Issue #18, Fall 2010

Advise and Dissent

History shows that dissent within the progressive ranks has been vital to advancing the liberal agenda. A response to Michael Tomasky.

Liberals are neurotic creatures. We tend to treat pressing global problems, small swings in the political dynamic, and minor differences of opinion among like-minded colleagues as if all were of equal world-historical importance. And so we come to believe that a blog post criticizing the President will do as much harm to progressive politics as a 9.5 percent unemployment rate; that catastrophic climate change is as consequential as a comment thread about Rahm Emanuel; and that a guy with a sign at an anti-war rally is as worthy of attention as the health-care crisis.

Some progressives, appalled by internecine warfare, believe that for the left to succeed, its members must band together and support the current Democratic President and Democratic Congress through all their compromises and concessions. These progressives urge their brethren to accept that which exists in the realm of the achievable, and form a united front against a pernicious conservative/corporate behemoth that can sniff out weakness and division, and use its massive resources and decades of cultural indoctrination to extinguish any hope for a progressive renaissance.

While this approach is not entirely wrong, it is deeply problematic. It assumes that unity of effort has animated political change over time. But history teaches us otherwise. In fact, what successful progressive movement politics has done over the decades is agitate, dissent, disrespect, and censure, until the forces arrayed against reform fold. Not everyone on the left has to join in this agitation–but some must. As American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) founder Roger Baldwin said, “So long as we have enough people in this country willing to fight for their rights, we’ll be called a democracy.”

In his essay “Against Despair,” Michael Tomasky makes the important point that, as a matter of the historical record, Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson made concessions to the conservatives of their time. As a result, while they achieved much, they also frustrated their progressive supporters, and limited the scope of their agenda. As Tomasky points out, popular history often smooths out these fits and starts, turning complicated politicians into neat archetypes. Obama shouldn’t be held to the same standard as those archetypes, Tomasky says, but should be assessed on the basis of the particular historical moment and his record of achievement despite the myriad obstacles in his path.

Although Tomasky grants legitimate grievances on the part of Obama’s progressive critics–from the backroom deals with stakeholders during the health-care debate, to the unconscionable embrace of many of his predecessor’s terrorism policies, to the preservation of the financial system’s structure in the Wall Street reform bill–he clearly aligns himself in opposition to such critics. If the argument were merely that progressives who have been critical of the Obama Administration should incorporate a sense of perspective and history into their criticisms, I would have little to complain about. Obama is working within a broken and often corrupt system, and has less ability than many on the left think to move members of either party where they often do not want to go. But Tomasky goes further than that. He seems to intimate that progressive despair disrupts liberal goals and makes them nearly impossible to achieve. As he writes:

The changes we want to see won’t happen in 18 months, or in two years, or four, or probably even eight. Indeed, the entire Obama era, if it lasts eight years, is best thought of not as a culmination, or a self-contained time frame that should be judged a failure if X, Y, and Z don’t happen. It’s the start of a process that may take 16 years, or 24; that may be along the way interrupted or undone; that will be fought tooth and nail.…Liberal despair only reinforces their power and helps to ensure that whatever gains are made during the Obama term could quickly be rolled back. And if that happens, we are back, ten years from now, to fighting the usual rearguard battles.

If this were true, then Tomasky would have to show evidence in the historical record. After all, he notes that FDR had his liberal critics, as did LBJ in the 1960s when the Great Society reforms took root. Did these critics reinforce the power of the forces trying to stop the New Deal or the Great Society, forces that existed in great numbers? Is there any evidence that liberal frustration and progressive pressure had a negative effect on Roosevelt’s or Johnson’s plans?

The history Tomasky provides suggests quite the opposite. Over time, the reforms put forward by FDR and LBJ only improved. But those improvements did not happen in a vacuum. They happened because passionate, well-intentioned progressives were willing to label the reforms as inadequate and to fight for their amelioration. You can argue with their methods, but not with their success.

To take but one example, consider Francis Townsend, a retired physician who, after watching old women rummage through garbage cans for food in his neighborhood at the height of the Great Depression, decided to enter politics with one simple idea: a $200 monthly pension plan for the elderly (a princely sum in those days) paid for with a 2 percent tax on all commercial, business, and financial transactions. A committed Keynesian, Townsend believed this money would immediately get circulated throughout the economy, create jobs, and end the Depression, in addition to bringing a modicum of dignity to the frail at the end of their lives. To promote this belief, he started a series of grassroots clubs around the country in 1933; within two years, his Townsend clubs counted more than five million members. In 1935, Townsend handed President Roosevelt a petition with 20 million signatures of support. In the pre-Internet age, this was a remarkable organizing feat.

Issue #18, Fall 2010
 
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crosstalk between Tomasky and Dayen:

Democracy Journal always has in-depth, thoughtful articles. Simply put, suspect Tomasky's point was that progressives not lose elections because of idealism trumping necessary compromise. Dayen seems to say fear not.

Sep 15, 2010, 7:18 PM

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