Issue #11, Winter 2009

Intellectual Firepower

New threats require new think tanks.

Thinking Beyond the Unthinkable: Harnessing Doom from the Cold War to the Age of Terror By Jonathan Stevenson • Viking • 2008 • 302 pages • $26.95

I grew up at ground zero during an age of terror. Just 10 miles upwind of my elementary school in Omaha, Nebraska sat Strategic Air Command headquarters, its proud motto posted outside the security gates: “Peace Is Our Profession.” A group of radical nuns had once spray-painted “War Is Just a Hobby” on the sign before being dragged away in cuffs. But the certainty of Mutual Assured Destruction was no joke for those of us growing up during the Reagan years. Duck-and-cover drills were an annual occurrence, and air-raid sirens punctuated my play time at depressingly regular intervals.

In Thinking Beyond the Unthinkable: Harnessing Doom from the Cold War to the Age of Terror, Jonathan Stevenson, a professor of strategic studies at the Naval War College, attempts to understand why it was that the air-raid sirens never sounded their warning for keeps. His answer focuses on the role of people like himself (and me, for that matter), strategists in think-tanks who spent their days contemplating the absolute destruction of life on our little planet, ostensibly in the service of the Strategic Air Command’s motto. Stevenson’s purpose in delving into this particular intellectual history is to examine the lessons that come from thinking about doom on a daily basis and their possible relevance for us today, living in a new “age of terror.” After tens of thousands of words evaluating deterrence through the threat of global annihilation, Stevenson proposes a kinder, gentler way of keeping America safe, one that relies on a more nuanced and pragmatic foreign and security policy devised by a new breed of think-tank denizens. As one who has lived under the shadow of nuclear deterrence and fought the shadowy terror of Al Qaeda, it should be unsurprising that I am an enthusiastic advocate of new thinking–and doing–in the pursuit of lasting peace.

Much of this story has been told before. Twenty-five years ago, Fred Kaplan, now a columnist at Slate, tracked the development of deterrence theory through the story of its intellectual architects in his wonderfully titled Wizards of Armageddon. Stevenson calls upon the same extraordinary cast of characters and chronicles their struggles to understand the most horrible way of war ever devised. In the wake of the devastation of World War II, the United States harnessed a small group of civilian intellectuals to think about how to use the power of the atom, unleashed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to keep the peace. Many of them came to work at RAND, the Research and Development Corporation, established in Santa Monica, California (a very nice place from which to contemplate Armageddon) in 1948. The most influential of them was probably Albert Wohlstetter, a mathematical logician born in Manhattan in 1913. His first important work for RAND, in 1951, was a study of how the Strategic Air Command should position its bomber bases; Wohlstetter’s conclusion, that they be dispersed as far as possible from the Soviet Union to allow maximum time and space to strike back, both imprinted the concept of second-strike deterrence in the nuclear lexicon and ensured that my childhood in Omaha would occur in the shadow of nuclear devastation. Wohlstetter’s 1959 Foreign Affairs article, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” was the public revelation of the logic of deterrence; published soon after the launch of Sputnik, it contributed greatly to an American appreciation of the nuclear sword of Damocles under which we lived.

Another important strategist was Thomas Schelling, who used game theory to inform his book The Strategy of Conflict. Shelling’s most significant contribution, Stevenson believes, was “his observation that those engaged in conflict would usually develop a common symbolic focal point–perhaps a physical or geographical point, perhaps a distinctive operational level of warfare–that dictated boundaries and limits.” The Yalu River served this purpose in the Korean War, while the use of nuclear weapons itself was a boundary between the Cold War superpowers. The imposition of mass civilian casualties became a focal point in a number of conflicts with substate terrorist groups during the twentieth century; the violation of this tacit bargain by Al Qaeda–and the as-yet-unresolved search for a new symbolic focal point–is one of the things that marks a new phase in terrorism in our own time.

No description of the key thinkers of the nuclear age would be complete without reference to Herman “Genghis” Kahn, who served as a communications sergeant in Burma in World War II–after setting a record on the Army’s intelligence test–and began work for RAND in 1948. The author of Thinking About the Unthinkable, from which Stevenson draws his own title, Kahn coined the phrase “wargasm” to describe all-out nuclear war and, according to Stevenson, “was the first to insert the word only in front of comparative estimates of civilian deaths that ran into the millions.” Although his greatest impact came in his advocacy of civil defense in order to make surviving a nuclear strike more conceivable (and hence make an attack less likely, as the enemy would be unable to destroy its opposition in one fell swoop), Kahn is most famous as the presumptive role model for the title character in Stanley Kubrick’s classic Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.

Issue #11, Winter 2009
 
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New Definitions of Power:

All of this reminds me of William Glasser's, Choice Theory of pschology. This theory makes a case for the art of perssuasion. The application of the basic tenets of this theory provide a framework for solutions to our wars. We are less likely to change the way terrorists behave if we continue to criticize, blame, threaten, punish, or bribe. I believe we can win the war by taking power away from terrorists, by changing the way their constituents view us. We must show the people in those countries, support, respect, and trust. We must encourage listen, accept, and be willing to negotiate differences. I was disturbed during the presidential campaign at some on the right who seem to view negotiate as a bad word. Until we get over our old mentality and evolve our thinking towards a new understanding of the type of war we face today, I thing mutual destruction is a terrifying possiblity. If you google suicide bomb you get 3,760,000 results. This is evidence that our new enemies don't fear mutual destruction, therefore our military might becomes a much weaker weapon. It is our financial might that weilds far greater power and influence. This is evidenced by how devastating our own economic collapse has profoundly influenced world markets. If we can help people around the world to help themselves and reduce the differences in economic disparity, we can win the war.











