Issue #3, Winter 2007

Crashing the Party of Davos

Globalization works for the bosses. Can we make it work for workers too?

All markets have a politics, reflecting conflict among economic interests over the rules and policies that determine–as the American political scientist Harold Lasswell once famously put it–“who gets what.” And when markets expand, so do their politics. Thus, in the nineteenth century, driven by improvements in transportation and communication technologies, commerce spilled across state borders beyond the capacity of states to regulate them. The power of large corporations went unchecked, generating bitter and violent class conflict. Fortunately, the democratic framework of the U.S. Constitution permitted popular challenges to the excessive concentration of wealth and influence. Ultimately, through the Progressive and New Deal eras, the United States developed a national politics that imposed a social contract–a New Deal that provided workers, as well as business, with enforceable economic rights. Over time, the contract was extended to racial minorities, women, and others who had been previously excluded from expanding economic opportunities.

Today, markets have expanded again, beyond national borders–and beyond the capacity of the world’s nation-based political institutions to manage them. As a result, the global economy is sputtering. Witness the collapse of the Doha Round of trade negotiations, popular hostility to the “Washington Consensus” of development in Latin America and other underdeveloped regions, and the spread of social tensions over immigration and foreign-wage competition in both rich and poor countries. The current pattern of globalization is undercut- ting the social contract that national governments, in developed and in many less-developed countries, had imposed over the last century in order to stabilize their economies and protect their citizens from laissez-faire’s brutal insecurities. Even as the world grows more tightly knit, it still lacks a common politics for managing its integration.

Just as bringing stability to the American economy in the last century required stronger national institutions, bringing social balance to the global economy in this century will require stronger global political institutions to regulate global markets. Already, many such institutions exist–such as the World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), and International Monetary Fund (IMF). But in make-up and in culture, they are dominated by those who own and manage large concentrations of internationally mobile capital, whose goal is to escape market regulation and break free of obligations to stakeholders other than the global corporate investor. In the politics of the global market, these institutions are dominated by a single party: Call it the Party of Davos, after the Swiss resort where several thousand global corporate CEOs, government leaders, and their assorted clientele of journalists, academics, and an occasional nongovernmental organization (NGO) or trade union head have the equivalent of their party convention every winter.

We are therefore faced with a catch-22: a global economy that is both prosperous and fair requires strong global institutions, but given the lack of a constitutional framework for democracy on that scale, strengthening existing global institutions is unlikely to generate a better distribution of global income and wealth. Indeed, under the present structure, as the world’s markets become more integrated, world inequality grows.

This fundamental contradiction cannot be resolved by unruly demonstrators at the entrance to the World Bank or the IMF. Nor will it be resolved in polite public policy seminars with proposals for globalization’s winners to share their gains with the losers; that is not what winners voluntarily do. Serious reform will only come from the development of a cross-border politics that challenges the cross-border power of the Party of Davos. Pulling together a worldwide movement is a utopian goal, but doing this in a region-by-region process is not. In fact, American progressives could begin the process right here in North America by transforming the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) into an instrument for continent-wide social progress. A redesigned NAFTA, in turn, could serve as a critical building block in constructing a global economy that is more equitable, more stable, and more democratic.

The Politics of Expanding Markets

The politics of the New Deal and social democratic analogues across the world rested on a new understanding of how national economies worked. The British economist John Maynard Keynes and his American followers showed that in a modern economy the worker/consumer was as important an actor in the market drama as the investor/manager. The government therefore had an obligation to pump income into the economy during downturns to assure that workers continued to buy the products they had made. Although many of America’s business elites resisted the egalitarian implications of the New Deal, the smartest of them understood that Franklin Roosevelt and Keynes had saved them from much worse, namely, Marx’s prediction of inevitable class warfare. When Dwight Eisenhower’s nominee for secretary of defense, Charlie Wilson, said, “What’s good for General Motors is good for America,” liberals snickered, but the country–and the United Auto Workers–thought he was right. By 1971, Richard Nixon could claim, with some justification, that “we are all Keynesians now.”

Shortly afterward, the slow fusion of the U.S. economy with the rest of the world accelerated. Between 1969 and 1979, the share of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) represented by foreign trade rose from 10 to almost 20 percent, and the trade balance shifted from a surplus to deficit. By 2005, trade was 26 percent of our economy, and the relentlessly rising trade deficit was at 6 per- cent of our GDP. Along the way, the American industrial base–from apparel to steel to high-technology products–has been dramatically eroded, wages have stagnated, and the economic security of the typical American worker has been systematically undercut. Economists will always debate the exact numbers, and globalization is not the only factor driving the erosion of American economic security, but by now few can doubt that it is a major cause.

Issue #3, Winter 2007
 
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Tim Worstall:

'Indeed, under the present structure, as the world’s markets become more integrated, world inequality grows.'



It does? Not read any Sala i Martin then? I agree that inequality within countries might be growing: but globally, it's shrinking. Try Paul Ormerod for another proof. You know, those hundreds of millions of newly middle class Chinese and Indians.



That you rest your argument on such an untruth makes the rest of it suspect.



Much of what you say can be negated by the free trader's simple observation: it isn't about who gets to sell what to whom, it's about who gets to buy what from whom. The free trade argument rests upon the idea that the consumer is sovereign, that they should be able to buy what they wish from whom they wish, national borders and other restrictions not withstanding.



Your bleating about the need for a counter-vailing power to business is simply that, bleating. If we actually had free trade then we'd have all 6.5 billion of us as exactly that counter-vailing power. Why on earth you want more of that bureaucratic gabfest which is the EU is entirely beyond me or any other sane person.



Unless you're looking for a cushy job, of course.

Dec 17, 2006, 12:07 PM

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