Center for a New American Security

Last night's CNAS 5th anniversary celebration was a tremendous amount of fun. Although the precedings were off-the-record, I don't think I'm breaking any rules by confirming numerous reports that Gen. Marty Dempsey called out this blog a number of times, wryly noting the way I've given him a hard time for his reading list and for his Pentagonese. 

It says a lot about the health of the United States and about civil-military relations that the most powerful military officer in the country is willing to have a good-natured back-and-forth with a blogger who has criticized him. (That's not the case, for example, in Egypt, the recipient of $1.3 billion in annual U.S. military aid, where the military leadership is so lacking in confidence that it throws critical bloggers in jail.) The United States has the most powerful military in the world, and it sends a strong message to military officers in other countries when our officers hold themselves accountable to the people they serve. (And have a sense of good Irish humor about it in the process.) 

It also says a lot about Twitter and other new media that @Martin_Dempsey noted I rather liked his speech at Duke and is willing to use social media to have a conversation with the public. A few months ago, I marvelled at a back-and-forth between former senior State Department official Anne-Marie Slaughter and George Washington University student Dan Trombly on the Responsibility to Protect. How cool, I thought. Any medium that facilitates egalitarian conversations between generals and bloggers on the one hand and between the former head of policy planning and an international relations student on the other hand is pretty darn amazing. 

I felt really blessed last night to work at a place like CNAS. But I also felt blessed to live in this kind of country -- and at a time when technology is democratizing the public discourse to an extent never seen before.

The New York Times generated a handy budget calculator that allowed its readers to trim dollars off the budget of the Department of Defense. As my colleague Travis Sharp noted, the cuts they collectively voted on reveal some really interesting things about what a reasonably informed public -- the kind of people who participate in online defense budget surveys, for example -- thinks about defense policy.

1. John Mearsheimer and Bob Kaplan may believe in the stopping power of water, but the public isn't so convinced. It has little idea what the U.S. Navy (SEAL teams aside) does in terms of national security. The public is more ready to stop building ships than it is to stop buying aircraft or to cut ground forces. Here the public is at odds with the majority of defense policy analysts I know. 

2. Half of the public is in favor of removing one leg -- nuclear weapons on bombers -- from the nuclear triad.

3. The public wants to close bases overseas -- even though, as Travis noted in an email, these bases can save money by reducing the cost of getting soldiers in and out of theater.

4. The public might not fully understand how much of the defense budget is eaten up by personnel costs. The public was very reluctant to cap the pay of service personnel and wanted to keep TriCare -- though it was open to a raise in TriCare premiums.

I think we in the defense analysis community have to do a better job explaining some things to the public, such as why, in the event of a major war, you can recruit and train new infantry battalions quicker than you can design and build ships, and also how much of the budget is eaten up by personnel costs. If you are a member of the Congress, meanwhile, I think you will find that you have more support to cut the defense budget than you might have previously thought. It will be up to you, though, to explain to your constituents why some cuts are smarter than others and why some "obvious" cuts are not as smart on second glance as they are at first.

I apologize for not writing on the blog this week. I have a lot of posts in my head but have been busy with other activities -- and writing for other websites.

Judah Grunstein of the World Politics Review commissioned a debate over the future of counterinsurgency and got responses from Steven Metz, Bing West, Michael Mazarr, and Starbuck. I contributed a piece arguing that the debate really misses the larger issue of what the hell our ground forces -- and especially our army -- are supposed to do.

Judah wryly noted that my article was itself textbook counterinsurgency: "Redefine the center of gravity (not COIN, but US Army); secure it from unnecessary collateral damage of kinetic ops; and construct narrative to encourage buy-in from on-the-fencers."

Anyway, I am always proud to participate in such debates, especially with other thinkers I very much admire. My article bears strong resemblance to a talk I gave earlier in the week at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in which I did my best to occupy the middle ground on a panel discussion with Gian Gentile and Max Boot.

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On another note, SEAL Team 6 is doing its very best to make the president immune to Republican attacks that he's Jimmy Carter. My analysis of the hostage rescue operation in Somalia can be read on the website of the BBC.

Considering the origins of the practice of fisking, I figured Andrew Sullivan wouldn't mind (and might even appreciate) if I offered some points of contention with his Newsweek apologia for the president. I'll ignore the sections on health care and the economy -- since no one would confuse me with a specialist on either subject -- and stick to the sections on national security.

