The Mystery of Bob Gates, aka "America's Best Defense Secretary" Posted by Michael Cohen

Justin Logan and Ben Friedman have a must read in Foreign Policy about the myth of Bob Gates as America's best defense secretary. It's worth reading the entire piece, but this section really jumped out at me:

The secretary has an uncanny knack for saying things that get him credit for what he will not do, as defense analyst Lawrence Korb has noted. Gates claimed it's crazy to send ground forces in large numbers to Asia or the Middle East after advocating precisely that in Afghanistan. He said that diplomacy is underfunded compared with defense, but wouldn't surrender funds for the State Department . . . He just gave a speech at the American Enterprise Institute saying that saving money on defense requires re-examining roles and missions -- two days after giving another speech at the University of Notre Dame claiming that all of the Defense Department's roles and missions are essential.

This has always been my great confusion about Bob Gates. He brags about defense cuts at the same that defense budgets have continued to expand under his watch. He has done precious little to reform the contracting process that squanders so much in the way of taxpayer dollars; his major cuts in defense programs have actually not amounted to much; his QDR simply reiterated the DC conventional wisdom that American leadership must be preeminent on the global stage and it must be guaranteed by a military that continues to take on more and more responsibilities - many of which should belong to civilian agencies.

I suppose in the constricted world of DC policy debates this is somehow what defines a maverick or an "out-of-the-box thinker" but in reality it's the profile of a guy who, on defense issues, has basically kicked the can down the road. I wrote about this a bit in 2009:

Secretary of Defense Gates caused a buzz in 2007 when he declared the need for a “dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security.” But nowhere did he call for the Pentagon to shed any responsibilities. Indeed, in his next breath, Gates made clear “I’ll be asking for yet more money for Defense this year.” At the same time, he noted the incongruous sight of “field artillerymen and tankers building schools and mentoring city councils.” Gates remarked that these skills will need to be “institutionalized and retained” in the military.

As Logan and Friedman note the gap between what Gates receives credit for, and what he's actually done is bizarrely wide.

On Afghanistan this story is even worse; for a guy who seemingly has the knowledge to understand that it's a bad idea to send large numbers of ground forces into a Middle Eastern or Asian country . . . he presided over both the Iraq surge and was the biggest civilian proponent in the Obama Administration of expanding the US presence in Afghanistan.

And right now Gates is doubling down on a bad policy by running around Afghanistan telling every reporter in sight that it is not the right time to begin drawing down troops from the fight or even opening political negotiations with the Taliban. He's doing this at the exact moment that the President and his national security advisors are having a debate about whether and how many troops will actually be drawn down from Afghanistan in July. Seems like an odd thing for a Cabinet Secretary to be putting his thumb on the scale in public while the President is trying to make a vital national security decision.

Ask yourself DA reader, can you imagine any other Cabinet Secretary publicly advocating for a position on an issue being debated at that exact moment by the President of the United States? it's almost as if Gates thinks he's a four star general and thus immune from the traditional rules of public comment on presidential decision-making on matters of national security.

But hey he's the greatest defense secretary so perhaps I should just get with the program.

The Afghan Troop Number Game Posted by Jacob Stokes

July 2011 has crept up on us, and it’s decision time on Afghanistan. At the end of last year, a number of reports called for a steady slope of reduction in U.S. forces in Afghanistan going into the 2014 timeline for transition to full Afghan lead. There’s has been no reason why those recommendations should have changed since last fall. But along comes this Reuters analysis, following up on a Wall Street Journal analysis last month, which frames removing 10,000 troops over the next year as a drawdown that was “larger than previously expected.”

Well, it may be that. But it’s also much, much smaller than what a number of experts – including some, such as those at the Center for a New American Security, which are seen as closely aligned with Gen. David Petraeus – have argued for. Below, I lay out all the specific recommendations I’ve seen in order from smallest to largest/fastest. (The math on this is variable, so please excuse any errors – journalism school.)

White House (Reuters prediction, not announced of course): "10,000 troops over the next year" 

Military plans via WSJ: “U.S. military officers in Afghanistan have drawn up preliminary proposals to withdraw as many as 5,000 troops from the country in July and as many as 5,000 more by the year's end, the first phase of a U.S. pullout promised by President Barack Obama, officials say.” 

Anthony Cordesman of CSIS: “Anthony Cordesman, a former defense official and military expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said a drawdown of some 15,000 soldiers over the next year would balance political and military concerns without endangering the overall counter-insurgency campaign. ‘It shows you're serious about reductions. It's the first step in this transition process to 2014,’ he said.” 

CNAS: “Today’s U.S. force levels of 100,000 would draw down by one-third to one half during this phase [by December 2012].” So down to somewhere between 50,000-70,000 by the end of next year, with forces drawing down to 25,000-35,000 going into 2014. (One note on fairness: this recommendation is cavaeted with a note about changing conditions, although I’d say it’d be tough to argue that anything has changed to make the situation any worse than it was in December 2010 when the report was written.)

Playing Games with American Power Posted by The Editors

This post by Nina Hachigian, who is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress.

Yesterday, the House Republicans staged a vote--predetermined to fail-- on a measure to increase the U.S. debt ceiling.  Nothing unusual here; this is standard political brinksmanship on Capitol Hill.

Unfortunately, this is not a standard political issue.  American power and world economic stability are at stake.

The entire global financial system depends in large measure on faith that the U.S. government can and always will repay its debts.  Any suggestion that it cannot can roil the markets. Realizing this, Republicans could have cancelled the vote.  Instead, they attemped to reassure Wall Street executives that it was all just a piece of theatre, not a real indication of Congress's inability to solve this problem.

But it is not wise to toy with a significant source of American power.  America enjoys the unique privilege of having its currency act as the world's reserve.  Every political circus act on the debt gives ammunition to those (often from emerging powers like China and Brazil) who are calling for the world to become less reliant on the dollar, and eventually to replace it with another reserve currency. While there is, at present, no attractive alternative, and some economists think a switch to another currency would be a net positive for the U.S. as it would force us to live within our means, such a move would take away advantages Americans have long grown accustomed to, and the transition would likely be very, very painful.  And, more immediately, some analysts predict that a failure to increase the debt ceiling could send the U.S. back into a recession.

Congressman Paul Ryan now says he is "serious" about not raising the debt ceiling unless the Republicans get exactly the untenable budget cuts they are demanding, though he earlier admitted that a government default was "unworkable."

Congress, the rest of the world can hear you. Please stop posturing and treat this issue with the gravity it deserves.

In Afghanistan, It's the Strategy Stupid Posted by Michael Cohen

In a piece looking at the outlines of the debate inside Obama's war cabinet about Afghanistan policy Rajiv Chandrasakaran previews the arguments of war opponents - it is too expensive:

Of all the statistics that President Obama’s national security team will consider when it debates the size of forthcoming troop reductions in Afghanistan, the most influential number probably will not be how many insurgents have been killed or the amount of territory wrested from the Taliban, according to aides to those who will participate.

It will be the cost of the war.

“Money is the new 800-pound gorilla,” said another senior administration official involved in Afghanistan policy, who also spoke on the condition of anonymity. “It shifts the debate from ‘Is the strategy working?’ to ‘Can we afford this?’ And when you view it that way, the scope of the mission that we have now is far, far less defensible."

