced a new Constitution, established education as a cornerstone of their growth strategy (Georgetown University and Cornell now have campuses there), are diversifying their economy well beyond dependency on energy resources, and even opened limited relations with Israel until the Gaza war put a swift end to that goodwill gesture. A homegrown vision and a determination to act in its own interest -- not some fantasy, regional, brotherhood lockstep -- is what drives Qatar and others who embrace new narratives in the Middle East.<br />
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The narratives now taking hold in the region will create innovative, homegrown solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, broken governments in Iraq and Afghanistan, arms control, nuclear proliferation, Salafist extremism, water rights, human rights, representative government, refugee crises, economic growth, border issues and other impediments to real progress.<br />
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It was not Washington's input that was necessary to form governments in Lebanon and Iraq after elections -- the deals were struck with the assistance of Riyadh, Damascus and Tehran. And it will not be the State Department that will ultimately solve the Palestine-Israeli issue either. I predict an entirely homegrown solution to that enduring conflict -- the idea will come from the region, if not the enforcing of it.<br />
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Importantly, the new narratives have opened up "possibilities" already. We are seeing this in Tunisia, Egypt and Bahrain recently -- populations suddenly deciding that they <em>will</em> strive for change; that the status quo has not served them well. Local corruption and economic, political and social decay are the root causes of this popular dissent, but it would be foolish not to recognize that these have been fueled by a new "chutzpah" derived from watching uncensored news (<em>Al Jazeera</em>) for the first time -- or bursting with pride at a perceived Israeli loss against Hezbollah in 2006 -- or frankly, just watching Turkey and Iran curb external hegemonic aspirations in the region. These events have inspired pride and honor in a part of the world that <em>values these attributes</em> highly.<br />
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This Mideast's new centers of influence are progressive ones. Yet we still quite deliberately cast them as militant, destabilizing, worrisome. They may threaten our exclusive hegemony, but if our goal still remains access to resources, we are better served by befriending and cooperating with the region's newest power brokers, than by alienating them at a time when our stock is falling globally. <br />
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The bottom line is that these regional actors are the only ones that can help <em>preserve the peace</em> and <em>open up markets</em> in the Middle East. If Washington does not recognize these developments, the new regional narrative will forge ahead without us, and we will be excluded until we learn some respect.<br />
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Alon Ben-Meir: Turkey Felt Betrayed by Israelhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/alon-benmeir/turkey-felt-betrayed-by-i_b_803862.htmlAlon Ben-Meirhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/alon-benmeir/
Perhaps the primary cause behind the rapid deterioration of Israeli-Turkish relations before Iran became central to their rift is Turkey's disappointment over the failure of Israel's former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to conclude an Israeli-Syrian peace. Turkey felt betrayed by Olmert, who failed to deliver the peace agreement with Syria which was painstakingly mediated by Ankara. Prime Minister Erdogan, who invested heavy political capital to mediate between Damascus and Jerusalem, was expecting to witness the signing of a peace treaty, but was instead confronted with the news that Israel invaded Gaza. From Turkey's perspective, an Israeli-Syrian peace could have fundamentally changed the geopolitical conditions throughout the Middle East and led to the resolution of other conflicts while fostering long-term regional stability. In essence, it was an historic opportunity that was squandered by Israel. <br />
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As a rising power, there was nothing more pronounced for Turkey to undertake than mediating peace between Israel and Syria, which has eluded the United States for decades. The opportunity presented itself in early October 2007 when Syria indicated through a back channel that it was ready, willing and able to forge a permanent peace treaty with Israel and that Damascus was prepared to make significant concessions to allay Israel's security and water concerns. It is critically important to note that Syria's expressed desire to enter into peace negotiations came only three weeks following Israel's bombing of a suspected Syrian nuclear plant. Syria was particularly interested in forging a peace agreement with Israel at that particular juncture prompted by its growing isolation, its economic hardship and especially the realization that however important its bilateral relations with Iran, it has its own liability as well as its limitations, especially in the long run. The question for Syria at the time was whether Turkey or Spain will be a more suitable mediator, as Damascus insisted that while it was ready to make peace with Israel, it wanted to negotiate through a third party. Damascus convincingly argued that it would be willing to move to direct negotiations once the parameters for an agreement were established, as long as Israel accepted the principle that any peace accord would be based on the exchange of territory for peace and that the 1967 June 4th ceasefire lines provided the baseline. Damascus' genuine desire to reach a peace agreement with Israel was subsequently demonstrated throughout the negotiations with Turkey's mediation. <br />
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Turkey's proximity, its improved relations with Syria and its excellent ties with Israel at the time quickly ruled out Spain as a potential mediator. Within a few weeks the three countries agreed on the modalities of the negotiations which commenced in earnest in the beginning of 2008. Although the details of the negotiations between Israel and Syria with Turkish mediation remained confidential, it became public knowledge that the Negotiations were taking place. Over a period of more than a year, the Turkish government invested substantial time and political capital to significantly advance the process. Based on very reliable accounts, by December 2008 Israel and Syria were able to resolve nearly 95 percent of their differences. Syria was able to satisfy Israel's stringent security requirements, which included the demilitarization of the Golan Heights, the stationing of peace keeping forces on Syrian territory, and a monitoring system to prevent any violation of the Accord. In addition, both sides agreed to a phased withdrawal of Israeli forces to insure orderly transition and time to resettle all settlers. Furthermore, Syria agreed to an equitable distribution of water, developing a joint park and providing special permits to the settlers to visit the Golan. Interestingly, Syria was also ready to consider the development of a free trade zone on the Golan open to all the states in the area, a project that would have transformed the relationships between Israel and all of its neighbors.<br />
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The occasion was celebrated between the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and his Israeli counterpart Olmert with a dinner in Ankara that lasted five hours. Mr. Olmert was expected to confirm the near agreement with his Turkish counterpart within a few days following his consultation with his government immediately upon his return to Israel. Instead, to the utter surprise and dismay of the Turkish government, five days after Olmert returned to Jerusalem, Israel began a massive incursion into Gaza. Ankara felt betrayed by the Israeli action and deceived by Olmert's failure to inform the Turkish Prime Minister of Israel's pending operation of which he, as the Prime Minister, was obviously fully aware of and could have disclosed to his Turkish counterpart while he was still in Ankara. For Mr. Erdogan, the problem was compounded not only because he did not hear from Olmert the message of peace which he eagerly anticipated, but a 'declaration' of war with all of its potential regional consequences.<br />
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It is hard to describe the depth of the Turks' disappointment, not only because they were left in the dark, but because a major breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli peace process of historical magnitude was snatched away. On the rise as a regional power, for Turkey to successfully mediating a peace agreement between Israel and Syria after sixty years of conflict would have placed Turkey at the front and center of international prominence, especially because an Israeli-Syrian peace would have had so many other regional and even international implications. From the Turkish perspective, it would have changed the region's political dynamic and paved the way to peace between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and the Palestinians, and might have also changed the nature of hostile relations between Israel and Iran, thereby averting a potential violent conflict between the two nations which Ankara profoundly fears. As the Turks see it, Israel has acted as if it is accountable to no one and independent of everyone. Turkey feels it has major stake in any conflict in the Middle East and it is loath to merely accept Israeli de-facto policies that run contrary to Turkish national interests. As several Turkish high officials lamented, the strategic alliance with Israel is meaningful only when there is full and open cooperation between the parties on any issue that may impact either country's national strategic interests. But when one side or the other acts as if the alliance is only one sided to be exploited then it becomes at best meaningless but often harmful because of the inherit strategic interdependency and cooperation between the parties.<br />
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Contrary to the view that the Syrian authorities only talk about peace but are not interested in forging one because keeping the tension with Israel allows Bashar al-Assad, Syria's President to keep his grip on power, from everything we know Syria is still ready and able to strike a peace agreement with Israel -- not because it is weak and despondent, but because Damascus understand that its ultimate well-fare and well-being depend on improved relations with the West, especially the United States, which is and remains the ultimate power-arbiter in the Middle East. Moreover, continued tension with Israel has no strategic value and it could be utilized tactically and even then only up to a point which may now have run its course as Israel is becoming militarily stronger and more prosperous economically. Furthermore, Damascus understands the precariousness of its position in connection with Iran not only because of Tehran's growing international isolation -- resulting from its nuclear program -- but also because of the inherent inconsistency with Damascus' determination to remain the dominant arbiter over the fate of Lebanon.<br />
<br />
Notwithstanding Israel's skepticism about Syria and especially Damascus' close ties with Iran, it appears that Israel's obsession with Iran obscured many other options, especially striking a peace agreement with Syria. The Netanyahu government today appears to be even farther away from any of its predecessors from considering a negotiated agreement with Syria that would of necessity require the return of the Golan. It is true that considering Israel's military prowess, Syria will not be able to regain the Golan by force in the foreseeable future. But this does not suggest that continued Israeli entrenchment on the Golan will overtime create an irreversible situation that would compel Syria to simply give up its claim over its territory. Although it is also true that relocating the settlers will require billions of dollars and it would be heart-breaking for many Israelis, the passage of time will make it only much more expensive and far more traumatic for the Israelis. Nobody should buy into the argument that there will be tremendous resistance by the settlers. The vast majority will relocate peacefully given the same quality of life and job opportunity. Any Israeli government that does not see far enough into the future and take the necessary measures to prevent inevitable catastrophic developments, even if the public is not alarmed by the status quo, that government will have to answer the judgment of time which will be harsh and unforgiving.<br />
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Due to the continuing Turkish-Israeli rift that was deepened by the flotilla incident, the time may not be auspicious for Turkey to resume its mediating role, but Ankara still is best positioned to mediate between Syria and Israel -- provided there is a government in Israel that can see the light. A government that is not blinded and self-absorbed, one that allows itself, time and again, to miss opportunities in the name of national security -- when in fact, by its own shortsightedness is jeopardizing Israel's long-term national security concerns.<br />
<br />
<em>A version of this article was published originally in the Jerusalem Post on December 31, 2010 and can be accessed here: http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id=201545</em><br />
<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/negotiations">Negotiations</a>, <a href="/tag/recep-tayyip-erdogan">Recep Tayyip Erdogan</a>, <a href="/tag/israel">Israel</a>, <a href="/tag/peace">Peace</a>, <a href="/tag/ehud-olmert">Ehud Olmert</a>, <a href="/tag/syria">Syria</a>, <a href="/world">World News</a></p>
Leon T. Hadar: Israel Needs to Adjust to a Post-American Agehttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/leon-t-hadar/israel-needs-to-adjust-to_b_803789.htmlLeon T. Hadarhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/leon-t-hadar/
"We cannot exist alone." That is Israel's national security axiom acknowledged by <a href="http://www.presstv.ir/detail/147745.html" target="_hplink">President Shimon Peres</a> during an address in Jerusalem in November. "For our existence we need the friendship of the United States of America," <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=192392&R=R2" target="_hplink">stressed the Israeli statesman</a>, highlighting the geostrategic reality. "It doesn't sound easy, but this is the truth," he added. It's not easy for a client-state to admit that its own survival depends on a global patron. <br />
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It's even more challenging for leaders of a dependent state to recognize that the great power they are relying on may be entering into an imperial twilight time -- that it's not so great anymore. Inertia, wishful thinking and the power of vested interests explains why elites in the empire's capital -- as well as in the provinces -- continue to share in the misconception about the hegemon's ability to exert global influence even as that influence is being eroded.<br />
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But after a prolonged <a href="http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/recognition_lag.asp" target="_hplink"> "recognition lag"</a> -- extending from the military fiasco in Iraq to the financial meltdown in Wall Street -- it's becoming clear to policymakers in Washington that the U.S. is facing the prospects of geostrategic decline. The military is overstretched in unwinnable wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a decaying economic base financed by Chinese loans is making it difficult to sustain expansive global commitments. The <a href="http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/46271/charles-krauthammer/the-unipolar-moment" target="_hplink">unipolar moment</a> is coming to an end and rising global powers are creating the conditions for the evolution of multipolarism.<br />
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It seems, however, that Israeli leaders continue to operate under the illusion that the U.S. remains the paramount global power. Israeli ultra-nationalists delude themselves that the muddled U.S. policy the Middle East and the Washington's tensions with Israel are temporary, reflecting Barack Obama's temperament and biases. When the Republicans return to power the hegemon will rise again and together with its Israeli deputy will bring order to the Middle East -- just like in the good, old days of George W. Bush.<br />
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Members of the Israeli peace camp believe that the role of Washington remains central to a resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict which could encourage the formation of a U.S.-led regional bloc, ready to contain the threat from Iran and its satellites in Lebanon and Palestine. They regard the support of a global patron not as a substitute for integrating Israel in the Middle East -- but as an element in a strategy to achieve peace.<br />
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During the Cold War and in the brief Unipolar Moment -- from the collapse of the Soviet Union to the fall of Saddam Hussein -- Washington was in a position to work with Israeli and Arab moderates in promoting peace. But that window of opportunity for this U.S. role may be closing. <br />
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The failed attempt by the neoconservative-guided policies to" "remake" the Middle East -- while marginalizing the Israel/Palestine issue -- ended up weakening American power in the Middle East and strengthening Iran and its allies, marking the start of the end of Pax Americana. <br />
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So in reality the Obama administration's current difficulties in setting the global agenda, whether that involves North Korean aggression and China's undervalued currency, Iraq and Afghanistan -- or bringing peace to the Holy Land and disabling Iran's nuclear capability -- reflect the long-term structural problems that are eroding American power. They are not going to be resolved anytime soon under either Democratic or Republican presidents and could gradually turn the U.S. into Israel's undependable global patron. <br />
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While the U.S. will not collapse with a bang a la the Soviet Union, it will cease being number one and will start playing the role of first among equals. Traditional allies of the U.S. like Turkey, Japan and Brazil, are recognizing that and are hedging their strategic bets and diversifying their global portfolios. They maintain their close ties with Washington while also trying to form alliances with like-minded regional and global powers. <br />