On foreign policy, the right-wing critiques have been the most unhinged. Romney accuses the president of apologizing for America, and others all but accuse him of treason and appeasement.

Well, here Sullivan and I are in agreement. I would like to chalk all of the craziness up to election year politics, but some of the rhetoric in these Republican primary debates has been downright scary.

Instead, Obama reversed Bush’s policy of ignoring Osama bin Laden, immediately setting a course that eventually led to his capture and death. And when the moment for decision came, the president overruled both his secretary of state and vice president in ordering the riskiest — but most ambitious — plan on the table. He even personally ordered the extra helicopters that saved the mission. It was a triumph, not only in killing America’s primary global enemy, but in getting a massive trove of intelligence to undermine al Qaeda even further.

The president deserves real and enduring credit for his bold decision to launch the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, but let's not overstate the case here. Sullivan makes it sound as if the president was the de facto J3 for JSOC. (That was actually Rich Clarke, if anyone at home is looking to assign credit.) The raid that killed Osama bin Laden was a great victory for the United States, but if victory truly has a thousand fathers, plenty of others deserve credit -- including George W. Bush, who was the president as JSOC and its allies in the intelligence community built up many of the capabiltiies that allowed them to track and kill bin Laden. Bush most certainly did not "ignore" bin Laden. Ultimately, the raid was enabled because the United States caught a break on intelligence. And does anyone think that George W. Bush, if given a similar break, would not have made similar decisions? 

If George Bush had taken out bin Laden, wiped out al Qaeda’s leadership, and gathered a treasure trove of real intelligence by a daring raid, he’d be on Mount Rushmore by now. But where Bush talked tough and acted counterproductively, Obama has simply, quietly, relentlessly decimated our real enemies, while winning the broader propaganda war. Since he took office, al Qaeda’s popularity in the Muslim world has plummeted.

There are several factors that have been driving al-Qaeda's decline in popularity -- a decline, like the economic collapse, that preceded the Obama Administration. Al-Qaeda's own missteps have been one factor, as have been the rise of moderate Islamist groups who have come to power through elections, not bombs. Will McCants discusses the threat moderate Islamists pose to al-Qaeda in this Foreign Affairs piece, and I discuss al-Qaeda's various own goals in my chapter in this book.* Finally, the drone campaign initiated by President Bush and intensified by President Obama has unquestionably degraded al-Qaeda's leadership. But we have no way of measuring second and third-order effects and have not begun to even ask questions about what they might be.

Obama’s foreign policy, like Dwight Eisenhower’s or George H.W. Bush’s, eschews short-term political hits for long-term strategic advantage. It is forged by someone interested in advancing American interests—not asserting an ideology and enforcing it regardless of the consequences by force of arms. By hanging back a little, by “leading from behind” in Libya and elsewhere, Obama has made other countries actively seek America’s help and reappreciate our role. As an antidote to the bad feelings of the Iraq War, it has worked close to perfectly.

Over the past 60 years or so, the nations of Europe have been "free-riders" off U.S. military strength. There is no evidence, though, to suggest that as the United States takes a backseat in regional security, European defense spending will increase or European nations will take on more responsibility. The nations of Europe, in the words of one defense intellectual, showed up to a gunfight in Libya with knives.** The United States brought the guns. And the ammunition. And all the taregting. And all the in-flight refueling. And the ISR. This is not a rebuttal of Sullivan's point but rather a word of warning to those who believe that Europe will opt to "defend itself" if the United States reduces its leadership role. 

The Iraq War—the issue that made Obama the nominee—has been ended on time and, vitally, with no troops left behind. Defense is being cut steadily, even as Obama has moved his own party away from a Pelosi-style reflexive defense of all federal entitlements.

The defense cuts on the table at the moment make sense. If we go into sequestration, they become really stupid, really fast. This is the fault of the U.S. Congress and not the president. (It's not the president's fault that Republicans in the Congress opted for lower taxes over defense spending.) With regard to the Iraq War, let me make two points: (1) The war is not over. It has not ended. U.S. involvement, rather, has ended. (2) The Bush Administration negotiated the Status of Forces Agreement that ended the U.S. involvement. It deserves credit for having done so.

