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Abu Muqawama

Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS. Abu Muqawama retains the right to delete comments that include words that incite violence; are predatory, hateful, or intended to intimidate or harass; or degrade people on the basis of gender, race, class, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. In summary, don't be a jerk.

  • Tripoli and other Qadhdhafi-held areas of Libya are now suffering from crippling shortages of both food and fuel. I want to prepare you all for the very real possibility that the United Nations or other multi- or international organizations will have to provide humanitarian relief to the people of Tripoli in the near future -- because the international community earlier intervened on behalf of Libyan rebels and has now enabled those rebels to march on those areas loyal to Qadhdhafi. If you're confused by war waged via the logic of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect ... you're not alone.

    UPDATE: From a reader...

    FYI, WFP has been sending in thousands of metric tons of food to Gaddafi controlled areas for well over a month, purchase with funding from USAID, among others.

     

    Ostensibly this food is being distributed by the Libyan Red Crescent to various bakeries from distribution to the public, but trust me when I say they have absolutely know way to verify this.

     

    I've been participating in this "humanitarian intervention" since the end of February, and I really don't have a fucking clue what we're doing here.

  • I do not know Sharmine Narwani, but she has written one of the more bizarre pieces on Hizballah and Lebanon I have read in quite some time -- and took some unfair shots at a few accomplished journalists in the process. (Read the whole post here.) Two of those journalists, Nick Blanford and Sheera Frenkel, are friends of mine from the region, and Nick responded in an email to a few close Lebanon watchers. He has allowed me to reproduce his response here. Let me just add that when you accuse a journalist in the Middle East of fabulism and then go on to cite the testimony of Robert Fisk (!!!) in support of your argument, you're not off to a good start.

    ***

    First, my contribution to the Times article was limited to the Hizbullah sources. I have no idea about the veracity of the Scud/Jabal Taqsis claims. Rupert Murdoch's political inclinations do not interest me.

    Second, I will not discuss nor elaborate upon my contacts within Hizbullah. They have learned to trust me sufficiently over the years to meet and talk (many of them have become friends) and protecting their identity is my paramount concern. That said, these are not "moles" slipping secret information to a foreign reporter. They are dedicated and proud members of Hizbullah and the Islamic Resistance and (frustratingly) guarded in their comments. Hizbullah cadres are not automatons; they are human beings and feel the tug of human emotion like anyone else. It is not extraordinary that they might be willing to meet and chat with a foreigner whom they like and have grown over the years to trust, the "veil of secrecy" notwithstanding.

    If I am a peddler of pro-Israel propaganda, then why would Hizbullah's Al Manar TV interview me for a documentary on the 2006 war, part one of which was aired this evening? (I think part two is tomorrow (Tuesday) night).

    My contacts within Hizbullah - both at a grassroots level and at a leadership level - are borne of nearly 16 years following the affairs of the organization from within Lebanon. Sharmine is perfectly within her rights to question my sourcing. All I can say is that after 16 years one develops good contacts. That said no Hizbullah figure - fighter or leader - has ever specified to me any particular weapons system that the organization has acquired or seeks to acquire prior to its use on the battlefield. Believe me, I have tried since my early interviews with Sheikh Nabil Qaouq in the mid '90s to obtain details and my requests are invariably met with a polite smile and a raised hand. No Hizbullah member has ever confirmed to me that the organization has acquired or seeks Scud missiles. When the Scud story broke last year, I wrote several articles that questioned the veracity of the claims. My doubts were not based on whether Hizbullah would like to include Scuds within its arsenal but centered on the logistical complexities of maintaining and launching them. (Without wishing to belabor the point, Scuds are liquid fueled not solid fuelled, like other rockets believed to be in Hizbullah's arsenal, which means that the launch cycle is much lengthier and more complicated. They also require dedicated transporter-erector-launchers which is another hassle to bring into Lebanon and hide. There's more, but I'm sure you get the point.)

    As for the increase of weapons into Hizbullah's arsenal, I have been hearing this since late March, shortly after the uprising began in Syria and long before the Israeli and US press began reporting such things. It's common knowledge within Hizbullah circles. Where the weapons go and what they are, I have no idea.

    To some specifics:

    Sharmine writes: I have been looking for weapons in Lebanon since Israeli President Shimon Peres told us in April 2010 that Syria was sending long-range Scud missiles to Hezbollah. Problem is that I can’t find them anywhere and neither can anyone else.

    Blanford says: Me too. And not since 2006 but since 1996. I like to think I know south Lebanon like the back of my hand, but I couldn't find any weapons down there in the 2000-2006 period even though I was sure they were there. (I did stumble across one of their 57mm anti-aircraft guns in 2002 which made for an entertaining afternoon but that's another story.)

    Sharmine writes: While Peres’ claims were reported widely in the international media, Syria rejected all charges and Hezbollah played the Israeli game of refusing to confirm or deny anything. Then came a slow but steady stream of denials from an array of international observers – albeit, quietly.First up was UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Commander General Alberto Asarta Cuevas: “We have around 12,000 soldiers and three Lebanese army brigades in a small area. We haven’t seen a thing,” said Asarta Cuevas. “Scud missiles are big. I’m sure there are no Scuds because it is very difficult to hide them,” he added.

    Blanford says: If Hizbullah has acquired Scuds, they are not going to bring 40-foot missiles and even larger TELs south of the Litani. The whole point of acquiring a Scud (probably the only point) is that you can launch them from northern Lebanon and still hit Eilat. Come to think of it, didn't Mohammed Raad last week say "If Israel launches an attack, rockets of the resistance will cover all of Israel. Even the city of Eilat won’t be spared".

    Sharmine writes: The Jewish state has even provided maps – down to the exact house – that indicate where Lebanese women-and-children-commandos have stashed these weapons. Kudos go to the IDF too for creating user-friendly video games – or, as they like to call it, “3D animated clips” – that “illustrate how Hezbollah has turned over 100 villages in South Lebanon into military bases.”

    Blanford says: I'm assuming that Sharmine is referring to the widely disseminated map published by The Washington Post in March showing a rash of red, blue and yellow dots across south Lebanon pointing out Hizbullah bunkers and positions. At the time, out of curiosity, I overlaid the WaPo map over a Google Earth image of south Lebanon and zoomed in to try and guage the accuracy of these multiple dots (I know it's a bit nerdy and obsessive but what can I say). Unlike Sharmine, who discerned that the map was accurate to the "exact house", I found that each dot covered around half a village. Come on, the WaPo map was nothing more than a psy-ops ploy by Israel and had no bearing on reality. If the Israelis really had such sensitive information, do you think they would pass it on to the media? The same applies to the 3D graphics video of Khiam released last year. I tried to relate the video to Khiam itself but failed. Maybe I'm not sufficiently tech-savvy to translate 3D graphics into reality, but this too was just another case of Israeli psy-ops.

    Sharmine writes: Hebrew-language newspaper Maariv last summer reported that Israeli finance officials were using Hezbollah to justify exorbitant defense budget demands. Ben Caspit wrote on July 11, 2010: “It’s interesting how every time the military budget is on the table, they release from the stocks Hezbollah’s missile array and expose sensitive classified material.”

    Blanford says: Totally right. I wrote such comments for The Daily Star back in the 1990s. Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose.

  • You think the United States has played its hand poorly during the Arab Spring?

    Hizballah busied themselves airing claims I am some kind of spy over the weekend, but if I were them, I would be less worried about American researchers and more worried about how they handle a post-Asad Syria. It will almost certainly not be as friendly as the one that currently helps funnel Hizballah weapons and money.

    Some fascinating reporting from Homs by Anthony Shadid:

    Perhaps most pronounced is the anger at Hezbollah, the Shiite Muslim militant movement in Lebanon that has bluntly supported Mr. Assad’s government. Hezbollah was widely popular in Syria, where sentiments against Israel and longstanding American dominance of the region run deep. But Hezbollah’s backing for Mr. Assad has unleashed a sense of betrayal at a movement that celebrates the idea of resistance. At times, it has also given rise to chauvinism among Syrian Sunnis against Hezbollah’s Shiite constituency.

     

    “We’ve started to hate them more than we hate Israel,” said Maher, a young father and protester in Hama, sitting with a friend who gave his name as Abu Mohammed.

     

    Abu Mohammed said that in the 2006 war fought between Hezbollah and Israel, which forced hundreds of thousands to flee their homes, he sheltered 40 Shiite families for as long as a month. “Food, drink, and I accepted nothing in return,” he said. “Now they’re with the regime, but it wasn’t the regime who opened the doors of their homes to them.”

  • Marc Sageman has strong words for Robert Spencer, Pamela Geller and others:

    Marc Sageman, a former C.I.A. officer and a consultant on terrorism, said it would be unfair to attribute Mr. Breivik’s violence to the writers who helped shape his world view. But at the same time, he said the counterjihad writers do argue that the fundamentalist Salafi branch of Islam “is the infrastructure from which Al Qaeda emerged. Well, they and their writings are the infrastructure from which Breivik emerged.”

     

    “This rhetoric,” he added, “is not cost-free.”