So instead of arguing the practically incontrovertible facts that the current strategy in Afghanistan isn't working - war opponents want to use the bogeyman of growing deficits to end the war. Why not just argue the facts?

Why not point out that since December 2009 the Karzai government has shown no inclination to improve governance or crack down on endemic corruption?

How about pointing out that the President's own party is increasingly in open revolt against his policy in Afghanistan - with only 8 voting against an amendment that would speed up troop withdrawals from Afghanistan? 

They could make the argument that current military gains are simply unsustainable because a) Pakistan continues to provide a safe haven for Afghan Taliban fighters and b) the Afghan Army and Police are nowhere close to taking over security responsibilities from the US and NATO? To the latter point why not remind David Petraeus of his confident prediction to President Obama that security could start being turned over to the Afghans in 18 months:

Inside the Oval Office, Obama asked Petraeus, “David, tell me now. I want you to be honest with me. You can do this in 18 months?”

“Sir, I’m confident we can train and hand over to the ANA [Afghan National Army] in that time frame,” Petraeus replied.

“Good. No problem,” the president said. “If you can’t do the things you say you can in 18 months, then no one is going to suggest we stay, right?”

“Yes, sir, in agreement,” Petraeus said.

“Yes, sir,” Mullen said.

If all else fails civilian advisors could even play the trump card that nation building in the Hindu Kush is simply not in the national security interest of the United States, particularly now that bin Laden is dead and al Qaeda is clearly on the run in Pakistan.

The point here is that the cost of the war is the least effective argument against the war, particularly since the President has said that the fight in Afghanistan is in the vital interest of the United States. Arguing about the money raises the idea that if we could afford to stay in Afghanistan for the long haul we should.

Well clearly we shouldn't - and one would hope that President's civilian advisors would have the courage to make precisely that argument.

 

 

Iraq, Iran - Same Difference? Conservative Cluelessness on National Security Posted by The Editors

This guest post is by Sara DuBois, Interim Communications Director at the National Security Network.

 New footage released today shows Tim Pawlenty appearing to mix up Iraq and Iran. After he explicitly establishes that the reporter is “talking about Iran,” Pawlenty responds,

“Well I think the situation now in Iran is such that Secretary Gates is negotiating with whether the United States military will be there beyond the end of this year. And they're looking to the Iranians to see if they invite the Americans to stay, invite us to stay.”

Pawlenty clearly confuses Iraq and Iran.  Unfortunately, he is not only blatantly incorrect in doing this, but also patently unoriginal.

For months, we’ve seen conservatives not giving thought to national security and/or foreign policy even when, like Pawlenty, they claim the mantle of expertise on these matters.

We saw this last year, when the conservative “Pledge to America” failed to address the wars we are fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, terrorism, energy security or other key national security issues.  We also saw Rep. Joe Wilson (R-SC) reveal that it wasn’t until his fifth visit to Iraq that he came to “realize” that Sunnis and Shiites don’t get along, while Rand Paul told the National Review “foreign policy is really a complete non-issue” and that he’s “not thinking about Afghanistan.”

Conservatives ignore foreign policy and national security, and then when the issue does come up, they resort to extremes: neoconservative interventionism or extreme isolationism -- or in Pawlenty's case here, blank confusion.

We saw this movie before, with a cast including seasoned pros like Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) and Rep. Wilson, along with neophytes like Rand Paul and Sharron Angle. Now we’re watching the sequel, and it's just as much of a horror film for an American people who deserve leaders who know how --and where-- to keep them safe.

G-Summitry Posted by James Lamond

Since 2009 and the rise of the G20 as the “premier forum for their international economic cooperation” the roles of the G8 and eth G20 have made for some very interesting debates on the future of economic and political global governance issues. On his new blog, the Internationalist, Stewart Patrick offers a great breakdown of dynamics in the various G-Summitries and the return of the G8. Stewart says the G8’s back for reasons of: members’ want of exclusivity and influence; practicality of working in a smaller group; and common “western” values and goals. But the most appropriate and efficient roles for the two organizations remains unclear. 

Democracy Arsenal itself is divided on this issue.  Shadi tweeted this week: “Just got back from pre-G8 summit in Paris. Came out a bigger believer in sticking w- #G8 over #G20 for political/security issues.” Meanwhile David outlines in a recent report  the “maximalist argument” for the G20 to become a multilateral hub, expanding to political and security affairs. In addition to more natural issues like climate financing, he outlines “The protection of core labor standards/minimum wage laws; The shift away from fossil fuel energy; Prevention of, and response to, mass atrocities; Regulation and internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle; Standards for the detention/prosecution of terror suspects; Cybersecurity; A more secure Middle East,” as potential issues.

I am very sympathetic to the practicality argument outlined by Stewart. It’s simply easier to function in a smaller setting and there’s an inverse relation between inclusion and efficiency for a summit. There is also the issue of more divergent interest in the larger group. For example a summit with Saudi Arabia will certainly have different outcomes on issues like the Arab Spring and Climate Change than a Euro-Atlantic plus Japan forum.

But if we are making an efficiency argument, then who is included does make a difference. Russia is included, but India is not. Yet India is both significantly more democratic and outranks Russia in GDP. Meanwhile Italy, which is already represented by the EU at the summit, is included though it ranks behind South Korea in exports and behind Brazil in GDP. Yet the G8, as Stewart points out, is meant to embody "the identity and aspirations of the world’s most advanced market democracies.” 

The issues on the agenda for this Deauville summit – Arab Spring, Japan’s nuclear crisis, internet freedoms, the global economy and climate change – are a mix of political and security issues that would be more effectively addressed in a smaller forum and issues (for example climate change) that cannot possible be addressed without countries like China and India. I think I have raised more questions than answers in this post. But the make-up of the GX summits and their portfolios over the next years will be interesting to watch.

Whose Side is the GOP's On? Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at Foreign Policy, I have a new piece looking at the behavior of Republicans in Congress over US policy toward Israel - and it's not a pretty picture:

The idea that Congress would openly side with a foreign leader against the president of the United States seems too far-fetched to believe. Remarkably, however, something not dissimilar happened in Washington Tuesday, May 24, as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke to a joint meeting of Congress (a speech interrupted more than 25 times by a rapturous standing ovation). While these types of congressional addresses are rare, this particular event is even a bit more unusual: The speech's intention -- with the full assistance and backing of the Republican leadership in Congress and implicit support of Democrats -- was to give Netanyahu a public forum to offer a rebuttal to President Barack Obama's recent proposals for moving forward with the Arab-Israeli peace process.

As the New York Times reported last week, the invitation was initially requested by Netanyahu of the GOP leadership before the president's Middle East speech plans had even been formalized: It was "widely interpreted as an attempt to get out in front of Mr. Obama, by presenting an Israeli peace proposal that, while short of what the Palestinians want, would box in the president." In turn,Obama's May 19 speech was scheduled purposely so that the president could get out ahead of Bibi's remarks.

It's one thing for Republicans to oppose the president's position on Arab-Israeli peace. In the hours after Obama's Middle East speech, Republican presidential contenders like Tim Pawlenty and Mitt Romney did just that, arguing that the president had proverbially thrown Israel "under the bus." (Never mind that Obama simply reiterated long-standing U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli peace process.) They were joined -- in a bipartisan manner -- by prominent Democrats, including Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, in offering pushback on the president's words.