I railed against him for the better part of two years for dragging his feet on gay issues. But what he was doing was getting his Republican defense secretary and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs to move before he did. The man who made the case for repeal of “don’t ask, don’t tell” was, in the end, Adm. Mike Mullen.

I am no specialist in gay rights or Don't Ask, Don't Tell, but I thought DADT was a silly policy and do not mourn its passing. I guess the president deserves credit for ending it, but I think all the new policy does is reflect the norms of this generation of U.S. servicemen and servicewomen -- as opposed to the more conservative norms of earlier generations.

Yes, Obama has waged a war based on a reading of executive power that many civil libertarians, including myself, oppose. And he has signed into law the indefinite detention of U.S. citizens without trial (even as he pledged never to invoke this tyrannical power himself). But he has done the most important thing of all: excising the cancer of torture from military detention and military justice. If he is not reelected, that cancer may well return. Indeed, many on the right appear eager for it to return.

I too opposed the way in which the administration went to war in Libya -- though, I must admit, things turned out a lot better than I thought they would. And I really have no issue with the rest of what Sullivan says. Though I think the loser in the 2008 presidential election, John McCain, deserves some credit of his own for partnering with human rights lawyers to set new standards for interrogation and detention.

*I was paid a flat fee for that chapter, so if you buy the book, I will not receive any royalties. I just wanted to be clear about that since I am linking to a product of my own.

**I was trying to remember where I heard this construct used. Oh, yeah -- in a discussion with Tom Ricks.

UPDATE: Andrew Sullivan responds to my criticism. 

Andrew [Exum] ignores the fact that Obama actually had a major fight with McCain in the debates in 2008 over whether he would unilaterally launch a mission into Pakistan to get the guy, without Pakistan's approval. McCain and the rest of the right cited this as evidence of Obama's naivete and incompetence in foreign policy. Obama set a new course in early 2009 - and did exactly what he said he'd do. Here's what we know of Bush and Bin Laden. He let him escape in Tora Bora; in 2002, he said this on Bin Laden.

Allow me to add a little bit to the historical record. I have a very small amount of personal experience with special operations in Afghanistan during the Bush Administration years. Cross-border operations into Pakistan were never explicitly ruled out. Rather, they were treated with all the gravity they deserved. Yes, you can go into Pakistan if it means killing or capturing Osama bin Laden. But if you go into Pakistan, crash a helicopter or get into a gunfight with Pakistani police and don't get bin Laden ... well, you can imagine what the costs would be to U.S. policy in the region. That was the logic in 2004, and as far as I can tell based on subsequent research, that remained the logic in 2011 and even today. I firmly believe, based on both personal experience and subsequent analysis, that George W. Bush was committed to capturing or killing Osama bin Laden. Were resources that could have been used toward that end diverted to deal with a worsening situation in Iraq? Absolutely. Did the administration's decision to invade in Iraq in 2003 take our focus off of al-Qaeda? Absolutely. But to argue that President Bush "ignored" Osama bin Laden is to overstate the case.

And if President Bush made public statements that he didn't really care about Osama bin Laden, I support those. Those were smart statements to make in public -- lest Osama bin Laden be turned into even more of a folk hero in the Muslim world than he already was. The longer the narrative was about "the United States versus Osama bin Laden," the longer bin Laden was a heroic figure who -- alone among Muslim leaders -- stood up to the great hegemonic power. Once that narrative went away, the Muslim world had to confront the ugliness and horrors of al-Qaeda's actions. And it didn't like what it saw.

As far as what Sen. McCain argued, well, I cannot defend that. But my point was about George W. Bush.

Gulliver at Ink Spots called my attention to some excellent commentary on TIME Magazine’s blog that deserves a wider readership. In it, a collection of defense analysts demolish some arguments Jay Carafano of the Heritage Foundation has made in support of the F-22 and F-35 and make some very important points about readiness and our aviators.

I am a specialist in neither air power nor the defense acquisitions process, but I know a devastating argument when I see one. Carafano had invoked the ghost of John Boyd to defend the new fighter-interceptors, and the analysts – all of whom knew Boyd personally and had spoken with him about each weapon system prior to his death – correct some of Carafano’s assumptions in the most brutal way.

