Shari’ ah Finance Part 2: Ramadan Provides Opportunities to Leverage Social Capital

by: Mehrunisa Qayyum

In this month, PITAPOLICY is highlighting Shar’iah Finance and its related Islamic components. The August 4th post identified the purpose and reasons for increased interest in Shari’ah finance. Also this month, the world’s 2 billion-ish Muslims engage in the holy month of Ramadan. Muslims from the “pita-consuming” region, Central & Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, Australia, and the Americas seize this opportunity of exercising self-discipline by engaging civically, socially, and economically. Ramadan provides an opportunity for Muslims beyond MENA to leverage its social capital through: a) fundraising iftars (the moment of breaking fast), b) Zakat giving lectures, and c) volunteering human and intellectual capital at philanthropic institutions.

Fundraising Iftars Leverage Social Capital
Before I describe the three opportunities, or mechanisms above, I will explain which definition of ‘social capital’ highlights Ramadan’s purpose. According to Social Capital Research, the term may refer to both internal and external influences, or ‘inputs.’ As a result, many definitions have emerged in the literature, but this essay refers to, “the web of social relationships that influences individual behavior and thereby affects economic growth (Pennar 1997, p. 154).” Hence, Ramadan provides about 30 daily opportunities to engage with networks and identify human and financial resources—essentially to leverage social capital.

Yes, I am arguing that iftars provide a platform to go beyond ‘inter-faithing’ and facilitate networks focusing on civic improvement and human development—or more briefly: leveraging networks, social media and institutional knowledge in a given space. The nationwide Islamic Relief USA (IRUSA) fundraisers for the Africa Famine serve as a prime example. Their Twitter handle,@IR_Worldwide and @IR_UK, share the updates of their global implementation efforts. The international development community can track Islamic Relief’s progress as it raises funds during its iftar event. Conversely, other organizations can virtually reach out to them when there is a confluence of interests. Thus, Islamic Relief among 25 largest online fundraising orgs in US in 2010, according to the Chronicle of Philanthropy.

At the same time, iftar attendees obtain the IRUSA literature and feel the emotional drive generated by the speakers’ pleas, the vivid images of starving Ethiopian, Somalia, and Kenyan children, and alarming statistics. For example, last year the World Bank estimated food price spike pushed additional 44 million people into poverty. Essentially, this emotional drive motivates the iftar attendees to collect the literature and hold their own fundraising iftars for the Africa Famine cause. Welcome to the social capital dimension of iftars.

Zakat Giving Lectures
Ramadan also provides a forum to better understand the applications of Shar’iah finance, the related Islamic principles of philanthropy and ‘Zakat.’ Also, Ramadan provides a consistent opportunity to regularly donate the yearly obligation of ‘Zakat’ because it is the month of giving. An Arabic term, ‘Zakat’ means “purification, growth and blessing” and is the fixed portion of wealth given by all Muslim adults who meet certain requirements, known as ‘nisab’. According to Islamic Relief, ‘nisab’ is the minimum amount of wealth a Muslim must have after minus the necessary expenses. ‘Zakat’ recipients include the orphans, the poor and the needy (Source: Qu’ran 9:60).

Essentially a Muslim’s wealth is liable for ‘Zakat’ if it means the following three criteria:
-The wealth is yours (no need to pay on debts that have not been cleared);
-Wealth is subject to development and increasing; and
-Personal necessities (e.g. home, car, clothes, utilities) are exempt from ‘Zakat.’

Organizations like, Islamic Relief, leverage its social capital to target human development and poverty challenges in the ‘pita-consuming’ region. Islamic Relief also provides Ramadan Relief. See Table 1 for the breakdown of MENA countries:

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Galloping Forward With Gallup Findings

by: Mehrunisa Qayyum

On August 2nd, Abu Dhabi Gallup released Muslim Americans: Faith, Freedom, and the Future, which is its follow up report to Muslim Americans: A National Portrait. Gallup launched this report in Washington, DC because their research examined U.S. Muslims’ political, social and spiritual engagement 10 years after September 11, 2001. Although economic engagement is absent from the long title, the findings begin with contextualizing the Muslim American experience within the global recession and the notion of ‘thriving’—a multi-dimensional indicator that stems from socio-economic livelihood. Muslim Americans are more optimistic about the future as their “youth bonus” has caught up to other groups’ regarding Gallup’s ‘thriving’ measure: a mix of life evaluations and perceptions of the economy. How will the U.S. optimize the 93 percent of Muslim Americans, who believe that other Americana that share their faith are loyal to the U.S., as a resource to advance political and economic engagement with the Middle East & North Africa region?

Furthermore, the findings reveal that the Muslim American experience has progressed socially and spiritually more so than politically. For example, more than 80 percent of Muslim Americans say that religion plays an important part of their life. Imam Mohamed Majid, President of the Islamic Society of North America, participated in the launch’s panel by highlighting how to address the social and civic engagement challenges within the Muslim American community. Meanwhile, Muslim Americans are less likely to be registered to vote when compared to other faith-based group cohorts. A list of highlights may be found below and prompt more questions about the extent to which the most recent set of diaspora communities within Muslim American are truly “galloping forward”. I wonder if Gallup’s findings for the MENA region would produce a similar story. How will Muslim Americans relatively low political engagement translate economically at home, as well as abroad, via philanthropic institutions and civic engagement.

Gallup August 2011 Highlights
I. Background
A. Sample Size=868,264 adults of which 3,883 self-identified as Muslim American
B. Religious Tolerance Index=5 statements of agreement
1. “not objecting to someone moving in next door”
2. “In the past year, I have learned something from someone of another religious faith”
3. Tolerant and Integrated
4. Acknowledges that Muslim Americans are most racially diverse religious community in the US

II. Analysis
A. Muslim American perception of the economy has improved more that that of other groups
B. Tend to register as Democrat, are optimistic about the political climate in the U.S.
C. Nearly 8 out of 19 Muslim Americans approve of Obama’s job performance
D. Average age of Muslim Americans is 36—significantly younger than people of other religion

III. Political Engagement
A. Muslim Americans have most confidence of any major US religious group in the honesty of elections
B. Less confident than any American religious cohort in FBI, military and US institutions closely associated w/”war on terror”
1. Iraq War=mistake; most prevalent among Muslim Americans (83%)
2. 65% MA believe unpopularity is result of what US has done, only 35% say negative image stems from misinformation

C. Least likely member of any major religious group to be registered to vote (65%, compare to 91% of Protestant, highest and Jewish)
D. Muslim Americans are also the least likely major religious group in the US to say there is ever a justification for individuals or small groups to attack civilians; conversely; in every other major religious group except Mormons the proportion of people who say such attacks are sometimes justified is at least twice that

Mehrunisa Qayyum is an International Development Consultant with a focus on political economy in the MENA region. Contact: pitapolicy@gmail.com

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Brazil: Arab Immigration Yields Cultural and Economic Gains-Huh?

by Andre Carletto

As a kid growing up in Brazil during the 1970s, there was no Middle East. No, that is not completely true. As a matter of fact, when some place was rather far away, Brazilians used to say that it was “pra lá de Bagdá” (passing Baghdad.) But the truth is that, although we knew very well about the Arab nations of Lebanon and Syria—mainly due to kibeh and sfiha, which represents some of the greatest culinary contributions and widely consumed in Brazil—everybody with a particular last name was called by “turco” (which means Turkish). Later on, while roaming in Latin America, I had discovered that other Lebanese and Syrian immigrants to Argentina, Colombia and Mexico were also called “turcos”… And this happened because back then they traveled with the Turkish Otoman Empire passport… Yes, Arab immigrants to Brazil were labeled as ‘Turco/Turkish’ because of the Ottoman Empire. However, despite the present day globalizing trends of increased information flow, many South Americans commonly refer to this nickname, which in turn became part of our folklore. At the same time, we do not exclude the word “árabe” to refer to the Levant’s culinary influence on Brazilian food.