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There is no reason why Israel should not consider pursuing such a "hedging" strategy as it recognizes that U.S. military forces are going to disengage from the Middle East in the future and that the U.S.-Israeli alliance -- a product of the unique historical constellation of the Cold War -- is bound to weaken, a result of U.S. geo-strategic decline as of demographic changes, such as the drop in the number of American-Jews and a growing non-European population. <br />
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American neoconservatives and Israeli right maintain that support from the American patron could become a substitute for peace with the Arabs and fantasize that Muslim terrorism would ignite a <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Clash_of_Civilizations" target="_hplink">clash of civilizations</a> -- a U.S.-led West vs. the "Caliphate" -- with Israel serving as America's strategic outpost in the Middle East, a Crusader State that for ever will depend on American support for its survival. But Muslim terrorism would only help bolster American isolationism and speed up U.S. disengagement from the Middle East.<br />
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In an example of dialectical thinking run amok, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has turned the strategic logic behind the patron-client state relationship on its head. He has "threatened" Washington that unless it supports his radical Zionist agenda, Jerusalem would ally itself with another global player that would supposedly be willing to prop up a militarized anti-Arab Jewish Ghetto in the Middle East.<br />
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But why would the European Union (EU), Russia, China, India or Turkey be interested in hooking up with a state that brings into the marriage a dowry in the form of the animosity of the entire Arab and Muslim worlds and the prospect of being entangled in dead-ended peace processes? Israel's promise as a strategic ally is in being a strong military power and a advanced economy playing a constructive role in sustaining a stable and prosperous region, the Singapore of the Middle East -- not its Cuba.<br />
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China and India may not be ready to become major players in West Asia, but their growing dependency on Middle East oil is drawing them into more diplomatic activism in the region. The Chinese are actually benefiting from status quo: The U.S. is wasting its resources in trying to manage the Middle East -- while the Chinese continue to grow their economy, ensuring that when Americans leave -- the Chinese will be the ready to assume more security responsibilities in the region. <br />
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And while the EU may be in a midst of an economic and institutional crisis, the Europeans, and in particular, the French, Germans and Brits have important strategic, economic and even demographic (large Muslim communities) interests in the region. They may consider advancing a peace deal under which in exchange for its concessions, Israel would join the EU. <br />
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Then there is also the "Turkish Option" -- a democratic, free-market oriented and pro-Western Muslim state emerging as a regional hegemon and in a position to promote Arab-Israeli peace and contain Iran.<br />
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No one is suggesting that Israel sue for an instant divorce from Washington and jump into bed with Turkey or China. But in this period of eroding American unipolarism and budding multipolarity, Israel should start reassessing it options -- very much the way its leaders have done in the past.<br />
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In fact, two of the major victories of the Zionist movement in the twentieth century followed historic transformations in foreign policy orientations in response to changes in the global balance of power. Chaim Weizmann anticipated the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and made a diplomatic bet on Britain, the new power in the Middle East -- a policy that resulted in the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/22/books/review/Segev-t.html" target="_hplink">Balfour Declaration.</a> Thirty years later, Ben-Gurion recognized that the British Empire was crumbling -- and that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were the new global powers -- and took advantage of the evolving Cold War to win support for the new Jewish State.<br />
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'Indeed, while it runs contrary to reigning narrative about the American-Israeli "special relationship," it's important to recall that Stalin's Soviet Union was the most enthusiastic supporter of establishing Israel in 1948. Moscow recognized Israel immediately after the state was proclaimed and provided it with arms, while it took the Americans more than a year to grant de jure recognition to Israel, on which they imposed an arms embargo. <br />
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Israel cannot exist alone. But as an adherent of realpolitik like Peres recalls from his own experience, interests do change. Peres was, after all, a proponent of a "European orientations" and the main architect of the Israeli alliance with France which served as Israel's main source of arms in the 1950s and early 1960s and helped it develop its nuclear arsenal. Indeed, Israel's survival depends on recognizing that international friendships come and go. It doesn't sound easy, but this is the truth. <br />
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<em>A longer version of this commentary was published in the Israeli daily<a href="http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/1206545.html" target="_hplink">Haaretz</a></em>
<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/france">France</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/shimon-peres">Shimon Peres</a>, <a href="/tag/unipolar-moment">Unipolar Moment</a>, <a href="/tag/israel">Israel</a>, <a href="/tag/cold-war">Cold War</a>, <a href="/tag/clash-of-civilizations">Clash of Civilizations</a>, <a href="/tag/china">China</a>, <a href="/tag/brazil">Brazil</a>, <a href="/tag/japan">Japan</a>, <a href="/tag/stalin">Stalin</a>, <a href="/tag/realopolitik">Realopolitik</a>, <a href="/world">World News</a></p>
Elcin Poyrazlar: US-Turkey Relations: A Real Cliffhangerhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/elcin-poyrazlar/post_1499_b_802274.htmlElcin Poyrazlarhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/elcin-poyrazlar/
In the last days of 2010 US-Turkish relations managed to escape yet another crisis. Backed by the Armenian diaspora, outgoing House Speaker Nancy Pelosi sought to hold a vote on a controversial resolution that depicts the deaths of Armenians at the end of the Ottoman Empire as "genocide".<br />
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Turkey is extremely sensitive about this -- and put all its weight behind avoiding a Congressional vote. Relations between Ankara and Washington have already deteriorated substantially this year and the resolution would have put them under much more strain. <br />
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The Obama administration was surprisingly silent about the issue. But the last day of the Congress came and went and the resolution was not brought to the House floor, so providing much relief for those who care about the two countries' relations. <br />
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There are other pitfalls ahead. The US President commemorates the Armenian deaths every year on April 24th and the 2011 statement will be the next thing for the Turks to worry about.<br />
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The incoming Republican-controlled House is likely to be even more suspicious of Turkey's foreign policy priorities than was its Democratic predecessor. Turkey's 'No' vote on Iranian sanctions at the UN Security Council has been neither forgiven nor forgotten. Turkey's efforts to convince Washington of its case are unlikely to get very far. <br />
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As for Ankara, the Turkish government has said it will implement the UN sanctions -- but is opposed to pressure from Washington to make Turkish companies comply with unilateral US sanctions as well. Its resistance is unlikely to diminish following a recent New York Times report that the Treasury department has granted American companies exceptions from longstanding US rules against doing business with Iran. <br />
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The whole issue of Iran is likely to stay on the table as a cause of friction between Ankara and Washington.<br />
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Then there are the damaged relations between Turkey and Israel. These continue to be a cause of concern in both countries since this year's Mavi Marmara incident, in which Israel killed nine Turkish citizens. <br />
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This too is set to remain a headache throughout next year. Even though Washington has tried to strike a balance between two of its most important allies in the region, the Turks are convinced that the Obama administration is irrevocably behind the Israelis. <br />
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At least there will be a US ambassador in Ankara. For almost six months, the administration's nominee for the post, Francis Ricciardone, was held up in the Senate by the Republican Sam Brownback. But Obama has just pushed Ricciardone through as a "recess appointment" so Washington will have an envoy in place when Turkey holds crucial general elections in June.<br />
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Finally, there is WikiLeaks, a potential peril for both countries. The group and its media partners have almost eight thousand cables from the US embassy in Ankara -- more than from any other post. When the first 30 of them were made public, it was enough to shake prime minister Tayyip Erdogan's fragile nervous system. In one of the angriest responses of any country's leader to the leaks, he threatened to sue the authors of the dispatches, who painted an unflattering picture of him as an authoritarian. President Obama soon called Erdogan to offer his regrets and the two men seemed to agree that their relationship would not be affected. <br />
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Easier said than done. As soon as more WikiLeaks documents emerge, Turkey's conspiracy-theory machine will whir into action again, leaving common sense struggling behind. At a time when anti-American sentiment remains extremely high in Turkey, the documents could whip up emotions further in the elections. <br />
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In 2010 there were so many bumps on the road that two countries' ride became distinctly unpleasant. It looks like 2011 will be tough as well, if relations do not dive into an abyss.
<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/erdogan">Erdogan</a>, <a href="/tag/iran">Iran</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/israel">Israel</a>, <a href="/tag/congress">Congress</a>, <a href="/tag/obama">Obama</a>, <a href="/tag/us">Us</a>, <a href="/tag/armenian">Armenian</a>, <a href="/tag/wikileaks">Wikileaks</a>, <a href="/world">World News</a></p>
Turkey: 10 Al-Qaeda Suspects Detainedhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/30/turkey-10-al-qaeda-suspects-_n_802734.htmlThe Huffington Post News Teamhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-news/
ANKARA, Turkey — Police have detained 10 people suspected of links to the al-Qaida terror network and accused of preparing to stage an attack before New Year's Eve, the state-run Anatolia news agency said Thursday.<br />
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The agency, citing police, said that the suspects were rounded up for questioning in simultaneous raids in the cities of Bursa and Istanbul earlier this week and on Thursday. It did not elaborate.
<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey-al-qaeda">Turkey Al Qaeda</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey-terrorism">Turkey Terrorism</a>, <a href="/tag/al-qaida">Al Qaida</a>, <a href="/tag/terrorism">Terrorism</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey-al-qaeda-arrests">Turkey Al Qaeda Arrests</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey-terror-plot">Turkey Terror Plot</a>, <a href="/tag/al-qaeda-terror-plot">Al Qaeda Terror Plot</a>, <a href="/tag/new-years-eve-attack">New Years Eve Attack</a>, <a href="/tag/al-qaeda">Al Qaeda</a>, <a href="/world">World News</a></p>
World Story Of The Year: Which Do You Choose?http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/29/world-story-of-the-year-p_n_798434.htmlThe Huffington Post News Teamhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-news/
Haiti's devastating earthquake kicked off what was to be a truly turbulent year in global news. <br />
But the last year of the first decade of the 21st century was marked by other world events -- some monumental, others devastating. <br />
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The June detainment of 10 seemingly harmless U.S. suburbanites who turned out to be Russian spies threatened to fracture newly-patched relations between the two nations, while the miraculous rescue of 33 miners trapped in Chile's San Jose Mine captivated readers and viewers the world over in late summer. "Cablegate" broke in late fall and continues full-force, with WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange finding himself simultaneously adored and maligned among the planet's most powerful figures as the year comes to a close. <br />
<br />
As we prepare to kick off 2011, we're asking HuffPost readers to cast their votes on 2010's world story of the year. Check out the contenders here, and email us at <a href="mailto:world@huffingtonpost.com">world@huffingtonpost.com</a> to suggest any we missed: <br />
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<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/wikileaks">Wikileaks</a>, <a href="/tag/flotilla">Flotilla</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/pakistan">Pakistan</a>, <a href="/tag/cablegate">Cablegate</a>, <a href="/tag/world-story-of-the-year">World Story of the Year</a>, <a href="/tag/anna-chapman">Anna Chapman</a>, <a href="/tag/nobel-peace-prize">Nobel Peace Prize</a>, <a href="/tag/haiti">Haiti</a>, <a href="/tag/chile-miners">Chile Miners</a>, <a href="/tag/san-jose-mine">San Jose Mine</a>, <a href="/tag/liu-xiaobo">Liu Xiaobo</a>, <a href="/tag/iran">Iran</a>, <a href="/tag/2010">2010</a>, <a href="/tag/mavi-marmara">Mavi Marmara</a>, <a href="/tag/russian-spies">Russian Spies</a>, <a href="/tag/gaza-flotilla">Gaza Flotilla</a>, <a href="/tag/espionage">Espionage</a>, <a href="/tag/slidepollajax">Slidepollajax</a>, <a href="/tag/julian-assange">Julian Assange</a>, <a href="/tag/21st-century">21st Century</a>, <a href="/tag/haiti-earthquake">Haiti Earthquake</a>, <a href="/tag/2010-stories">2010 Stories</a>, <a href="/tag/iran-stoning-woman">Iran Stoning Woman</a>, <a href="/world">World News</a></p>
Janet Ritz: "A Success Story in the Middle East"http://www.huffingtonpost.com/janet-ritz/a-success-story-in-the-mi_b_799533.htmlJanet Ritzhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/janet-ritz/
A recent conversation with Qubad Talabani, the Kurdish representative to the U.S. for their regional government, centered on what the son of Iraq's President Jalal Talabani called the U.S.'s success story in the Middle East. It was during an interview that covered politics, religion, Turkey, Iran, and the Kurdish attitude toward the U.S. for their involvement in Iraq.<br />
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As Qubad Talabani stated, "there is a success story in the Middle East that has significant U.S. fingerprints on it and I can't point to too many of those right now in the Middle East. "<br />
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A <a href="http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2007/0706.rozen.html" target="_hplink">2007 profile</a> described the Iraqi president's son as "English-accented, a onetime Italian-car mechanic with an American wife--[who] handles his duties with aplomb, rushing around town in subtle suits to meet with policy makers and power brokers."<br />
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The Italian cars and the mechanical engineering degree have since given way to the mechanics of diplomacy. My interest in the Kurds began with research for a book. Their history and culture fascinate me. I became aware of Qubad Talabani as part of that research and have watched his transformation from Kurdish exile raised in Britain to the diplomat on the Washington scene. <br />
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Mr. Talabani was candid, engaging and achingly interested in putting across to the American people what the Kurds have accomplished and how much of that progress they attribute to past, current, and -- emphasized -- ongoing U.S. engagement in the region.<br />
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We started with his father's reelection as president of Iraq and the confirmation of Jalal Talabani's objection to the death penalty, which came up when he said he would not sign the execution order for Saddam Hussein's former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz. It was one of many times during our discussion that I was reminded of how different the Kurds were than perceptions of them by many in the West. <br />
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That difference was evidenced by a statement from Qubad Talabani about a growing nationalist movement among Kurdish youth that had them turning from Islam to Zoroastrianism, the ancient religion of the Kurds when they were known as the Medes. It's a faith that includes, as its precepts, tolerance toward other religions, protection of the environment, equality of the sexes, truth, and loyalty toward family, country and God. <br />
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There's no evidence of a wider movement, although those in Iraqi Kurdistan are now free to explore that option. Most Kurds are Muslim, which is practiced by those in rural areas. But, even there, it is not the same as in other parts of the Middle East. <br />