But the commentary also sparked some lively back-and-forth over Twitter when I suggested that it had taken a few cheap shots. Not content with merely demolishing the substance of Carafano’s arguments, the analysts strongly imply that the reason Carafano argues what he does is because his organization, the Heritage Foundation, receives support from Lockheed Martin, the maker of the F-22 and F-35. Here I cry foul. On the one hand, defense policy analysts have an obligation to speak up whenever their work relates to the interests of a donor. This is why I maintain a policy of transparency on my blog and why my employer, I am proud to say, is one of the very few think tanks that publicly discloses its supporters. People like Carafano and myself have an obligation to announce our conflicts of interest and to let the public make an informed decision about the substance of our research.

On the other hand, though, I strongly believe that if you are going to impugn a man’s integrity, your evidence better be air-tight. It is not enough to establish correlation (“Jay Carafano’s employer receives money from large defense contractors”). One must also establish causation as well (“Jay Carafano argues what he does because his employer receives money from large defense contractors”). You better have hard evidence to support the latter.

Because it has been my experience that most people make their arguments – even their dumber arguments – in good faith. And as Daveed Gartenstein-Ross points out, you can also slander good work with accusations of financial motivations. Finally, it has been my experience that when defense analysts argue to cut weapon systems, they are rarely congratulated for taking stands that run counter to the short-term financial interests of their research institution. You only hear a research institution’s donors mentioned when it affords people an opportunity to undermine an argument in favor of buying weapon systems.

There is a lot that is wrong with the defense policy community and its public discourse. One of the problems is that analysts are too slow to mention when there is a conflict of interest. (I learned the hard way a few years ago that you need to mention every conceivable conflict of interest as soon as possible if you want your arguments to be taken seriously.) Another problem, though, is that rival analysts are not satisfied with criticizing the substance of a given argument but also feel the need to rashly question the integrity of the analyst. If you can prove that an analyst is more or less paid to produce his or her "analysis," by all means impugn that analyst's integrity. (Such a situation, sadly, would not be without precedent.) If you cannot prove it, though, don't mention it. It weakens your argument. And as much as I love to engage with those who challenge the substance of my own arguments, you'll note that I simply ignore those with a history of making evidence-free attacks on my integrity instead.

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By the way, yes: Lockheed Martin is a supporter of the Center for a New American Security. Do with that information what you wish.

I should also point out that my values here were not born from the womb. My natural instinct in argumentation, in fact, is to be just as nasty as others. But I like to think I have grown a little and matured over the years and that the discourse on this blog reflects that maturation.

Dave Barno took this picture of CNAS staffers watching yesterday's Pentagon press briefing. From right to left, USMC fellow Rob Clark, USAF fellow Tom Cooper, Nora Bensahel, Travis Sharp, and some guy too busy writing snarky comments on Twitter about Leon Panetta's yellow tie to pay attention to what is actually being said. This is an "action" shot of life at a think tank.

I will be live-tweeting the speeches by the President and Secretary of Defense today, starting around 1050. I will then offer comment on the blog on matters that relate to my areas of study -- the ground forces, irregular warfare, posture in the Middle East, etc.

If you are in Washington, DC today and have already given up on your New Years resolution to go to the gym after work each day, swing by the W Hotel around 6:00 tonight for an event featuring Philip Taubman's new book, The Partnership: Five Cold Warriors and Their Quest to Ban the Bomb. Taubman's book received a very positive review in the New York Times on Sunday. 

I am no specialist in nuclear weapons or arms control, but can I still share Henry Kissenger's doubts about whether "Nuclear Zero" is actually a good idea in practice?

Kissinger’s doubts hang ominously over “The Partnership.” The technology cannot be uninvented; when one country goes to zero, its enemy is sorely tempted to cheat; and the scarier the government, the less amenable it is to disarming. Many of the governments and dignitaries calling for abolition are just mouthing the words.

My worries exactly. Anyway, please RSVP here if you plan on attending. I am sure CNAS director Bill Perry will have lots of smart responses to my above concerns. 

Matthew Kroenig, Steven Walt and others have given us a real Christmas treat in the form of the debate over Matt's recent article in Foreign Affairs. Walt responded to Matt's article, as did Dan Drezner and Paul Pillar. Although I was inclined to agree with Walt when the debate began, I was put off by the condescension -- as I perceived it -- in his original response, so I was especially pleased to see him then allow Matt a chance to reply before posting one final time himself. Students of international relations and Middle East policy should take the time to read through the informative back-and-forth, and I thank both scholars for getting their ideas out there in the public sphere.