Introduction of Arabs into Brazil
The Arab immigration to Brazil started by the end of the 19th century and grew steadily over the beginning of the 20th century. As a result, the Arab Diaspora experience after World War I (the fall of the Ottoman Empire) emerged as a key factor in Brazil’s development. Today we have around 15 million Brazilians of Arab descent, mostly Lebanese—but with a strong presence of Syrians alongside Egyptians, Moroccans, Jordanians and Iraqis.

The Arab Diaspora experience started with Brazil’s Emperor Pedro II. (Yes, Brazil had a monarchy, and it was by choice!). Pedro II visited the Middle East and became fascinated with the local culture and its peoples’ hospitality. According to Brazil’s Royal Archive, Emperor Pedro II wrote to his Prime Minister describing his worry about the Christian Arab persecution by the Turkish Ottoman Empire. He decided to offer political asylum. In reality, I think, he saw a great opportunity to bring a skilled labor force to Brazil since the Industrial Revolution started to spread to South America.

Brazil was unknown to the Arab world. As a matter of fact, most immigrants though that they were coming to America—as in the United States—not to America, as in South America. There is no need to mention the frustration of some when they realized that they had taken the wrong boat. But I believe that eventually they realized that an economic destiny brought them to the right place.

In 1880, the first group of 5,400 Lebanese immigrants arrived. They took up employment as traders roaming the vast country to sell textiles and clothes. The new merchant class opened up new markets, which facilitated a transformation for many Lebanese-Brazilian merchants to assume large retailerships. In fact, they became industrialists, and Aziz Jereissati and Abraão Otoch are examples of that. It was definitely the American dream establishing itself as a reality in Brazil. Who could predict?

Brazil expanded because of our immigrants, and Arabs played an important role for this. Arab Brazilian immigrants settled across the country. I already mentioned about the food, but words, uses, and fashion, were absorbed into Brazilian culture and society as if it were a multi-cultural people sponge. They settled down in different cities from North to South and raised their large families. Inter-marriage was very high between Brazilians of Arab descent and other Brazilians, regardless of ethnic ancestry or religious affiliation. Today, most Arab-Brazilians only have one parent of Arab origin. As a result of this, the new generations comprising Brazilians of Arab cent do not speak Arabic. When Arabic is spoken, the usage is often limited to a few basic words.

Brazilian Arabs Compared to Other Arabs
Like Shakira in Colombia, Brazil also has its share of entertainment celebrities of Arab ancestry. However, it is in Brazil’s political life where they play a major role. Brazil is an open and integrated society, where all of us prefer to be called simply as ‘Brazilian’ rather than by our ancestral origin. I think Brazil differs from the US in this regard of assimilation.

The list of famous Arab-Brazilians is very long, but some of the most influential are: Carlos Ghosn (CEO of Groupe Renault and NISSAN Motor Co.), Geraldo Alckmin (Governor of the State of São Paulo), Paulo Maluf (former Governor of the State of São Paulo), Gilberto Kassab (Mayor of the City of São Paulo), Fernando Haddad (Minister of Education), Tasso Jereissati (Senator), Raimundo Fagner (composer and singer), Arnaldo Jabor (Movie director, journalist and writer), Luíza Thome (actress), and Luciana Gimenez Morad (actress).

Recently, on immigration issues between 1975 and 1991, Brazil received a new flow of immigrants, with a considerable number of Muslims. Both Christians and Muslims did not find any difficulty to adapt to the Brazilian society. The Federeção Islãmica Brasileira (Brazilian Islamic Federation) estimates that 1.5 million Muslims live in Brazil, which is a small minority within Brazil’s population of 180 million.

Now, I will present a few statistics comparing Brazil and the Arab world. According to the Arab-Brazilian Chamber of Commerce, in 2010 the Brazilian exports accounted for US $12.57 billion, and imports for US $6.96 billion, which represents an increase of 34% and 33% respectively. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, and Algeria are the four main importers of Brazilian goods. Conversely, besides some oil and oil sub-products, Brazil imports fertilizers and minerals.

Once someone said that the world was like a handkerchief: very small. However, as small as it is, we are so close and yet so far: like Baghdad for Brazilians. Considering the reciprocal influences to both areas, isn’t the 21st century the time to close the gap? Can Brazil become as important for new Arab generations as once it was for those Lebanese and Syrians that venture to come to South America? Only the time can tell, but certainly the Arab world continues to operate as a destination to explore, even if it is only for vacations…

Andre Carletto is an International Development/Governance Specialist in the Washington, DC area. He may be reached at andre@carletto.co.

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High Level Foreign Policy Versus Grass Roots Level Outreach

by Ramah Kudaimi

The uprisings which have taken place across the Arab region have prompted many to ask what role Arab Americans can- or should- play in supporting those demanding the fall of their authoritarian regimes. In particular Syrian Americans are the latest group trying to figure out how they should organize to help those who are risking their lives across Syria. The interplay among Syrian Americans serves as an example of how diasporic communities may organize along differing approaches.

Efforts by the Syrian American community have focused on: (a) raising awareness by calling for more media attention on what is happening in Syria; (b) pushing for the passage of a UN Security Council Resolution condemning the regime; and (c) working towards getting Bashar al-Assad indicted in the International Criminal Court for war crimes. There has also been a humanitarian effort to help Syrian refugees in Turkey.

While these steps may seem small in the face of continuing massacres by regime forces, there also needs to be a realization that due to the actions of the United States, especially these past ten years, there is little the American government or international community can be expected to do on behalf of Syrians.

Some pundits have been making the rounds arguing that the United States needs to take a more aggressive approach to Syria and it is time to help force Assad out just like is happening in Libya with Muammer Gaddafi. Others, particularly those from the AIPAC think tank, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, have pushed that this is an opportunity to break the Syria-Hizbullah-Iran alliance. This type of analysis either ignores the fact that no one in Syria has been calling for US intervention or seeks to promote its own agenda which has no interest in realizing the rights of Syrians but rather in strengthening the position of Israel in the region by turning Syria into what Egypt was under Hosni Mubarak’s rule: an American puppet.

To truly help Syria, US foreign policy in general needs to be reformed. The United States has almost zero leverage with the Syrian regime due to various reasons. The inclusion of Syria in the axis of evil after 9/11; the 2003 Iraq invasion and subsequent threat of regime change in Damascus; and the continuing unconditional support for Israel all hinder the United States from having any ability to effect the actions of the government. These issues also keep the United States from being able to connect to the Syrian protesters themselves. The one thing the opposition agrees on is to avoid military intervention- which speaks to how deep the lack of trust in the United States and international community runs.