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I brought up a saying I'd heard, "Kurds hold their Islam with a light touch." Mr. Talabani explained the phrase, "Kurds are Kurds first today and, in my opinion, it's because -- when we were being massacred -- nobody came out in the Muslim world to say: 'hang on a minute. This is wrong.' No religious authority from Cairo or Saudi Arabia or any of the other epicenters of the Muslim world came out and said here are Muslim brothers being massacred by supposed Muslims in the form of Saddam's Iraq. That's gone a long way, again, toward increasing nationalism, which I believe is a defensive ideology. Nothing instills nationalism more than oppression and fear."<br />
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In Iraqi Kurdistan, nationalism is the common belief in a distinctly pluralistic society where the Kurds have opened their gates to Iraqi Christians seeking refuge from extremist violence. <br />
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"We've had this welcoming policy [to Iraqi Christians];" Mr. Talabani explains; "we've probably settled in Kurdistan 12,000 to 15,000 Christian families and, regrettably, hundreds of thousands have left Iraq altogether. Those who've chosen not to leave Iraq have resettled in Kurdistan."<br />
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They've shown the same tolerance toward other religious minorities. Problems, when they do arise, are cultural in nature. Mr. Talabani was candid about the challenges faced by women in their rural regions, with crimes of honor killings and female genital mutilation, on which, he said, Kurdistan, unlike other parts of the Middle East, reports and has begun work to stop. It won't be easy. In the male dominated culture that exists in the rural areas, he points out that it will take religious leaders and village elders to change the practices. There's been some progress in those efforts, including a statement by the Kurdish Islamic authority to condemn the practices, but, as he said, "we can't shy away" from the problem. There's more work to be done. <br />
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That's in contrast with the high participation of women in their parliament, their presence in the armed forces (Peshmerga and police), their access to education and activities in civic life. The cities of Iraqi Kurdistan are booming. There's money from oil and billions in investment from foreign companies, pouring into everything from resource development to mega malls. The regional government has built an information technology academy, a police academy, water and grid infrastructure improvements with electricity near prewar levels, unlike the rest of Iraq. <br />
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Also unlike the rest of the country, Iraqi Kurdistan is verdant, cooler in summer, snowy in winter with tall mountains, wildflowers, rushing rivers and waterfalls (see slideshow below). <br />
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"Iraqi Kurdistan is to me..." Talabani said, "I consider it a vibrant, thriving, civil society in the heart of a turbulent Middle East. I view it as this beautiful part of the world with majestic mountains, sweeping valleys with a natural beauty that is unrivaled, but with a population that has seen so much tragedy that has instilled in us an enormous sense of national pride."<br />
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That pride includes the fact that there has not been, to date, any U.S. casualties due to hostile action in Iraqi Kurdistan. "This is because the Kurds," as Mr. Talabani points out, "like Americans." <br />
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"It's important for Americans to know that out of the nearly five thousand U.S. casualties in Iraq, not one of those casualties have occurred in the Kurdistan region," he said, "we've not lost one U.S. serviceman or civilian, for that matter, in Kurdistan, through hostile action. We're proud of a statistic that always makes us knock on wood because we want to keep it that way. Why is it? First and foremost, Kurds, by and large, view the United States as liberators. We didn't view you as occupiers. We liked the fact that you were there." <br />
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Talabani acknowledged Western concerns that the Kurds might be too close to Iran, but defied those making the statements to prove that anything has been done against U.S. interests. <br />
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"What I've told those who've expressed their concern about Kurdish closeness to Iran," Talabani said, "is find me one example where we have carried out an action or a policy that has been consistent with Iran's interests and, at the same time, detrimental to U.S. interests. We haven't done it. Of course we want to have good relations with all of the countries that we live next door to. We didn't pick the neighborhood that we live in. It picked us."<br />
<br />
He was more specific about another neighbor.<br />
<br />
"Turkey has transformed from this secular, cold war ally of the United States," he explained, "[which was] Ataturk Kemalist's vision, pro-Israel, another non-Arab, pro-Israeli group of democrats who were secular in the Middle East. That was the perfect combination of attributes for the United States at the time. That is no longer the same Turkey. Turkey has changed. Turkey has a new government, a new government with a new mandate; a new platform -- a very strategic and systematic shift in policy which places its emphasis on the region of the world it lives in."<br />
<br />
This brought up the problem of Kirkuk, a city that straddles the Iraqi Kurdistan border atop vast oil and gas reserves. Saddam Hussein depopulated the Kurds from the city, leveling whole neighborhoods, and replaced them with Arab and Turkmen families. Resolving the issues of property rights and administration of the reserves has become what Mr. Talabani called "messy." <br />
<br />
It's messy because everyone has claim to the province with its oil. The Arab and Turkmen families established by Saddam have lived there a generation. The Kurds that were displaced have come back to demolished homes and streets. The inclusion of the Turkmen garners Turkey's interest, as does the oil and, especially, their concern about Kurds expanding their territory should they be given the administration of Kirkuk. <br />
<br />
The Turks watch this because they have their own large Kurdish minority which is not as well off as Iraq's Kurds. A rebel Kurdish group out of Turkey, the PKK, which encamps just over the Iraqi border, has been declared a terrorist group by the U.S., EU and Turkey. The PKK does not have the support of Iraqi Kurdistan but have not been dislodged from their mountain camps in the north of Iraq. The U.S. has been working with Turkey to improve the lot of the Turkish Kurds, which could reduce support for the PKK within Turkish borders, but one has to wonder what it would take to improve their situation enough when they can look across the border at a thriving Iraqi Kurdistan while they struggle to survive. <br />
<br />
Oil was another topic for conversation. Foreign investment has come into Iraqi Kurdistan like a spigot opened on a well-head. They held a recent ceremony to open a facility near Erbil. Deals have been made with scores of companies. The Kurds are open for business. Their position on these resources is that it's their investment fund; there to help them develop their society. <br />
<br />
"The oil of Iraq," Talabani explained, "has been a curse for the Kurds since Iraq's inception. We've never truly benefited from our so-called natural resource. On the contrary, this resource has been used to fund the war of genocide against the Kurdish people. So, for the first time, we have an opportunity to develop our oil and gas sector with the hope of reinvesting the proceeds of the sale of that oil and gas into developing infrastructure, into our educational sector, into our agricultural sector."<br />
<br />
The genocide to which he refers is Saddam's Anfal Campaign of the late 1980's. During that time, the Kurds of Halabja in Iraqi Kurdistan were gassed from the air in what still is the largest poison gas attack upon a civilian population. The description of that gassing is horrific, with many of its victims women and children. More Kurds were rounded up and disappeared in what the Iraqi High Criminal Court has, just this past year, declared a genocide against the Kurdish people. The Kurds feel this loss at their core and are still recovering their dead. There was a recent ceremony in their capital city, Erbil, where the bodies of long-missing Kurdish children were returned to their families. <br />
<br />
The Iraqi Kurds' peaceful society is a testament to their growing maturity. They've seen violence used against them and between their own factions in an outbreak of internecine conflict during the 1990's. They resolved the differences with the support of the Clinton Administration and formed a government with the two parties (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdish Democratic Party) that power-share in their semi-autonomous region. The Kurdish parliament held an election in 2009 where a third group, known as the Change List -- in opposition to the two primary parties -- took twenty-five seats. They are building their democracy. <br />
<br />
Given the past horrors to which they'd been subjected, the Kurds have no patience for extremist groups like Al Qaeda. "Our society does not tolerate the so called insurgency," Mr. Talabani was adamant, "Al Qaeda tried to set up a base in Kurdistan after it knew it was going to get hammered in Afghanistan. The intention was to set up a base of operations in Kurdistan and it couldn't because the society there, although it was predominantly Muslim, although it was in the rural areas predominantly conservative, it was just not tolerant of that intolerant ideology. " <br />
<br />
The impression I took away from the interview was that the Kurds have more in common with the West than the American public has been made aware. They are sophisticated in their understanding of the fickle nature of world powers. They know the Iraq War was unpopular and have their own take on the U.S. invasion of Iraq that differs from the one offered by the Bush administration. <br />
<br />
"There's what I wished America came into Iraq for and what they did come into Iraq for," Talabani explained, "I think that, ultimately, after 9/11, there was a new order and a new state of play in the world and the United States was leading the charge. Saddam was viewed with weapons of mass destruction as a mortal threat to say peace, stability, of allies in the region and, by extension, the United States. That's why the principle argument for the liberation of Iraq was that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. We were quietly, publicly, actively trying to inject into the justification for this war issues of human rights violations, issues of genocide against the Kurds, issues of genocide against Iraqis, issues of torture and of the constant struggle of many Iraqis - the lack of political freedom, so all of the stuff that is not considered important in world politics, regrettably." <br />
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What's not regrettable from the Kurds' point of view is the formation of their semi-autonomous region and the relative freedom they now enjoy while they pursue opportunity and manage the associated growing pains that come with the rebuilding of a diverse society. <br />
<br />
It's not been without its challenges. The Kurds interacted closely with the Bush administration for years, and, for better or worse, knew how to deal with them. The transition to the Obama administration has presented its own challenges for the Kurds. Mr. Talabani was specific: <br />
<br />
"What the world is looking for, in particular, what we are looking for as Kurds," he pointed out, "is a clear vision from the United States. What are its core interests? What are its core principles? We see the debate in the United States. We know that there is Iraq fatigue. We know that there is a world economic crisis the United States is caught up in and is suffering as a result of it. We know all these things. We're reading the tea leaves. We've become more astute in observing political reality. If the United States is serious about a long-term commitment with Iraq, we're ready." <br />
<br />
In reference to a comment by President Obama that America was 'turning the page in Iraq', Qubad Talabani responded directly. "You've talked about promoting democracy. It's starting in Kurdistan. Embrace it. Support it. Defend it. You want to talk about energy security. It's starting in Kurdistan. We can apply it nationally. Counterterrorism is happening today in Kurdistan. All of the things that we have hoped for in broader Iraq are today happening in the Kurdistan region of Iraq."<br />
<br />
The Kurds understand the difficulty of President Obama's position. Mr. Talabani referred to the president as "caught between Iraq and a hard place" and said he knew how that felt. To this, he added, "what would be nice for Americans across the political spectrum to know is that you have a friend in the Kurds. And, even though there may be times when we might disagree with one another, this friendship we feel is strong, is deep, and is based on core values and core principles." <br />
<br />
He closed with, "there is a success story in the Middle East that has significant U.S. fingerprints on it and I can't point to too many of those right now in the Middle East. This success story needs to be embraced. It shouldn't be feared. It needs to be developed. It shouldn't be ignored. I'm hopeful this administration along with future administrations in the United States will appreciate this and help us where we need help, guide us where we need guidance, work with us when we need to be worked with. "<br />
<br />
<em>The full interview transcript <a href="http://world.the-environmentalist.org/2010/12/success-story-in-middle-east.html" target="_hplink"> is at this link</a>.</em><br />
<br />
Slideshow:<br />
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<HH--236SLIDEPOLLAJAX--15306--HH><br />
<br />
More on this topic at <a href="http://www.the-environmentalist.org" target="_hplink"><em>THE ENVIRONMENTALIST</em></a><br />
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<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/iraq">Iraq</a>, <a href="/tag/iraqi-kurdistan">Iraqi Kurdistan</a>, <a href="/tag/jalal-talabani">Jalal Talabani</a>, <a href="/tag/qubad-talabani">Qubad Talabani</a>, <a href="/tag/kurdistan">Kurdistan</a>, <a href="/tag/slidepollajax">Slidepollajax</a>, <a href="/tag/religion">Religion</a>, <a href="/tag/environment">Environment</a>, <a href="/tag/iran">Iran</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/the-environmentalist">The Environmentalist</a>, <a href="/tag/politics">Politics</a>, <a href="/tag/kurds">Kurds</a>, <a href="/world">World News</a></p>
Flotilla Protest Ship Greeted By Thousands In Turkeyhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/27/flotilla-protest-ship-gre_n_801466.htmlThe Huffington Post News Teamhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-news/
ISTANBUL — Thousands of pro-Palestinian activists on Sunday welcomed back to Istanbul the ship that was the scene of bloodshed during an Israeli raid on a Gaza-bound aid flotilla in May. Activists meanwhile, promised to send more ships in an effort to break the Gaza blockade.<br />
<br />
Hundreds of balloons were released as the ship, Mavi Marmara, sailed into Istanbul's Sarayburnu port, following repairs at a port on Turkey's Mediterranean coast.
<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/gaza-blockade">Gaza Blockade</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey-israel">Turkey Israel</a>, <a href="/tag/gaza">Gaza</a>, <a href="/tag/flotilla-turkey">Flotilla Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/israel-flotilla">Israel Flotilla</a>, <a href="/tag/gaza-flotilla">Gaza Flotilla</a>, <a href="/tag/gazafreedomflotilla">Gaza-Freedom-Flotilla</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey-israel-relations">Turkey Israel Relations</a>, <a href="/tag/flotilla-raid">Flotilla Raid</a>, <a href="/world">World News</a></p>
Elmira Bayrasli: Turkey's Answer to the Armenian Questionhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/elmira-bayrasli/turkeys-answer-to-the-arm_b_800919.htmlElmira Bayraslihttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/elmira-bayrasli/
Turkey dodged yet another bullet in the U.S. House of Representatives yesterday when a resolution "recognizing" the Armenian "genocide" failed to reach the floor for a vote. Had Resolution 252 gone before legislators, it, in all likelihood, would have passed. That is exactly what the powerful Armenian-American lobby is determined to make happen. And that is a reality Ankara must either be prepared to accept or prevent by normalizing relations with Armenia.<br />
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There is no doubt that something horrible happened to over 1.5 million Armenians in eastern Anatolia in the spring of 1915. It is a vexed issue, fraught with intense emotion. Armenians and their sympathizers maintain that it was genocide. It is a charge the Turks deny. <br />
<br />
Given that the Turkish government hasn't made public archived material on the matter or been willing to debate the issue, it is difficult to defend them. The heart wrenching stories of Armenians who survived deportations, starvation and executions make it impossible to do so. There is an overdue need to access Ottoman archives where the world -- and not one side -- can make a more informed conclusion. That would upset any effort for a Congressional resolution. It would also be more in line with Ankara's "zero problems" foreign policy. <br />
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Because Turkey is facing, according to its foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, "pressure to assume an important regional role," the country has made it a priority to "carry out a careful foreign policy." Open and good diplomatic relations with all of Turkey's neighbors is its underpinning. While that has happened with Syria and Iran, it has not with Armenia. That must change. <br />
<br />
In 2009, Turkey and Armenia had launched talks intended to normalize relations. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, along with the Swiss government, was actively involved. Among the things that were brokered was the inclusion of a clause that would have had historians examine the evidence from 1915. Unfortunately, the Turks scuttled the negotiations that otherwise would have been a remarkable step that could have avoided yesterday's close call, and any other ones in the future. <br />
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Passionate Armenian-Americans have lobbied to label Ottoman actions as genocide for decades. Protected by the Pentagon, the National Security Council and the Israeli lobby, the Turks, NATO's second most powerful members, have managed to avoid the Armenian question entirely. Since adopting a more activist approach to regional Middle Eastern affairs, which has included closer ties to Tehran and championing the end of Palestinian isolation in Gaza, Ankara is no longer shielded by anyone. <br />