I have a few problems of my own with Matt's original article. Those problems all concern second and third-order effects.

If Iran gets the bomb, I have heard all kinds of worries about what would then happen in terms of regional security. But in conversations with leaders around the region, I have heard very few specifics. Why, exactly, would a nuclear Iran be so much worse than a non-nuclear Iran? Bear with me here: Let's say Iran gets a nuclear weapon. What happens next? Would other states bandwagon? What would that bandwagoning behavior look like in real terms? (For the record, I have never heard any compelling answer to this question in travels around the region.)

Would other states seek nuclear weapons? How, exactly? Let's pick one example: Saudi Arabia. Why, first off, has Saudi Arabia not already begun a nuclear energy program? (And don't say "oil," because there is an opportunity cost to Gulf states using oil for their own energy rather than selling it on the open market for $100 a barrel.) Does Saudi Arabia have the technical expertise to start a nuclear program? If so, how long would it take them? Would Saudi Arabia instead buy a bomb? From where? From Pakistan, perhaps? Why would the Pakistanis sell one to them? Why might the Pakistanis not sell one to them? You can see where I am going here: once you start trying examine the second and third order effects and their various branches, it's tough to explain how, exactly, a nuclear Iran would be that much more dangerous than a non-nuclear Iran. I am not saying it would not be more dangerous -- I am saying it is very hard to explain how, exactly, a nuclear Iran would be more dangerous. And I think those arguing for war with Iran have an obligation to sketch out those specifics to both policy makers and to the public.

On the flip side of the equation, what might be the adverse second and third order effects of a U.S. strike on Iran? I agree with Matt's critics that he gives us the best-case scenario. But how does the situation look if we work through the effects of a U.S. strike on Iran country-by-country? How might another war affect U.S. security and economic interests elsewhere in the region? How might such a war affect U.S. interests outside the region? How might Iran respond?

I like Matt as both a person and a scholar. I think he owes us more analysis, though, than he has thus far given us.

Update: On the other hand, I can think of few people less qualified to answer the questions I have asked in the above paragraphs than this freaking guy. I mean, why in the world would any responsible analyst or policy maker listen to what John Yoo, J.D., has to say about the regional security architecture of the Persian Gulf? Or military operations? It's not as if the Republican Party does not have plenty of smart people who can speak about each. I have no idea what the editors at the National Review were thinking.

Today's news from Egypt, where the offices of the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute were raided along with several other civil society organizations*, should prompt swift action from the U.S. Congress when it returns from the holidays.

Unlike many other regional analysts, I am not terribly upset by U.S. military aid to regimes in the Middle East: this aid, in theory, gives the United States influence over the behavior of regimes and institutions in the region -- and also professionalizes Arab military organizations. But the United States has an opportunity to support the promotion of democracy in the region by linking military aid to the development of civil society. Egypt receives approximately $1.3 billion in annual military aid from the United States. The Congress should include a clause to the effect that regimes will not be eligible for U.S. military aid if organizations funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (such as the NDI and the IRI) cannot operate free from host government harassment. The Egyptian military claims organizations like the NDI and the IRI "meddle" in the affairs of Egypt. Well, $1.3 billion in military aid also "meddles" in the affairs of Egypt. If you want the latter, you should be prepared to accept the former as well.**

I have written about the sources of U.S. leverage in the Middle East. I do not think the problem is that the United States does not have leverage but that it has been incompetent in using it. The United States now has an opportunity to use it in Egypt. And even if the Egyptian military declines U.S. military aid (unlikely), the United States will have sent a strong signal that democracy promotion is a strategic goal of the United States in the region and that allied regimes should adjust their behavior. I might not have recommended such a gambit in 2010, but I think the events of 2011 mean the United States has to play by new rules in the region.

*Reports from Cairo indicate the other organizations were the Arab Center for Independence of Justice and Legal Professions (ACIJP), The Budgetary and Human Rights Observatory, Freedom House and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

**Military aid comes from a different pool of money than does other aid. One of the problems the United States has using its leverage is that the right hand often does not know what the left hand is doing. So the Dept. of Defense might be doing one thing while U.S. AID is doing another. Foreign governments know all about the fault lines and divisions in the U.S. government and exploit them. They bet (correctly) the U.S. government will not be able to come up with a whole-of-government approach. The U.S. Congress, though, can step in here and tie one set of activities to another by federal law.