Dec 16, 2008, 10:42 AM
Sam Rose:

John Nagl's proposal, endorsing Jonathan Stevenson's concept of a RAND- or a Manhattan-type think tank to -- not in a literary but actual sense -- deconstruct, subdue and unravel Muslim fundamentalist terror groups, is most commendable!



Of the more than 400 think tanks now operating in the whole United States, according to a Council on Foreign Relations research-study, not one is specializing in Muslim studies: political, social,cultural, economic, religious, and military. If the Obama administration can dole out, in the guise of 'bail-outs', billions of dollars to banks, insurance companies and mortgage firms which are mainly responsible for the current economic turmoil, why not also let the think tanks partake of such assistance? Endowing the country's think tanks with some "seed capital' to inaugurate an entirely specialized and concentrated field of study focused on Muslim fundamentalism would be the best "bail-out" -- not of America's immediate economy, to be sure, but its civilization. The economic bail-out is to the present what seeding the think tanks with research money is to America's future.



The mechanics, budget and structure for this brain trust should, naturally, be patterned after the country's think tank centers. In fact, each think tank should contribute its manpower from which to recruit, mold and consolidate the brains needed for this purpose, to ensure that American civilization and culture shall endure.



For a start, all the country's divinity schools should be motivated and encouraged to offer courses and subjects on various politico-religious interpretations of Islam. These religious learning institutions should teach, elucidate, and promote an authentic and reliable interpretation of Islam, not as a violent religious creed but as a peaceful, orderly, and constructive faith whose roots are as old as Abraham's time. What should be emphasized are the similarities, not differences, between and among the world's major religions. Indeed, there are more similarities between the Jewish and Muslim religions than their differences in relation to Christianity. So, why can't they all co-exist peacefully doctrinally?



Using these think tanks and divinity schools, much as the Pentagon is using the universities, RAND and other centers of research and analysis, should encourage new approaches to America's Middle East diplomacy. What the Obama administration needs now to break the stalemate in Middle East diplomacy is novelty and creativity, a fresh, peaceful approach in thinking which only a synergy of the world's three major religions, in terms of similarities and convergence, can provide. Here, as in other aspects of peaceful diplomacy -- particularly involving Israel and its Arab neighbors -- the think tanks and the divinity schools can provide much broader, realistic policy choices, proposals, and alternative solutions.



To cite what I deem is fresh diplomatic thinking, all the accounts published so far about how George W. Bush 'prepared' for Iraq's invasion, centered albeit lopsidedly on quick mobilization of U.S. armed forces, equipment, and war materiel. No clear, definite plan for study and approval was submitted by Secretary Rumsfeld or Gen. Tommy Franks to Bush on how to rehabilitate and reconstitute the Iraqi army as a dependable ally against a resurgent Iran. If such an operational plan should have been incorporated for implementation immediately after Iraq was conquered and pacified, there would have been no mass casualties being inflicted on American occupation forces up to now. Neither did the CIA conduct any psychological war maneuver, before, during and after Iraq's invasion, on Iraq's generals and their officers to turn their attention to Iran instead as their continuing enemy, not anymore the U.S. occupying forces.



Lest I be misunderstood and my concept of charting new paths to peaceful diplomacy misconstrued, let me state outright that Bush's justification for invading Iraq should have been the very same justification for enlisting its conquered armed forces to help prevent Iran's manufacture and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. This need not have required of course invasion of Iran but only a quick rehabilitation of Iraq's armed forces to place it, in terms of defensive and offensive capability, at par with Iran's military, its historic foe. This way, using a strategy of providing graceful exit to the humiliated commanders of Iraq's military borrowed from Sun-Tzu, the Bush administration (for purposes of constructive diplomacy) would have readily restored the pride and dignity of Iraq's fallen armed forces under, this time, U.S. benign rule.



Evidently, unlike Gen. MacArthur's conquest of Japan, this form of psychological warfare -- restoring the pride and dignity of a devastated army in disgrace -- was not looked into, as there was no room for its appreciation, by Bush's war cabinet. A strategy tying both Iraq and Iran, two traditional ferocious enemies, under Bush's WMD policy alibi, would have prepared the ground for Obama's anti-nuclear proliferation strategy vis-a-vis Iran, not using only Syria but even Libya and Iraq now, under a democratic government poised to assume its pro-U.S., anti-nuclear role versus Iran.



Lacking this synergy in their occupation diplomacy, Bush, his war advisers and generals merely conquered Iraq, only to lose it now to Iran through its radical fundamentalist groups trained by and allied with al-Qaeda. That the Bush administration failed to pursue a 'twin' Iraq-Iran strategy, a war to conquer Iraq but, following victory, to use Iraq as a spearhead to check Iran's nuclear proliferation program, is a pity since they could have provided Bush with a historic precedent, a model based on how Alexander conquered the Persian empire and enlarged his Macedonian army by conscripting soldiers he defeated in battle and brought them to help him conquer distant lands up to the Himalayas. Sadly, that model of conscription, set by Alexander with his adoption of a policy of benign rule over armies he defeated swiftly in battle, was lost completely on Bush and his war cabinet.



So as not to repeat Bush's strategic blunder, Nagl's and Stevenson's think tank proposal should be considered by the White House for funding by Congress. But, unlike other think tanks engaged in general studies, their policy research and analysis for government decision making must focus on Islam as a peaceful religion, not Wahhabism or other such fanatical sects employing like al-Qaeda terrorism and violence as an instrument of religious proselytization.

May 19, 2009, 2:27 AM

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