  • A few days ago, I was accused by a German conspiracy theorist of having assassinated former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri. On first glance, this is kind of funny. Yesterday, for example, the Twittersphere was joking about all the other people I might have killed: Stringer Bell, Bill, Tupac, Iranian nuclear scientists, the sheriff and the deputy, Amy Winehouse, a man in Reno (just to watch him die), etc. One friend, employing the same "logic" as this conspiracy theorist, noted that I was also "suspiciously near" the scene of dozens of bombings in Iraq in 2003 and that 338 people have been murdered since I moved back to Washington, DC in 2009. Also, this same friend noted, I have never been able to prove that I did not meet with Mohammed Atta in Prague.

    Quite quickly, though, what's kind of amusing on the first glance is not at all funny. If you are a journalist or researcher working on the Arabic-speaking world, what do you think is the worst possible thing someone could do to endanger your work and your life? If you guessed "holding a press conference in Beirut to announce you are working for the Mossad or CIA," you're either correct or close to the mark. As several other scholars of the region noted in emails to me yesterday, my research in Lebanon and the broader region will almost certainly be complicated by this crank and his new pet conspiracy theory.

    But at least I have a nice job in Washington, D.C. that allows me to do a lot of my work from a comfortable air-conditioned office. Spare a thought for my ex-girlfriend, who I mentioned in a New York Times op-ed a few days after the assassination and who now works as a credentialed photojournaist in the Arabic-speaking world. With no evidence whatsoever, this German "journalist" has now quite literally endangered both her life and her livelihood. 

    A few notes about the claims themselves, which were made on the pro-March 8th Coalition website tayyar.org as well as on Hizballah's television station, al-Manar. Unsurprisingly and aside from the basic fact that I did not assassinate the former Lebanese prime minister*, the claims are riddled with factual errors. I am not even Jewish, for example.** On all four sides of my family, I am the latest in a long line of Scottish Presbyterians who have all been in the United States since well before the American Revolution. Prior to this century, the only times we felt the need to leave the United States was to invade and defeat Germany on a few occassions, the first defeat of which was explained away by some German extremists by blaming it on a Jewish conspiracy against Germany, and the second of which ... well, you get the point. At some point, amidst the rubble and the mass murder of millions of Jews, Roma, and other minorities, most Germans and other Europeans decided blaming the ills of the world on Jewish conspiracies was not in anyone's best interest. Most Germans, it seems.***

    Second, if anyone wanted to actually see my military record, they could do the responsible journalistic thing and submit a freedom of information request. There is nothing classified in my military record, and you can see for yourself exactly what I did, where I deployed, what medals I earned, etc.

    Third, and along the same lines, I am a semi-public figure. I have a Wikipedia page, a publicly available biography (all of the facts of which you can check), and a publications record a mile and a half long. Do I behave, in any way, shape, or form, like a spy?

    This entire experience is deeply frustrating and troubling. I am not aware of any legal recourse I have available, though the claims being made by this guy endanger both work as well as the life and work of my ex-girlfriend. (Who is a great and wonderful person despite having dated me and was never my fiancee. I am happily married, as many of you know, to a woman who will surely be cannonized at some point.) I am hardly the first American to do research on the Middle East to be accused of being a spy, but this is upsetting nonetheless.

    Last fall, I was actually contacted by this conspiracy theorist. I responded in good faith to his first email but ignored his others as they grew weirder. If any of you out there, by the way, send me requests for research assistance and such out of the blue and wonder why I have never responded, you have cranks like this guy to thank. I am attaching the full text of this guy's emails to me below and, when I get to work tomorrow, will scan and publish a .pdf of these emails as well.

    *I cannot believe I actually had to write this sentence. Do I also need to let you guys know I did not assassinate Imad Mughniyeh?

    **Although rest assured, if I were blessed enough to be one of God's chosen people, I would be very proud of that.

    ***Today, Germany boasts an impressive Holocaust education program, and even in the madness of the early 20th Century, many brave Germans spoke out for the Jews and against anti-Semitism. I am not trying to tar an entire noble people with the same brush here, but I find this especially disturbing a German is peddling this nonsense when surely he should know the power of these kinds of conspiracy theories.

     

    Hariri assassination; your articles_4

    juergen_ck [juergen_ck@t-online.de]

    Sent:    Friday, November 12, 2010 4:17 AM

    To:      

    Andrew Exum

     

    Dear Mr. Exum,

     

    I want to mention you and XXX in my next book. Your presence at the Hariri crime scene is remarkable and raises questions. I like to repeat my question: Have you been asked by UN investigators and how did you respond?

     

    Regards

     

    JCK

     

    Von: juergen_ck [mailto:juergen_ck@t-online.de]

    Gesendet: Freitag, 5. November 2010 11:46

    An: 'Andrew Exum'

    Betreff: Hariri assassination; your articles_3

     

    Dear Mr. Exum,

     

    I have one last question: Have you been questioned by the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission or the Special Tribunal for Lebanon regarding your observations prior and after the Hariri assassination, the kind of disaster tourism you executed and your motive to visit the crime scene and so on?

     

    Regards

     

    JCK

     

    Von: juergen_ck [mailto:juergen_ck@t-online.de]

    Gesendet: Dienstag, 2. November 2010 11:51

    An: 'Andrew Exum'

    Betreff: Hariri assassination; your articles_2

     

    Dear Andrew,

     

    thank you very much for your quick reply.

     

    Yes, I know Fisk and his article with his unforgettable impressions. He’s living a few hundreds meter from the blast scene and therefore he was one of the first there. Unlike you he describes the tragic situation very vividly. This is not meant to be an accusation. Apparently you have all seen through the eyes of a military. I would indeed do so, I'm a criminologist.              

     

    But let me make some other remarks.

     

    You wrote: “As a former soldier, I couldn't help but marvel for a moment at the audacity of the attack and the meticulous planning involved. The Corniche at this point takes a sharp turn, forcing cars to slow. The men who placed the bomb surely knew this. In addition, the building across from the St. George was also under construction and uninhabited, so any collateral damage to civilians would have been minimal. Further down the Corniche, the road is wider and would have been choked with pedestrians. Whoever planned this attack had been calculating as well as ruthless.”

     

    I do not share your opinion on any kind of intended prevention of collateral damage to civilians: At the end 21 people died and about 220 persons were wounded!

     

    You wrote: “The crater it left in the middle of the Corniche was at least three meters deep and 20 wide, astonishing given all the asphalt and rock it had to blast through.”

     

    Indeed, Beirut was built on a rocky promontory. And the crime scene behind the Rocky-coast-Line between Ain al Mrayseh and Zaytuneh is located in a cove with rocky underground. Now let’s go back to bomb. OK, we are not experts but as former officers we should know a little bit about explosions. The bomb produces primarily heat. The bomb itself and the material in their environment evaporate. It creates abruptly a (relatively) small area with very hot and high pressured gas. All around is just a vacuum, so the gas expands, and that is the pressure wave. But a more complex problem is the behavior of the pressure wave of any explosion under reflection. An explosion near a flat hard surface (rocky basement of the coast) leads to a strengthening of the pressure wave. The relationship between the reflected shock wave and the incident shock wave is called the reflection coefficient. And don’t forget the reflection from the buildings around the crime scene. The explosion was calculated to do maximal damage. That’s my opinion.

     

    Remember Fisk; he wrote: “The blast had sent another car, perhaps one of Hariri's, soaring through the air into the third floor of the empty hotel's annex, where it was still burning fiercely.”

     

    It was a powerful explosion that shot a car from a weight of about one ton to a height of 6 to 7 meters. Did you see the car? I can find neither any photo nor another source.

     

    Best and thanks

     

    JCK

     

    Von: Andrew Exum [mailto:]

    Gesendet: Montag, 1. November 2010 16:20

    An: juergen_cain_kuelbel@t-online.de

    Betreff: FW: To Mr. Andrew Exum: Hariri assassination; your article

     

    Juergen,

     

    Answers below. IN CAPS.

     

    Best,

     

    Ex

     

    From:

    Sent: Monday, November 01, 2010 10:53 AM

    To: Andrew Exum

    Cc: CNAS Information

    Subject: FW: To Mr. Andrew Exum: Hariri assassination; your articles

     

    From: jürgen_cain_kuelbel [mailto:juergen_cain_kuelbel@t-online.de]

    Sent: Monday, November 01, 2010 8:31 AM

    To: ; CNAS Information

    Subject: To Mr. Andrew Exum: Hariri assassination; your articles

     

    Dear Mr. Andrew Exum,

     

    my name is Jürgen Cain Külbel, I’m a German author and former criminalist. I’m just writing my second book about the Hariri assassination and the assassination series in Lebanon from 2005 to 2008.

     

    I studied your interesting articles “Blood, Smoke and Tears in Beirut”, (NYT, 16 February 2005) and “Hope amid tragedy” (saloon.com) over the weekend. You are something like an “eye witness” of the devastating bombing and I’d greatly appreciate if you could kindly answer my few questions.

     

    You wrote: “Firefighters and police officers worked to keep back the crowd, then soldiers slowly began to pour in.”

     

    Questions:

     

    How did you manage to escape police or soldiers and climb up the hotel St. George although a large fire was raging inside the shell of the hotel?

     

    THERE WAS NO LARGE FIRE. I MUST HAVE ARRIVED 10 MINUTES AFTER THE INITIAL BLAST AND DID NOT SEE ANY SECONDARY FIRES INSIDE THE HOTEL. THE ONLY SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS THAT I SAW CAME FROM A FEW CARS WHOSE GAS TANKS HEATED UP AND EXPLODED.

     

    Was the crime scene not secured at that time (you arrived around ten minutes after the blast)?