It is certainly appropriate for members of Congress to disagree with the president's foreign-policy agenda. But it's something else altogether to be appearing to work in concert with the leader of another country in trying to put the president on the defensive -- and seeking to score a partisan political advantage in the process. By openly siding with Netanyahu against Obama and making Arab-Israeli peace a partisan issue, Republicans in Congress are at serious risk of crossing a dangerous line and in the process undermining U.S. interests in the Middle East.

Read the whole thing here

 

Iran and the Bomb: Always on the Brink Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ominously warned Congress today that Iran was on the brink of acquiring the bomb: “Now time is running out, and the hinge of history may soon turn. For the greatest danger facing humanity could soon be upon us: A militant Islamic regime armed with nuclear weapons.”

While an Iranian nuclear weapon is certainly nothing to scoff at—Iran’s refusal to address the concerns of the international community and verify the nature of its nuclear program is one of the most serious foreign policy challenges we face—the ticking time bomb scenario isn’t exactly new.

Assessments regarding the status of Iran’s nuclear program have varied widely over the years. Salon’s Justin Elliot pointed out last December, “According to various Israeli government predictions over the years, Iran was going to have a bomb by the mid-90s -- or 1998, 1999, 2000, 2004, 2005, and finally 2010. More recent Israeli predictions have put that date at 2011 or 2014.”  Roughly a month after Elliot recounted that timeline, Israel’s former Mossad chief, Meir Dagan, said he believed that the Iranians would not be able to make a bomb until 2015, at the earliest. That same month, the Atlantic’s Jeffery Goldberg penned an article where he noted a shift among Israeli defense officials. "I spoke with one of the Israeli officials I quoted in my article last year about the coming confrontation between Israel and Iran, and he put the chances of an Israeli strike on Iran in the next year at less than 20 percent -- and he was one of the Israelis who felt, in the spring of last year, that it would be necessary for Israel to attack Iran's nuclear facilities by the end of 2011. ‘People have very different opinions inside the defense establishment,' he said, when I reached him, ‘but it's clear to all analysts that the virus and the sanctions are working better than we thought.'"

A recent CNAS report by Marc Lynch similarly notes that, “Although Iran’s progress toward a nuclear weapon is often presented as a clock counting down as HEU inexorably accumulates, in fact the clock has been reset frequently. Israeli and U.S. officials have declared routinely that Iran is two years away from a weapon over the past 10 years, with the deadline endlessly receding like a Zeno’s paradox. For instance, Israel’s outgoing Mossad chief Meir Dagan revealed that Israel’s estimate of Iran’s likely date for a nuclear weapon had extended from 2012 to 2015. Similarly, IAEA reports do not indicate linear progression in Iran’s nuclear development, and revise observations about that progress frequently. Indeed, the Obama administration estimates that the Iranian nuclear program has not developed as quickly as expected due to supply chain problems, inferior equipment and technical problems (and not only from the reported effects of the Stuxnet virus).”

While negotiations on the nuclear front do not appear to be going anywhere anytime soon, there may be an opportunity, given all of the changes happening in the Middle East, to influence Iran’s long-term strategic calculus. Ominously warning that Iran is going to have the bomb any day now does not help achieve that objective.

Obama's Strange Middle East Speech Posted by Michael Cohen

So as a former speechwriter, foreign policy/political analyst and occasional blogger I suppose I have to say something about Obama's big Middle East speech yesterday . . . but truth be told I'm a bit stumped.

It was a fine speech, but hardly a major one. There was some tough rhetoric on Bahrain and it was nice to see the President associate the United States more directly with the democratic revolts unfolding in the Arab world and to pledge acceptance of countries and movements that we disagree with but who at least accept "genuine and inclusive democracy." We'll see how that works out in practice, but I suppose it's good that Obama said it.*

And of course no Middle East speech would be complete without a misguided overreaction to comments related to Israel or efforts by discredited and desperate neo-cons like Charles Krauthammer to claim that any rhetorical support for democracy in the Arab world is vindication of George Bush's Freedom Agenda. The less said about these two ludicrous and pointless arguments the better.

But in general, I'm a bit mystified by the whole thing. As near I can tell there was no significant policy shift or announcement. Generally, the President doesn't give major foreign policy speeches unless he has something new or important to say. There was little of that in this address (reiterating rhetorical support for democracy is not a policy shift) - and little sense that the US would suddenly become more diplomatically and politically engaged in the region's most pressing issues. So what exactly was the point? 

It seems to follow a White House pattern of viewing major speeches on the Middle East as a way of changing perceptions of the United States in the region. This view seems to be based on two flawed assumptions 1) that words rather than actions shift public opinion in the Arab world and 2) that changing Arab public opinion about the United States has any real impact on US national security interests.

To the first point, the President gave a major speech on the Middle East in the Spring of 2009. It was a well-received address, but the follow-up was tepid and didn't challenge in any serious way the real impediments to how the US is viewed in the Arab world, namely its support for Israel and un-democratic regimes across the region - or more important the actual impediments to reform. Indeed since May 2009 the peace process with Israel has further floundered and when the Arab Spring emerged the US was caught completely flat-footed. The result is that the US is once again seen in a negative light in the region. 

But it was a nice speech.

Today, if the United States is serious about shifting how the US is viewed in the Arab world there is really only one way to accomplish this goal - putting actual pressure on Israel or involving the US more directly in political negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. That's the only issue that would really move the needle in a serious way, because US pressure might actually have an impact. But I have no sense that either of these things are going to happen so all these efforts to shift perceptions of the US probably aren't going to amount to much. 

Indeed, I think David Ignatius captures the dilemma well, "Each thread of his “dignity” agenda for the Middle East requires something that has been in short supply at this White House: a systematic ability to implement foreign policy strategy through committed, emphatic follow-up actions. It’s this operational question — not the rhetorical framework — that will be the crux."

Precisely. You really do get the sense sometimes that the Administration thinks the rhetorical framework is as, if not more important than the operational question. But the simple fact is without effective follow-up Obama might as well have not given this speech. Simply mouthing US support for reform in the region and offering some relatively minor helping hands to emerging democrats doesn't do much of anything to further US interests.

Part of the problem here is that this Administration seems to operate under the notion that improving the US image in the Arab world is of vital concern to US national security interests. This has become one of those untested DC national security assumptions - but to be honest I don't fully understand it. Obviously, it's nice if people around the world have a good image of the United States and it can have a positive impact, along the margins, of bilateral relations but ultimately perceived interests will generally trump public opinion. Ultimately, we should be supporting democratic reform because we perceive it to be in our interests that more countries live under free and democratic rule (a defensible and compelling point) . . . but because people will like us better? Meh. 

As a foreign policy interest or a counter-terrorism strategy, public opinion is, well, of marginal importance and pretty hard to affect in any serious way. And if you do believe this is an important goal there are surely better ways to go about than fancy words without much in the way of follow-through.