<br />
Without a strong ally on Capitol Hill, U.S.-Turkish relations have hit an all-time low. Resolution 252 has found the perfect moment to rear its head. There is little political capital to defend a country everyone inside the beltway considers "lost." It is an issue that will most certainly resurface in the next Congressional session. It is unlikely to continue to come out in Turkey's favor. <br />
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That the House resolution labels the Ottoman Empire's actions "genocide" does not make it so. It is a point of semantics, in which there are no legal ramifications. It is nothing more than political pandering to a very effective ethnic lobby. <br />
<br />
Still, it is a pandering that the U.S. and Turkey cannot afford. Much is at stake in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, where Turkey has lent Washington tremendous and reliable support; support Washington is keen to continue. Sadly, its policymakers are no longer in a position to rescue Turkey at the eleventh hour. Nor should Turkish policy makers want them to. Turkey's new independent diplomacy puts the responsibility of tackling the Armenian question in its own hands.<br />
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To start the process, Turkey must normalize relations with Armenia, which have never been formally established. Though the two shared an open border when Armenia declared independence from the USSR in 1991, it was closed down in 1993 over a border dispute Armenia has with its other Turkic neighbor, Azerbaijan. Turkish-Armenian reconciliation must include the examination of historical records of 1915. Armenians and Turks deserve to know the truth about the events that took place at that time. <br />
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Armenians are eager to reconcile with the Turks. The BBC reports "most people in Armenia feel their landlocked country has been too isolated since the Turkish border closed and are ready for it to reopen." Armenia, which continues to suffer from the legacy of the Soviet planned economy, has remained "underdeveloped." Yerevan wants to do business with its economically powerful Turkish neighbor, its only real link to the West. Many deals are already underway. Flights between the two countries are packed with businessmen signing agreements to trade and collaborate.<br />
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Turkey was able to avoid a relationship with Armenia and the Armenian question for years. Armed with a bold, new foreign policy, a strong economy and an Armenian neighbor ready to engage, Turkey has what it needs not only to permanently frustrate Armenian-American efforts for a "genocide" resolution, but, more importantly, to set the truth about 1915 straight. Nothing could prove Turkey's capacity for true global and mature leadership more.<br />
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<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/armenian-genocide-bill">Armenian Genocide Bill</a>, <a href="/tag/armenians">Armenians</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey-genocide">Turkey Genocide</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey-armenia">Turkey Armenia</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/armenia">Armenia</a>, <a href="/tag/armenian-genocide">Armenian Genocide</a>, <a href="/world">World News</a></p>
Harut Sassounian: Armenians Sue Turkey Claiming U.S. Air Base Landhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/harut-sassounian/armenians-sue-turkey-clai_b_800003.htmlHarut Sassounianhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/harut-sassounian/
Over the years, Armenian-Americans have gradually shifted their attention from demanding recognition of the Armenian Genocide to pursuing various legal remedies for the massive losses they suffered between 1915 and 1923.<br />
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They filed several lawsuits recently in U.S. Federal Courts against Western insurance companies and banks. In July, Armenian-American attorneys sued the Republic of Turkey and its two major banks, seeking compensation for confiscated properties and loss of income.<br />
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A new federal lawsuit was filed last week by attorneys Vartkes Yeghiayan, Kathryn Lee Boyd and David Schwarcz, along with international law expert Michael Bazyler, against the Republic of Turkey, the Central Bank, and Ziraat Bank for "unlawful expropriation and unjust enrichment." The plaintiffs are Los Angeles-area residents Rita Mahdessian and Anais Haroutunian, and Alex Bakalian of Washington, D.C.<br />
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The three Armenian-Americans, who have deeds proving ownership of properties stolen from their families during the Genocide, are seeking compensation for 122 acres of land in the Adana region of Turkey where the strategic Incirlik U.S. Air Base is partly located on their property.<br />
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During the Genocide, the Turkish government initially placed all properties belonging to Armenian victims under seal. Subsequently, it directed the Ziraat Bank to hold all proceeds from the sale of seized properties in trust and for safekeeping on behalf of the Armenian owners. These properties were then transferred to the Turkish Treasury and placed under the administration of the Central Bank. The lawsuit accuses the Republic of Turkey, the Central Bank and Ziraat Bank of unfairly benefiting from the plaintiffs' seized assets.<br />
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The three Turkish defendants are currently engaged in commercial activities in the United States which grants jurisdiction to U.S. courts. The Republic of Turkey operates several state-owned or controlled enterprises in the U.S., such as the Turkish Airlines and Tourism Information Office. Both the Central Bank and Ziraat Bank also have offices in the United States.<br />
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In addition to seizing the Armenian plaintiffs' property, the Turkish government has pocketed the rent paid by the United States for the Incirlik Air Base during the past 60 years. The base is operated by the Army and Air Force Exchange Service -- a U.S. Department of Defense entity. Several major American corporations, such as Baskin Robbins, Taco Bell, Pizza Hut, Starbucks, and AT&T transact business and provide services on the base for U.S. troops. These companies have also been profiting from Armenian-owned lands for many years.<br />
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The lawsuit claims that the Armenian plaintiffs "are suffering harm from the loss of use and proceeds from their property." Turkey and its Central Bank's "continued unlawful use of the property causes a direct effect in the United States because a U.S. commercial entity pays money" to Turkey to lease the Incirlik Air Base and "is engaged in a long-term business arrangement with defendants..."<br />
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The lawsuit also states that the "plaintiffs' action is additionally based upon their rights in property unlawfully expropriated by defendant Turkey in violation of international law, pursuant to a Turkish campaign of genocide... International law prohibits the taking of property when it is done in a discriminatory way or pursuant to gross violations of human rights. Plaintiffs' property was taken pursuant to the genocidal campaign of the Ottoman Turkish Empire to destroy, in whole or in part, Armenian Christians in Turkey."<br />
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The plaintiffs assert that after the Genocide, the Turkish government transferred Armenian-owned "businesses, factories, shops, farms, and all other economic enterprises into Turkish Muslim ownership," Yet, the most shocking charge is the accusation that the Turkish authorities used "the proceeds derived from the sale of Armenian property to fund their deportation." It is noteworthy that beyond depriving Armenians of their lives and property during the Genocide, Turkish authorities strictly forbade the survivors from reclaiming their properties, by stamping their passports "Return prohibited."<br />
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The Armenian-American plaintiffs estimate the current value of the property seized from their families to be $63.9 million, since their land constitutes 3.7% of the $1.7 billion "plant replacement value" of the Incirlik Air Base, according to the latest U.S. Defense Department data. The plaintiffs are demanding the current fair market value of their property as well as the accrued rental for the past 60 years, possibly totaling hundreds of millions of dollars. This lawsuit does not include the value of other Armenian properties in Incirlik, including a church and school.<br />
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In the coming months, several other lawsuits are expected to be filed in U.S. courts against the Turkish government and other Turkish entities, including a claim for the Turkish Presidential Palace in Ankara, which is located on land expropriated from the Kassabian Armenian family. <br />
<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/christians">Christians</a>, <a href="/tag/federal-courts">Federal Courts</a>, <a href="/tag/kathryn-lee-boyd">Kathryn Lee Boyd</a>, <a href="/tag/insurance-companies">Insurance Companies</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/turkish-airlines">Turkish Airlines</a>, <a href="/tag/incirlik">Incirlik</a>, <a href="/tag/armenianamericans">Armenian-Americans</a>, <a href="/tag/united-states">United States</a>, <a href="/tag/ankara">Ankara</a>, <a href="/tag/armenian-genocide">Armenian Genocide</a>, <a href="/tag/baskin-robbins">Baskin Robbins</a>, <a href="/tag/lawsuit">Lawsuit</a>, <a href="/tag/adana">Adana</a>, <a href="/tag/att">AT&T</a>, <a href="/tag/presidential-palace">Presidential Palace</a>, <a href="/tag/department-of-defense">Department of Defense</a>, <a href="/tag/vartkes-yeghiayan">Vartkes Yeghiayan</a>, <a href="/tag/central-bank">Central Bank</a>, <a href="/tag/pizza-hut">Pizza Hut</a>, <a href="/tag/taco-bell">Taco Bell</a>, <a href="/tag/us-air-base">U.S. Air Base</a>, <a href="/tag/david-schwarcz">David Schwarcz</a>, <a href="/tag/army-and-air-force-exchange-service">Army and Air Force Exchange Service</a>, <a href="/tag/german-banks">German Banks</a>, <a href="/tag/ziraat-bankasi">Ziraat Bankasi</a>, <a href="/tag/starbucks">Starbucks</a>, <a href="/tag/legal-remedies">Legal Remedies</a>, <a href="/tag/michael-bazyler">Michael Bazyler</a>, <a href="/world">World News</a></p>
Tevfik Arif, Kazakh Businessman, Slams Turkey Yacht Sex Party Allegations As 'Imaginary'http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/22/tevfik-arif-kazakh-busine_n_799765.htmlThe Huffington Post News Teamhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-news/
On trial in the Mediterranean city of Antalya, Kazakh businessman Tevfik Arif has angrily denied charges of bankrolling a sex party comprised of underage prostitutes on one of the world's largest and most famous yachts. <br />
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As the <em>Guardian</em> <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/20/tevfik-arif-sex-party-allegations" target="_hplink">reports</a>, Arif went on trial with nine additional suspects for charges that include human trafficking, establishing a crime ring and encouraging prostitution aboard the Savarona, a yacht once owned by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the late founder of modern Turkey. In September, officials deported nine Russian and Ukrainian women, two of which were under the legal age of consent, who were said to be part of a prostitution ring aboard the ship. <br />
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Arif, whose work includes partnerships with firms in the U.S. and Britain, has denied all involvement in the case. "I am not accepting any of these charges," Arif is<a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/20/tevfik-arif-sex-party-allegations" target="_hplink"> quoted </a>by SkyNews as saying during the hearing, and went on to call the charges "imaginary" before the court adjourned the trial until Feb. 18, 2011. <br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10695841&ref=rss" target="_hplink">According</a> to the <em>New Zealand Herald</em>, Turkish officials have been planning to turn the ship into a museum since the raid. <br />
<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/sex-party">Sex Party</a>, <a href="/tag/prostitute">Prostitute</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/mustafa-kemal-ataturkyworld">Mustafa Kemal Ataturk@Y:World</a>, <a href="/tag/turkish-yacht">Turkish Yacht</a>, <a href="/tag/prostitution">Prostitution</a>, <a href="/tag/sex-scandal">Sex Scandal</a>, <a href="/tag/tevfik-arif">Tevfik Arif</a>, <a href="/tag/human-trafficking">Human Trafficking</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey-sex-scandal">Turkey Sex Scandal</a>, <a href="/tag/mustafa-kemal-ataturk">Mustafa Kemal Ataturk</a>, <a href="/world">World News</a></p>
Harut Sassounian: U.S. Court of Appeals Ruling: Major Setback for German Companies and Turkish Denialistshttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/harut-sassounian/us-court-of-appeals-rulin_b_796727.htmlHarut Sassounianhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/harut-sassounian/
In a stunning development, a federal appeals court handed last week a major setback to German companies and Turkish denialists of the Armenian Genocide. It reversed its earlier ruling and decided that a California law extending the deadline for lawsuits against life insurance companies was constitutional, after all!<br />
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The new ruling did much more than assist heirs of Armenian Genocide victims to file lawsuits against insurance companies for unpaid claims. It also blocked possible legal action by Turkish organizations which could have undone the recognition of the Armenian Genocide by local and state governments.<br />
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In 2009, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decided that a law adopted by the California Legislature in 2000 -- extending to December 31, 2010 the statute of limitations on insurance claims -- was unconstitutional, because it included a reference to the Armenian Genocide. In a 2-1 decision, the court ruled that the State of California had infringed on the foreign affairs power reserved by the U.S. Constitution to the federal government. Two of the three federal judges asserted that the state had contravened the federal government's policy of not acknowledging the Armenian Genocide.<br />
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I pointed out in a column I wrote in response to the 2009 appeals court decision that Judges David Thomson and Dorothy Nelson were mistaken in claiming that Congress and states were prohibited from adopting resolutions on the Armenian Genocide. In their majority opinion, the two Judges selectively mentioned only those resolutions that were not approved, ignoring that the U.S. House of Representatives twice adopted Armenian Genocide resolutions in 1975 and 1984, and Pres. Reagan issued a Presidential Proclamation in 1981, acknowledging the Armenian Genocide. I also wrote that the U.S. government did <em>not</em> have an official policy of denying the Armenian Genocide. I also wondered why the California Attorney General was not asked to file a friend of the court brief to defend the state from unwarranted accusations that it had adopted a statute that supposedly violated the U.S. Constitution.<br />
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After the appeals court ruled agaisnt the lawsuit filed by the Law offices of Geragos & Geragos; Kabatek, Brown, Kellner LLP; and Yeghiayan Law Firm, attorneys David Balabanian, David Salmons, and Erin Conroy from Bingham McCutchen sought a rehearing of the case. Friend of the court briefs in support of the rehearing were filed by the Armenian National Committee of America, Armenian Bar Association, Zoryan Institute, International Association of Genocide Scholars, EarthRights International, Center for Constitutional Rights, Cong. Adam Schiff, and California Attorney General Jerry Brown.<br />
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On December 10, the same appeals court with the same judicial panel as last year's ruled 2 to 1 that the California law referring to the Armenian Genocide did not conflict with U.S. foreign policy. Judge Nelson, switching sides, joined Judge Harry Pregerson in ruling in favor of the Armenian plaintiffs. "We conclude that there is no express federal policy forbidding states to use the term Armenian Genocide," Judge Pregerson wrote for the majority. He quoted from "various statements from the federal executive and legislative branches in favor of genocide recognition." He specifically cited the Armenian Genocide resolutions adopted by the House of Representatives in 1975 and 1984, and Pres. Reagan's Presidential Proclamation of 1981. Judge Pregerson also stated that "the federal government has never expressed any opposition" to the recognition of the Armenian Genocide by any of the 43 states!<br />
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Following this ruling, the lawsuit against the three German insurance companies can resume, opening the door for more lawsuits against other insurance companies, subject to a possible rehearing by a full 11-judge panel of the appeals court.<br />
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In addition, the appeals court's ruling could persuade those members of Congress who may be reluctant to support a pending Genocide resolution out of an unfounded concern that it may contradict U.S. foreign policy. The court's ruling makes it clear that the federal government has never denied the Armenian Genocide and never objected to the plethora of U.S. cities, counties, and states recognizing it. Members of Congress, State Department officials, and the White House should be made aware of the appeals court's critical decision.<br />
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Neil Soltman, attorney for the three German insurance companies being sued, stated that he was baffled by the appeals court's decision. Meanwhile, Gunay Evinch, President of the Assembly of Turkish American Associations, called the ruling "unprecedented," "politically motivated" and "shameful."<br />
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It is noteworthy that Armenians are suing German insurance companies in California, and a Turkish lobbying group is squirming -- for good reason!
