Cato.org | Nuclear Proliferation Update |December 2009

U.S. Conduct Creates Perverse Incentives for Proliferation
By Ted Galen Carpenter

There are important reasons why most nations choose not to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. For one thing, it is very expensive. The opportunity cost is usually regarded as prohibitive. Occasionally, even a poor country such as North Korea will be willing to make a nuclear weapons program the highest priority, but most governments will not make the sacrifice. A decision to go nuclear also has important adverse diplomatic repercussions. Trying to build a nuclear arsenal is not the way to win friends in the international community. The majority of governments become extremely agitated when a country seeks to break out of the nonproliferation system and become a nuclear weapons state, and any would-be nuclear power has to take that hostility into consideration. Finally, by trying to acquire a nuclear arsenal, a country may trigger or exacerbate a regional arms race, and at the end of the process be no more secure than it was at the beginning. In fact, it might be even less secure.

On the other hand, there are some important reasons why a country might decide to go nuclear. One reason is prestige. The global nuclear weapons club is a very exclusive association. All five permanent members of the UN Security Council are nuclear weapons states, and a sixth, India, is likely to become a permanent member of the Council in the next few years. Countries that have nuclear weapons are treated differently from non-nuclear powers. Before they became nuclear powers in 1998, India and Pakistan were treated with less than a great deal of respect by other international actors. India was considered a chronic Third World underachiever, and Pakistan was considered a problem state—if not a potential failed state. Consider how those countries are treated now, since they have joined the nuclear weapons club. It is markedly different.

Another motive to go nuclear is to deter or possibly intimidate a regional adversary. That appeared to be a consideration for both India and Pakistan. India had long sought to overawe its smaller neighbor, and possessing a nuclear arsenal eventually became part of that strategy. Pakistan, in turn, concluded that it had to neutralize India’s growing conventional military advantage as well as its new nuclear capability. A nuclear deterrent was the most decisive and cost-effective way to achieve that goal. Beyond its regional rivalry with Pakistan, India was also concerned about China’s rising military power. There was no question the perceived Chinese threat was a factor in India’s decision to go nuclear, as then minister of defense George Fernandes emphasized.

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Proliferation: The Real North Korean Nuclear Threat
By Doug Bandow

The so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was near the top of the agenda in both Seoul and Beijing during President Barack Obama’s recent trip to East Asia. Administrations change and years pass, but the threat of a nuclear North Korea continues. No one, other than Kim Jong-il and a few devoted acolytes, wants the DPRK to develop nuclear weapons. However, not all nuclear threats are equal.

The creation of a North Korean nuclear capability would understandably generate unease throughout Northeast Asia. Nevertheless, simple possession of a small nuclear arsenal would not much change the regional balance of power. The North would face destruction if it attacked South Korea—the former would receive no support from China and would face massive retaliation from the United States. Pyongyang might feel more secure with nuclear weapons, and thus be more willing to engage in other provocative behavior. But nothing suggests that the regime is bent on suicide; by all accounts Kim prefers his virgins in this life rather than the next. Defense and deterrence likely remain important objectives of the DPRK’s nuclear program.

Click here to view the entire December 2009 bulletin.

Nuclear Proliferation Update is dedicated to promoting peaceful resolutions to the nuclear crises in North Korea and Iran. It aims to provide policy makers with analysis on the latest developments in both nations and options for formulating coherent U.S. responses. In highlighting the importance of achieving diplomatic solutions, the goal is to avoid armed conflict and its attendant consequences.