 

*(There were also one decidedly odd turn in the speech worth mentioning; the part here Obama said, "one of the broader lessons to be drawn from this period is that sectarian divides need not lead to conflict" and then talked about how Iraq had turned a corner into a multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian conflict. That's a bit like arguing that the United States had moved away from regional and racial divides . . . in 1875. I mean there was this bloody, horrible civil war in Iraq, so it's not quite accurate to use Iraq as an example of turning the sectarian other cheek.)

Obama's Big Speech: Should He Apologize? Posted by Shadi Hamid

I have a new piece out in Slate previewing Obama's big Middle East speech today. I suspect Obama will not do what I suggested he do: apologize. You can read the piece here. I will also be live-tweeting the speech. You can follow me here. We can disagree on whether televised apologies are appropriate or whether they're political suicide with a certain conservative demographic. But my basic point is this: the Obama administration has been behind the democracy curve in nearly every single Arab country. I’m unaware of even one exception to this. Five months into the Arab spring, the U.S. still funds, supports, arms many of the region’s autocracies. I don’t think this has been lost on Arabs.

So, if there’s one message I want to convey, it’s: we can do better. Also, we should do better. Lastly, doing better is actually in U.S. strategic interests. 

We'll wait and see what Obama has to say about that in a few minutes.

Obama Must Chart a New Course in the Arab World Posted by Jacob Stokes

My colleague and fellow DA blogger Kelsey Hartigan and I wrote a piece for Real Clear World on what President Obama should say in his speech Thursday on the Arab Spring. Here's a quick excerpt:

President Obama will give a speech Thursday explaining his vision of what the Arab Spring means for American policy in the Middle East. Coming nearly two years after his Cairo speech, it has the chance to become a historic address. The speech should include four main points.

First, the Arab Spring represents a profound opportunity to align America's interests in the region with its values. The Middle East that produced Osama bin Laden is, like the man himself, gone. Replacing it are mass movements of ordinary people standing up for their rights. Assisting those fighting for freedom and democracy is a bedrock American value.

Additionally, America has an interest in maintaining stability in the Middle East and, by extension, the steady flow of oil. In the past, protecting that interest meant supporting autocrats and dictators as they used unsavory methods to stamp out any dissent that threatened stability. As both autocrats and extremists are being challenged across the region, a fundamental truth is being learned again: stability comes when the legitimate needs, desires and aspirations of people can be met. Only democracy can provide that.

Read the rest here.

UPDATE: Our piece was picked as one of The Atlantic Wire's "Five Best Wednesday Columns." Thanks, Atlantic Wire!

Threats and Responses Posted by James Lamond

Bob Graham, the former Florida Senator who chaired the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, has an op-ed in today’s Post about the threat posed post bin Laden. While his analysis that the current threat posed by AQ to America is from “significant but smaller attacks” is correct, Graham overstates AQ’s capabilities, matching them to AQ's intentions for a WMD attack.

He says, that:

What do we do now? What are al-Qaeda’s capabilities to do us harm?

For at least the past 15 years, bin Laden sought to acquire a nuclear or biological weapon of mass destruction. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a career intelligence officer and former head of the CIA’s department on weapons of mass destruction, has observed that “al Qaeda is the only group known to be pursuing a long-term, persistent and systematic approach to developing weapons to be used in mass casualty attacks.” Bin Laden’s quest for a weapon of mass destruction was driven by his dogma that each attack against the United States or its interests abroad should be greater than any previous assault. This became operational in late 2002 or early 2003, Mowatt-Larssen reported, when al-Qaeda’s central leadership canceled a planned attack using a crude cyanide device on New York subways because it was waiting for “something better.”

How the Death of bin Laden Can End the "Democratic Weakness" Meme Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at the Atlantic I have a new piece up on how the death of bin Laden can end the stereotype that Democrats are "soft" on national security and give President the political space to chart a new course on national security:

In May 2004, a senior Bush Administration official was asked by the Wall Street Journal about the challenges facing John Kerry as he sought to address national security issues, and in particular the war in Iraq, in his campaign for the White House. "It's never stopped being 1968" for Democrats, the official said.

There was no need to spell out what "1968" meant. It was shorthand for the caricature of Democratic "weakness" and anti-military attitudes, dating from the party's opposition to the war in Vietnam, that has become the prism by which the Democrats are viewed on national security issues -- and by which the party often views itself. The challenge for Kerry wasn't Iraq; it was in battling this negative perception of Democrats as weak and indecisive on national security and foreign policy. As time would tell, it became one of the proximate causes of his defeat that November.

For more than four decades the perception of Democratic "weakness" on foreign policy and national security has been one of the most dominant and distorting political stereotypes in modern American politics -- affecting not only how voters perceive Democrats, but also how the party approaches these issues. It has become a knee jerk political mindset that shapes the attitudes, policy preferences and even career choices of progressive foreign policy and national security analysts. Perceived political vulnerability about the party's ability to keep America safe and strong has led Democrats, time and time again, to engineer their national security policies around looking tough rather than necessarily doing what they believe is best for the country. The politics of vulnerability don't just influence policy -- often, they trump it altogether.

But on Sunday, May 1, that meme may have finally died.

With the killing of bin Laden, Democrats have, for the first time in more than four decades, the chance to retire the notion that they are not tough enough to protect America from external danger. Beyond that immediate political function, it provides Democrats with the opportunity to chart a new course for American foreign policy. The question now is whether they will take advantage of this previously unbeknown political space.

Read the whole thing here

Looking Past the 'Orchestra Pit' on China Posted by The Editors

This post by Nina Hachigian, who is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress.

I went to an interesting exhibit yesterday, called 91 92 93, on display at the Schindler house in Los Angeles. In it, three artists, Andrea Fraser, Simon Leung and Lincoln Tobier, each revisited a work they had done some 20 years earlier. Tobier’s piece documented the political impact of Roger Ailes, long before Rupert Murdoch hired him to create Fox News. Tobier told the story of how Roger Ailes fathered the “orchestra pit” theory of the media with this question: “If you have two guys on a stage and one guy says, 'I have a solution to the Middle East problem,' and the other guy falls in the orchestra pit, who do you think is going to be on the evening news?”

Ailes has certainly taken his theory to new heights with Fox News.  But it is pervasive now, and no more so than with China.   Only certain issues with China make the headlines—the value of its currency, the new jet fighter, the recent brutal crackdown on artists and political activists.  While those issues are each very important, what the media coverage of the US-China relationship does not tend to reveal is how broad it has become.

In addition to the mother of all bilateral forums, the annual Strategic & Economic Dialogue that was just held in Washington, D.C. , where the big issues like trade imbalances are on the agenda, look below at the list of over 40 other formal dialogues or cooperative efforts that exist or soon will between the US and Chinese governments.  This is far from a complete list, and it does not include the multilateral fora where the US and China are always interacting, like the G-20, IMF, East Asia Summit and APEC, among others.  Non-government cooperative efforts are not listed either.

All this exchanging can lead to tangible change.  The deliverables from this week’s S&ED were not breakthroughs, but were progress nonetheless.  And we cannot expect much more when two massive nations with different systems of government, history and values are trying to work things out. 

There is no G-2.  The US and China, even if they did see eye-to-eye, could not solve global problems on their own.  But deepening the very broad working relationship is a step in the right direction.