     

    HA. IT WAS “SECURED” IN THE LEBANESE SENSE OF THE WORD. WHICH MEANS MY GIRLFRIEND AND I IDENTIFIED OURSELVES AS WORKING MEMBERS OF THE PRESS AND, WITHOUT ANY ACCREDIDATION, SLIPPED THROUGH THE OUTER CORDON ESTABLISHED BY THE POLICE AND ARMY. AT SOME POINT, A LITTLE LATER, THEY REALLY SEALED OFF THE BLAST SITE. BUT INITIALLY, IT WAS REMARKABLY OPEN. I SAW OTHER REPORTERS THERE, INCLUDING ROBERT FISK. AND THERE WERE ALSO WHAT LOOKED LIKE ORDINARY LEBANESE. ANYWAY, IN THE INITIAL CONFUSION, IT WAS QUITE EASY TO GET CLOSE. AND EVENTUALLY TARA AND I JUST CLIMBED UP INTO THE ST. GEORGE.

     

    You wrote: “… and I climbed up the ruins of the St. George and looked down at the crater. It was easily 25 yards wide and at least three deep. To create a hole this size, you would have to fill a large truck or van with high explosives, first re-enforcing the shock absorbers to accommodate all the extra weight.

     

    Questions:

     

    This is a very smart first analysis because the experts argued at length about theories of aboveground or underground explosions. How do you get the smart idea of a large truck or van with re-enforced shock absorbers? Did you have some experiences? Did you ever see in Iraq or Afghanistan such kinds of terror trucks or explosions?

     

    I SERVED TWICE IN AFGHANISTAN AND ONCE IN IRAQ. AT THE TIME OF THE BLAST, I HAD ONLY BEEN RETURNED FROM IRAQ FOR A YEAR AND FROM AFGHANISTAN FOR JUST SIX OR SEVEN MONTHS. SO YES, I HAD A LITTLE BIT OF EXPERIENCE WITH EXPLOSIVES AND WITH CAR BOMBS. I ALSO HAD EXPERIENCE WITH CRATERING CHARGES. THE U.S. ARMY WOULD USE THOSE IF YOU WANTED TO CREATE A HASTY ROADBLOCK. IT TAKES A LOT OF EXPLOSIVES! SO I KNEW, FIRST, THAT A LOT OF EXPLOSIVES HAD TO HAVE EBEN EMPLOYED TO HAVE CREATED A CRATER THAT LARGE IN ONE BLAST. I KNEW, SECOND, THAT ANY TRUCK OR CAR YOU LOADED UP WITH THAT MUCH EXPLOSIVES WOULD HAVE HAD TO HAVE BEEN REINFORCED IN TERMS OF THE CAR’S SHOCKS.

     

    Thank you very much.

     

    Best regards

     

    Jürgen Cain Külbel

     

    Berlin

  • ... you get accused of assassinating Rafik Hariri.

    تهم المحقق السابق والخبير الألماني جيرغن هانزغولبل الموساد الإسرائيلي بوقوفه وراء اغتيال رئيس الوزراء اللبناني الأسبق رفيق الحريري مؤكداً تجاهل وعدم مصداقية التحقيق الدولي في التعامل مع الأدلة التي قدمها الأمين العام لحزب الله السيد حسن نصر الله وخاصة مراقبة طائرة الأواكس الإسرائيلية لخط سير الحريري قبل الاغتيال.

    وعرض الخبير الألماني في مؤتمر صحفي عقده اليوم مع المحامية اللبنانية مي الخنساء في بيروت وثائق وأدلة تؤكد تورط إسرائيل والإدارة الأمريكية وبعض الدول الأوروبية في التخطيط لاغتيال الحريري.

    وأشار الخبير الألماني استنادا لتحقيقات خاصة قام بها بنفسه إلى وجود شخصيتين أمريكيتين يهوديتين هما اندرو اكسيوم ضابط سابق في الجيش الأمريكي وخبير متفجرات عمل في أفغانستان والعراق وخطيبته تارا تودرس وايت هيل مهندسة اتصالات حضرت إلى لبنان يوم وقوع الجريمة حيث شوهدت في منطقة الحمراء في بيروت في نفس التاريخ ثم غادرت إلى إسرائيل حيث تعمل هناك.
    وأوضح الخبير الألماني أن الضابط الامريكي بقى في لبنان تحت ستار الدراسة في الجامعة الأمريكية لكن تبين انه كان يتجسس ويجمع المعلومات ويحاول اختراق صفوف حزب الله والأحزاب الوطنية اللبنانية حيث غادر لبنان أواخر عام 2006.

    ودعا الخبير الألماني إلى الرجوع للأمن العام اللبناني والجامعة الأمريكية في بيروت للتأكد من صحة المعلومات التي أوردها عن حركة دخول وخروج هاتين الشخصيتين الأمريكيتين إلى لبنان وخروجهما منه.

    This is pretty hilarious. As some of you may know, I was indeed in Beirut the day of the bombing and wrote about the experience for the New York Times the next day.

  • If you watch U.S. cable news in the aftermath of today's attacks in Norway -- and really, why are you watching U.S. cable news? -- you are likely to see various "terrorism" "experts" talking about what happened. If you are lucky, you'll see someone like Peter Bergen who has written extensively and well on various jihadi groups, but beyond that, the quality can go downhill pretty quickly.

    As a service to the readership, the following is an incomplete list of several scholars who write and comment well on terrorism.

    1. Will McCants. Will, an analyst at the Center for Naval Analysis, worked in the State Department's counter-terrorism shop until recently. Armed with excellent Arabic and a PhD in Near Eastern Studies from Princeton, Will is a serious scholar of both Islam and jihadi movements. He founded the website Jihadica and can be followed on Twitter at @will_mccants.

    2. Thomas Hegghammer. A Norwegian himself, Thomas is the author of this incredible book and introduces the field of jihadi studies quite well in this excellent if dated essay.

    3. Brynjar Lia. Another Norwegian, Brynjar also wrote a rather wonderful book and is an analyst at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment.

    4. Leah Farrall. Aussie goddess of all things counter-terrorism. Follow her on Twitter at @allthingsct.

    5. Brian Fishman. A research fellow at the New America Foundation, you might actually see Brian on television. He probably will not say anything ignorant. Which is more than you can say for most people you will see on television. @brianfishman

    You will note my incomplete list of counter-terrorism experts is somewhat biased toward those with language skills and formal education in the subject and away from law enforcement and military experience. This is not an accident. Nothing wrong with the latter, of course. It's just that if you want someone to explain the origins of al-Qaeda, some guy who used to kick down doors is probably not your man. (Though he may be, I guess.) My list is also biased toward experts on Islamist terror. There are those in the field of strategic studies who focus more on terror and coercion as general subjects, but I have found they are less likely to be able to say something of consequence about specific groups than people who are experts on specific groups can say something of consequence about terror tactics and coercion in general. Anyway, do add your own names in the comments section.

    P.S. This list was compiled after jihadi groups claimed responsibility for the Norway attacks. If the attacks were instead the acts of what we social scientists call an "LDA," or Lone Derranged A******, save this list for the next time there is an attack by bona fide terrorist group or you're just otherwise curious about terror and counter-terrorism.

    CT
  • I have just spent the past several days talking about small wars and insurgencies with the brilliant graduate students who make up this year's SWAMOS class. I lectured all day Wednesday and stuck around to hear Conrad Crane talk on Thursday about the development and implementation of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. One of the topics that kept coming up was the ways in which FM 3-24 needs to be revised, so I was pleased to see Carl Prine, Starbuck and Mike Few tackle this very issue in a paper for the Small Wars Journal (.pdf). Jason Fritz then piled on over at Ink Spots.

    My primary criticism of the doctrine as it is currently written is the doctrine's weakness with respect to waging counterinsurgency as a third party, something both Charlie "Erin" Simpson and Steve Biddle have written a lot about. Any doctrine that borrows heavily from lessons learned in the colonial era will not take into account the fact that when you yourself are not the sovereign power, you have a whole 'nother set of issues to deal with. The main issue is that of what Steve calls interest alignment. As the doctrine is written, there is a naive assumption that our interests line up with those of the host nation, which is almost never the case. As a consequence of that assumption, though, we fail to think through how we need to use our leverage over the host nation to be successful.

    You might think that the father of the doctrine, Con, would be really protective of it. Not at all. Con was taking a lot of notes yesterday and seems excited about revising the doctrine to incorporate lessons learned as well as to fill gaps where the doctrine is weak. He's a lot more open minded about the doctrine, in other words, than a lot of the doctrine's most vehement critics.

  • I am in Ithaca, New York preparing to teach a module on insurgency and counterinsurgency tomorrow as part of the Summer Workshop on Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS). I myself am a SWAMOS alumnus (Class of 2008), so when the great Richard Betts asked me to teach this year, I was humbled and honored to accept. The students this year seem to be a really interesting mix of graduate students, some with military experience, and I am sure the questions they ask will be excellent. So although I will not be blogging, I will be taking notes of the best questions I hear tomorrow to be discussed in blog posts when I return. I'm teaching a morning introduction to insurgency and counterinsurgency and will then lead a structured afternoon discussion of insurgency and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. I have taught one-day seminars on counterinsurgency before, but those have been for military officers and others in government, so I have written new slides for a more academic audience. (And I assigned Chapter 5 of Kalyvas for advance reading, though I'm sure half of the students have already read the entire book.) I'm sticking around to listen in on another day of lectures and return Thursday night.
  • Genius CNAS research assistant Mirv "Matt" Irvine, who knows more about Pakistani militant groups than most, has written a review of my friend Steve Tankel's new book on Lashkar-e Taiba. Enjoy.