<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/white-house">White House</a>, <a href="/tag/international-associaiton-of-genocide-scholars">International Associaiton of Genocide Scholars</a>, <a href="/tag/judge-harry-pregerson">Judge Harry Pregerson</a>, <a href="/tag/neil-soltman">Neil Soltman</a>, <a href="/tag/armenian-bar-association">Armenian Bar Association</a>, <a href="/tag/david-salmons">David Salmons</a>, <a href="/tag/president-reagan">President Reagan</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/state-department">State Department</a>, <a href="/tag/earthrights-international">Earthrights International</a>, <a href="/tag/center-for-constitutional-rights">Center for Constitutional Rights</a>, <a href="/tag/zoryan-institute">Zoryan Institute</a>, <a href="/tag/brian-kabateck">Brian Kabateck</a>, <a href="/world">World News</a></p>
Margie Goldsmith: From St. Nicholas to Santaconhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/margie-goldsmith/from-stnicholas-to-santac_b_795535.htmlMargie Goldsmithhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/margie-goldsmith/
<img alt="2010-12-17-Santacon.png" src="http://images.huffingtonpost.com/2010-12-17-Santacon.png" width="423" height="271" /><br />
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<img alt="2010-12-12-Picture3.png" src="http://images.huffingtonpost.com/2010-12-12-Here's something you probably don't know about Christmas: there really was a St. Nicholas. He was born in 280 AD, in Patara, on the southern coast of Asia Minor, now part of Turkey. He was a Christian priest who later became a bishop. He was also a rich man who developed a reputation for secret gift giving. If children left their shoes outside, late at night Bishop Nicholas would return and put coins in them. The Bishop traveled the country, giving money and other presents to those who were in need, but he wanted to remain anonymous. Parents told their children to go to sleep quickly or Nicholas would not arrive -- in this way, he would not be seen. <br />
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Myths sprang up all around the Mediterranean Sea. Nicholas was said to be able to calm raging seas, rescue desperate sailors, help the poor and downtrodden, and save children. He was soon named the patron saint of sailors. <br />
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If you're wondering why we hang up stockings, the story goes that a poor man had no money to give to his three daughters on their wedding day, so Nicholas dropped bags of gold into their stockings which the girls had left to dry by the fire. Others began to hang their stockings by the fire in hope that Nicholas would also leave them money and gifts.<br />
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Nicholas died on December 6, 343, and by 800, was officially recognized as a saint by the Eastern Catholic Church. In the 1200s, December 6th was celebrated as Bishop Nicholas Day. By the end of the 1400s, he was the most beloved religious figure after Jesus and Mary, and over 2,000 chapels and monasteries were named after him. Over the centuries, Nicholas' popularity continued. Europeans created new stories showing his concern for children. Nicolas' named evolved as "Santa Claus" from the Dutch Sinterklass -- their pronunciation of "St. Nicholas." <br />
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Unlike Santa Claus and Christmas, celebrated on December 25th, Jesus Christ's birthday, the day of St. Nicholas is celebrated two weeks leading up to and on his birthday. Sinterklass is celebrated on December 5th in such countries as the Netherlands, Suriname, Aruba, Curacao, Bonaire, and Indonesia. In Belgium, Sinterklass is celebrated on the morning of December 6th. <br />
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In the Netherlands, Sinterklaas arrives with his helper, Zwarte Piet (Black Pete), who helps disperse candy and presents to "good" children. Sinterklaas has a long white beard and dresses in his red mantle, mitre, and golden crosier. He carries a book listing all the good and bad children, delivering presents to only the good children. <br />
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Children from many countries could not pronounce Sinterklass, so it became "Santa Klass," and then, Santa Claus. Replacing Bishop Nicholas' cloak and jeweled gloves and hooked staff, were a red suit, black belt and boots. Today, in anticipation of St. Nicholas's nightly visits, children in several European countries put their shoes outside and leave a carrot or hay for St. Nick's horse. When they wake up in the morning, their gift to the horse is gone and their shoes have been filled with gifts and candy.<br />
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When I was a child, we left a carrot by the fireplace for Santa's reindeer, and milk and cookies for Santa. In the morning, the food and milk would be gone; Santa would leave a note as well as presents under the tree and a filled stocking by the mantel. I grew up; neither husband was big on Christmas and I'd outgrown it. Today, I still like to look at the department store Christmas windows (although this year, except for Bergdorf's and Barney's, they are pretty unspectacular). I always go to see the Rockefeller Tree, but my favorite is the snowflake on 57th Street. I buy some gifts, but I don't really think about Santa Claus; that is, I didn't until yesterday, <br />
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I was jogging on 59th St. and Park Avenue, headed towards Central Park when I suddenly was forced to dart around a large group of people all dressed as Santa Claus. I figured they were going to a costume party -- but by the time I arrived at Bethesda Fountain, it was so packed with Santas that I had to slow to a crawl. "What's going on?" I asked a Santa who was adjusting his white beard. <br />
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"SantaCon," he grinned. <br />
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Santacon, a mass gathering of Santas and assorted Christmas characters, I learned, doesn't just take place in New York City, but around the world -- in parks, in bars, on street corners. It's an event for people to dress up as Santa, sing, belt out ho-ho-ho, and spread goodwill. Santacon evolved in 1994 in San Francisco where the first "Santarchy" was held. Later, a group of free spirit San Franciscans known as the Cacophony Society turned Santarchy into SantaCon. <br />
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I worked my way through the mass Santas at Central Park's Mall and began to run again. A thin Santa caught up and ran next to me. "Hello!" he said, "How often do you run?"<br />
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"A few times a week," I responded.<br />
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"Yeah, I thought so. You need to, to keep your sanity, right?"<br />
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"Oh yes," I laughed. I pointed to his costume, "And I see how you keep yours."<br />
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<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/bethesda-fountain">Bethesda Fountain</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/barneys">Barney's</a>, <a href="/tag/st-nicholas">St. Nicholas</a>, <a href="/tag/belgium">Belgium</a>, <a href="/tag/central-park">Central Park</a>, <a href="/tag/bergdorfs">Bergdorf's</a>, <a href="/tag/christmas">Christmas</a>, <a href="/tag/mary">Mary</a>, <a href="/tag/swarte-piet">Swarte Piet</a>, <a href="/tag/christmas-windows">Christmas Windows</a>, <a href="/tag/suriname-bonaire">Suriname. Bonaire</a>, <a href="/tag/indonesia">Indonesia</a>, <a href="/tag/mall">Mall</a>, <a href="/tag/jesus-christ">Jesus Christ</a>, <a href="/tag/saint">Saint</a>, <a href="/tag/aruba">Aruba</a>, <a href="/tag/curacao">Curacao</a>, <a href="/tag/santa-claus">Santa Claus</a>, <a href="/tag/eastern-catholic-church">Eastern Catholic Church</a>, <a href="/tag/chrsitian">Chrsitian</a>, <a href="/tag/sinterklass">Sinterklass</a>, <a href="/tag/santacon">Santacon</a>, <a href="/world">World News</a></p>
Joshua W. Walker: After WikiLeaks, U.S.-Turkish Relations in Need of Catharsis, Not Recriminationshttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/joshua-w-walker/after-wikileaks-usturkish_b_797490.htmlJoshua W. Walkerhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/joshua-w-walker/
Relations between the U.S. and Turkey have always been dynamic and reflective of the historical moment in time. As the release of classified U.S. government cables by WikiLeaks has most recently demonstrated, turbulence in U.S.-Turkey relations should be expected in the short-term and ignored only at both countries' peril. The readjustments in the half-century old U.S.-Turkish alliance chronicled through the State Department documents leaked thus far are critical for the long-term health for one of the transatlantic community's most dynamic and important partnerships, particularly at this moment in time as they have reached a tipping point. U.S. diplomats' skepticism about Turkey's dependability as a transatlantic partner and warnings about the leadership in Ankara should be taken seriously, but it would be foolish to write-off the strategic role that Turkey has played and continues to play in a critically important region. If U.S.-Turkish relations are going to weather this latest storm, it will need to involve sustained political leadership on both sides of the Atlantic and a cooperative approach to adapting this historic alliance to the needs of a new Turkey and a transformed America.<br />
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The information contained in the leaks have centered on <a href="http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/turkey/101129/latest-wikileaks-will-damage-us-turkey-relations" target="_hplink">unflattering portrayals of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</a> as being an authoritarian and corrupt Islamist who is surrounded by a closeted Muslim fraternity of advisors where he is worshiped as the Sultan or "Tribune of Anatolia." Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu is similarly described as a dangerous "Neo Ottomanist" Muslim philosopher who has little to no understanding of politics beyond Ankara. Unfortunately, these latest revelations come at precisely the worst possible time in U.S.-Turkish relations that are already reeling from a deficit of trust and severe differences in approach, strategy, and tone on everything from Iran and Israel to NATO missile defense. Secretary of State Clinton's first meeting after the release was with Davutoglu who pointedly welcomed a WikiLeaks in Ankara as a chance to show that Turkish foreign policy does not engage in "double-speak." Erdogan, meanwhile, shrugged off most of the cables, but reacted strongly to personal accusations of corruptions involving alleged Swiss bank accounts which he threatened to sue former US diplomats over. The political points scored by Erdogan and Davutoglu over an apologetic and embarrassed Washington have registered with their Anatolian conservative constituencies that are now lashing out at their opposition both domestically and internationally.<br />
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With WikiLeaks as a new backdrop to the already contentious debates about Turkey's place in the transatlantic partnership, which were in the headlines less than two weeks ago at the Lisbon Summit, Ankara and Washington seem to be publicly downplaying tensions. Given the political calendars in both America and Turkey, which just saw a Republican majority swept into Congress in Washington and a national election less than seven months away in Ankara, this is a prudent move given the strong domestic winds pushing against the alliance in both capitals. <br />
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Washington has been particularly unhappy with Ankara's responses to Jerusalem and Tehran, which has in turn fed the perception of an "axis shift" that sees the re-orientation of Turkish foreign policy eastward as a zero-sum game that is costing the country its traditional Western vocation. Unfortunately for these critics, the rise of Erdogan's Justice and Development Party and its conservative nationalist Muslim worldview as the dominant and unrivaled force in Turkish politics is a fact of life given divided domestic opposition and a stalled E.U. process. Rather than seeing further democratization and reform in Turkey, Washington now sees a final nail being placed in the coffin of the military and secular elites that once protected American interests. Adjusting to the new Turkey that not only does not march to America's drum, but creates its own diplomatic rhythm with the likes of Brazil, China, and Iran, takes time. However, the advantages of keeping Turkey actively engaged with America and the transatlantic community is mutually beneficial.<br />
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Misreading Turkey today will bolster the very internal forces the West fears. It will give credence to the false claims that Turkey can never be part of the West and allow darker forces within the country to move Turkey's foreign policy in an even more extreme direction. It risks demonizing Turkey precisely at a moment in which Washington should be actively coordinating with Ankara. There is genuine cause for concern with Turkey and the U.S.-Turkish relationship has reached a critical tipping point, but all is not lost, even in the wake of the WikiLeaks.<br />
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The silver lining from the WikiLeaks is that, like it or not, all of Washington's cards are publicly on the table with Ankara. Hopefully this opportunity is not lost on simply a half-hearted apology, but rather a much needed catharsis in U.S.-Turkish relations that involves a more transparent and candid assessment of each partner's aims and policies that can be publicly affirmed. The degree to which America and Turkey's interests still converge more than they diverge in the long-term is an open question. Turkey may not be the model partner that America had hoped for, however neither is America the omnipotent global superpower that it has been revered and reviled to be throughout most of Turkish history. The sooner both partners come to terms with the new realities of their relationship, the better.<br />
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<em>Part of the On Turkey series of the <a href="http://www.gmfus.org/cs/publications/publication_view?publication.id=1539" target="_hplink">German Marshall Fund</a><br />
<br />
Dr. Joshua W. Walker is a postdoctoral fellow at the Crown Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Brandeis University, where his <a href="http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/meb46.html" target="_hplink">brief on U.S.-Turkey</a> can be found. He is also a fellow at the German Marshall Fund and a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School.</em><br />
<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/erdogan">Erdogan</a>, <a href="/tag/us-foreign-policy">US Foreign Policy</a>, <a href="/tag/usturkey-relations">US-Turkey Relations</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/akp">Akp</a>, <a href="/tag/wikileaks">Wikileaks</a>, <a href="/tag/recep-tayyip-erdogan">Recep Tayyip Erdogan</a>, <a href="/tag/foreign-policy">Foreign Policy</a>, <a href="/tag/ankara">Ankara</a>, <a href="/world">World News</a></p>
Joshua W. Walker: Will Turkey Remain an American Ally?http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joshua-w-walker/will-turkey-remain-an-ame_b_796710.htmlJoshua W. Walkerhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/joshua-w-walker/
The headline stories from WikiLeaks of the last few days have focused attention on American foreign policy, with a particular focus on the strains within and with historic allies.<br />
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The central role of Turkey in these revelations has caused further apprehension in U.S.-Turkish relations at an already tense moment in the alliance. Given the actions of Ankara this summer with regard to both Israel and Iran, a powerful narrative has emerged in which the West has "lost" Turkey.<br />
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The rise of the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its Muslim worldview as the dominant and unrivaled force in Turkish politics, as demonstrated by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's successful approval of a Sept. 12 constitutional referendum, has only heightened fears among many in Washington. Rather than seeing further democratization in Turkey and noting the domestic pressures facing a populist AKP government, they see a final nail in the coffins of the military and secular elites that once protected U.S. interests. So former friends of Turkey have concluded that Ankara has become a turncoat to the West by switching sides from the historic U.S.-Turkey alliance.<br />
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This would be a grave misreading of Turkey and, worse, could bolster the very internal forces the West fears. It will give credence to their assertions that Turkey can never be part of the West and encourage Turkey to move its foreign policy in a more extreme direction. It risks demonizing Turkey precisely when Washington should be coordinating policies with Ankara. There is cause for concern that the U.S.-Turkish relationship has reached a critical juncture, but that all is not lost, yet.<br />
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America has recently elected a more conservative Congress, and Turkey has been seen recently as anything but a "model partner" to the U.S. Ankara's rhetoric and behavior on Iran and Israel have caused anger and confusion in Washington, as evidenced by WikiLeaks. The links between U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy have rarely been understood in Turkey, and have become increasingly difficult for Turks to understand in light of recent events. At the recent NATO summit in Lisbon, Turkey was seen as one of America's greatest problems regarding missile defense and broader divergences in strategic concepts about the threats confronting the transatlantic community.<br />
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Turkish officials insist that their new foreign policy represents only a difference in tactics, and not ends, regarding Washington. However, they clearly have not internalized that the Obama administration sees preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons as one of its primary strategic goals in the region, along with containing such non-state actors as Hamas and Hezbollah.<br />
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Despite its "No" vote at the U.N., Ankara insists it will uphold the letter of the law concerning sanctions on Iran. But given Turkey's efforts to triple trade with Iran, many in Washington complain that Ankara is undermining the intention of the sanctions.<br />
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Turkey should work with the U.S., given that a nuclear Iran, with proxy allies in the region, would be a long-term destabilizing factor that would ultimately change the region's strategic calculus, which currently favors Ankara's considerable economic incentives for stability and conventional military advantage over its competitors. Perhaps even more damagingly, it would dangerously alter Ankara's relationship with Washington.<br />
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Turkey is at the center of one of the most critical regions, and recent changes to the country and the region have only heightened the country's confidence on a global stage.<br />