New Middle East Speech: Is there one story the President Can Tell Americans and the World? Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Even leaving aside the thorny problem of a Middle East peace plan, the White House has set itself a very difficult challenge in putting a "New Middle East speech" on the agenda:  too much demand.  Americans are still struggling to decide what to make of events from Tunisia and Egypt to Libya to Syria to Pakistan.  The political jockeying over them has paused, well, no, it hasn't, with Mitch Daniels wrapping himself in the flag of Syrian protestors today.  Meanwhile, the peoples of the region mix hope, skepticism, and some well-deserved indifference -- the Egyptians made their own revolution, after all -- our way.  Speaking to one audience in a way that is intelligible and doesn't trip on the internal quirks of the other audience will be enormously difficult.  Herewith, four themes that should cross the divide:]

Aligning U.S. interests with values.  Americans cheered with Egyptians --and Syrians -- in the streets and prayed for Ghaddafi's victims as they did for bin Laden.  time to remind everyone that Muslims suffered greatly from Al Qaeda terrorism, and to re-amplify the Administration's words about the rights of peoples everywhere.  Time also to explain to Americans how, long-term, this will be in our security interest.

No cookie-cutters, no short-term fixes, no naivete.  My "three nos" for the Middle East.  Arab peoples themselves, and their well-wishers abroad, will have to invest in economic growth, institutional reform and rule of law.  The US will have to be patient and get used to partners who speak their own minds and take their time -- and sometimes take decisions that we don't like.  Equally, our core interests -- including Israel's security but also our economic and terrorism cocnerns -- will still be our core interests.  And, tragically, there are no quick fixes.

The civilian toolkit comes of age.  American and Arab audiences alike can profitably hear the US make a new commitment to leading with diplomatic, economic, social and communications tools -- from Twitter to debt relief -- and to spell out how, if the US invests in those tools, and in partnerships that let other countries and institutions do some of the work, we'll reap rewards even in a time of sparse budgets.

Understanding the challenges ahead.  Firm messages to Al Qaeda and other estremist groups that they will not be allowed to grow strong at the expense of weak new governments; to Iran that efforts to gain in the region will further expose its government's own weakness as its people seek the freedom of Egyptians.  And a down payment on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process -- unfortunately, perhaps the thing the Arab world wants most to hear -- a pledge of unshakable support for Israel, and greater engagement with the Israeli people (ie, a trip date...) combined with plain language about how Israel must prepare itself to make peace and live in a world of newly- and legitimately-empowered Arab citizens; and a pledge of continued support for legitimately elected Palestinian authorities that meet the conditions previously set out (ie, who is in government and how matters, even under a Fatah-Hamas unity government) and that use the public legitimacy conferred by teh unity government to take, as well, the hard steps to get ready for peace.

9/11-Style Commission Needed to Review US Policy on Pakistan Posted by The Editors

This post by Scott Bates, the former senior policy advisor for the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee. Bates is currently vice-president of the Center for National Policy and can be reached at sdbates66@hotmail.com.

In a world full of national security challenges, none demands more urgent focus than the conundrum that is Pakistan. For at least a decade, Pakistan has consistently been one of the top three national security worries for the United States with issues ranging from being a center of nuclear proliferation to its inability to prevent its territory from serving as a sanctuary for the Taliban/Al Qaeda alliance launching attacks against US troops in Afghanistan.

The recent killing of Osama Bin Ladin revealed at best, a Pakistani regime either unwilling or unable to be an effective ally in our ongoing battle against Al Qaeda.  Troubling questions need to be answered. What did Pakistani officials know about Bin Ladin’s presence and when did they know it? How effectively have Pakistani national security officials used $20 Billion in US aid to combat Al Qaeda and the Taliban? Why is the main debate in Pakistan today focusing on the US “violation” of their sovereignty in attacking Bin Ladin instead of on their own failure to find him? Is Pakistan worthy of the designation of major non-NATO ally and the steady stream of financial assistance provided by the American people? 

To answer these questions and fashion a long term and sustainable approach to relations with Pakistan, Congress should authorize and the President should support the creation of a “Commission on US-Pakistan Relations”.  Precedents are available for quickly moving forward with just such an effort. 

The 9/11 Commission served as a thorough and credible fact finder concerning the events of 9/11. Its factual findings provided a necessary narrative on the events and raised questions that then could be answered with future policy action.  The Iraq Study Group trained consistent attention on one national security challenge and provided a series of potential options for policy makers. In each of these instances the national security challenge to be confronted needed sustained focus and bi-partisan engagement. In a world of rapidly changing events demanding many responses, the President and the US Congress need the assistance of just such a Commission to provide the answers and options regarding our past and future relationship with Pakistan.

A “Commission on US Pakistan-Relations” should be provided with sufficient resources to gain a high level expert staff that is able to conduct interviews, investigations and support hearings that could culminate in a Final Report to be delivered within six months.  The Commission Membership should be appointed by a combination of the President and Congress; two from the Speaker of the House, one from the Democratic Leader of the House, two from the Senate Majority Leader, one from the Senate Minority Leader, and five from the President of the United States. 

Our relationship with Pakistan is too important for the security of our nation, and for the peace of South Asia region to let be shaped by the pressures of cable talk shows and the necessarily shifting attention of senior policy makers.  The creation of a “Commission on US-Pakistan Relations” can go far toward letting the American people know that policymakers are not satisfied with the status quo, are committed to finding answers and charting a new and sustainable way forward for protecting our interests in this most challenging part of the world.

The Pakistani Conundrum Posted by Michael Cohen

One of the more interesting elements of the OBL post-mortem is the emerging criticism of Pakistani behavior in allowing the world's most wanted terrorist to stay hidden for years in its country. American policymakers and analysts now seem shocked, shocked to discover that Pakistan is an uncertain and unhelpful ally to the United States.

Forgive me for saying: where have these people been? Let's step back for a second and remember what we basically knew about Pakistan before last Sunday. 

1) Pakistan has actively harbored remnants of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, for years. The basic assumption in the higher reaches of the US government is that bin Laden and other top lieutenants escaped across the Afghan-Pakistani border in the wake of the battle of Tora Bora and have been there ever since. Now whether elements in the Pakistani government or military knew where bin Laden is and were helping him or even if they didn't know where he was - it was not exactly a secret that bin Laden has called Pakistan home for much of the past 9 1/2 years. And it's also not a secret that Pakistan wasn't expending much of any effort to help the US find him.

2) Terrorist attacks against the US have been actively plotted from Pakistan. Just as one small example, we know that Faisal Shahzad, the convicted terrorist who sought to blow up a bomb in Times Square was trained in bomb-making techniques in Waziristan, Pakistan. So not only was Pakistan home to some of the most wanted terrorists in the world, but it's terrain served as a training ground for other terrorist groups intent on killing Americans - and of course was also a staging ground for larger attacks, like the Mumbai massacre, in India.

3) Pakistan is aiding and abetting the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Lastly, we know that Pakistan is actively supporting and providing safe haven to Afghan Taliban insurgents that are killing American soldiers on an almost daily basis. We know that the Quetta Shura continues to serve as a sanctuary for Afghan Taliban leaders and the movement's political leadership - and remains unmolested by Pakistan. We know that Pakistan has a long-standing relationship with the Haqqani network. We know that the Pakistani foreign minister is actively encouraging the Karzai government to abandon United States support. We know that Pakistan while the recipient of large amounts of US aid has since 2009 actively sought to undermine US military and political aims in Afghanistan.