    ***

    Multiple bombings tore through downtown Mumbai last week, killing 17 people. Though attributed to domestic Indian Mujadhedin, these attacks revived painful memories of the devastating 2008 raid launched by 10 Lashkar-e-Taiba fighters in the same city. Last week’s attack did not amass near the casualties as LeT’s 2008 spectacle, but it comes at a critical juncture in the still tenuous security environment of South Asia.

    With U.S.-Pakistani relations approaching near complete dysfunction over the bin Laden raid, the latest attacks brought further suspicion of Pakistan and its ability and willingness to control its cadre of state-sponsored militant groups.  A new book, Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba (Columbia University Press, 2011), by Stephen Tankel shines a new light on the murky world of Pakistan’s premiere militant group and its rise to become one of the world’s most dangerous non-state actors (a term used very loosely).

    The 2008 attacks marked a turning point for Lashkar-e-Taiba and for Pakistan's infamous ISI: the Mumbai raid signaled the arrival of Lashkar as a globally capable terrorist organization and was a clear example of the explosive danger of Pakistan and its military and intelligence services' active support for terrorist proxies against India. According to Tankel, the Pakistani "army and ISI essentially built Lashkar's military apparatus from the mid-1990s onward specifically for use against India."

    In discussing Pakistan's calculus following the 9/11 attacks, Tankel argues that the Musharraf regime and ISI divided the country's militants into good and bad jihadis. Lashkar won out over other terrorist groups because it "was the most reliable in Islamabad's eyes and fared the best." Lashkar would occupy an increasingly prominent role in the India-Pakistan conflict as the two nuclear powers sought to avoid conventional clashes due to the risk of escalation.

    Pakistan resisted eliminating its proxies throughout the last decade to preserve what the ISI viewed as "a necessary auxiliary force in the event of a war with India, which they continued to view as an existential threat." Following the 2008 Mumbai attacks, according to Tankel, "the security services made no attempt to dismantle the military apparatus that produced Lashkar's militants and which made the Mumbai attacks possible."

    Just as Pakistan practices a double game with the United States and militant proxies today, Lashkar itself balances its state sponsor's interests with its own effort to support the jihad against America and the West. Tankel documents how Lashkar capitalized on its protected position within Pakistan by offering safe haven to other jihadi groups, fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan against American forces, recruiting and training al Qaeda fighters and participating in terrorist attacks in Pakistan and abroad.

    U.S. policymakers are increasingly focusing on Lashkar as an emerging transnational threat that weighs heavily on not only U.S. counterterrorism objectives but also the broader U.S.-Pakistani relationship. As a parting component of Storming the World Stage, Tankel answers the question: Does Lashkar threaten the U.S. and its Western allies at home and abroad? Yes. According to him, the group's role in the war in Afghanistan, its targeting of foreign interests in India and elsewhere and its increasingly global operations make it a direct threat to U.S. interests. More alarmingly for Tankel, Lashkar's continued "work as part of a consortium" of militant actors working in concert makes it a key enabler for transnational terrorism, one that receives support and protection from the Pakistani government.

    Lashkar is not going to fade from the world stage for the foreseeable future. Policymakers in the U.S. and throughout the world must increasingly plan for dealing with the group. However, it is also important to note that the group and its Pakistani sponsors are not unitary actors and, as Tankel notes, "unless something changes, arresting this tide will only grow more difficult with time."

    Tankel has produced one of the definitive accounts of Lashkar’s rise as well as the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and his book should be the go-to-guide for those looking to understand Pakistan’s reliance on proxies against India and its attached baggage.

    Suggested follow-on reading: Sebastian Rotella’s Pakistan and the Mumbai Attacks: The Untold Story and Bruce Riedel’s Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of Global Jihad.

    Matthew Irvine is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security and co-author of the report Beyond Afghanistan: A Regional Security Strategy for South and Central Asia.

  • Micah Zenko has a piece up on Foreign Policy's website about gender (im)balance in think tanks. His data (which I assume he took from our website, here) demonstrates that only 18% of our policy-related staff is female and that just 31% of our overall staff is female.

    There are lies, though, damn lies, and then statistics. In this case (and I can only speak for myself, obviously), CNAS does not seem like such a male-dominated place if you actually work here. This is because our staff includes a lot of non-resident and part-time staff who are rarely here. If you subtract part-time staff like Tom Ricks and Bob Kaplan (sorry, guys) who are rarely here and non-resident staff like David Asher and Nancy Berglass (who are almost never here), the numbers are different: CNAS actually has just as many female full-time staff (50%, or 11) as we do male full-time staff. (And two more females are about to join the full-time staff in the next week, putting men in the overall minority.) Among our research staff, we do have a big gender imbalance: 11 men to just three women. (With another on the way, making the percentage either 21% or 27%, depending on how charitable you want to be.) That having been said, our director of research is Kristin Lord, and her deputy is Nora Bensahel. So to the degree that we are hierarchical, women are in real positions of authority when it comes to shaping our research agenda.

  • SFC Leroy Petry will receive the Medal of Honor today. Army.mil has a really excellent feature explaining the medal itself, Rangers, and what SFC Petry did to earn the nation's highest honor. Needless to say, this is a proud day for all Regimental alumni out there.

  • As either Reinhold Niebuhr or Brother Mouzone once said, "The game is the game."

    Ahmed Wali Karzai, long a case study for how U.S. government agencies and departments pull in different directions in Afghanistan, was killed today in Afghanistan

    I am neither the pro's pro on Ahmed Wali Karzai or southern Afghanistan, but let me direct you to Mattieu Aikins' excellent recent profile of AWK and also to Matt's Twitter feed, which I will be watching today for further news and cogent analysis.

    Finally, you will note that our tech-support team at CNAS has added CAPTCHAs to the comments section in order to combat the spam. Fans of cut-price NFL jerseys may be upset, but I hope this makes the blog more reader-friendly for the rest of you.

  • I had mentioned on the blog a few weeks back that I was looking forward to reading Dan Byman's A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism. I can safely recommend the book now after having read it. A few quick thoughts:

    1. If you are a geek like me who has spent a lot of time studying a group like Hizballah and the Israeli attempts to counter such a group, you are probably not going to learn a lot in terms of new details from Byman's book. Most of Byman's research leans heavily on well-known secondary sources and periodicals, so if you have read books like Sayigh's Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 or Harel & Issacharoff's 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon in addition to all the Crisis Group reports that have been published on the region over the past 20-odd years, you're probably not going to learn a whole heck of a lot that you did not already know. But ...

    2. ... The reason Byman spends so much time carefully constructing a narrative of Israel's struggles to build a coherent counter-terror strategy is so that he can draw the conclusions he does in the last chapter, where he notes what the world can learn from the Israeli experience and what Israel itself still needs to learn. The last chapter of this study is must-read stuff, and the evidence for Byman's conclusions is to be found in all the chapters that preceed it.

    3. In particular, Byman makes a great point about thinking counterinsurgency while fighting terrorism. I have argued ad nauseum (and for several years now) that the dichotomy between counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency is a false one, and I have demonstrated how effective direct-action special operations (which we usually associate with counter-terrorism) fit into a counterinsurgency campaign. Byman makes the equally correct case that when you are executing what you consider to be a strict counter-terror campaign, the label "terrorist" doesn't do justice to a group like Hamas or Hizballah and that simply eroding the operational capabilities of such groups does not address the things like the social services and political representation those groups provide to their constituencies. You can't just have counter-terror operations, in other words: you also have to have a political strategy. The next point Byman makes, about countering terrorist groups in the information battle, goes part and parcel with this.

    In sum, this was a good book, and unless you a serious geek like me about these issues, you will learn a lot. Byman relies a lot on Israeli sources, but as the Economist noted in their approving review, he does so in a very even-handed way. Don't let the fact that Byman repeatedly cites this blogger in Chapters 16 and 17 prevent you from buying this important and well-written new book.

  • Ready?

    1. This nonsense about adding new medals to recognize service in Iraq and Afghanistan is just as ridiculous as people have been saying, and for even more reasons. The way the U.S. military has divided up the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan into arbitrary phases is unnecessary and confusing. Ask a soldier if they have served in either country, and they will likely say, "Yes, two deployments to Iraq and three to Afghanistan" or something similar. They do not say, "Well, let's see, I had one deployment as part of the Liberation, one as part of the Transition, one deployment that overlapped between the Surge and Iraqi Sovereignty ... and then I deployed to Afghanistan as part of the Consolidation." That's silly. Just award one medal for service in each combat theater, and if you want to keep score beyond that, well, that's why God invented service stripes and valor awards.