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With the world's second-fastest growing economy -- after only China -- in the second quarter of 2010, Turkey is clearly no longer a backwater but a regional hub defining dynamic change in its neighborhood. As the head of the Council of Europe, NATO member, G-20 founding member, U.N Security Council member, European Union aspirant and head of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Ankara has transformed itself into a more autonomous actor.<br />
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However, with greater influence comes greater responsibility. While there are real causes for concern, it is clear that Turkey continues to offer the U.S. numerous opportunities for strategic cooperation and thus remains a critically important partner for the U.S. Relations between Turkey and the U.S. have always been dynamic. So turbulence in U.S.-Turkish relations should be expected in the short-term but ignored only at America's peril.<br />
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It would be foolish to write off Turkey's important strategic role and the degree to which America's and Turkey's long-term interests will still converge more than they diverge. While Turkey may not be the model partner that we had hoped for, neither is it a turncoat that has been irrevocably lost.<br />
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<em>Joshua W. Walker is a post-doctoral fellow at the Crown Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Brandeis University.</em><br />
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<em>Originally published by <a href="http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/CT_turkey2_12-02-10_9PL7KS2_v9.3f6d9c0.html" target="_hplink">Providence Journal</a></em>
<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey-iran">Turkey Iran</a>, <a href="/tag/hezbollah">Hezbollah</a>, <a href="/tag/erdogan">Erdogan</a>, <a href="/tag/us-foreign-policy">US Foreign Policy</a>, <a href="/tag/usturkey-relations">US-Turkey Relations</a>, <a href="/tag/hamas">Hamas</a>, <a href="/tag/akp">Akp</a>, <a href="/tag/wikileaks">Wikileaks</a>, <a href="/world">World News</a></p>
Alon Ben-Meir: The Psychological Underpinnings of the Turkish-Israeli Rifthttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/alon-benmeir/the-psychological-underpi_b_796133.htmlAlon Ben-Meirhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/alon-benmeir/
Any evaluation of Turkey and Israel's national strategic objectives reveals that the perceived policy incompatibility between the two countries is embedded not as much in their objectives of regional peace and stability, as in their assessment of three other geostrategic factors: a) the role and the objectives of other regional players, such as Iran, b) the terms under which peace and regional stability can be secured, and c) the manner in which Turkey and Israel seek to ensure their national interests and remain unchallenged by other states in the area. To better understand the Turkish and Israeli perspectives we must first to look into their national mindsets.<br />
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<strong>Turkey's rise and its national mindset:</strong><br />
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Turkey's rise to prominence, especially in the past decade, is impressive by any account. Ankara determined to free itself from the shackles of the past and pursue domestic and foreign policy initiatives consistent with the size of its population, geostrategic location, Western orientation, and potential for development. One of the first factors behind Turkey's recent boisterous behavior is its rising position in the global arena in the post-9/11 world. Turkey has benefited greatly from its status as a member of NATO, with the largest standing military and one of the 20 largest global economies. In a relatively short period of time, Turkey has significantly expanded its trade with neighboring states. Moreover, Turkey's location as a border country to Europe, Iraq and Iran, and its status as the only other major democracy in the region besides Israel, have allowed it to pursue an ambitious and independent foreign policy with considerable success.<br />
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Since 2002, Turkey has resolved to carve its own sphere of influence, even at the risk of defying the United States, which explains Turkey's refusal to transport American troops and supplies destined for Iraq at the beginning of the war in 2003, its cozying up to non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah and its public condemnation of Israel's incursion into Gaza. Moreover, Turkey opposed the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution imposing a fourth set of sanctions against Iran, while aggressively pursuing political and trade relations with Tehran.<br />
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The voice of the ruling AKP government has resonated particularly well on the Arab street, a factor which plays into a new brand of Turkish populism and a new national objective--that of leader of the Sunni Arab world. The "Zero Problems with Neighbors" Policy, a visionary doctrine developed by Turkey's current Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, has been systematically implemented with vigor and considerable skill. Ankara has converted enemies into friends such as Syria, settled its differences with Iraq, and forged a closer alliance with Lebanon. Moreover, Turkey has reached out to the majority of Arab states, as well as the Balkans and Caucuses-all while trying to enhance its E.U. membership prospects.<br />
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Such ambitious foreign policy initiatives were bound to have some setbacks. Ankara has failed to settle a century-old conflict with Armenia, found no solution to the situation in Cyprus, failed to realistically address the Kurdish issue and strained its relations with its critical ally, the United States. Many Israelis believe that none of these shortcomings, however, have been more pronounced than the deterioration of Turkey's relations with Israel. The doctrine of "Zero Problems with Neighbors" was forsaken in the case of Israel, with whom Turkey has had an important strategic relationship over a period of more than six decades.<br />
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<strong>Israel's national mindset and how it views itself:</strong><br />
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Israel too has gone through significant developments, though national security has remained central in its strategic calculations. Israel has achieved a near miracle in its six decades of existence, as it has become one of the most developed nations in the world with a growing economy, unsurpassed technological advancement and entrepreneurial spirit. Its reputation as a leader in the high-tech sector has led many to call Israel the "Silicon Valley of the Middle East." Moreover, Israel's perceived invincibility stems from its military power, which is among the strongest and most expertly trained in the world. Israel reportedly possesses the fourth largest stockpile of nuclear weapons estimated to be between 150-200 warheads.<br />
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Turkey, a predominantly Muslim state, was an extremely important ally for Israel, with the Israel-Turkey relationship considered by Israelis to be second in importance only to its ties with the United States. This explains why Israelis felt so deeply troubled with the turn of events with Turkey, which, from the Israeli perspective, has unabashedly embraced Israel's mortal enemies, especially Iran and its surrogates, Hamas and Hezbollah. From the Israeli perspective, the country's experience with the Arab states, and especially Hamas, is far more complex than Ankara is willing to recognize. They argue that the withdrawal from Lebanon and Gaza, and the subsequent rocket attacks and wars that followed, prove that the concept of land-for-peace is no longer valid. With this mindset, Israel has become extraordinarily sensitive about its relations to the outside world, specifically with countries such as Turkey, whom Israel could count on in the past as a reliable ally. More importantly, Israelis are growing increasingly convinced that Turkey has made a calculated strategic shift to gain influence in the region at Israel's expense. They argue that Turkey may have given up on E.U. membership in favor of casting its lot with the East to become a dominant regional power, while viewing Israel as an impediment to its regional ambitions. Israel insists that Turkey must come to grips with the real threat to the region emanating from Iran and that the recent improvement in Ankara-Tehran relations will be short-lived.<br />
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<strong>Turkey and Israel-A mutuality of misperceptions:</strong><br />
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Perhaps taken by their formidable successes, Israel and Turkey have failed to live up to the responsibility of their strategic alliance, which covers by its very nature the entire Middle East. As such, it is not enough to have trade relations and military cooperation without a genuine understanding of each other's national concerns and aspirations.<br />
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From the Turkish perspective, Israel hardly reached out to Ankara in a comprehensive way on Iran, not in just intelligence sharing, but also in taking into account that Turkey has a vested interest in engagement-especially in oil import-rather than confrontation with its Iranian neighbor. While proclaiming its strategic alliance with Turkey, Israel made little effort to allay Turkish concerns about the stalled Arab-Israeli peace process and paid little heed to Ankara's desire to play a constructive role to advance regional stability. Israel also insulted Ankara when the Turkish Ambassador to Israel was summoned to explain a Turkish TV series depicting Israeli soldiers as killers of Palestinian children. The Ambassador was intentionally seated on a lower sofa than his Israeli host, Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon, for TV audiences to witness while only the Israeli flag was displayed on the table-an episode which was deeply humiliating for Ankara. Furthermore, Turkey feels that Israel has deliberately misled it, especially in regard to the Israeli-Syrian negotiations under Turkish mediation, by failing to share with Turkey the plans to launch Operation Cast Lead. The flotilla incident, in which eight Turks and one American citizen were killed, was reckless and failed to consider Turkish sensitivity or genuine humanitarian concerns.<br />
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Conversely, the Israelis feel that Turkey's closeness to Iran represents a major point of departure as Turkey has placed itself in the column of Israel's enemies. Israelis are convinced that Turkey made Israel the target of its verbal attacks, especially by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose political onslaughts were designed to arouse Turkey's popularity in the Arab street. In particular, Israel became extraordinarily alarmed when it was revealed that Turkey's National Security Council amended Turkey's policy paper outlining foreign and domestic policy for the next five years to define Israel as a central threat to Turkey, while the paper ironically removed Iran, Russia, Syria and Iraq as threats. Israeli officials insist that Israel's Operation Cast Lead and the flotilla incident provide only excuses for-and are not the real causes behind-the deteriorating relationship. The Israelis argue that one needs to go no further than to read Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu's book Strategic Depth, in which he lays out Turkey's indispensability as a regional and global player. As the Israelis see it, Turkey has abandoned the healthy dose of moral equivalence needed to balance the execution of such a divergent and ambitious foreign policy.<br />
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The suggestion that Turkey made a strategic shift to the East at Israel's expense is not a likely scenario because Ankara knows that without Israel's full cooperation, regional peace and stability will remain elusive at best. Moreover, Turkey needs not abandon its bilateral relations with Israel to become a leading regional player. In fact, the opposite is true. The Arab states have long since come around to accept Israel's reality, they understand that Arab-Israeli peace is the only real option and Turkey can play a significant role in advancing it, which can only further enhance its regional leadership.<br />
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Turkey and Israel have made many mistakes and assumed a zero-sum posture that will serve neither side's national interests. To get out from the corners in which they have painted themselves, both countries must clearly demonstrate that their professed desire to restore friendly relations is translated into action while providing a mutually face-saving way out. Mr. Erdogan will not be able to fully retreat from his demands that Israel apologize for the flotilla incident and offer compensation for the bereaved families. If he did, he would be subject to intense criticism and ridicule by the opposition parties in the Turkish national election next year. That said, he is in a position to exhibit leadership by settling for what Israel can deliver. Similarly, Mr. Netanyahu cannot issue an unqualified apology, not only because this would be tantamount to an admission of guilt, but also because he too is under political pressure to show resolve in the face of the perceived changing dynamic of Israeli-Turkish relations.<br />
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To move forward, both sides must agree to deal constructively with the UN panel of inquiry into the flotilla incident by providing all the necessary information and avoid, under any circumstances, acrimonious charges and counter-charges once the finding is made public. In the interim, Turkey and Israel must commit themselves to initiate a constructive dialogue to reduce tension through a combination of private and official channels, albeit quietly. To begin the process of reconciliation, Israel should agree to pay compensation as a humanitarian gesture to the families of those who were killed on the Mavi Marmara and apologize only for operational mistakes. This would likely satisfy the Turkish demand without an admission of wrong-doing and it could also go a long way toward ameliorating the tense relations between the two countries. Turkey, in return, should allow its officials in major Western capitals to talk informally to their Israeli counterparts. Such dialogues held in a calm atmosphere will have a marked impact on removing the growing misperception about each others intentions. <br />
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Israel needs to be disabused of the notion that the Islamist tendency' of the AK Party is the only driving force behind Turkey's policy and Turkey needs to understand that Israel has serious and legitimate security concerns that cannot be dismissed. In addition, since the United States is an ally of both Israel and Turkey and has a vested interest in improved relations between them, an active role by the Obama administration to discuss their differences could be extremely beneficial. Turkey and Israel can readily justify their willingness to American mediation because; a) their close alliances with the US and b) doing so could improve their respective bilateral relations with the US which have been strained-albeit for different reasons-in the past several months.<br />
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Ankara and Jerusalem must realize that their bilateral relations in the past were dictated by the geostrategic conditions in the Middle East, which have not fundamentally changed despite the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The emergence of Iran as a regional power potentially equipped with nuclear weapons is a threat not only to Israel, but to Turkey's long-term strategic interests as well. It would be an illusion for either Turkey or Israel to think that they can reach their national objectives of peace and continued prosperity without the help and full cooperation of the other.<br />
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<em>*A version of this article was published in the Jerusalem Post on December 3rd, and can be accessed at http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Features/Article.aspx?id=197645</em>
<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/gaza-flotilla">Gaza Flotilla</a>, <a href="/tag/israelipalestinian-conflict">Israeli-Palestinian Conflict</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/benjamin-netanyahu">Benjamin Netanyahu</a>, <a href="/tag/israel">Israel</a>, <a href="/tag/flotilla-raid">Flotilla Raid</a>, <a href="/world">World News</a></p>
Turkish Catholics Fear Cover-Up of Bishop's Murderhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/10/turkish-church-fears-cove_n_795221.htmlThe Huffington Post News Teamhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-news/
<strong>By Jonathan Luxmoore<br />
Religion News Service</strong><br />
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WARSAW -- The head of Turkey's Roman Catholic bishops conference has rejected medical findings that the man who brutally murdered his predecessor, Bishop Luigi Padovese, was insane.<br />
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"The Turkish Justice Minister seemed quite sincere when he promised the truth -- but our church is being silenced by this manipulation of the court and public opinion," said Ruggero Franceschini, the Archbishop of Izmir.<br />
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Franceschini was reacting to the report by a medical panel in the southern town of Adana, published in Turkey's Hurriyet daily newspaper on Dec. 1, which said Padovese's killer, Murat Altun, was mentally unbalanced when he stabbed the cleric in June.<br />
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In an interview with the Rome-based AsiaNews agency, Franceschini said the finding by "professors and lawyers" contradicts a separate medical report on Altun before the murder, which had declared him of sound mind.<br />
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"Unfortunately I cannot speak in court," Archbishop Franceschini told AsiaNews. He said the doubts and suspicions among local Catholics appear to have been ignored.<br />
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Padovese, Turkey's best-known Catholic leader, was stabbed to death at his home by Altun, his driver, who was said by eyewitnesses to have chanted "Allah is great!" after the killing.<br />
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The provincial governor of Anatolia, where Padovese worked, told journalists Altun had been treated previously for psychiatric disorders.<br />
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However, this was vigorously rejected by the church's lawyer, Ercan Eris, who said the murder of the bishop, a monk with the Capuchin order, bore the hallmarks of Islamic militancy, and urged the authorities to widen their enquiries.<br />
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The murder was the latest of several acts of violence against Turkey's 32,000-strong Catholic Church. Christian minorities have frequently complained of discrimination and hostility in Turkey, most of whose 71.5 million inhabitants are Sunni Muslims, despite repeated warnings from the European Commission that the country must protect religious rights as a precondition for joining the European Union by 2015.