So to sum up, well before Osama bin Laden's body was dumped in the Arabian Sea, we knew that the Pakistani government is a state sponsor and abettor of international and regional terrorism; we know that it is assisting groups with the blood of American soldiers on its hands and we know that it harbored and provided safe haven for al Qaeda members - either on purpose or via incompetence - for nearly 10 years.  Now we can quibble over whether these were active decisions of the Pakistani government or whether they being carried out by rogue elements of the country's military and in particular its intelligence services (an issue that Mosharraf Zaidi tackles with great brilliance today) - but we do know that the Pakistani government has expended little to no effort in dealing with these issues. And we know that billions in US assistance has done little to influence Pakistani behavior either in shedding ties with jihadist terror groups or acting in support of direct US national interests.

So why again is everyone surprised to discover that bin Laden was living a hop, skip and jump from Pakistan's capital? If anything it only serves to confirm what we already knew about Pakistan but for some reason, had long denied.

Killing Osama bin Laden Was a Legal Act Posted by Michael Cohen

I’ve been a bit out of the loop for a few days but I’ve watching with almost stunned fascination the debate that has unfolded over the past few days about the legality of killing Osama bin Laden. 

In fairness, part of the problem is with how badly the White House has bungled the public information part of this job.  I give the White House and the President credit for the execution of this operation and the manner in which they have pursued bin Laden since taking office. But their behavior since Sunday night - and their public narrative on what happened then - has only added to the confusion.

I will forgive the President for getting some basic elements of the story wrong the night the attack happened, but the fact that John Brennan went before the cameras on Monday and offered a briefing that had key facts wrong and was corrected by White House press spokesmen Jay Carney the next day is not only embarrassing but it also fed the sense that the White House is not being honest. (Although at the same time credit must be given for correcting the record after the fact).  

In a sense though, none of this should be terribly surprising. First reports on an incident like this, where you’re likely dealing with a host of contradictory eyewitness reports, are going to get some basic facts wrong.  It’s a bit like a game of telephone. However, the White House should have waited before putting the whole story out and considering the sensitivity of the matter they should have gotten their facts straight. Still, while this certainly seems to have been badly handled I’m having a hard time seeing it as conspiratorial. 

The problem, however, is that others hold a different view. The White House’s mistakes have led to a bizarre cottage industry of claims about what did happen – and some rather exaggerated arguments about he legal ramifications.  Today for example, Glenn Greenwald argues that many people, including Democrats, are indifferent about how Osama bin Laden was killed because they just view his death as an unadulterated good – legality be damned. This is what he calls the bin Laden exception. I am sympathetic to this argument because I'm sure it accurately reflects the views of many people. But it rather clearly ignores an entirely reasonable position regarding OBL’s killing – that he was a legitimate military target and everything that happened in Pakistan on Sunday night was legal and proper.

From that perspective it is important to remember that based on the 2001 Authorization of the Use of Military Force (AUMF) it is the view of the US Congress – and the President – that the US was at war with al Qaeda.

Here’s the key phrase from the AUMF:

That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.

This is a legal argument that has been consistently upheld by the US Congress; by Presidents Bush and Obama, by the Supreme Court and by the United Nations.

Now I understand that some may not support this legal opinion, but it is vitally important to acknowledge that viewing bin Laden as a legitimate military target – and no different from any solider on a battlefield – is not only a completely reasonable argument, it is one that is firmly grounded in US and international law and is supported by a wide array of legal scholars both inside and outside of government. So this isn’t just a case of victor’s justice or revenge. It is legally appropriate to believe that the US had the right to go into this compound and kill Osama bin Laden, even if he wasn’t carrying a weapon.

There is of course an exception -- as there would be an exception in any battlefield engagement – was Osama trying to surrender?  To date the only “evidence” that he was is a report passed along by an anonymous Pakistani intelligence officials (the same people who were either lying about OBL’s whereabouts in Paksitan or unaware of them) claiming that OBL’s daughter says he was held captured for 10 minutes and then killed. This hardly qualifies as evidence and I find remarkable that Greenwald, for one, considers it as legitimate a source as what is announced publicly by US officials. However, it should be noted that if this story is true it would be an illegal act and absolutely worthy of further investigation: and it would represent an extrajudicial execution.

The fact is, only if Osama was in the act of surrendering or had been captured and killed is there any real legal question here. Otherwise this is the legitimate killing of an appropriate military target. This is in fact, very similar to the killing of Admiral Yamamoto during WWII, an unarmed, but legitimate military target shot down by US bombers

Now the argument has also been made that after some initial armed resistance no other shots were fired at the Navy Seals thus suggesting that OBL wasn’t resisting. That is Monday morning quarterbacking. There is simply no way for the US troops involved in this engagement to know that resistance had ended; that they had taken fire suggested that they were being violently opposed and they every reason to fear further attack. Thus any individual in the compound would likely – and rightly - have been considered a threat.

Second, the fact that Osama didn’t have a weapon is irrelevant. A soldier can be killed on the battlefield even if they are unarmed. Osama is no different. Also the fact that soldiers allegedly saw him pop his head out and retreat deeper into his compound is, in fact, an act of resistance and again makes him a legitimate target.

There is one issue here – was Osama trying to surrender? Were his arms raised in the air; was he waving a white flag etc?  If not, the US Navy Seals in question had every legal right to kill him.

Lastly, one of the further problems with this debate is we also get into the question of second guessing decision made by soldiers on the ground, in highly stressful situations. Should the Seals have given bin Laden an opportunity to surrender? Did they misread his actions coming into his bedroom? Perhaps, but I’m not sure any of us are in a position to say otherwise or question with any veracity on the ground decision-making during a military engagement. That these troops were instructed to kill bin Laden - and only capture him if he surrendered - is not only not suspicious, it's completely appropriate. After all, he was a legitimate military target. That the US soldiers encountered initial resistance and retreat of that target only increased the likelihood that he would be killed on the spot.

The very fact that so many of us are gleeful over the fact that this monster is dead doesn’t change any of those basic facts or obviate the legality of what happened. Osama got what he deserved; both legally and morally.

UPDATED**: Experts Comment on Collecting Effective Intelligence Posted by The Editors

In the aftermath of the killing of Osama bin Laden and the rampant speculation on the nature of the intelligence used to plan the raid, the National Security Network and the Center for American Progress held a press call this morning with Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Paul Eaton, NSN Senior Advisor; Ken Gude, Managing Director for National Security at CAP; Matthew Alexander, Air Force interrogator who led the team that tracked down the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq; and Glenn L. Carle, former CIA Clandestine Service officer and Deputy National Intelligence officer for Transnational Threats, to examine the methods used by military and intelligence officials -- what these practices and policies are and how they fit into the United States' overall counterterrorism and foreign policy.

Listen to the call here .

Read the transcript here.

 

Selected highlights from the call (more after the jump):

**

MATTHEW ALEXANDER: I’ll be the person to go on record and say that we do know that other interrogation techniques would have worked and produced more info definitively.  And why do I say that?  Because we have Saddam Hussein, who was captured without using them, and we have Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who my team tracked down and killed, without using them.