Small Wars Journal has a thought-provoking post by Michael Cummings that takes issue with something I have often argued: 

[W]hen it comes to counter-insurgency, military theorists continue to ignore humanity’s underlying irrationality. Consider Andrew Exum’s article in the Daily Beast:

 

“Populations, in civil wars, make cold-blooded calculations about their self-interest. If forced to choose sides in a civil war—and they will resist making that choice for as long as possible, for understandable reasons—they will side with the faction they assess to be the one most likely to win.”

I dub this the “Chicago School of Counter-Insurgency”, the idea that in warfare--with death and subjugation on the line--mankind’s rationality trumps his unconscious thoughts and emotions. ...

 

We cannot pretend that killing people won’t cause emotional reactions. We cannot pretend that in a war zone people always act rationally, because people don’t. As a counter-insurgent, we must balance our views of insurgents and the population as both rational and emotional actors.

Cummings has a point, of course. But what Cummings calls the Chicago School would better be described as the New Haven School. For a long time, the scholarly literature on civil wars discussed political allegiance in civil wars as primarily exogenous. In 2006, though, a scholar at Yale named Stathis Kalyvas published a book called The Logic of Violence in Civil War that argued the precise opposite. Anyone who knows my own work knows that I find the argument advanced by Kalyvas to be compelling. And a large-N analysis of population behavior in civil war environments would, I believe, lead to similar conclusions. But as many people know, I did my own graduate work in and on southern Lebanon, where all kinds of "irrational" factors like religion motivated the population. So what gives?

I heard Steve Biddle describe the state of civil wars scholarship well last summer when he said that what Kalyvas and his work did was to effectively swing the literature from the all the way from the exogenous end of the spectrum to all the way over to the endogenous end. As more work is done, Steve said (and I agree with him), the literature would likely end up somewhere in the middle. Or right back where it started, when Thucydides noted man is motivated to go to war by fear, honor, and interest -- only one of which is covered in most economics textbooks. For now, I have yet to read a good corrective to Kalyvas that would lead me to radically change my own views about popular behavior in civil wars in general.

(Cummings, alas, goes on to argue that "foreign occupation triggers suicide attacks." Let's all agree not to tell Daveed Gartenstein-Ross.)

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The subtitle given to the Cummings article on the Small Wars Journal webpage was "It's time to stop listening to CNAS." So ... no Christmas card from Small Wars Journal this year?

Update: the original Michael Cummings post was here.

For the past several months, I've been working on a big project related to U.S. policy toward the Middle East at the Center for a New American Security. (My research partner is Duke's Bruce Jentleson, whose research I have long admired.) During that time, I've had the opportunity to interact with a wide array of former and current U.S. policy makers as well as the kinds of na'er-do-well academic specialists on the region whose work I have always found to be thought-provoking. One thing virtually everyone can agree on is the dilemma in which U.S. policy makers find themselves: in a region that is rapidly democratizing, the United States is over-invested in the least democratic institutions and regimes in the region.

Where things get tricky is when one tries to decide what to do about that. The principle problem is one that has been in my head watching more violent crackdowns in Bahrain and Egypt: the very source of U.S. leverage against the regimes in Bahrain and Egypt is that which links the United States to the abuses of the regime in the first place. So if you want to take a "moral" stand against the abuses of the regime in Bahrain and remove the Fifth Fleet, congratulations! You can feel good about yourself for about 24 hours -- or until the time you realize that you have just lost the ability to schedule a same-day meeting with the Crown Prince to press him on the behavior of Bahrain's security forces. Your leverage, such as it was, has just evaporated. The same is true in Egypt. It would feel good, amidst these violent clashes between the Army and protesters, to cut aid to the Egyptian Army. But in doing so, you also reduce your own leverage over the behavior of the Army itself.

At some point, of course, the United States has no choice to cut all ties to a regime or institution. We are not, I feel strongly, quite there in either Egypt or Bahrain. But as I hear of more and more of my friends in the region beaten with crowbars and pelted with rubber bullets by the forces charged with protecting the citizenry, it's fair to wonder whether or not the United States is using the leverage it has to its greatest effect.