Even if the United States did have leverage over Syria, there is no guarantee that the administration would actually use it to support the people. To paint the macro-level picture of the MENA region, just take the examples of Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen and you can predict what the United States would have actually done if it had a relationship with Syria. The protests in Egypt were greeted early on by quite ridiculous statements from the United States including Joe Biden claiming Hosni Mubarak is not a dictator and Hillary Clinton demanding restraint from both sides. In Bahrain the United States sat on the sidelines as Saudi Arabia sent in its troops and even claimed that it was “not an invasion.” The fact that the United States had relationships with all these governments did not stop the brutal repression of protesters as the United States once again chose to protect its supposed national interests vs. upholding its values. And let’s not forget that the United States had no problem cooperating with this same Syrian regime in its secret rendition and torture of Maher Arar or that Clinton back in March claimed many see al-Assad as “a reformer.”
Diasporic communities are in a unique position to exert influence both in their new and old homelands. The American reaction to the uprisings thus points to what the role of Syrians and other Arabs in the United States should be: to push for a change in foreign policy from one which is based on (a) buying oil, (b) selling weapons and (c) guaranteeing the supremacy of certain allies to one which is based on values of equality, justice and dignity. The biggest threat to the successful transformation of the region is not necessarily the regimes themselves but rather American allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia who have already started promoting the counterrevolution through pushing to guarantee pro-Western policies in new governments or stopping the revolutionary spirit from reaching other countries.
Thus it is essential that we as Americans concerned with the MENA world work to change the mindset of our government which operates on the idea that national security depends on power and dominance instead of a mutual working relationship which promotes the values of equality, justice and dignity. There are many ways to do this but here are three initial ideas to consider:

1. The budget battle that we have witnessed symbolizes macro-level problems with current American priorities. Recommendations to slash benefits such as Social Security and Medicare are promoted yet there are virtually no suggestions that perhaps it is a bad idea that 60 percent of the proposed discretionary US budget is dedicated to the departments of defense, war, veterans affairs and nuclear weapons programs. Every minute the US government spends $2.1 million on the military. The United States sends the Israeli and Egyptian militaries more than $4 billion annually and has spent almost $800 billion on its Iraq War. You can check out how these billions could be spent otherwise and then use this information to get in contact with your elected representatives and demand that your tax dollars go towards building peace instead of waging war.

2. The atrocities committed by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq continue to have a deep impact on millions even if the current administration has taken a “forget the past” attitude to the war crimes committed. About 15 percent of babies born in Fallujah have birth defects due to the use of depleted uranium and though supposedly the American presence in Iraq will end by the end of the year, there are at least 5,000 private mercenaries employed to protect US diplomats left there. In Afghanistan there are no actual plans for the future and the maternal and child mortality rates remain the same as they were in 2000. These realities have led a group of Americans to proclaim that come October 2011, they will partake in their own nonviolent resistance denouncing militarism and warmongering.

3. Many self-proclaimed analysts the past few months have done their utmost to relay that that these protests have nothing to do with Palestine/Israel and that dictators such as Mubarak were the ones flaming anti-Israel and anti-American sentiments. One cannot deny that the Palestinian cause has been used to gain support for regimes, but it is quite absurd to deny that Palestine is a central issue for most Arabs. Protests in solidarity with Palestinians, especially around the 43rd anniversary of the Nakba, have taken place across the region. The Egyptian Independent Union Federation recently rejected any normal relations with Israel. And the absolute fear many pro-Israel pundits have displayed now that Arabs will actually dictate their governments’ stances shows that they understand that if the decision is left to the people, the position of Israel in the region will be very different. The US-Israel relationship is the most blatant example of American hypocrisy and needs to be overhauled. Educate yourself on the work of organizations such as the US Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation as well as the worldwide Boycotts, Divestment and Sanctions movement and see how you can get involved.

While each country in the region has its own specific circumstances, all of us as American citizens should use this time to help all the Arabs- and anyone else seeking self-determination- risking their lives for a future free of oppression.

Ramah Kudaimi is a Master of Arts Candidate in Conflict Resolution at the Department of Government at Georgetown University. She may be reached at Rkudaimi@gmail.com. Tweet Ramah @ramahkudaimi.

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Islamic Banking Part 1: Shar’iah Finance

Since this is the month of Ramadan in much of the Middle East & North Africa, or “pita-consuming”, region, PITAPOLICY will kick off Ramadan by looking at the topics of Islamic Banking and Diaspora communities in business.

Islamic Banking will comprise of a three part series, followed by a call for papers on the applications of Zakat for various charities. (Zakat is the Islamic practice that requires Muslims to give 2.5 percent of their income and assets (gold and jewelry) back to society.) As such, Ramadan also witnesses a significant increase in Zakat activity due to spiritual, personal, societal, and institutional reasons. Islamic banking–or participatory institutions as described in Turkey—facilitates a number of Zakat friendly transactions and investment opportunities in the MENA region, Malaysia, Indonesia, Europe, and North America. (Please see July 6th posting for the discussion on Turkey’s economy regarding Islamic Banking and participatory institutions.)

On the topic of Islamic Banking, or Sha’riah, Finance, Raina Dong will provide an introductory walk through to explain Shariah Finance and its growing popularity in the question/answer format that follows. As always, PITAPOLICY welcomes statistical references, debate, and comments in a follow up piece for those who would like to add to the discussion. Send submissions to pitapolicy@gmail.com.

Q: What’s Sha’riah Finance?
- A system of finance that is bound by religious laws that prevent
the taking or paying out of interest payments
- The Sha’riah gives guidance as to what is, and what is not,
acceptable behaviour in all areas of a Muslim’s life (halal
(acceptable) vs. haram (forbidden)) – a belief system and notions of
equity, justice and fairness that underpins a way of life
- Islamic finance as practised today involves the application of the
Sha’riah to the financial activity of Muslims and non-Muslims in the
modern world

Q: Why is Shariah Finance becoming more Popular?
- Pressures on margins in traditional markets lead banks to
investigate new opportunities
- The Middle East is one region of the world that is showing growth
despite political insecurities and the recent economic crisis
- There is a large pool of liquid funds (high oil and gas prices)
looking for an investment home that accords with religious beliefs
- Middle Eastern investors are looking to re-direct funds from America
to the UK and Europe

Q: Why use Sha’riah Finance?
- Growing demand for finance in the many industrial sectors
- Islamic finance as a credible alternative source of funds
- Islamic finance needs tangible assets
- Islamic economic theory fully supports financing in many industrial sectors where they add value and benefit to society
- Economic growth throughout the Muslim world

Raina Dong worked as an Investment Associate at Capital Guidance in Washington, DC, where she worked with clients regarding Shariah Finance. Raina is now an MBA Candidate at The Wharton School of Business as well as a Robert Toigo Foundation MBA Fellow.

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The Politics of Faith

By Younes Abouyoub

From the 5th to 7th of June 2011, a seventh round of negotiations started between Morocco and the Polisario Front in Manhasset, a suburb of New York. These talks are held at the invitation of the UN Secretary General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, and are attended by Polisario Front and Morocco, in addition to Algeria and Mauritania as observer countries. The informal talks, which started August 2009 in Austria, will help prepare the ground for the fifth round of direct negotiations.

This conflict has been going on for decades, taking a heavy toll of human life and causing suffering and economic problems besides being a stumbling block in the face of consolidating the Maghreb Union. Both the Algerian and the Moroccan governments have divergent interpretations of this protracted conflict. The former insists that it opposes Morocco and the Polisario Front, which represents a people claiming their right of self-determination, while the Moroccan position has been advocating the granting of an autonomy status to this geographic area lying in the southern parts of Morocco and bordered by both Mauritania and Algeria.

During the recent years, with the burgeoning of a relatively independent press, there have been many articles in the Moroccan newspapers warning that the Moroccan diplomacy has been weakening since the death of the former king Hassan II and the changes made by his successor Mohamed VI in the diplomatic staff. No doubt that the international setting has changed. The cold war, used diplomatically by Morocco to win the Western bloc’s support for his position, is over. The war on terrorism does not carry the same weight since both Algiers and Rabat can use it as an argument to win support for their respective positions. Yet in the diplomatic arena, King Hassan II had more than one ace in his sleeve. One of them was religion.