**

QUESTION: I was wondering if [...] what this demonstrates is – what we know now is that actually there was more information left, you know, undiscovered because of torture rather than discovered because of torture?

GLENN CARLE:  [...] The answer to that is yes, that I’m convinced that that’s the case from personal, first-hand experience.

**

MAJ. GEN. (RET.) PAUL D. EATON: Enhanced interrogation techniques has a corrosive effect on the good order and discipline [of American troops] to the point where the commanding general at the time, General Petraeus, had to issue a letter that set a higher standard for the conduct of the American soldier than was set by the president and the vice president and secretary of defense of the United States.

EATON: This is a war of ideas and I will not allow the Taliban to set the moral standard for America. 

**

KEN GUDE: It [the decision by the Bush administration in 2005 to shut down its bin Laden unit in the black sites in Eastern Europe] seems to indicate that the Bush administration itself did not view information that was being produced from those interrogations as in any way decisive or critical in the hunt for bin Laden.

**

Pakistani Military Posted by David Shorr

Decision Points: Tora Bora vs. Abbottabad Posted by Jacob Stokes

As deluge of news coverage on the death of Osama bin Laden continues, and some go to great lengths to credit George Bush with putting policies in place that ultimately led to bin Laden's death, it’s worth reminding ourselves that President Bush and his administration had an opportunity to nab bin Laden at Tora Bora, Afghanistan, in 2001. But their decision-making during that episode failed. The opportunity was squandered. In contrast, in Abbotabad, Pakistan, President Obama’s clear-eyed choices and ability to effectively multi-task in the last few weeks made all the difference. Three key decisions illustrate the difference between the meek, unfocused choices Bush made and what ultimately caught bin Laden.

Prioritizing competing demands

Peter Bergen’s definitive account of the battle for Tora Bora explains how the Bush administration’s attention was distracted by the planning process for Iraq. “In late November, Donald Rumsfeld told Franks that Bush ‘wants us to look for options in Iraq.’… Franks points out in his autobiography that his staff was already working seven days a week, 16-plus hours a day, as the Tora Bora battle was reaching its climax. Although Franks doesn’t say so, it is impossible not to wonder if the labor-intensive planning ordered by his boss for another major war was a distraction from the one he was already fighting.” It’s a well-worn story but one worth repeating: President Bush botched a golden opportunity for a quick, early, relatively decisive victory in the war on terror in favor of pursuing the ultimate war of choice in Iraq.

In contrast, President Obama – while managing the uprising in the Middle East, the war in Afghanistan and a government on the brink of shutdown – could have been too distracted to pay attention to what were surely incomplete intelligence reports saying the CIA had located bin Laden. He could have followed the advice of members of Congress and put the U.S. in the lead of the war in Libya, which would have occupied a significant portion of the national security apparatus’s attention. All of those things could have taken President Obama’s eye off the goal of capturing bin Laden. This opportunity could have been squandered. (Of course, most presidents will take any opportunity – even a risky one – to score a foreign policy victory of this nature. And rightfully so, but that makes President Bush’s failure at Tora Bora all the more stunning.)

Global War on Terror RIP Posted by Michael Cohen

Let me start off by saying that I am really glad Osama bin Laden is dead. He attacked my hometown, he murdered my good friend, Brock Safronoff and his actions led to the deaths of many more Americans and far more Muslims. Good riddance to him and the blight that he represented on humanity.

Now with that out of the way, here's my hastily crafted piece for World Politics Review on why the death of bin Laden could mean an end to the war on terrorism:

While the death of Osama bin Laden represents the long overdue demise of one man, its impact on the long-term trajectory of American foreign policy is likely to be more profound: Along with bin Laden, so too dies the "global war on terrorism." This does not mean that there are no longer any terrorists who want to kill Americans and other Westerners. Neither does it mean that al-Qaida will simply disappear overnight. And another major attack could return the U.S. and its allies to a war footing.

But bin Laden's death does mean that the exaggerated role that terrorism has played in America's foreign policy discussions for the past 10 years can finally come to an end. Osama bin Laden, for better or worse, was the face of the terrorist threat to America. As long as he was at large, not only would the war on terrorism remain seemingly unfinished in the eyes of the American people, but the threat would remain viscerally real -- even though from all accounts his operational role in al-Qaida had diminished. With his death, the terrorism narrative that has held this country in its thrall for 10 terrible years has taken a rather significant and perhaps fatal hit.

. . . For 10 long years the American people allowed the deaths of 3,000 of their fellow citizens -- and the possibility of additional deaths -- to justify squandering blood, treasure and policymaking attention on a breathtaking scale. Sunday night, the life of a nihilistic, pyschopathic and deranged terrorist came to an end. That his death might signal the beginning of the end of our own national bloodletting makes the news all the better.

Read the whole thing here

The Trouble with Petraeus Pt. 2 Posted by Michael Cohen

So I hadn't quite realized how unpopular David Petraeus was in Pakistan until I read this piece in the New York Times today:

The appointment of Gen. David H. Petraeus as director of the Central Intelligence Agency puts him more squarely than ever in conflict with Pakistan, whose military leadership does not regard him as a friend and where he will now have direct control over the armed drone campaign that the Pakistani military says it wants stopped.

Pakistani and American officials said that General Petraeus’s selection could further inflame relations between the two nations, which are already at one of their lowest points, with recriminations over myriad issues aired publicly like never before.

The usually secretive leader of the Pakistani Army, Gen.Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, has made little secret of his distaste for General Petraeus, calling him a political general.

Now it almost goes without saying that the CIA's relationship with Pakistan is the most important US agency relationship to any other country in the world. And on a good day, that relationship stinks (a situation only further inflamed by the Davis incident and Pakistan's general disinclination to do anything helpful for the United States in regard to the war Afghanistan and fighting al Qaeda). But it does beg the question, will the Petraeus selection make that relationship better or worse?

Now in a sense perhaps we shouldn't dwell on the issue. After all, the US relationship with Pakistan is in terrible shape and I genuinely don't think there is a good way to improve upon it unless we dramatically shift US strategy in Afghanistan. But if Petraeus is being picked in part because of his knowledge of the operational arts; if those operational arts are most relevant when it comes to the US relationship with Pakistan and in particular the fight against al Qaeda; and if Petraeus is mistrusted by the Pakistanis . . . well then what exactly is the value added of putting Petraeus in the DCI job? I'm not asking the question in jest; behind some fuzzy notion of "leadership" I'm at a loss in understanding why Petraeus is the best person for the job, especially since there seem to be a number of indicators that would point to him being the wrong man (not to mention the fact that it's impossible to believe that anyone at the White House actually trusts him).

Aha, but perhaps I've missed David Petraeus's most obvious attribute - over to you Mr. President:

I'm also very pleased that Leon's work at the CIA will be carried on by one of our leading strategic thinkers and one of the finest military officers of our time, General David Petraeus. 

Petraeus is one of our leading strategic thinkers? Interesting. Now clearly generals occasionally show some level of strategic enlightenment. Eisenhower comes to mind; so to does George Marshall, even Colin Powell for a brief moment - but field commanders? Isn't Petraeus's greatest skill on the tactical level? Where has he shown great strategic thinking? As a person who thought (among others) that the US not only could, but should conduct armed social work and nation building in Afghanistan, well I'm not sure that "great strategic thinker" is the description that comes to mind.