    2. I have mixed feelings about the news that the White House will now issue condolence letters to the families of soldiers who have committed suicide. First off, I care a lot less about condolence letters than I do about investing in psychological screening and counseling to reduce the number of suicides in the first place. Second, not all suicides are the result of combat stress. (One study demonstrated that "79 percent of army suicides occurred within the first three years of service, whether soldiers were deployed or not.") I have known soldiers who have died in Afghanistan in helicopter accidents and soldiers who have died in stateside helicopter crashes. Although neither crash was directly caused by enemy action, the families of the former received condolence letters. The families of the latter did not. If you're going to start writing letters to the families of all soldiers who commit suicide (where indirect cause of death cannot be clearly determined), should you not also start writing condolence letters to the families of all servicemen who die while serving on active duty? And what about the soldier who returns home from war, horrified by what he has seen, gets really drunk and dies (and maybe kills a few others) while driving under the influence? Does that guy's family get a letter? I mean, where do you draw the line between those who receive condolence letters and those who do not? My man Yochi Dreazen gets deeper into these questions in this National Journal article.

    3. Speaking of PTSD, if a U.S. soldier wrote a difficult, painful-to-read, searingly honest essay on his or her struggle with PTSD, no one would tell that soldier that he or she does not have the right to write such an essay because they failed to also consider the effect of the war on innocent civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan. People would just accept that everyone has the right to share his or her own personal narrative, and that when people are brave enough to open up about their personal experiences, we should all give them the space to do so. Which is just one of the reasons why the outrage over Mac McLelland's essay annoys me.

  • Max Boot's provocative op-ed in the Los Angeles Times in defense of nation-building has been getting people excited and angry. Max:

    If you want yet another example of how costly our aversion to nation-building has been, look no further than Iraq. The Bush administration associated nation-building with the hated policies of the Clinton administration and refused to prepare for it. The result was that Iraq fell apart after U.S. troops had toppled its existing regime.

    I'm with Max half-way on this one. On the one hand, I firmly believe that when you decide to go to war, you should be prepared to use any and all means at your disposal to effect victory. If that means building institutions of the state, as we have done in both Iraq and Afghanistan, okay. You can't "win" in either place, after all, without at least creating strong police forces to take your place and keep public order so that a peaceful political process and economy can thrive. You have to create a secure environment in any post-conflict state, and unless you plan on staying forever, that means building up competent local security forces. That's a form of nation-building that I can support.

    Where I diverge from Max is in two places. First, Max conflates nation-building with the willingness to intervene and engage in the first place.

    Is isolationism really a course we want to follow today at a time when Iran is going nuclear, Pakistan is turning against the West, North Korea is trying to export its destructive technology, turmoil is spreading across the Middle East, Al Qaeda is far from defeated and China's power is growing?

    I know Max is afraid Americans of all stripes will now embrace isolationism in the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But employing whatever means you need after the United States enters a conflict and deciding to intervene in the first place are two different things. I, for one, in large part because I am all too familiar with what a "resource suck" wars can become, am reluctant to intervene in places like Libya in the first place. And, had anyone asked me about Iraq in 2002 or 2003, I would have offered the same opinion there. But I whole-heartedly endorse the U.S. decision to rebuild and train Iraqi military and polices forces after the invasion. (I do not feel the same way about Libya. For any number of reasons, the United States should step aside and leave the responsibility for post-conflict Libya to others. I have a sinking feeling we will not do this, though.) 

    The second place I disagree with Max concerns our ability to nation-build. For the most part, we suck at it. In Afghanistan, at least, our aid and development projects have arguably exacerbated the drivers of conflict. We have created a rentier state on steroids, and as we begin to withdraw the majority of our aid and development funds, it will take a minor miracle to avoid Afghanistan's economic collapse. The only area in which we are reasonably competent is in building military organizations, which we have a lot of experience doing, but even there, we are better at building military organizations in our own image rather than the kinds of police/gendarme forces countries like Afghanistan really need.

    Why do we suck at nation-building? A lot of reasons. Here are just a few: (1) We are ignorant. We do not know enough about the cultural, political and social contexts of foreign environments to fully appreciate how our interventions will affect those environments. Thus our aid and development spending (and military operations, to be fair), meant to ameliorate drivers of conflict, often exacerbate them. (2) We do not provide enough oversight and accountability for the projects we initiate. This is boring but important. We have spent ungodly sums of money in both Iraq and Afghanistan and have not provided enough contracting officers to effectively oversee the money we have spent. How do we just give tens of millions of dollars to agencies and departments in the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan without any oversight? Lack of contracting officers. How are contracts in Afghanistan divided up between shady sub-contractors and sub-sub-contractors, with tax-payer money falling into the hands of the Taliban and warlords? Lack of contracting officers. (3) We do not have any patience -- and we have limited resources. Nation-building takes time. Where we can nation-build at relatively low-cost over an extended period of time, as in Colombia, we can be successful. But asking Americans to spend massive amounts of money for an extended period of time in Iraq or Afghanistan is a recipe for ... turning your average U.S. tax-payer into an isolationist. 

  • CNAS is closed for the week, so I am at home catching up on my reading and workouts. A few random thoughts, though:

    1. The Dutch are justifiably ashamed of what happened -- and what did not happen -- at Srebrenica, but someone explain to me how today's ruling is good for peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. If you can be held responsible in a court of law for things you did or did not do in a peacekeeping operation, what incentive is there for top-flight military organizations such as those that belong to the NATO countries to participate in peacekeeping operations? Will you not be left with only those countries who need the money? I am not trying to say military organizations in peacekeeping operations should not be held accountable for their actions. I just see today's ruling unhelpful. When the United Nations next goes around looking for participants in peacekeeping operations, we might see fewer hands go up. Or rather, we might see fewer hands go up from among the better militaries.

    2. 197 U.S. troops were killed in Afghanistan in the first six months of this year.* 195 were killed in the first six months of 2010. Does this mean anything? Well, not really. First off, let me start off by saying that those 197 men and women are "statistically significant" to the mothers, fathers, friends and other family they left behind in the United States. We Americans all mourn their passing and honor their sacrifice. But in terms of trying to wrap our heads around the conflict, an increase of two is statistically insignificant. Or maybe it is significant when you consider there were roughly 30,000 more U.S. troops in Afghanistan in the first six months of 2011 than there were in the first six months of 2010. So you have more troops in the country, contesting more areas, and the number of U.S. casualties more or less held steady. That might be good news, then? But we have a real problem with data in Afghanistan. Most of the data we do have actually tells us little about the direction of the conflict. And much of the data we want to have is uneven, unstandardized, and has massive gaps in it.

    3. The security services of the Pakistani state are an annoyance to the United States. They are a hazard to the people of Afghanistan. And they are an absolute menace to the people of Pakistan itself.

    *A number of readers pointed out that this figure is lower than the one tracked by iCasualties. That figure is 203, which I do not think changes anything. (Though, again, I realize every single one of these fallen soldiers is someone's son or daughter, so I am not trying to be insensitive here.)

  • I would be remiss if I did not say anything about Sec. Gates today. I have never met the man but greatly appreciated the way in which he brought greater accountability to the Department of Defense and provided leadership in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan while caring deeply for the men and women serving in our armed forces. The love he feels for the average sailor, soldier, airman, Marine and special operator is reciprocated. So let me just say thank you to the secretary and also to his wife -- for allowing such a great public servant to spend a few more years with us in Washington. Although Sec. Panetta seems well placed to steer the department into an era of greater austerity, the greater defense policy community will be poorer in the absence of his predecessor.

  • I just finished Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann's essay on drone strikes in Foreign Affairs and recommend it. I especially agreed with the concluding recommendations, which address the two things that bother me most about the drone program thus far: perceptions and accountability.

    Few in the U.S. government -- because the drone program has been, in the words of our new secretary of defense, "the only game in town" when it comes to targeting militants in Pakistan* -- have been willing to admit that the program could have second- and third-order effects that might off-set tactical gains. There is some evidence to suggest the drone strikes are not unpopular within the tribal areas themselves, but they are highly unpopular in Pakistan as a whole and in, one suspects, the Pakistani diaspora community. If we kill bad guys in the tribal areas, great. But if killing bad guys in the tribal areas makes people in Walthamstow or Connecticut want to blow themselves up**, not great. It seems to me that we have been willfully ignorant of the ways in which the program might be radicalizing militants outside the places where we can kill them and that what is a great CT platform is, in the absence of a broader strategy, a crappy CVE platform.

    Bergen and Tiedemann suggest ways to make the program more transparent, which might address popular grievances. Bergen and Tiedemann also recommend transferring control of the program over from the intelligence community to the Department of Defense. Again, I think this makes a lot of sense because it would make the program both more transparent and also subject to more robust chains of accountability. Bergen and Tiedemann argue such a transfer of control would have other advantages, and they make a strong case.

    Not that I think this will ever happen. The drone program has been, if nothing else, a great way for the intelligence community to justify its budget since 9/11, and various agencies will be reluctant to surrender control for both substantive reasons and budgetary reasons.

    Contrary to popular belief, I have never been an anti-drone fundamentalist. But I do think the drone program has been a tactic executed in the absence of a strategy and without proper transparency and oversight. Bergen and Tiedemann's recommendations would go a long way toward addressing some of my main concerns.

    *Aside from, apparently, Seal Team 6.

    **Or lead someone to plant a bomb in Times Square, which is a total hypothetical, of course, and would never happen in real life.

  • As the names of those indicted by the special tribunal for Lebanon begin to leak out, please go to Qifa Nabki for invaluable background reading on the tribunal itself.

  • There are two items of note I want to highlight to which I was not able to draw attention while traveling. The first is this post by my friend Steve Negus on Issandr's blog on how Libyan rebels are learning to fight by ... playing video games. Alternately fascinating and hilarious.