Indeed, religious brotherhoods were in the heart of the Moroccan diplomacy during the reign of Hassan II, with a main focus on Tijania brotherhood in Western Africa. This religious movement can be traced back to late 18th century. It was founded by a Sufi named Sheikh Ahmed Tijani, hence the name of Tijaniya movement. It spread first in North Africa then in the Southern parts of the continent by early 19th century. Sheikh Ahmed Tijani was born in 1738 in Ain Madhi, a small desert town in Algeria, not far from a town called Laghouat, where the Algerian government organized a controversial international symposium on the life of the Sheikh. Ahmed Tijani travelled extensively throughout the Maghreb and settled to study theology in the Moroccan city of Fez, at the Qaraouiyine University. He died in Morocco in 1817 and his tomb is still nowadays a place of pilgrimage for all the followers of this Sufi movement from different parts of Africa.

For the Algerian government, this movement is an Algerian one since the aforementioned Sheikh was born in an Algerian village, while Moroccans oppose such an argument by contending instead that the Tijaniya is a Moroccan brotherhood since the Sheikh spent most of his life in Fez, where he was educated and started his movement. What this new controversy shows is that religion is also one, sometimes even a main component of an effective diplomatic strategy, hence the new attempts by Algiers to use it after it has underestimated its efficiency for decades of socialism.

In fact, the Algerian government has attempted during the 1980s to organize an international seminar on the legacy of Sheikh Ahmed Tijani, but Hassan II intervened swiftly to nip this attempt in the bud. Unlike his successor, he has always been aware of the importance of religious symbols in the construction of a national identity and in building alliances internationally. He was thus the Commander of the Faithful nationally and President of the Al-Quods Committee internationally, Jerusalem being highly symbolic for Muslims all over the world.

Millions of Tijaniya followers live in Sub-Saharan Africa and mainly in Senegal, a traditional ally of Morocco, where they represent 90% of the Muslim population. Besides, the expansion of the movement in Western Africa started from Senegal during the nineteen century.

The tangible proof that testifies to the strong lobbying role played by this movement is what happened in the United Nations years ago. During the first mandate of the former Senegalese President Abdou Diouf, the permanent representative of Senegal at the United Nations supported officially the Algerian position, backing thus the Polisario Front, the rebel movement that fought for years an attrition war against the central government in Rabat. The following day, King Hassan II sent his emissary to Dakar to meet with Sheikh Tall Moltaka, then the leader of the Tijaniya movement, who immediately pressured President Abdou Diouf to withdraw his support of the Polisario. Finally, the Senegalese President caved in and the permanent representative of Senegal at the United Nations was removed. Hassan II would later on back Abdou Diouf in his campaign to win a second mandate.

This faith-based diplomacy was adopted by the Moroccan regime towards other West African countries. During the presidency of Ibrahim Babangida in Nigeria, a huge mistake, or rather a lese-majesty crime was committed by the Nigerian diplomacy when it recognized officially the Polisario Front as the legitimate representative of the Saharoui population. In such case, calling back the Moroccan ambassador and severing diplomatic ties with Nigeria should have been in order, but Hassan II did not choose that option. Rather, he applied the same tactics as with Senegal and had the Tijaniya lobby pressure the Nigerian government to change its position, which it did eventually. The same thing took place when Olusegun Obasanjo presided over Nigeria. During a meeting in Abuja with a representative of the Polisario movement, the Nigerian President agreed to host an embassy for the Saharoui Front in the Nigerian capital. Once again, the Tijaniya lobby torpedoed the initiative.

Finally, when the Moroccan regime wanted to have a Moroccan elected president of the African Development Bank; it activated the Tijaniya network to achieve successfully its aim with the nomination of Mr. Omar Kabbaj. Many African Presidents took offence at these religious-diplomatic ploys. Presidents of Chad, The Sudan and Burkina Faso even drew the king’s attention to the danger of using religion as a diplomatic tool and subtly warned him against intervening in their national affairs. It was all in vain. Time and again, Morocco kept activating these networks and extended its diplomatic effort to other religious brotherhoods in Africa such as the Qadiriya.

Times have changed since. It seems that the regime has lost its dexterity at playing with this highly efficient diplomatic tool. The new diplomatic team has focused on other religious movements, unfortunately less effective in the on-going conflict, such as the Boutchichiya brotherhood, which has a smaller presence in Africa than the Tijaniya. Yet, this is not the only explanation of such a deficiency. Today, with the growing clout of political Islam and mainly movements such as the Salafists and the Wahabis, who do not hold in high esteem Sufi movements in general, these brotherhoods seem to have lost their strong lobbying role.

The French statesman and novelist, André Malraux once said that the 21st century will be religious or will not be. He was right, but only partially though. Religion has always played an important role in politics; a role which will increase tremendously as we are witnessing a revival of schisms within Islam between Shiites and Sunnis and a plausible clash between civilizations if the unfortunate trend in international affairs stays unchanged.

Younes Abouyoub, Ph.D.
Political Sociologist and Research Scholar
Department of Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African Studies,
Columbia University, NYC
Dr. Abouyoub may be reached via email at: ya2125@columbia.edu

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Europe & the Arab Spring: EU Policy for the Mediterranean Arab States (Part 3 of 3)

By Alec Simantov

Part 3~Abstract: In light of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions in 2011 and the spread of the ‘Arab Spring’ across the Middle East, the European Commission and the European Parliament have fundamentally called into question the effectiveness of current European Union (EU) policy toward the Mediterranean Arab states, the EU’s ‘southern neighborhood.’ Subsequently, Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Commissioner Stefan Fule, as well as the European Parliament have called for a re-examination of such policy. Currently, EU policy toward the Mediterranean is conducted through the bilateral “Action Plans” of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the joint projects of the French-designed Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), both of which were born out of the Barcelona Process/Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). These processes have aimed to create a stable ‘European neighborhood’ in the Mediterranean by promoting political and economic reforms in North Africa and the Middle East in hopes of contributing to the overall security of the European Union. However, the EMP as a whole, through the Neighborhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean, has been heavily criticized as having been ineffective in achieving the EU’s stated policy aims. This essay seeks to examine the effectiveness of the ENP and the Union for Mediterranean up to the current political crisis, if the UfM represents a defective policy overlap with the ENP, and whether or not new proposals presented by the Commission demonstrate a true rethinking of Mediterranean policy.

IV. New Proposals in the wake of the ‘Arab Spring’

On March 3rd, the European Commission released a Joint Communication outlining the initial steps of a re-tooling of EU policy on the Southern Mediterranean. The report, entitled, A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, calls for a “differentiated approach” for various countries (a seeming justification for continuing to use bilateral relations as the primary tool to achieve stated goals). (Source European Commission Joint Communication, “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean,” March 8, 2011, 2.) The new Partnership should be built upon the following three elements according to the report:
a) democratic transformation and institution building; with focus on “fundamental freedoms, constitutional reforms, reform of the judiciary and the fight against corruption.”
b) “a stronger partnership with the people,” an emphasis on “people-to-people” contacts in the form of youth exchanges, and support for civil society groups.
c) Support for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), vocational and educational training, development of poorer regions, and overall “sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development.” (Source: Ibid.)
Other proposals include a commitment to free and fair elections in partner countries that are adequately monitored as a prerequisite for Partnership, the possible resumption of Advanced Status negotiations on Action Plans for countries that are deemed to be carrying out necessary reforms, and a new Civil Society Neighborhood Facility. (Source: Ibid 6.) The Commission has also expressed willingness to “work with Member States on legal migration legislation and visa policy to support the goal of enhanced mobility, in particular for students, researchers and business people.” (Source: Ibid, 7.)