So aside from the obvious political advantage of keeping Petraeus inside the tent I'm just having hard time seeing why Petraues got picked . . . unless of course the political advantage is the reason why. But who would ever accuse the Obama Administration of putting the politics of foreign policy ahead of actual foreign policy decision-making?

The Trouble With Petraeus Posted by Michael Cohen

So I'm still having a hard time getting my head around the fact that President Obama has chosen David Petraeus to be his new director of central intelligence. Was Joe Lieberman busy? Here's someone who became a public advocate, rather than advisor, during presidential deliberations on Afghanistan policy; someone who misled the President about the ability of the military to turn things over to the Afghan security forces by the summer 2011 and someone who repeatedly used media leaks and public media appearances to advocate for a counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan that by all accounts is failing spectacularly. 

I mean I understand the concept of keeping your friends close and your enemies closer, but this is sort of ridiculous.

This issue, notwithstanding, my concern about this move is two-fold: one is that it continues the further militarization of our intelligence agencies, away from intel gathering to covert operations; and second I fear for the impact on Afghanistan policy.

On the first point, Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti have a smart article on how these moves continue the process of basically turning the agency into a militarized, operational arm of the Pentagon. So not only do you have someone at Langley who seems to be a big advocate of special operations; but you put someone at DoD (Leon Panetta) who built up the covert action capability at the CIA. Hard to imagine that either will suddenly slow down the cooperation between the two agencies on this front. And if one of the goals of the Obama Administration was to shift attention away from terrorism as the focus of US foreign policy I'm not sure how giving top national security jobs to the guy who built up the CIA's clandestine service over the past two years and the guy who managed the last two American wars achieves that goal. If anything it ensures that two of the Administration's top strategic thinkers (and I use those words guardedly) will have an intimate and perhaps overweening focus on terrorism as the focal point point of US national security policy.

Also it's worth remembering here that the CIA is primarily a civilian, espionage agency - not a hornet's nest of covert ops (no matter what Hollywood movies might tell you). How is Petraeus going to fare in that part of the job; managing the CIA's intel gathering mandate?  Maybe this is the direction that the Administration wants to take the agency, but it does raise the very serious question of whether the Petraeus's likely focus on military operations and cooperation with DoD will have a deleterious impact on the intel-gathering part of the CIA's mandate. Does Petraeus have any track record of being able to effectively manage this fairly significant aspect of what the CIA does? Might be a question worth exploring at this confirmation hearings.

On Afghanistan, there is another more serious concern. While I am glad to see Petraeus out of day-to-day management of the war (if only because it would theoretically allow the White House to establish more control over the mission) I do wonder about the impact on the future of that policy.

Today there is something of a divide in the Obama Administration between those who think the time has come to being political reconciliation with the Taliban - and a more influential group that believes military pressure against the Taliban must be maintained and that the time is not right for negotiations. It appears, from the outside, that Petraeus comes down on the latter camp; believing that continued pressure will wring eventual concessions out of the Taliban.

It's worth asking what effect this will have on analysis about Afghanistan with the agency. Knowing that Petraeus is an advocate for a very specific policy choice in Afghanistan could have a potentially chilling effect on analysts in the agency. After all, there is some evidence that Petraeus has weighed in heavily on these matters in the past (the White House's December Af/Pak review comes to mind). How this affects the tenor and tone of intelligence analysis that gets passed up the chain of command to the White House and elsewhere is not an insignificant issue. It seems for the sake of Afghanistan policy that it might be better if the person in charge at Langley didn't have his thumb on the scale.

In the end, the White House seems to be adopting the view that it's better to have Petraues inside the tent pissing out, then pissing in. But there is a cost for doing so - and I'm not sure that the White House fully appreciates it.

Our Wonderful Af/Pak Allies Posted by Michael Cohen

So while political Washington has completely lost its mind over the President’s birth certificate  . . . there’s actually a war going on in Afghanistan. It’s being fought by real flesh and blood American soldiers.  And it’s not going well.

Yesterday, nine Americans (8 soldiers and 1 civilian) were murdered at Kabul airport by a disgruntled Afghan Air Force officer. Now having spent several hours at the Kabul airport I would have to say this is one of the more secure locations in Afghanistan with more security than you can shake a large stick at. That even here American servicemen are not safe from violence is troubling indeed. That these soldiers were killed by an individual nominally fighting on the same side as the US against Taliban is even more upsetting. That this attack is the seventh time this year that Afghans in police or military garb have killed NATO or Afghan forces (24 of them) . . . well you get the idea.

But as long as we’re on the subject of terrible American allies, how about that Pakistani government? According to the Wall Street Journal the Pakistani foreign minister recently met with President Karzai and advised him to go tell the US to fly a kite:

Pakistan is lobbying Afghanistan's president against building a long-term strategic partnership with the U.S., urging him instead to look to Pakistan—and its Chinese ally—for help in striking a peace deal with the Taliban and rebuilding the economy, Afghan officials say.

The pitch was made at an April 16 meeting in Kabul by Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, who bluntly told Afghan President Hamid Karzai that the Americans had failed them both, according to Afghans familiar with the meeting. Mr. Karzai should forget about allowing a long-term U.S. military presence in his country, Mr. Gilani said, according to the Afghans. 

It should be noted here that the official telling President Karzai to break with the Americans is not a member of the Pakistani military or the ISI. It's the country's foreign minister (a member of the civilian government), who is trying to convince Karzai that he would be better off abandoning the country that provides Pakistan with $1.5 billion a year in assistance. 

And here's my favorite part:

Pakistani officials say they no longer have an incentive to follow the American lead in their own backyard. "Pakistan is sole guarantor of its own interest," said a senior Pakistani official. "We're not looking for anyone else to protect us, especially the U.S. If they're leaving, they're leaving and they should go."

"No longer" have any incentive! Ha! Remind me again when that incentive to follow the American lead actually did exist.  

And yet it seems some American officials are still holding out hope that this represents a good development for US-Pakistani relations. In a follow-up piece in the Washington Post, Josh Paltrow quotes an American official:

“The good news,” the official said, “is that I think that there’s some prospect that Afghanistan will become the common ground on which the U.S. and Pakistan” can solidify their relationship.

I'm not really sure how this latest incident leads to that conclusion. In fact, what this does show is how decidedly the US and Pakistan don't see eye to eye on the future of Afghanistan. But of course that has been obvious for a decade no matter what US officials try to convince themselves of.

Apparently all this political wrangling has left our other great ally Hamid Karzai not sure of what to do - although this also could just be a move on his part to wring more concessions out of Washington in upcoming talks about a long-term strategic partnership between the US and Afghanistan. I guess those American soldiers being maimed and killed (in part by bombs built in Pakistan) is not enough to sway Karzai toward the US side.

So to sum up, we have American soldiers being killed by the same Afghan security forces that we are spending billions of dollars to train and fight the Taliban; we have the President of Afghanistan discussing with the Pakistani foreign minister abandoning the United States; and we have the Pakistani foreign minister actively working to undermine US interests in Afghanistan. 

Other than all that the war seems to be going great.