    The second item to which I want to draw your attention is this paper by Doug Ollivant* for the New America Foundation challenging the "new orthodoxy" about what led to the dramatic drop in ethno-sectarian violence in Iraq in 2007. This is an excellent paper. Doug knows enough to know that we cannot definitively determine what caused the 2007 drop in violence, but he advances what he calls "an alternative, counter-narrative" to those offered by Tom Ricks, Bob Woodward, Kim Kagan, Linda Robinson and others.** (Which is in itself interesting in part because Doug is one of the heroes of these other narratives -- most especially that of Robinson.)

    Doug is one of the smartest thinkers on counterinsurgency I know***, and his piece is littered with interesting observations, though again, it is as tough to prove Doug's narrative is any more valid, given the lack of evidence, than that of Tom Ricks or, say, Peter Feaver. There are just too many variables out there, and as I have argued ad nauseum, the best we can hope to do in the absence of causality is to establish correlation among all the things that happened.

    Some of the more interesting observations, though, concern Afghanistan, from where Doug recently returned after a year spent as John Campbell's counterinsurgency advisor. Here are a few choice excerpts. This first one echos a point I made yesterday:

    The President’s statements have been ambiguous, ever since his West Point speech of 2009, during which he both authorized an increase in troop strength, and gave a July 2011 date for the beginning of their withdrawal, recently confirmed in an address on the future of the war. This mixed message from the President (which continues to resonate despite post-Lisbon Conference messaging about 2014, and not 2011, being the key date) has been echoed by his administration. This ambiguity is almost certainly driven by the desire to reconcile the largely incompatible goals of permanently and decisively denying al Qaeda safe havens and Taliban establishment in Afghanistan, while simultaneously avoiding long-term intervention and nation building at astronomical cost. So in short, while the troops have arrived in Afghanistan, the unambiguous message of support and presence that accompanied the 2007 Iraq surge has not. We should not be surprised when politicians in both Afghanistan and Pakistan react accordingly.

    This second bit is more sobering:

    ...it is unlikely that a push of more forces, better tactical counterinsurgency, and the arrival of a highly talented commander can compensate for a lack of political commitment and absence of shared goals between the host nation and the intervening power.

    Read the whole paper here, watch Doug run his yap here, and many kudos to the New America Foundation for giving such a smart scholar-practitioner a home.

    *Hahahaha, I love Doug like a brother, but he needs to change his profile picture. "Oui, c'est moi. Je suis au musée du Louvre parce que je suis un homme de culture. Regardez l'angoisse sur mon visage parce que je ne peux pas se permettre une coupe de cheveux."

    **Carl Prine dings me for citing Robinson and Ricks in my recent IFRI paper (in his otherwise very touching, thought-provoking post), but I did write that this was an incomplete sample and not a full review of the literature. At least I did in the initial draft I turned in.

    ***It struck me as so weird and stupid that Doug is set up as some kind of anti-COIN rival to my boss (and his longtime friend) John Nagl in this snarky, argumentative National Journal piece. Doug is as much a card-carrying COINdinista as anyone, and those who understand the continued scholarly and policy development of counterinsurgency know there are genuine operational and strategic differences of opinion concerning COIN and how it should be applied in Afghanistan. (Big footprint with lots of general purpose forces? Small footprint with more special operations trainers? Some combination of both? All of that is counterinsurgency -- it's just different ways of doing it.) More to follow on this...

  • Let's give Gov. Tim Pawlenty some credit for wading into the Middle East in a serious policy speech yesterday. I'm going to pick through it in this post, taking major issue with some things he said and commenting in a more neutral manner on others. Ready? Okay...

    I want to speak plainly this morning about the opportunities and the dangers we face today in the Middle East.  The revolutions now roiling that region offer the promise of a more democratic, more open, and a more prosperous Arab world.  From Morocco to the Arabian Gulf, the escape from the dead hand of oppression is now a real possibility.  

    Agreed.

    Now is not the time to retreat from freedom’s rise.

    Agreed. Though it was right here that I started to think about how the United States can effectively respond to what is taking place in the Middle East with limited and reduced resources.

    Yet at the same time, we know these revolutions can bring to power forces that are neither democratic nor forward-looking.  Just as the people of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria and elsewhere see a chance for a better life of genuine freedom, the leaders of radical Islam see a chance to ride political turmoil into power. 

    Probably true. Thought not chief among my own concerns about the revolutions in the Arabic-speaking world.

    The United States has a vital stake in the future of this region.  We have been presented with a challenge as great as any we have faced in recent decades.  And we must get it right.  The question is, are we up to the challenge?  

    Probably not, actually. Gov. Pawlenty's teammates in the Congress aim to slash the International Affairs budget.

    My answer is, of course we are.  

    Oh.

    If we are clear about our interests and guided by our principles, we can help steer events in the right direction.  Our nation has done this in the past -- at the end of World War II, in the last decade of the Cold War, and in the more recent war on terror … and we can do it again.

    Sometimes, though, as we have seen in the Middle East, our interests do not match up with our principles.

    But President Obama has failed to formulate and carry out an effective and coherent strategy in response to these events.  

    This is certainly true. But I have a little sympathy for the president here. It's tough to formulate a coherent regional strategy when our interests vary to such a high degree from country to country.

    He has been timid, slow, and too often without a clear understanding of our interests or a clear commitment to our principles.

    Meh. I actually see the guy's advisors trying to balance our interests against our principles, which is not the easiest thing to do in a region with Saudi Arabia in it.

    And parts of the Republican Party now seem to be trying to out-bid the Democrats in appealing to isolationist sentiments.  This is no time for uncertain leadership in either party.  The stakes are simply too high, and the opportunity is simply too great. 

    Well! At this point in the speech, I started to wonder whether or not we were about to get a taste of the full-throated freedom agenda stuff that kind of died in the maelstrom of Iraq and Israel's debacle in Lebanon in 2006.

    No one in this Administration predicted the events of the Arab spring - but the freedom deficit in the Arab world was no secret.  

    True.

    For 60 years, Western nations excused and accommodated the lack of freedom in the Middle East.

    True.

    That could not last.  The days of comfortable private deals with dictators were coming to an end in the age of Twitter, You Tube, and Facebook.

    True.

    And history teaches there is no such thing as stable oppression.

    True.

    President Obama has ignored that lesson of history.  Instead of promoting democracy – whose fruit we see now ripening across the region – he adopted a murky policy he called “engagement.”  

    Not sure how one is the opposite of the other, though I'm now sensing where this is going...

    “Engagement” meant that in 2009, when the Iranian ayatollahs stole an election, and the people of that country rose up in protest, President Obama held his tongue.  His silence validated the mullahs, despite the blood on their hands and the nuclear centrifuges in their tunnels.  

     

    While protesters were killed and tortured, Secretary Clinton said the Administration was “waiting to see the outcome of the internal Iranian processes.”  She and the president waited long enough to see the Green Movement crushed.  

    I'm sure the administration has some good reasons for not wanting to openly side with the protesters in 2009 in Iran, but that decision has made the administration an easy target for the other party.

    “Engagement” meant that in his first year in office, President Obama cut democracy funding for Egyptian civil society by 74 percent.  As one American democracy organization noted, this was “perceived by Egyptian democracy activists as signaling a lack of support.”  They perceived correctly.  It was a lack of support.  

    Interesting. I had not heard this. It would, of course, be interesting for Gov. Pawlenty to point out here that his own party now controls the purse strings. Should the Congress now spend more on these kinds of democracy promotion programs abroad?

    “Engagement” meant that when crisis erupted in Cairo this year, as tens of thousands of protesters gathered in Tahrir Square, Secretary Clinton declared, “the Egyptian Government is stable.”  Two weeks later, Mubarak was gone.  When Secretary Clinton visited Cairo after Mubarak’s fall, democratic activist groups refused to meet with her.  And who can blame them?

    Plenty of activists met with Sec. Clinton, actually, though Gov. Pawlenty is correct that the United States was on the wrong side of history on Egypt.

    The forces we now need to succeed in Egypt -- the pro-democracy, secular political parties -- these are the very people President Obama cut off, and Secretary Clinton dismissed.  

    This is weak sauce. You can't blame the U.S. government for the fact that secular political parties are not stronger than they are.

    The Obama “engagement” policy in Syria led the Administration to call Bashar al Assad a “reformer.”  Even as Assad’s regime was shooting hundreds of protesters dead in the street, President Obama announced his plan to give Assad “an alternative vision of himself.”  Does anyone outside a therapist’s office have any idea what that means?  This is what passes for moral clarity in the Obama Administration.  

    I'm with Gov. Pawlenty on this one, but there is a contradiction coming up later. Wait for it.

    By contrast, I called for Assad’s departure on March 29; I call for it again today.  We should recall our ambassador from Damascus; and I call for that again today.  The leader of the United States should never leave those willing to sacrifice their lives in the cause of freedom wondering where America stands.  As President, I will not.

    Cool.

    We need a president who fully understands that America never “leads from behind.”  

    Oh, man. Whichever advisor uttered those infamous words in front of a reporter from the New Yorker needs to be flogged.

    We cannot underestimate how pivotal this moment is in Middle Eastern history.  We need decisive, clear-eyed leadership that is responsive to this historical moment of change in ways that are consistent with our deepest principles and safeguards our vital interests.

     

    Opportunity still exists amid the turmoil of the Arab Spring -- and we should seize it.