The UfM Parliamentary Assembly has called for the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Investment Bank (EMID) to help fund democratic transitions. (Source: European Parliament Press Service Press Release, “Union for the Mediterranean Assembly calls for a ‘Marshall Plan’ for transition countries,” April 4, 2011, accessed April 25, 2011, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/pressroom/content/20110228IPR14442/html/Union-for-the-Mediterranean-Assembly-calls-for-a-Marshall-plan .) Franco Frattini, on behalf of Italy’s UfM rotating presidency called for a ‘new Marshall Plan’ and also called for the European Investment Bank (EIB) to invest in the region while EIB President Philippe Maystadt expressed support for the creation of the EMID. (Source: Ibid.) Frattini also declared that the “paralysis” of the UfM could be reversed and stressed the importance of using the opportunity to revitalize the UfM. (Source: Ibid, 2.) There have also been calls from EU leaders for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to extend its activities to the SM countries. EBRD President Thomas Mirow has stated that the bank is ready to invest up to 1 billion euros a year in Egypt if given permission by the bank’s shareholders. (Source: Reuters, “EU Leaders want more EIB, EBRD involvement in North Africa,” Reuters, March 25, 2011, accessed April 6, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/25/eu-northafrica-lending-idUSLDE72O1XH20110325 .) Egypt’s transitional government has already applied for funds which Mirow said would depend on whether a new Egypt was committed to democracy, a multi-party political system, and a free market economy. (Source: Steven Scheer, “UPDATE 1-EBRD head: Egypt’s new govt has reapplied for funds,” Reuters, March 22, 2011, accessed April 6, 2011, http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/03/22/ebrd-egypt-idINLDE72L1WE20110322 .) However an increased role for the EIB and EBRD has come under fire from EU watchdog groups.

Fidanka Bacheva, of CEE Bankwatch Network, notes that the EIB has been operating in the SM since 1979. Ten of the twenty-three billion euros invested in the region went to Tunisia and Egypt. Bacheva accuses the bank of having an “unbalanced” lending portfolio that promoted EU energy import interests, “[...] it is less clear how it brings any added value in the areas of democratisation and sustainable development.” (Source: Fidanka Bacheva, “Banking is not a tool to support democracy,” New Europe, March 27, 2011, accessed April 6, 2011, http://neurope.eu/print.php?id=105473.) Desislava Stoyanova of Counter-Balance argues that the EIB and the EBRD, while operating “in line with broad EU political mandates,” actually control the design and management of their own investment portfolios. The big infrastructure projects in Egypt and Tunisia, according to Stoyanova, were, “white elephants, benefiting a few politically well-connected people, and rarely the populations they aim to serve.” (Source: Desislava Stoyanova, “Are the EU’s public banks fit to support southern Med’s new democrats?,” The Guardian, March 29, 2011, accessed April 6, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/mar/29/eu-banks-support-middle-east-democracy.) Additionally, the EIB has done a historically poor job of reaching SMEs. (Source: Ibid) Bacheva urges the EU “to consider pausing” before giving the EBRD a role in the Mediterranean due to its lack of expertise in politically unstable countries and its poor record on poverty reduction and human rights. (Source: Bacheva, 2.) EIB spokesman Nick Antonovics claims that the bank has reviewed is North Africa investments and has not found any evidence misuse of funds. (Source: Sebastian Tong, “Advocay groups oppose larger North Africa role for EBRD, EIB,” Reuters, March 23, 2011, accessed April 6, 2011, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/03/23/ebrd-eib-northafrica-idUKLDE72M0VZ20110323.)

V. Conclusions

The European Commission Joint Communication outlines some decent proposals for re-examining EU policy in SM countries. However concerns remain over what further policies will take shape; and if they will address the fundamental framework liabilities of the ENP and the UfM. The new ‘Partnership’ as outlined by the Commission is right to include constitutional reforms and judicial reforms as part of its scope and jurisdiction. The Commission is also correct in making participation in the new Partnership conditional upon election monitoring. The refocus on civil society initiatives through a new Civil Society Neighborhood Facility also appears promising as does the Commission’s willingness to review legal migration and visa policy in support of enhanced mobility. However the proposal’s foci are still relatively vague and do not address the concern of how the UfM will fit in to the larger policy; it is clear from the language of ‘differentiation’ that the EU’s preference remains for bilateral initiatives through the framework for the ENP’s Action Plans. The EU, as suggested by Commissioner Füle, will need to address the inefficiencies of the APs themselves if they are to continue to serve as the basis for new reforms to Mediterranean policy. The 2007 European Parliament report, previously mentioned, heavily criticized the APs as being “imprecise, cautious and not specific in policy-operational detail.” (Source: Policy Department External Policies Briefing Paper, 10.) They have no clear indication of incentives that could be used to induce political reforms nor do they provide any specific time frame for agreed upon reforms instead relying on generically vague “short-term” and “long-term designations.” A more fundamental review of the original framework is needed before attempting to implement or add new layers to the policy. Furthermore, the EU must find a way to properly incentivize political reforms.

The concerns raised by Bacheva and Stoyanova also must be addressed. The immediate fallback to banking institutions that have essentially wasted billions of dollars for economic projects that benefit ruling elites is of great concern. While the primary vehicle of economic development will of course be the EU’s various investments banks, there must be some mechanism that allows the EU to ensure its financial assistance is having a direct impact on the people those investments are meant to help. The involvement of the EIB and the EBRD, both already poised to make significant new investments in the SM countries to the tune of billions of euros, makes the concept of a Euro-Mediterranean Investment Bank superfluous. Such a bank would be an added layer of complexity in a sector that is more in need of streamlining and transparency. The proposals represent a good starting point for further discussion and development; however the EU should heed the advice of the CEE Bankwatch Network to “take more time” before committing billions in EU resources to the continuation of failed policies.

Alec Simantov is a graduate student at George Mason University’s School of Public Policy and will be beginning a research assistantship at the Heinrich Böll Foundation’s Washington office in September with a focus on international governance and democracy. asimanto@gmu.edu

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Europe & the Arab Spring: EU Policy for the Mediterranean Arab States (Part 2 of 3)

By Alec Simantov

Part 2~
Abstract: In light of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions in 2011 and the spread of the ‘Arab Spring’ across the Middle East, the European Commission and the European Parliament have fundamentally called into question the effectiveness of current European Union (EU) policy toward the Mediterranean Arab states, the EU’s ‘southern neighborhood.’ Subsequently, Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Commissioner Stefan Fule, as well as the European Parliament have called for a re-examination of such policy. Currently, EU policy toward the Mediterranean is conducted through the bilateral “Action Plans” of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the joint projects of the French-designed Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), both of which were born out of the Barcelona Process/Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). These processes have aimed to create a stable ‘European neighborhood’ in the Mediterranean by promoting political and economic reforms in North Africa and the Middle East in hopes of contributing to the overall security of the European Union. However, the EMP as a whole, through the Neighborhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean, has been heavily criticized as having been ineffective in achieving the EU’s stated policy aims. This essay seeks to examine the effectiveness of the ENP and the Union for Mediterranean up to the current political crisis, if the UfM represents a defective policy overlap with the ENP, and whether or not new proposals presented by the Commission demonstrate a true rethinking of Mediterranean policy.