<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/murder">Murder</a>, <a href="/tag/luigi-padovese">Luigi Padovese</a>, <a href="/tag/turkish-christianity">Turkish Christianity</a>, <a href="/tag/ruggero-franceschini">Ruggero Franceschini</a>, <a href="/tag/islam">Islam</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/catholicism">Catholicism</a>, <a href="/tag/turkish-bishop-killed">Turkish Bishop Killed</a>, <a href="/tag/christianity">Christianity</a>, <a href="/tag/european-union">European Union</a>, <a href="/religion">Religion News</a></p>
Hoyt Hilsman: Ancient Istanbul Synagogue Reborn as Arts Center†http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hoyt-hilsman/ancient-istanbul-synagogu_b_793276.htmlHoyt Hilsmanhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/hoyt-hilsman/
The Haskoy quarter of Istanbul, which overlooks the historic Golden Horn inlet of the Bosphorus, was once the site of the gardens and pavilions of the Ottoman Empire sultans. In the late 15th century, it became the refuge for thousands of Jews who were expelled from Spain and Portugal and who built dozens of synagogues in the area. Today, Haskoy is a gritty industrial area where barely a trace of the former synagogues remains -- except for one.<br />
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Hidden behind a squalid aluminum foundry and run-down billiard hall is the abandoned Mayor Synagogue, standing as a lonely testament to the Jews of the Ottoman Empire whose descendants lived here for centuries. While its exact origins are in dispute, historians estimate that the Mayor is between 300 and 500 years old. Unlike other historic synagogues of Istanbul, which have been restored to become centers of worship, the Mayor Synagogue was virtually forgotten -- used mainly for industrial storage -- before it was discovered by Esra Nilgun Mirze, a dynamic Turkish community arts advocate.<br />
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Mirze has worked for 18 years with the Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts, which organizes international visual and performing arts festivals in Turkey. For the past few years she has been the international relations director for Istanbul 2010 -- European Capital of Culture. The Council of the European Union awards the title each year to two or more cities, which then showcase their cultural life and development during a yearlong international festival. In between visits to foreign capitals to promote Istanbul 2010, Mirze has been energetically pursuing her own passion -- restoring the Mayor Synagogue not simply as a place of worship, but as an arts center that reflects the diversity of Istanbul's heritage.<br />
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Mirze's dream is to transform the ancient synagogue into a multicultural arts center that will give young artists an international platform for their work. She aims to use her extensive international contacts throughout Europe and elsewhere to bring the work of young artists to the attention of the international art community. At the same time, she hopes to bring an international perspective to young Turkish artists, who may not have been broadly exposed to the global viewpoints on cultural and religious diversity. At a time of economic, political and cultural transformation in Turkey, which has faced many challenges as a secular Muslim nation, both from the West and from conservative Islamic critics, Mirze believes that arts and culture may be an ideal force to meet those challenges, particularly with young people. <br />
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To promote her vision, Mirze has founded <a href="http://www.4129istanbul.org/" target="_hplink">4129 Istanbul</a>, a nonprofit organization to renovate the synagogue and sponsor exhibitions and events featuring young artists. (The "4129" moniker comes from the geographical coordinates of the city of Istanbul.) While the effort has been a labor of love -- and a continual struggle -- Mirze's organization got an unexpected boost from the American artist Serge Spitzer, who visited the Mayor Synagogue and decided it would be the perfect location for an onsite installation. Born in Romania, Spitzer is an internationally renowned artist who uses site-specific installations to explore the relationship between art and locations as they exist in real life. Spitzer's work has been exhibited in museums around the world, from the Museum of Modern Art in New York to the Museum fur Moderne Kunst in Frankfurt, and he has participated in international exhibitions like Documenta in Germany and the Venice Biennale. <br />
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Spitzer was viscerally drawn to the historic, ruined synagogue. "The fact that it is not an isolated art space, with its desolateness and emptiness despite its real existence, drew my interest," he said. <br />
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Spitzer's installation at the synagogue was titled "Molecular Istanbul" and opened at the site in fall 2009. Spitzer's work reflects the confluence of art and daily life, and in the Mayor installation he used tons of green and blue marbles that were brought to the site and deposited on the floor of the dimly lit shul. With only a small window providing a thin shaft of light, the thousands of blue and green glass balls lying on the stone floor create a vibrant and mysterious atmosphere. Critics called the installation "breathtaking," and it drew flocks of visitors during the 2010 European Capital of Culture events.<br />
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With Turkey facing a pivotal era in its history -- torn between the dynamism of economic development and the pull of traditional values -- projects like the Mayor Synagogue, which remind both the Turkish people and the international community of the diverse history of Turkey, are of particular importance. Spitzer believes that although change is inevitable, "Authentic values should not be forgotten while making these changes in the city of Istanbul, which reminds one of a patchwork."<br />
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Mirze believes that the future is bright for her dream of restoring the Mayor Synagogue and for its rebirth as an important center for the arts. "It is a great opportunity and source of happiness for me that the work of a very significant artist like Spitzer is displayed at a place that will turn into a culture and art center in the future," she said. However, she added, "this gives us an even greater responsibility to fulfill the dream."<br />
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<em>This article originally appeared in<a href="http://www.jewishjournal.com/travel/article/historic_istanbul_synagogue_reborn_as_vibrant_arts_center_20101111/" target="_hplink"> The Jewish Journal</a>.</em><br />
<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/jews">Jews</a>, <a href="/tag/islam">Islam</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/istanbul">Istanbul</a>, <a href="/tag/synagogue">Synagogue</a>, <a href="/tag/muslim">Muslim</a>, <a href="/tag/judaism">Judaism</a>, <a href="/tag/serge-spitzer">Serge Spitzer</a>, <a href="/tag/arts">Arts</a>, <a href="/tag/jewish">Jewish</a>, <a href="/travel">Travel News</a></p>
Sami Moubayed: Looking Elsewhere, Not Trusting Americahttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/sami-moubayed/looking-elsewhere-and-not_b_793163.htmlSami Moubayedhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/sami-moubayed/
After 9-11, American intellectuals began asking the question: "Why do they hate us?" A better question for today's world would be: "Why don't they trust us?" If one were to dig through history, a million answers would arise, starting with the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 and the Balfour Declaration, reaching up to the 2003 war on Iraq. The US, simply put, has repeatedly called on Arabs to come to its aid, in combating Nazism during World War, Communism during the Cold War, Khomenism since 1979, and global terrorism since 2001. Never for once, however, did the US lift a finger to help Arabs challenge the one thing that has kept them awake at night, for the past 62-years, being Zionism. On the contrary, it systematically did the exact opposite, using its heavyweight influence at the UN, among world capitals, and within the Arab world itself, to ensure a peaceful and sustainable environment for Israel, in which it can flourish and grow. <br />
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Probably because of the West's colonialist past, when we think of the outside world as Arabs, what immediately comes to mind is Great Britain and France, or the superpower that replaced them after WWII, being the United States. Five years ago, Syria's relations with all three countries hit rock bottom, during the difficult years of the Bush White House. A foreign policy orientation began to emerge in Damascus, saying that the outside world does not stop at the gates of Paris, London, and Washington DC. There was an entire world out there filled with heavyweight nations willing to step into the oversized shoes of the Western world. The list of potential allies was long, Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela and Argentina in Latin America, onto Turkey, Malaysia, India, China, and Russia. All of these countries were willing to do business with Syria, with no preconditions. These countries had emerging and very promising economies, were willing to engage, and happened to share views on topics that were dear to Syria's heart, vis-à-vis liberation of the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, for example, and lifting the siege of Gaza. <br />
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Bouthaina Shaaban, a respected Syrian intellectual who now serves as presidential advisor on media affairs, wrote an article five years ago, outlining this approach. "Perhaps the time has come to bring the Arabs, from a state of complete submission to the hostile West, towards the East and countries that share with us values, interests and orientation." She then asked: "What did we get from the West, to which the Arabs affiliated themselves for the entire past century, except for occupation, hatred and war?" She made reference to former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad, one of the many champions of the East, who similarly "headed East" towards Japan, Korea and China when reforming his country between 1981 and 2003. It was only logical for Syria to pursue this policy even after relations began to mend with the US and Europe from 2008 onwards. The West, after all, had collectively wronged Syria under orders from Bush White House in 2005-2008--blaming it for instability in Lebanon and Iraq, accusing it of murdering ex-Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, and steering clear from engagement with Damascus so as not to cross George W. Bush. When US planes stormed into Syria, violating international law by killing innocent Syrian civilians on the border with Iraq in 2008, for example, the entire West looked the other way. It would have been madness for the Syrians to focus on relations with the US after 2009 when an entire universe was out there, heralding an entire new world order. <br />
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The heading East policy had begun to crystallize during the high profile visit by President Bashar al-Assad to Malaysia in 2003 and was taken to new heights with a similar trip to India in 2008. <br />
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All of that coincided with a concentrated effort to boost political and economic ties with Turkey, a regional heavyweight in its own right, whose bilateral trade with Syria stands at US$1.5 billion and which is expected to reach $5 billion, according to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. One year ago, Syria and Turkey signed 47 trade agreements and lifted visa requirements between both countries, with Erdogan famously telling the Syrians, "Cooperate with us [in economy and business] and we will extract milk, even from the male goat." Trade with China, for example, currently stands at $2.2 billion, while Syrian imports from Malaysia are $119 million, with bilateral trade at $156.7 million. With numbers like these, ordinary Syrians were asking: who needs an Association Agreement with Europe?<br />
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In 2010, President Assad welcomed the presidents of Pakistan, Russia, and India in Damascus and paid high profile visits to Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria. Last summer he visited Venezuela, Cuba, Argentina, and Brazil. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has been to Syria three times, the last being two months ago, and during Assad's visit to Caracas, the two countries decided to boost bilateral trade and create a $100 million fund for development. In Argentina, the trade volume already stands at $158 million and Argentinean exports to Syria have increased by 75 percent over the past two years. Politically, one common denominator for all these countries is their vocal support for Syria's right to restore the occupied Golan Heights. All of them, additionally, are loud supporters of the Palestinians. Chavez severed his countries diplomatic relations with Israel during the Gaza war of 2008; Turkey did it during the Freedom Flotilla incident last June, while Cuba does not even recognize the State of Israel. <br />
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Being close to one country -- if it supports Syria's aspirations -- does not mean severing ties with another, only because that is a wish of the Obama Administration. Clearly the US is un-impressed with these countries stepping into what since 2003 Washington considers its own backyard. This is very true, for example, for Syrian-Cuban relations, which are arousing a stir in Washington where many have asked: "We can understand Venezuela and Brazil; but why Cuba?" The reason, Syria seemed to be saying, is: why severe our relations with Cuba and Iran -- or not invest in them -- so long as Cuba and Iran have done nothing to anger us as a people and nation? The same argument, do doubt, applies to Brazil and Venezuela. The US cannot continue to warmly welcome Avigodor Liebermann to Washington DC, for example, and then expect the Syrians not to maintain a historical relationship, for example, with countries like Iran, Argentina, and Cuba. <br />
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<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/syria">Syria</a>, <a href="/tag/iran">Iran</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/malaysia">Malaysia</a>, <a href="/tag/cuba">Cuba</a>, <a href="/tag/us">Us</a>, <a href="/tag/china">China</a>, <a href="/tag/brazil">Brazil</a>, <a href="/tag/bashar-alassad">Bashar Al-Assad</a>, <a href="/politics">Politics News</a></p>
Joel Epstein: If I Forget Thee O Los Angeles Public Transportationhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/joel-epstein/if-i-forget-thee-o-los-an_b_792855.htmlJoel Epsteinhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/joel-epstein/
On a recent trip to Turkey, I saw firsthand how lives and communities could be displaced when larger issues like war and nationalism intrude. Here in LA our displacement is generally of our own making and of a more innocuous variety. Our love of the car and our insatiable appetite for homes farther and farther away from our jobs have meant a built environment in which relatively few have access to fast and efficient fixed rail transportation or bus rapid transit (BRT). But this need not be our eternal fate. Measure R, dimmed but not extinguished hopes for the <a href="http://www.metro.net/projects/30-10/" target="_hplink">30/10 Initiative</a> and a new and improved <a href="http://www.metro.net/" target="_hplink">Metro</a> mean we have the will and at least some of the cash to build the public transportation system Angelenos need and deserve. Which is why it is so critical that we take advantage of LA's good bones, and Metro's ample rights of way, to build out the best surface and underground transportation system we can afford to build. Not just for our children, but for those of us who choose today to ride transit rather than stressfully commute to work by car. <br />
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Last month, the good news started with a Metro Board vote on the route for the Wilshire subway to the VA and an injection of federal cash for the new Crenshaw Line. Later this week, Thursday morning to be precise, the Metro Board will vote on the shape of the Wilshire BRT. Let's all hope it's a vote for a true BRT with a dedicated lane along the entire route including Wilshire between Comstock and Selby through the Condo Canyon. Ditto for the stretch between Centinela and the 405.<br />
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As I approached a half century recently I found myself reflecting on why it is so important that we do what matters to us in life and make the most of our time here on the planet. The temporal nature of things was driven home for me most profoundly while visiting Ayvalik, a once Greek Christian town along the shimmering Aegean not too far from Izmir, Turkey. Ayvalik is off the beaten path, so most travelers don't get to the little fishing village. And I wouldn't have either but for the wise counsel of Mr. Happy, the proprietor of the cozy <a href="http://www.limanhotel.com/" target="_hplink">Liman Hotel</a>, in Kusadasi near Ephesus in Southern Turkey. Even after visiting the ruins at Ephesus and recovering from the 12-hour overnight bus trip from Istanbul I was in no mood to get on another endless bus ride. As much as I love mass transit, I needed to break up the trip back to Istanbul. I'd been to Izmir years before and though I'd loved it, I was in the market for a new destination. Mr. Happy's reply was quick and self-assured. Ayvalik, and then Canakkale across the Dardanelles from the famous World War I battlefields of Gallipoli, and within easy striking distance of Istanbul. This would break up the trip back to the city on the Bosphorus and would expose me to important parts of Turkey's past.<br />
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As I learned from <a href="http://www.lonelyplanet.com/turkey" target="_hplink">Lonely Planet</a> and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayval%C4%B1k" target="_hplink">Wikipedia</a>, until 1922 and the Turkish War of Independence, Ayvalik was home to a large Greek population. Following the war, the Greek population was <em>exchanged</em> by the Turks for Muslims from Greek territories and other formerly held Ottoman Turkish lands. Visiting Ayvalik, I can't imagine the disruption that the war and the subsequent 1923 agreement on the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations caused to those affected. Most of the new arrivals that replaced the former Greek community were Muslim Turks.<br />
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In Ayvalik and neighboring Alibay, a beautiful peninsula that juts out into the sea, the scars of the 1920s remain fresh, as if they had recently occurred. Wander a block or two beyond the seaside restaurants, Internet cafes, and shops that line the waterfront and one sees countless empty stone buildings, the former homes and shops of Greek residents. It is nearly 2011 and yet it is still haunting to see the empty Greek homes, and churches turned into mosques, by the "new" residents. <br />
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I am not a religious man but I have long known by heart the exhortation in Psalm 137, "If I forget you O Jerusalem, let my right hand lose its cunning." Having visited picturesque but deeply scarred Ayvalik, I won't soon forget its broken down stone buildings, a memorial to those forced to leave their homes and rebuild their lives in a new land.<br />
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If you visit Ayvalik the place to stay, by the way, is the <a href="http://www.istanbulpansiyonayvalik.com/" target="_hplink">Istanbul Pansiyon</a>. Recently opened, the pension, which is housed in a lovely, restored stone Greek house, has a half dozen rooms, some with private bath. I had a delicious breakfast in the garden underneath a large pomegranate tree. <br />
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Just as I won't forget Ayvalik, so too we should not forget our commitment to making LA a more transit-oriented city. We have the rights of way and now we even have some of the money needed to build what needs to be built. <br />
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Let's not miss this opportunity to construct a real BRT on Wilshire Blvd, the subway to the VA (and beyond) and the Green Line to Torrance along the existing train tracks.<br />
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This morning on the bus, a fellow commuter struck up a conversation with me about her being a new transit rider. She said she'd been moved to ride by LA's terrible traffic and poor air quality and to set an example for her daughter, a high school student.<br />
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LA needs more commuters like this fellow Metro rider. Commuters who won't forget that public transportation in Los Angeles is the better way to go.