    Hahaha, Tim Pawlenty sounds like Brad Pitt's Achilles from that horrible Troy movie. I'm fired up, Tim! Let's storm the beach!

    As I see it, the governments of the Middle East fall into four broad categories, and each requires a different strategic approach. 

    Just four?

    The first category consists of three countries now at various stages of transition toward democracy – the formerly fake republics in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya.  Iraq is also in this category, but is further along on its journey toward democracy.  

     

    For these countries, our goal should be to help promote freedom and democracy.  

    Okay, I'll buy that.

    Elections that produce anti-democratic regimes undermine both freedom and stability.  We must do more than monitor polling places.  We must redirect foreign aid away from efforts to merely build good will, and toward efforts to build good allies -- genuine democracies governed by free people according to the rule of law.  And we must insist that our international partners get off the sidelines and do the same.  

    Okay, but now I'm starting to ask those questions about where the money for this will come from.

    We should have no illusions about the difficulty of the transitions faced by Libya, Tunisia, and especially Egypt.  Whereas Libya is rich in oil, and Tunisia is small, Egypt is large, populous, and poor.  Among the region’s emerging democracies, it remains the biggest opportunity and the biggest danger for American interests.  

    True.

    Having ejected the Mubarak regime, too many Egyptians are now rejecting the beginnings of the economic opening engineered in the last decade.  

    True. But that liberalization allowed Egypt's economy to grow but only benefitted a small percentage of the richest Egyptians. Sounds a lot like another country I know, actually.

    We act out of friendship when we tell Egyptians, and every new democracy, that economic growth and prosperity are the result of free markets and free trade—not subsidies and foreign aid.  If we want these countries to succeed, we must afford them the respect of telling them the truth.  

    Nothing controversial there. A lot of truth, in fact. Read the Economist's special briefing on the Egyptian economy for more.

    In Libya, the best help America can provide to these new friends is to stop leading from behind and commit America’s strength to removing Ghadafi, recognizing the TNC as the government of Libya, and unfreezing assets so the TNC can afford security and essential services as it marches toward Tripoli.  

    I'm with this. The United States either needs to focus on a) removing Qadhdhafi or b) supporting the TNC militarily and politicially. One or the other. If Gov. Pawlenty wants to do that latter, I'm down with that. By the way, there's that "leading from behind" phrase again. Expect to hear a lot more of that in 2011 and 2012.

    Beyond Libya, America should always promote the universal principles that undergird freedom.  We should press new friends to end discrimination against women, to establish independent courts, and freedom of speech and the press.  We must insist on religious freedoms for all, including the region’s minorities—whether Christian, Shia, Sunni, or Bahai.  

    Outstanding.

    The second category of states is the Arab monarchies.  Some – like Jordan and Morocco – are engaging now in what looks like genuine reform.  This should earn our praise and our assistance.  These kings have understood they must forge a partnership with their own people, leading step by step toward more democratic societies.  These monarchies can smooth the path to constitutional reform and freedom and thereby deepen their own legitimacy.  If they choose this route, they, too, deserve our help.  

    I'm skeptical of how far Jordan is going to promote reform, actually. They still have one of the more brutal secret police in the region. But okay, I'll go along with this.

    But others are resisting reform. While President Obama spoke well about Bahrain in his recent speech, he neglected to utter two important words:  Saudi Arabia.  

    Yup.

    US-Saudi relations are at an all-time low—and not primarily because of the Arab Spring.  They were going downhill fast, long before the uprisings began.  The Saudis saw an American Administration yearning to engage Iran—just at the time they saw Iran, correctly, as a mortal enemy.  

    Oh boy, where are we going with this, Gov. Pawlenty?

    We need to tell the Saudis what we think, which will only be effective if we have a position of trust with them.

    Relationships of trust with the Saudis are built over decades, by the way.

    We will develop that trust by demonstrating that we share their great concern about Iran and that we are committed to doing all that is necessary to defend the region from Iranian aggression.

    Maybe. But I have spoken with a lot of high-ranking Saudi officials and princes, and all of them agree on two things: a) the United States must attack Iran because an Iranian bomb would destabilize the region and b) the United States must not attack Iran because a U.S. strike would destabilize the region. I wish Gov. Pawlenty the best in trying to reconcile this mixed message.

    At the same time, we need to be frank about what the Saudis must do to insure stability in their own country.  Above all, they need to reform and open their society.  Their treatment of Christians and other minorities, and their treatment of women, is indefensible and must change.

    Amen. But this is not the way to build up a position of trust with Saudi Arabia.

    We know that reform will come to Saudi Arabia—sooner and more smoothly if the royal family accepts and designs it.  It will come later and with turbulence and even violence if they resist.  The vast wealth of their country should be used to support reforms that fit Saudi history and culture—but not to buy off the people as a substitute for lasting reform.

    #realtalk

    The third category consists of states that are directly hostile to America.  They include Iran and Syria.  The Arab Spring has already vastly undermined the appeal of Al Qaeda and the killing of Osama Bin Laden has significantly weakened it.

    True. I might have myself argued much the same thing.

    The success of peaceful protests in several Arab countries has shown the world that terror is not only evil, but will eventually be overcome by good.  Peaceful protests may soon bring down the Assad regime in Syria.

    Peaceful protests? Probably not. Civil war? Maybe.

    The 2009 protests in Iran inspired Arabs to seek their freedom.  Similarly, the Arab protests of this year, and the fall of regime after broken regime, can inspire Iranians to seek their freedom once again.  

    Let's hope.

    We have a clear interest in seeing an end to Assad’s murderous regime.  By sticking to Bashar al Assad so long, the Obama Administration has not only frustrated Syrians who are fighting for freedom—it has demonstrated strategic blindness.  The governments of Iran and Syria are enemies of the United States.  They are not reformers and never will be.  They support each other.  To weaken or replace one, is to weaken or replace the other.

     

    The fall of the Assad mafia in Damascus would weaken Hamas, which is headquartered there.  It would weaken Hezbollah, which gets its arms from Iran, through Syria.  And it would weaken the Iranian regime itself.    

    I'm going to give Gov. Pawlenty a pass on this for the moment. You'll understand why later.

    To take advantage of this moment, we should press every diplomatic and economic channel to bring the Assad reign of terror to an end.  We need more forceful sanctions to persuade Syria’s Sunni business elite that Assad is too expensive to keep backing.  We need to work with Turkey and the Arab nations and the Europeans, to further isolate the regime.  And we need to encourage opponents of the regime by making our own position very clear, right now:  Bashar al-Assad must go.  

     

    When he does, the mullahs of Iran will find themselves isolated and vulnerable.  Syria is Iran’s only Arab ally.  If we peel that away, I believe it will hasten the fall of the mullahs.  And that is the ultimate goal we must pursue.  It’s the singular opportunity offered to the world by the brave men and women of the Arab Spring.

    I'm with the governor here.

    The march of freedom in the Middle East cuts across the region’s diversity of religious, ethnic, and political groups.  But it is born of a particular unity.  It is a united front against stolen elections and stolen liberty, secret police, corruption, and the state-sanctioned violence that is the essence of the Iranian regime’s tyranny.  

     

    So this is a moment to ratchet up pressure and speak with clarity.  More sanctions.  More and better broadcasting into Iran.  More assistance to Iranians to access the Internet and satellite TV and the knowledge and freedom that comes with it.  More efforts to expose the vicious repression inside that country and expose Teheran’s regime for the pariah it is.  

    Okay.

    And, very critically, we must have more clarity when it comes to Iran’s nuclear program.  In 2008, candidate Barack Obama told AIPAC that he would “always keep the threat of military action on the table to defend our security and our ally Israel.”  This year, he told AIPAC “we remain committed to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.”  So I have to ask: are all the options still on the table or not?  If he’s not clear with us, it’s no wonder that even our closest allies are confused.    

    Gov. Pawlenty, I have a question: would you launch military strikes against Iran to prevent the Iranians from acquiring nuclear weapons? (y/n)

    The Administration should enforce all sanctions for which legal authority already exits.  We should enact and then enforce new pending legislation which strengthens sanctions particularly against the Iranian Revolutionary Guards who control much of the Iranian economy. 

    Again, what about strikes?

    And in the middle of all this, is Israel. 

    Actually, to the left and upper right of all this.

    Israel is unique in the region because of what it stands for and what it has accomplished.  And it is unique in the threat it faces—the threat of annihilation.  It has long been a bastion of democracy in a region of tyranny and violence.  And it is by far our closest ally in that part of the world.  

     

    Despite wars and terrorists attacks, Israel offers all its citizens, men and women, Jews, Christians, Muslims and, others including 1.5 million Arabs, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, the right to vote, access to independent courts and all other democratic rights.  

    [Lips bitten. I suspect Arab Israelis and Palestinians living under occupation might have a few words to say, though.]

    Nowhere has President Obama’s lack of judgment been more stunning than in his dealings with Israel.

     

    It breaks my heart that President Obama treats Israel, our great friend, as a problem, rather than as an ally.

    This is complete B.S. And Americans do not buy it.

    The President seems to genuinely believe the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lies at the heart of every problem in the Middle East.  He said it Cairo in 2009 and again this year.   

    This is also complete B.S. But you know who does care about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? All those Arab democrats you've been talking about for the past 10 minutes.

    President Obama could not be more wrong.  