III. The Union for the Mediterranean and its discontents

The UfM primarily came into existence as a result of the lost momentum of the EMP. The southern and eastern Mediterranean partner countries had become disillusioned with the process and the ENP due to perceptions of the EU’s marginalization of development issues and emphasis on security. (Source: Erzsebet N. Rozsa, “From Barcelona to the Union for the Mediterranean,” (paper prepared for the Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs, Budapest, 2010) 4.) They also complained about the conditionality of aid on political reforms and the ENP’s combination of focus of both the Mediterranean and Eastern European (eastern partnership) neighborhood regions into a single policy. The Mediterranean partners collectively voiced their displeasure with both the EMP and ENP with many Arab Mediterranean leaders choosing not to attend the tenth anniversary summit of the Barcelona Process in 2005. (Source: Ibid.) On the European side, anxiety over the U.S.’s ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ sparked fears that Mediterranean partners would eschew partnership with the EU for generous U.S. funding. (Source: Rozsa, 4.) Jakub Wodka notes that the UfM’s existence is owed to the ENP’s fundamental flaws and its “geographical arbitrariness,” necessitating the ‘re-splitting’ of the southern neighborhood from the eastern one. (Source: Jakub Wodka, “Union for the Mediterranean and Eastern Partnership: Geopolitical Interests or Complementary Concepts,” Turkish Policy Quarterly 9:3 (2010): 151.) Thus the UfM came to be seen as a possibility for a “new and improved” version of the EMP with support from Mediterranean partners for a variety of the union’s new features; such as the co-presidency. (Source: Driss, 2-3.) The co-presidency became the central tenet of the UfM as a shift from “EU tutorship to co-ownership.” (Source: Rozsa, 7.)

Despite original speculative hopes that the UfM would indeed complement the bilateral approach of the ENP, the UfM has been routinely accused of remaining little more than a project that reflects French economic and political ambitions and concerns. (Source: Stephanie Colin, “The Union for the Mediterranean: Progress, Difficulties and Way Forward,” ICTSD, June 2009, accessed April 13, 2011, http://ictsd.org/i/news/tni/47668, 2.) The UfM was born as a uniquely French idea; the brainchild of French President Nicolas Sarkozy. His original vision for the ‘Mediterranean Union’ was a regional body that existed outside the EMP; an idea that aroused the ire of non-Mediterranean EU member states. (Source: Therese Carolin Tasche, “The Project of a Union for the Mediterranean –Pursuing French Objectives through the Instrumentalisation of the Mare Nostrum,” L’Europe en formation 356 (2010): 56.) The most vocal opposition of a Mediterranean Union that would compete with existing EU institutions came from German Chancellor Angela Merkel. (Source: Wodka, 152.) Sarkozy’s vision was motivated solely by French domestic political and foreign policy interests. A separate Mediterranean Union with France at its head was meant to revitalize French international influence in Africa and create for itself a leading role in the Mediterranean littoral. (Source: Michael Reiterer, “From the (French) Mediterranean Union to the (European) Barcelona Process: The ‘Union for the Mediterranean’ as Part of the European Neighborhood Policy,” European Foreign Affairs Review 14 (2009): 320.) Sarkozy also designed the initiative to offer Turkey an alternative to possible EU membership as France was fundamentally opposed to the possibility of Turkish accession to the EU. (Source: Ibid, 321.) Spain joined Germany in voicing opposition to a Mediterranean Union that was not part of existing EU frameworks and excluded non-Mediterranean member states; realizing that such a union would in fact be dominated by French interests to the detriment of wider European concerns. (Source: Wodka, 153.) Under pressure from other member states, Sarkozy eventually agreed to a union that would include all EU members that would indeed represent the interests and concerns of the European community in its entirety, and thus the UfM was born.

Michael Reiterer argues that the formation of the UfM within the institutional framework of the Barcelona Process represents the successful ‘Europeanization’ of a French national project and is a “triumph for institutionalism.” (Source: Reiterer, 328.) While lofty French leadership ambitions were thwarted by such a ‘Europeanization’ of the project, Therese Carolin Tasche argues that France has continued to make use of the UfM for uniquely French purposes. Sarkozy took credit for the creation of the UfM as a success of France’s EU Presidency and has used its inaugural co-presidency of the UfM to increase French diplomatic presence in international affairs, particularly in the Arab-Israeli conflict. (Source: Tasche, 68.) Tasche also states that the six major projects of the UfM largely reflect the original French proposals over energy, education, and trade policies. (Source: Ibid.) This sentiment is reflected by Stephanie Colin who reiterates that UfM skeptics still perceive the union’s priority projects to primarily benefit “large French business operators,” rather than concerned partner countries. (Source: Colin, 2.) France’s continued dominance over the UfM can also be attributed to divergence of regional priorities for different EU member states. The importance of the Mediterranean region has been traditionally championed by France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal. (Source: Wodka, 148.) What is now referred to as the ‘eastern partnership’ has generally been a concern of member states like Germany, Austria and the UK; and more recently, Poland and Sweden, who jointly proposed the aforementioned ‘eastern partnership’ in response to France’s UfM push. (Sources: Reiterer, 316 & Wodka, 154.)

Ahmed Driss and Erzsébet Rózsa both point to institutional asymmetries between the EU and the southern Mediterranean states. Driss states that the EU, “has at its disposal internal mechanisms that permit it to coordinate the positions of its various member states and thus speak in a unified voice [..].” (Source: Driss, 3.) In comparison, the states on the southern shores of the Mediterranean have no common voice. Rozsa states, “ […] the reception of any proposal from the north [EU], be it common or different, could differ from country to country. (Source: Rozsa, 11.) This dichotomy is most glaringly obvious in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its functional constraints on the UfM. (Source: Ibid.) Driss further argues that the coordination mechanisms within the Arab world itself do not function properly, making the framework of co-presidency in the UfM complicated, uncoordinated, and victim to “political instrumentalization.” (Source: Driss, 3.)

Tony Barber, in an editorial in The Financial Times on June 1, 2010 lambasted the UfM’s ineffectiveness and declared the union irrelevant. This bold statement and condemnation of EU foreign policy was a reaction to the postponement of the UfM’s 2010 summit, originally scheduled for July, due to Arab opposition and anger at Israel over the Gaza Flotilla incident. The UfM had also previously suspended high level meetings in 2009, again due to Arab anger at Israel, over its war with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. (Source: Tony Barber, “EU’s Union for the Mediterranean drifts into irrelevance,” Financial Times, June 1, 2010, accessed April 13, 2011, http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/2010/06/eus-union-for-the-mediterranean-drifts-into-irrelevance/.) “ […] the UfM turned out to be a hostage to decades-old political tension in the Middle East [..] The whole point of the UfM is that is supposed to steer clear from politics and concentrate on uncontroversial projects […].” (Source: Ibid.) In addition to the Arab-Israeli conflict, regional conflicts between Algeria and Morocco over Western Sahara and the suggested divisive effect of the UfM on the Joint Africa-EU Strategy introduce political obstacles to the union’s effectiveness. (Source: Colin, 2.) These examples underscore the claims made by Rósza and Driss. Driss further defines the problem of politicization of the UfM as “linkage politics.” (Source: Driss, 4.)

Interest in the UfM, both by EU member states and Mediterranean partner countries has significantly waned. Tasche points to the UfM ministerial meeting in Cairo in January of 2010 where it was clear that that the general atmosphere demonstrated little interest or engagement on behalf of European members states; largely due to the Eurozone crisis and Greece. (Source: Tasche, 68.) Driss also points to specific national ambitions on the part of Mediterranean partner states seeking to advance their status and cooperation with the EU through the ENP and potential Advanced Status negotiations; in particular Morocco and, at the time, Tunisia. (Source: Driss, 5.) Kausch and Youngs argue that the UfM, “dilutes the political character and thrust of the EMP vision.” They claim the UfM is “expressly designed” to shift the focus of relations between the EU and North Africa away from politically sensitive areas. (Source: Kausch and Youngs, 964.) Unlike Reiterer who argues that the UfM can be seen as the “deepening” of the EMP, Kausch and Youngs state that the UfM “rolls back” the EMP’s acquis on human rights and democracy. (Source: Reiterer, 329.) The UfM merely represents a shift of from seeking a “ring of well governed states” to a “ring of firmly governed states.” (Source: Kausch and Youngs, 967.) In contrast, despite problems, the bilateral approach of the ENP has offered some Mediterranean partner states, “some concrete gains in specific sectors of cooperation that have been liberated from linkage to the problematic regional context.” (Source: Ibid, 965.)