<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/crenshaw-line">Crenshaw Line</a>, <a href="/tag/jerusalem">Jerusalem</a>, <a href="/tag/torrance">Torrance</a>, <a href="/tag/3010">30/10</a>, <a href="/tag/wilshire-subway">Wilshire Subway</a>, <a href="/tag/istanbul">Istanbul</a>, <a href="/tag/congress">Congress</a>, <a href="/tag/ephesus">Ephesus</a>, <a href="/tag/los-angeles">Los Angeles</a>, <a href="/tag/measure-r">Measure R</a>, <a href="/tag/metro-green-line">Metro Green Line</a>, <a href="/tag/muslims">Muslims</a>, <a href="/tag/brt">Brt</a>, <a href="/tag/metro">Metro</a>, <a href="/tag/greeks">Greeks</a>, <a href="/tag/condo-canyon">Condo Canyon</a>, <a href="/tag/public-transportation">Public Transportation</a>, <a href="/tag/ayvalik">Ayvalik</a>, <a href="/los-angeles">Los Angeles News</a></p>
Hugh Rawson: Fowl Talk for the Holidayshttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/hugh-rawson/fowl-talk-for-the-holiday_b_791870.htmlHugh Rawsonhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/hugh-rawson/
Birds rank high in the lexicon of insult. For example, and this is just for openers, you can be <em>dumb as a dodo, crazy as a coot, silly as a goose, a sitting duck</em>, or simply a <em>dupe</em> (from <em>de huppe</em>, the hoopoe, an Old World bird, said to be more stupid than most). One would have thought that the turkey might have escaped this. Virtually our national dish, it has graced dinner tables in the English-speaking world since the sixteenth century. Thus, from 1573: "Christmas husbandrie fare . . . shred pies of the best . . . and turkey well drest" (Thomas Tusser, <em>Five Hundred Pointes of Good Husbandrie</em>). <br />
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Away from the table, however, the turkey has come to symbolize failure, stupidity, incompetence, and worthlessness. On stage and screen, a <em>turkey</em> is a flop, a play or film that is panned by critics and shunned by audiences. As noted in <em>Vanity Fair</em> in 1927, "'A turkey' is a third rate production." More generally, a <em>turkey</em> is any unsuitable or worthless thing. Referring to a nuclear power plant in East Shoreham, N.Y., a 1984 <em>New York Times</em> editorial called it "a $4 billion turkey." (The plant was closed five years later without ever having generated any electricity for commercial use; by then, the turkey's price tag was around $6 billion.) A <em>turkey</em> may also be an inept person. During Jimmy Carter's presidency (1977-1981), Republican wits regaled themselves by asking "Why does the president's staff always carry a frozen turkey aboard Air Force One?" To which the politically correct answer was "Spare parts." <br />
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This hardly exhausts <em>turkey</em>'s pejorative meanings. <em>To have a turkey on one's back</em> is to be drunk; <em>to go cold turkey</em> is to begin something without preparation, especially to withdraw suddenly from drugs; a victim of a mugging, or someone who is easy to take advantage of, is a <em>turkey</em>, and a <em>turkey shoot</em> is something easily accomplished (from the nineteenth-century custom of shooting matches with turkeys, or turkeys' heads, as targets). <em>To walk turkey</em> is to strut like one and <em>to say</em> or <em>talk turkey</em> is either, depending on context, to use pretentious language (gobbling, in effect), to talk pleasantly, or to speak very frankly. The last appears to stem from a joke that was making the rounds in the 1820s: Two hunters, a Yankee and an Indian, or Native American as we now say, met to divide the day's catch, consisting of turkey and buzzards (or crows in some versions). The shrewd Yankee allotted the birds, saying "I will take the turkey and you may take the buzzard," then "You may take the buzzard and I will take the turkey." And so on, until all the birds were accounted for, leading the Indian to complain, "You never once said turkey to me." <br />
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Even the bird's name is a misnomer. Turkeys do not come from Turkey; they are original Americans. The name initially was applied to the African guinea fowl, imported into England in the sixteenth century from Turkey and mistakenly assumed by the English to be native to that country. This error then was compounded by confusion of the African bird (known variously, depending on sex, as the turkey-cock or turkey-hen) with the New World turkey, which was domesticated in Mexico prior to the Spanish invasion in 1518, and which is ancestral to the one we eat.<br />
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As an original American, the turkey would have made an appropriate national symbol. At least, Benjamin Franklin thought so. Writing to his daughter, Sarah Bache in 1784, he said, "I wish the bald eagle had not been chosen as the representative of our county. . . . The turkey . . . is a much more respectable bird." <br />
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But if Franklin had had his way, would our main course at Thanksgiving be Bald Eagle? That's a thought to chew on. And a tough drumstick, too . . . where <em>drumstick</em> is of special interest for being an old euphemism for <em>leg</em>, a topic that is meaty enough to warrant a separate discussion in my next post.<br />
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<p>Read more: <a href="/tag/talk-turkey">Talk Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey">Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/turkey-shoot">Turkey Shoot</a>, <a href="/tag/cold-turkey">Cold Turkey</a>, <a href="/tag/benjamin-franklin">Benjamin Franklin</a>, <a href="/tag/christmas-2010">Christmas 2010</a>, <a href="/tag/thanksgiving-2010">Thanksgiving 2010</a>, <a href="/tag/sex">.Sex</a>, <a href="/arts">Arts News</a></p>
Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett: Why Should Iran Trust President Obama?http://www.huffingtonpost.com/flynt-and-hillary-mann-leverett/why-should-iran-trust-pre_b_791434.htmlFlynt and Hillary Mann Leveretthttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/flynt-and-hillary-mann-leverett/
In the run-up to a new round of nuclear talks between the P5+1 and Iran on Monday, Western commentators are re-hashing old arguments that the Islamic Republic is either <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/11/AR2010111106147.html" target="_hplink">too politically divided </a>or <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/11/the_sources_of_ssoviets_iranian_conduct" target="_hplink">too dependent on hostility toward the United States </a>for its legitimacy to be seriously interested in a nuclear deal. From this perspective, <a href="http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/obama-administration" target="_hplink">the Obama administration has been more than forthcoming </a>in its efforts to "engage" Tehran; the obstacles to diplomatic progress are all on the Iranian side. <br />
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But a sober examination of the Obama administration's interactions with Iran since President Obama took office in 2009 reveals a dismaying mix of incompetence and outright duplicity that has done profound damage to American interests and credibility. In light of this record, the question is not whether the United States should have any confidence it can productively engage the Islamic Republic. The real question is: why should Iranian officials believe they can trust President Obama and his administration to deal with them straightforwardly and with a genuine interest in finding a diplomatic solution to the nuclear standoff? <br />
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The recent release of the Wikileaks cables <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/opinion/24leverett.html?_r=1" target="_hplink">confirms the assessment we have been offering since May 2009</a>: The Obama administration has failed to follow up on President Obama's early rhetorical overtures to Tehran with bold steps and substantive proposals to demonstrate its seriousness about rapprochement. <strong>Strategic engagement -- <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/15/the_fog_of_containment?page=full" target="_hplink">think Nixon and China</a > -- is not the same as "carrots and sticks". In fact, strategic engagement requires a self-conscious effort by the United States to put "sticks" aside in order assure Iran that it is serious about realigning relations.</strong> And that is something the Obama administration has never been willing to do. (Obama's vague letters to Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei -- dispatched as Obama ignored two letters sent by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad -- were seen in Tehran as just the latest U.S. attempt to "game" Iran's political system rather than to come to terms with it.) <br />
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Of course, this could all be characterized as the product of incompetence and political timidity -- both are surely important drivers of the Obama administration's Iran policy. But, more ominously, the administration has treated participation in nuclear negotiations with Iran primarily as a way of bringing international partners and the American public on board for more sanctions, and, eventually, military strikes against Iranian nuclear targets -- <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/opinion/24leverett.html?_r=1" target="_hplink">as we warned in May 2009</a>. <br />
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<strong>In his celebrated Iranian New Year message in March 2009, Obama said that U.S.-Iranian rapprochement "will not be advanced by threats". But, at the same time Obama was taping this message, officials in his administration were telling European Union member states that Washington remained committed to the "pressure" track of the "dual track" approach, <a href="http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09BRUSSELS536.html " target="_hplink">see this cable</a>. And State Department talking points, <a href="http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10STATE9124.html" target="_hplink">see this cable</a>, disclosed as part of the Wikileaks documents note that "the two elements of the P-5+1 strategy -- engagement/incentives and pressure -- were always intended to run in parallel, because without a credible threat of consequences, it is unlikely that Iran will make a strategic or even tactical change in direction." </strong> <br />
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That, unfortunately, suggests there is something fundamentally dishonest about the Obama administration's approach. Such an appraisal is supported by the way in which the administration has dealt with the question of refueling the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) -- an issue that will be on the table again next week. <br />
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The issue of refueling the TRR arose in early June 2009 -- before the Islamic Republic's June 12, 2009 presidential election -- when Iran's ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sent a letter to the Agency's then-director general, Mohammed ElBaradei, requesting IAEA assistance in finding a supplier from which Iran could purchase new fuel for the TRR. Baradei, in turn, showed the letter to the United States and Russia. <br />
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<strong>Instead of taking the Iranian letter as the straightforward confidence-building measures -- Iran buys the fuel, so it does not need to produce it -- the Obama administration decided to put Tehran in a bind. </strong>By offering to swap new fuel for the TRR for the majority of Iran's stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU), the United States could set a precedent that would constrain the development of Iran's enrichment program without requiring the United States to "give up" anything of strategic significance. And, if the Iranians balked at the proposal, the United States could cite that as further evidence of Tehran's unwillingness to accept a "cooperative" solution to concerns surrounding its nuclear activities. This was particularly important, for -- <a href="http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09TELAVIV2757.html " target="_hplink">as the Wikileaks documents confirm</a> -- the administration had agreed with Israel to set the end of 2009/beginning of 2010 as a "deadline" for progress in nuclear talks with Iran; after that, Washington would launch a concerted campaign for new United Nations Security Council sanctions. <br />
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The Obama administration's "swap" proposal for refueling the TRR was crafted, quite deliberately, to advance this Machiavellian agenda. When the proposal was tabled in October 2009, the Iranians agreed "in principle" to a fuel swap, but wanted to negotiate details of timing and implementation -- primarily to ensure that, after giving up a substantial quantity of LEU, they would actually receive new fuel for the TRR. But discussions with Iran to find a mutually acceptable outcome regarding the TRR -- even if those discussions ultimately proved successful -- would not advance the administration's real agenda: getting the Security Council to adopt a new sanctions resolution. (Strikingly, we were told by senior British officials in November 2009 that the British government did not want the TRR proposal to succeed because, as a practical matter, that would make it impossible to get the Security Council to authorize new sanctions against Iran.) <br />
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So, instead of negotiating, the administration made the "swap" proposal a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. The only diplomatic outcome acceptable to the Obama administration was Iran's "surrender" to the original fuel swap proposal; if the administration could not get that -- and get it by December 31, 2009 -- then it would focus exclusively on sanctions. Thus, <strong>the Wikileaks documents show that the administration rebuffed Turkey's initial efforts in November 2009, <a href="http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09ANKARA1654.html " target="_hplink">see this cable</a> -- made at the behest of the IAEA -- to put itself forward as a depository for the Iranian LEU, pending the Islamic Republic's receipt of new fuel for the TRR. As administration officials told Israeli counterparts at the time, the United States was planning to "pivot to apply appropriate pressure" against Iran, <a href="http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TELAVIV2500.html " target="_hplink">see this cable</a>. </strong> <br />
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In early 2010, having made its "pivot" to pursue "crippling sanctions" against Iran, the Obama administration used tactics reminiscent of the George W. Bush administration's approach during run-up to the Iraq war to press other countries. Among other things, the administration sought to use the prospect of an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear installations to pressure other states into supporting new sanctions against the Islamic Republic. <strong>The Wikileaks documents reveal that, in December 2009, senior Israeli Defense Ministry official Amos Gilad told Undersecretary of State Ellen Tauscher that "he was not sure Tehran had decided it wants a nuclear weapon", <a href="http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09TELAVIV2757.html " target="_hplink">see this cable</a>. As far back as 2005, the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv reported that Israeli officials were casting doubt on their colleagues' worst-case assessments of Iran's nuclear activities; a senior Israeli Foreign Ministry official, for example, noted that Israeli assessments had "from 1993 predicted that Iran would possess an atomic bomb by 1998 at the latest", <a href="http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05TELAVIV1593.html " target="_hplink">see this cable</a>. </strong><br />
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<strong>But senior Obama administration officials ignored these cautionary points. Instead, senior U.S. officials, <a href="http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10PARIS174.html " target="_hplink">including Defense Secretary Gates</a>, <a href="http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09BEIJING3313.html " target="_hplink">Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns</a>, and Dennis Ross peddled the unsubstantiated public rhetoric of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to argue that Israel believed it would be necessary to attack Iran to prevent it from fabricating nuclear weapons. The cables show that U.S. officials used the hyped threat of Israeli military action to press China and Turkey to support tougher sanctions against Iran, even though Israeli sources had given them serious grounds to doubt Netanyahu's highly politicized public rhetoric.</strong><br />
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The Obama administration then adopted a duplicitous approach to dealing with Turkey and Brazil over the TRR. In early 2010, Turkey and Brazil put themselves forward as potential mediators of a deal to refuel the TRR. While the Administration was not interested in a deal, a group of senior U.S. officials -- with the NSC's Dennis Ross at the helm -- persuaded Obama to manipulate his Turkish and Brazilian counterparts for what they argued would be a huge diplomatic payoff. These officials had never bought into Obama's early rhetoric about engagement, and had their own convictions that the Islamic Republic was an inherently irrational and/or unreliable interlocutor. They judged that, if the United States continued to insist on certain conditions in any prospective arrangements to refuel the TRR, it could effectively guarantee that Tehran would never accept a deal. <br />
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On the basis of this deeply flawed assessment, these administration officials devised a plan: Lead the Turks and Brazilians to think that the United States is still interested in a diplomatic solution on refueling the TRR. Let them go to Tehran, before the Security Council voted on a new sanctions resolution, in a high-profile effort to find such a solution--but insist on terms for refueling the TRR that the Iranians will surely reject. Once the Turkish-Brazilian effort failed, the United States would be in a position to insist that both governments -- non-permanent members of the Security Council -- support intensified sanctions. And that would give Washington a unanimous vote in the Council authorizing a new sanctions resolution. <br />
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This is the backdrop to <a href="http://www.politicaexterna.com/11023/brazil-iran-turkey-nuclear-negotiations-obamas-letter-to-lula" target="_hplink">the letter that President Obama sent to Brazilian President Lula</a> in April 2010; U.S. and Turkish officials tell us that Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan received a virtually identical letter around the same time. The letter lays out a number of conditions that would need to be met for an international arrangement to refuel the TRR to be acceptable to the United States. The Tehran Declaration which Lula and Erdoğan negotiated in Iran the following month meets every one of these conditions. But the United States immediately -- and derisively -- rejected the Tehran Declaration as a basis for further negotiations and continued pushing for a new sanctions resolution, which the Security Council adopted in June (with Turkey and Brazil voting against it). <br />
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In conversations we have had with senior Iranian officials since May, our Iranian interlocutors have come across as both puzzled and troubled by the Obama administration's categorical rejection of the TRR. <strong>Why would President Obama act in a manner so deeply damaging to the credibility of the United States on a matter of the highest international importance? As time goes on, the sad truth is becoming clear: in fact, no arrangement to refuel the TRR was acceptable to the United States in the spring of 2010. To put it bluntly, Obama lied to President Lula and Prime Minister Erdoğan. He set them up to fail, so he could get their votes for the sanctions resolution. </strong> From the White House's perspective, the worst possible thing that these two leaders and their foreign ministers could have done was to succeed in winning Iran's agreement to the Tehran Declaration. Without that, the duplicitous plan concocted by Obama's "expert" team of Iran advisers would have succeeded brilliantly. <br />
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This is a truly appalling record -- one that should embarrass every American who values his country's international credibility and cares about its effectiveness as an international actor. The record is certainly raising questions for major non-Western governments about the Obama administration's real intentions toward Iran. And, in Tehran, it is raising the prospect that no American administration -- even one headed by Barack Hussein Obama -- can accept and deal honestly with the Islamic Republic. <br />
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This piece will also appear on www.RaceForIran.com <br />
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