     

    The uprisings in Tunis, Cairo, Tripoli and elsewhere are not about Israelis and Palestinians.

    This is actually true. But just because the uprisings were not about Israel does not mean our secular, Arab democratic heroes do not care about the Palestinians.

    They’re about oppressed people yearning for freedom and prosperity.  Whether those countries become prosperous and free is not about how many apartments Israel builds in Jerusalem.

    See previous.

    Today the president doesn’t really have a policy toward the peace process.  He has an attitude.  And let’s be frank about what that attitude is:  he thinks Israel is the problem.  And he thinks the answer is always more pressure on Israel.  

    Okay, this is nonsense, and most Americans do not buy this. Most Jewish American voters do not buy this either and are not animated by this nonsense. But I suspect that most of this is not directed at Jewish voters but rather at conservative Evangelical Christian voters -- the kind who vote in Republican primary elections.

    I reject that anti-Israel attitude.  I reject it because Israel is a close and reliable democratic ally.  And I reject it because I know the people of Israel want peace. 

    They most certainly do. Here's a question I have for Gov. Pawlenty, though: he realizes that many Israelis are scared to death about what will follow the al-Asad regime in Syria, right? I ask this because he seems to argue that we should a) support Israel on everything but b) work toward the overthrow of the al-Asad regime. What will Gov. Pawlenty do when our Israeli friends voice their concerns about post-Asad Syria?

    Israeli – Palestinian peace is further away now than the day Barack Obama came to office.  But that does not have to be a permanent situation. 

    Correlation =/= causation. Domestic Israeli and Palestinian politics might have more to do with this situation than the occupant of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

    We must recognize that peace will only come if everyone in the region perceives clearly that America stands strongly with Israel.  

    I would love to hear Gov. Pawlenty prove why this statement is true.

    I would take a new approach.

     

    First, I would never undermine Israel’s negotiating position, nor pressure it to accept borders which jeopardize security and its ability to defend itself.

     

    Second, I would not pressure Israel to negotiate with Hamas or a Palestinian government that includes Hamas, unless Hamas renounces terror, accepts Israel’s right to exist, and honors the previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements. In short, Hamas needs to cease being a terrorist group in both word and deed as a first step towards global legitimacy.

     

    Third, I would ensure our assistance to the Palestinians immediately ends if the teaching of hatred in Palestinian classrooms and airwaves continues. That incitement must end now. 

     

    Fourth, I would recommend cultivating and empowering moderate forces in Palestinian society.

    This is a new approach, actually. The first, second, and fourth points sound a lot like the approach taken by the Bush Administration between 2000 and 2006. But even the Bush Administration continued support for Palestinian security forces in the face of anti-Israeli sentiment among Palestinians. So this is actually more hardline than even the George W. Bush administration. And how the hell do you do #3 and #4 simultaneously? Also, good luck doing what you have just described in the above while at the same time engaging with Arab civil society and the new governments of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya as described earlier.

    When the Palestinians have leaders who are honest and capable, who appreciate the rule of law, who understand that war against Israel has doomed generations of Palestinians to lives of bitterness, violence, and poverty – then peace will come.

    Demonstrably false, actually. See Fayyad, Salam.

    The Middle East is changing before our eyes—but our government has not kept up.  It abandoned the promotion of democracy just as Arabs were about to seize it.  

    True.

    It sought to cozy up to dictators just as their own people rose against them.  It downplayed our principles and distanced us from key allies.

    Like Hosni Mubarak? Oh, wait, you mean Israel.

    All this was wrong, and these policies have failed.  The Administration has abandoned them, and at the price of American leadership.  A region that since World War II has looked to us for security and progress now wonders where we are and what we’re up to.

    That's probably true. But I think U.S. influence in the region is on the wane anyway, and I am not sure this is entirely bad.

    The next president must do better. Today, in our own Republican Party, some look back and conclude our projection of strength and defense of freedom was a product of different times and different challenges.  While times have changed, the nature of the challenge has not.  

    Well, let's give Gov. Pawlenty credit for making it clear where he stands on the primacy/restraint divide within the G.O.P.

    In the 1980s, we were up against a violent, totalitarian ideology bent on subjugating the people and principles of the West.  While others sought to co-exist, President Reagan instead sought victory.

    Aaaaaand also withdrew from Lebanon in the face of violent Islamist extremism.

    So must we, today.  For America is exceptional, and we have the moral clarity to lead the world.

     

    It is not wrong for Republicans to question the conduct of President Obama’s military leadership in Libya.  There is much to question.

    True.

    And it is not wrong for Republicans to debate the timing of our military drawdown in Afghanistan— though my belief is that General Petraeus’ voice ought to carry the most weight on that question.

    Half true. The president's voice should carry the most weight on that question, though I wish he trusted his field commanders more than he apparently does. 

    What is wrong, is for the Republican Party to shrink from the challenges of American leadership in the world.  History repeatedly warns us that in the long run, weakness in foreign policy costs us and our children much more than we’ll save in a budget line item.  

    Again, bold words for his own party.

    America already has one political party devoted to decline, retrenchment, and withdrawal.  It does not need a second one.

    Wow. I suspect we're going to see this "Democrats = Isolationism" meme more in 2011 and 2012.

    Our enemies in the War on Terror, just like our opponents in the Cold War, respect and respond to strength.

    Oh, goodness, has he been reading this?

    Sometimes strength means military intervention.  Sometimes it means diplomatic pressure.  It always means moral clarity in word and deed.  

     

    That is the legacy of Republican foreign policy at its best, and the banner our next Republican President must carry around the world.   

     

    Our ideals of economic and political freedom, of equality and opportunity for all citizens, remain the dream of people in the Middle East and throughout the world.  As America stands for these principles, and stands with our friends and allies, we will help the Middle East transform this moment of turbulence into a firmer, more lasting opportunity for freedom, peace, and progress.  

     

    Thank you.

    Thank you.

  • Any and all scholars of the contemporary Arabic-speaking world need to read Greg Gause's nostra culpa in the latest Foreign Affairs, "Why Middle Eastern Studies Missed the Arab Spring."

    Scholars did not predict or appreciate the variable ways in which Arab armies would react to the massive, peaceful protests this year. This oversight occurred because, as a group, Middle East experts had largely lost interest in studying the role of the military in Arab politics.

    I am proud to have completed my own studies under the supervision of one of the few scholars still both inclined and equipped to carefully study the role of the military in Arab politics. But as Harb and Leenders point out (.pdf) with regards to Hizballah, few contemporary area studies scholars have either the training or inclination to carefully study the role of military organizations and their activities.

  • I was unable to hear the president give his speech on Afghanistan, but it does not seem to have pleased many people. Reading it a few days later, I had a similar reaction of dissapointment to the one I had to the 2009 speech at West Point

    In that earlier speech, the president blunted a lot of any possible advantage he might have drawn from a renewed commitment to Afghanistan by simultaneously announcing we were going to begin a withdrawal in July 2011. On the one hand, that promised withdrawal provided reassurance to the peoples of the United States and other troop-contributing nations, who obviously wanted their men and women home from Afghanistan as soon as possible. But it was a terrible blunder in terms of the way it played in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It offered no reason to the people of Afghanistan to choose to support the institutions of the government of Afghanistan -- such as the security forces -- if the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan was temporary. It convinced the Taliban that their strategy of waiting us out was the correct one, and it also did nothing to persuade the Pakistani security services that their hedging strategy of continuing to arm and train insurgent groups in order to safeguard Pakistani interests after a U.S. and allied withdrawal was anything but wise. So the Surge of troops into Afghanistan was consigned to have less of an effect than it otherwise might have had.

    In this speech, meanwhile, I thought the president was well within reason to withdraw all the Surge troops by the end of 2012, and I myself co-wrote a paper on the mechanics of transition. But forcing commanders to remove all the Surge troops by the end of the summer just made no sense to me. No sense at all. Why not give commanders an extra 60 days until the end of the "fighting season"? As it turns out, administration officials confessed they think this whole "fighting season" thing is a bit of a false construct -- which it is, to a degree. Anyone who says the conflict in Afghanistan is like the baseball season, starting in the spring and ending in the fall, is simplifying things a bit too far. But there is an annual rhythm to the conflict -- if you measure the conflict by violent acts against either NATO and Afghan security forces or against Afghan civilians. The conflict is at its strongest in terms of violence in the summer and at its weakest in the winter. So why demand commanders withdraw so many forces right when things are getting most violent? Why? Why not give commanders a 180-day window or a target at the end of the year? One can only conclude the administration simply does not trust its generals in the field. But like Hew Strachan and for the same reasons, I think the administration itself is largely to blame for the disconnect between civilian leaders and field commanders.

    I have a tremendous amount of respect for many of the national security professionals in this administration but have been frustrated with the way the administration has handled both the conflicts in Afghanistan and Libya. In both conflicts, the administration has failed to provide clear strategic guidance to military commanders, and in Afghanistan, it has concentrated its message on voters at home at the expense of hearts and minds abroad.* That's hardly a recipe for success in this kind of conflict. I would give the Obama Administration higher marks on overall defense policy and on counter-terrorism operations than on waging wars, which demand the kind of resolve and strategic clarity from above that the president and his advisors do not seem very comfortable giving.

    *There is a tremendous amount of confusion, both within and outside the U.S. military, about what "hearts and minds" means. For more on this, read my latest essay in the French journal Politique étrangère. (It's in both English and French.)

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