Wodka joins Kausch and Youngs in the pessimistic view of the future of the UfM stating that it is “doomed to failure” as it will not meet the expectations of either EU members states or partner countries; agreeing with Tasche that it remains fundamentally a French, not an EU, project. (Source: Wodka, 155.) Roberto Aliboni offers a different perspective. He argues that the UfM can be saved from irrelevance; but not without significant institutional revisions. (Source: Roberto Aliboni, “The State of Play of the Union for the Mediterranean in the Euro-Med Context,” (paper prepared for the Instituto Affari Internazionali of Rome, 2010) 8.) Aliboni echoes Driss’ criticisms of the co-presidency feature of the UfM but also criticizes the structure of the Secretariat. Six additional deputy Secretaries were created under the Secretary-General; which has made the structure overly cumbersome, “especially for an organization as poorly financially endowed as the UfM.” (Source: Ibid, 7.) Ultimately, Aliboni argues that the UfM should divorce itself entirely from trying to defend the Barcelona acquis. This instead should be dealt within the context of the ENP by creating a “significant multilateral component” within that policy. The UfM should solely be concerned with large scale regional projects. (Source: Ibid, 8.)

(Editor Note: Stay tuned Sunday for Part 3 of Alec’s analytical review of the Arab Spring from the other side of the Mediterranean…)

Alec Simantov is a graduate student at George Mason University’s School of Public Policy and will be beginning a research assistantship at the Heinrich Böll Foundation’s Washington office in September with a focus on international governance and democracy. asimanto@gmu.edu

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Europe & the Arab Spring: EU Policy for Mediterranean Arab States (Part 1 of 3)

By Alec Simantov

Part 1~
I. ‘Southern Neighborhood’
The self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia on December 17th 2010, sparked popular protests that eventually led to the ouster of the Tunisian dictator Zine el-Abedine Ben-Ali on January 14th, 2011. (Source: Rania Abouzeid, “Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself and Tunisia on Fire,” TIME, January 21, 2011, accessed April 1, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2043557,00.html) The unrest then spread to Egypt, where pro-democracy protesters forced Hosni Mubarak from power on February 11th. (Source: Craig Whitlock, “Mubarak steps down, prompting jubilation in Cairo streets,” The Washington Post, February 12, 2011, accessed April 5, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/11/AR2011021102386.html.) Protests have since erupted across the entirety of the region from Morocco to Yemen, and most recently, Syria; while Libya’s burgeoning democracy movement descended into what has become a bloody and protracted civil war. The massive geopolitical changes taking place have forced the European Union to begin re-examining its policies toward the countries of the Middle East and in particular North Africa; its ‘southern neighborhood. (Source: Andrew Rettman, “Barroso to young Arabs: ‘We are with you’,” euobserver.com, March 2, 2011, Accessed April 4, 2011, http://euobserver.com/892/31905?print=1.)

European Commission President José Manuel Barroso declared on March 3rd, “It is our duty to say to the Arab people that we are on their side. From Brussels I want to say this particularly to the young Arabs that are now fighting for freedom and democracy: We are on your side.” Barroso also called the revolutionary fervor across the region a “rendezvous with history” for the EU and further reiterated the Union’s support for democratic change. “I think Europe would rather be guilty of holding on to dreams of democracy than to be accused of cynicism.” (Source: Ibid.) Štefan Füle, the EU Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Commissioner, stated in an April 13th interview, “ […] the developments in our southern neighborhood are actually changing the way the European Union is dealing with its neighborhood. It’s changing our style. It’s changing our procedure. It’s changing our interaction within and among institutions, with the member states.” (Source: Georgi Gotev, ed., “Stefan Fule: EU won’t allow Arab revolutions to be ‘stolen,’” EurActiv, April 13, 2011, accessed April 13, 2011, http://www.euractiv.com/en/global-europe/tefan-le-eu-wont-allow-arab-revolutions-stolen-interview-504001.) Füle further highlighted the Commission’s proposal of a new “Partnership for Democracy and Proposed Prosperity,” while speaking to the need of the EU to develop a closer relationship with civil society organizations in Arab nations and a willingness to re-examine the ENP’s bilateral ‘Action Plans.’ (Source: Ibid.) The European Parliament also reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to the stated principles of the ENP: democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and women’s rights, good governance, the market economy, and sustainable development. (Source: MEP Mario David, “Motion for a Resolution: B7-0199/2011,” European Parliament (2011): 6.)

In keeping with the EU’s heightened rhetoric on support for democracy in the Mediterranean Arab states, the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Affairs, Catherine Ashton, has pledged an increase in bilateral EU assistance for Tunisia. The overall budget under the European Neighborhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) has thus been raised from 240 million euros to 258 million euros. (Source: “The EU and Tunisia,” ENPI Info Centre, accessed on March 29, 2011, http://www.enpi-info.eu/mainmed.php?id_type=1&id=24725 .) The European Investment Bank (EIB) has earmarked 1.87 billion euros in economic aid for Tunisia centered on job creation and job growth. (Source: Ibid.) The 17 million euro increase in ENPI assistance allocates a paltry 4 million euros to support a new electoral process in the country and strengthening civil society groups. (Source: Ibid) An electoral process that has already seen delays as the interim government has pushed back scheduled elections for a constituent assembly until late October. (Source: BBCNews, “Tunisia’s interim government delays election,” BBCNews.com, June 8, 2011, accessed July 10, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13702372 .) The overwhelming majority of assistance funding to post-revolutionary Tunisia is dedicated to economic projects. This represents no significant departure from previous EU policy on Tunisia under the Euro-Med Partnership (EMP) and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) specifically.

The problem presented by Tunisia is unfortunately a common thread in the various ENP Action Plans (APs) between the EU and Arab governments of the southern neighborhood. The focus on cooperating with autocratic governments primarily on economic reforms and immigration and security issues, while allowing political reforms to take a back seat, has simply allowed autocrats to consolidate their political power through economic hegemony. Adding to the complication is the multilateral Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), inaugurated in 2008. The UfM began as French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s pet project to create a separate EU style body for the Mediterranean region. The original plan reflected specific regional French foreign policy goals rather than wider European interests. Major opposition within the EU ensured that the UfM that currently exists is a significantly ‘watered-down’ version of Sarkozy’s original vision; with the main task having been to fully ‘Europeanize’ a French regional project cooperation scheme. The evidence suggests that despite making the UfM the newest chapter in the evolution of the Barcelona Process, the body remains largely irrelevant and ineffective. The question that remains is whether the European Commission and the European Parliament can re-energize both the Neighborhood Policy and the UfM, increase the effectiveness of both processes, and either ensure greater synergy between them or find a streamlined solution.

II. The European Neighborhood Policy in the Southern Mediterranean (SM)
The ENP was launched in 2004 with, “a view to living up to its [the EU] image as a ‘force for good’ in its dealings with neighboring countries.” (Source: Esther Barbe and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogues, “The EU as a modest ‘force for good’: the European Neighbouhood Policy,” International Affairs 84 (2008): 81.) The aim of the ENP is to create a ‘ring of friends’ on its periphery under an EU-led wider economic region. This thought process was evolved out of the 2003 European Security Strategy. (Source: Paul James Cardwell, “EuroMed, European Union Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean: Overlapping Policy Frames in the EU’s Governance of the Mediterranean,” Journal of Common Market Studies 49:2 (2011): 227.) Amichai Magen states that the overall objective of the ENP as stated by the European Commission was to “share” the benefits of the EU’s 2004 enlargement with its peripheral neighbors to strengthen stability, security, and well-being. (Source: Amichai Magen, “The Shadow on Enlargement: Can the European Neighborhood Policy Achieve Compliance?,” Columbia Journal of European Law 12 (2005-2006): 391.) In such context, Judith Kelley asserts that the EU, “clearly modeled the ENP on the enlargement process.” (Source: Judith Kelley, “New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighborhood Policy,” Journal of Common Market Studies 44:1 (2006): 30.)

Part of the initiative to create a ‘ring of friends’ was increased political integration between the EU and its neighbors in the commitment to ‘shared values,’ i.e. democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law as outlined by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. (Source: Magen, 392.) The rhetoric of support for democracy and human rights in EU relations with its neighbors, in particular the Mediterranean, was outlined in the original Barcelona Declaration of 1995. (Source: Richard Youngs, “Ten tears of the Barcelona Process: A Model for Supporting Arab Reform?” (paper prepared for FRIDE, Madrid, 2004) 2.) Richard Youngs notes that the entire logic of the Barcelona Process was to create a single “holistic” framework for promoting political, social, cultural, and economic change in the EU’s Mediterranean neighbors. (Source: Ibid.) The founding principles of the EMP on democracy and human rights extend to the ENP which in theory was supposed to champion a, “comprehensive and ambitious agenda for domestic political, economic, and institutional reform converging towards what is seen as an ‘EU model’.” (Source: Dimitar Bechev and Kalypso Nicolaidis, “From Policy to Polity: Can the EU’s Special Relations with its ‘Neighbourhood’ be Decentred?” Journal of Common Market Studies 48:3 (2010): 478.) Indeed, former External Relations and ENP Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner touted the ENP as the EU’s “newest democratization tool.” (Source: Barbe and Johansson-Nogues, 87.)

The developments of the ‘Arab Spring’ have brought to realization, what appears to be the failure of the ENP to match the EU’s rhetoric on democracy promotion, political reform, and human rights in its Mediterranean partner countries. The shortcomings of the policy were already apparent to the European Parliament in 2007 which released the report, “A Cost/Benefit Analysis of the ENP for the EU’s Southern Partners.” Among its main conclusions, the ENP had failed to deliver “concrete positive results” for the majority of citizens of the southern partner countries because the primary beneficiaries of ENP policies were ‘ruling elites.’ (Source: Policy Department External Policies Briefing Paper, “A Cost/Benefit Analysis of the ENP for the EU’s Southern Partners,” European Parliament (2007): 9.) The report also highlighted the structural inefficiencies of the ENP such that the prospect of EU membership could not be offered as an incentive to implement political reforms. (Source: Ibid) The 2007 EU-Tunisia ENP action plan progress report shows that from the initial signing of the Action Plan, little to no progress had been made in political reforms. (Source: Barbe and Johansson-Nogues, 92.)

Tunisia’s bilateral AP with the EU under the ENP (signed in 2004) is almost solely dedicated to economic reforms and security cooperation with the Union. The hefty document dedicates only one section to “political dialogues and reforms” (Section 2.1). (Source: EU-Tunisia Action Plan) The small subsections on ‘democracy and the rule of law’ and ‘respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ are entirely generic and devoid of substance. (Source: Ibid) Under an authoritarian government, with little to no regard for the well-being its people; the economic assistance delivered by the EU through the ENP solely benefited ruling elites over ordinary Tunisians. Tunisia’s image of economic stability was, as Lisa Anderson, President of the American University in Cairo called it, “a Potemkin village.” (Source: Lisa Anderson, speech, “The Arab Uprisings: A View from Tahrir Square,” The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 23, 2011, http://pomed.org/blog/2011/03/pomed-notes-the-arab-uprisings-a-view-from-the-university-on-tahrir-square.html/.) Ben Ali siphoned off significant amounts of all foreign investment directly to the pockets of his sons, family members, wife, and wife’s family. “Tunisia’s economic system was designed to entirely to foster the prosperity of a single family.” (Source: Ibid) France occasionally raised human rights concerns with the Tunisian government in private; however several officials in the French government had close ties with members of the Tunisian ruling elite. Recently disgraced French foreign minister Michele Alliot-Marie was revealed to have taken gifts from and conducted business deals with Ben Ali stalwarts all the way up to and through the Tunisian Revolution until her forced resignation. (Source: Andrew Rettman, “France ignored human rights in Maghreb, cables show,” euobserver.com, February 22, 2011, accessed April 4, 2001, http://euobserver.com/892/31851?print=1.)

As previously noted, before the uprising in Tunisia began, the country had been allocated 240 million euros under the European Neighborhood Policy Instrument (ENPI). The Egyptian AP with the EU allocated 558 million euros in financial support for “internal reforms” including reforms of the country’s judiciary, human rights practices, and elections from 2007-2010. (Source: Michele Comelli, “Dynamics and Evolution of the EU-Egypt Relationship Within the ENP Framework, (paper prepared for the Instituto Affari Internazionali of Rome, February 2010) 3.) During this time, Egypt experienced an extremely serious period of political deterioration. Local and parliamentary elections in 2007 were marred by government repression of political opposition. In May 2008, the Egyptian regime again extended the state of emergency law that prohibited political dissent. (Source: Ibid, 5.) A report released by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) in February 2011 highlighted a continued trend in electoral violence with government crackdowns on voters during the November 2010 parliamentary elections. (Source: IFES Briefing Paper, “Elections in Egypt: Key Challenges for Credible and Competitive Elections,” February 5, 2011, 10.) Kristina Kausch and Richard Youngs state that the majority of investment into countries like Tunisia and Egypt was in fact oriented toward “large-scale state led projects.” (Source: Kristina Kausch and Robert Youngs, “The end of the ‘Euro-Mediterranean vision’,” International Affairs 85:5 (2009): 967.) Michele Comelli states that in Egypt, the country’s ruling elites were mainly interested in these types of projects that improved the state’s trade and economic cooperation with the EU. (Source: Ibid.) Like Ben Ali, Mubarak has been accused of grifting billions of dollars from Egyptian state coffers. (Source: Ethan Bronner, “Mubarak Denies Corruption and Defends his Legacy,” The New York Times, April 10, 2001, accessed April 11, 20011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/11/world/middleeast/11egypt.html.)

The European Parliament report also demonstrates that in countries like Morocco and Jordan, that have generally been more willing to cooperate on aspects of political reform as outlined in their respective APs, the rights and liberties of citizens have actually been simultaneously reduced. (Source: EP Policy Department External Policies Briefing Paper, 1.) The power structures in these countries remain unchanged because the various APs do not tackle what the report calls, “the three major obstacles to political liberalization in Southern Mediterranean (SM) countries, which are the lack of a separation of powers, the oppression of civil society and political parties, and flaws in electoral procedures.” (Source: Ibid.) Morocco’s AP with the EU has become increasingly depoliticized in practice argues Kausch and Youngs; as demonstrated by the country’s 2008 ENP progress report which leveled “explicit criticism” on the lack of reforms. (Source: Kausch and Youngs, 970.) Additionally, Moroccan democrats have expressed dismay over the EU’s seeming lack of pressure on political reform. (Source: Ibid, 971.) Comelli notes that the ENP has demonstrated the EU’s limitations when applied to SM countries; what the APs offer in terms of economic benefit and market integration are not enough to trigger substantive political reform.

(Editor Note: Stay tuned tomorrow for Part 2 of Alec’s analytical review of the Arab Spring from the other side of the Mediterranean…)

Alec Simantov is a graduate student at George Mason University’s School of Public Policy and will be beginning a research assistantship at the Heinrich Böll Foundation’s Washington office in September with a focus on international governance and democracy. asimanto@gmu.edu

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Lebanon After the Indictments–the Arab World’s Next Crisis

By George Salem
July 2, 2011</em

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