Exactly one year ago, I was in Doha to speak at the Al Jazeera Forum, where a remarkable group of Arab politicians, intellectuals and activists had assembled to talk about the seemingly unstoppable momentum of the changes sweeping the region. Moncef Marzouki, then a human rights dissident and now President of Tunisia, told me about his hopes for crafting a genuinely democratic constitution -- hopes which al-Nahda leader Rached Ghannouchi assured me he shared. Tareq el-Bishri gave a long speech about how Egypt's 1952 revolution gave way to despotism and military rule; the youth activists in the audience could hardly mask their boredom with the old man, but perhaps should have listened more carefully. The Libyan revolutionaries at the conference were treated like rock stars, as were the youth activists from Tunisia, Egypt and other Arab countries. The mood was celebratory and electric, though tinged by anxiety over the atrocities in Libya and reports of Qaddafi's forces moving towards Benghazi.

But in retrospect, the week of March 12 marked the precise turning point away from the "New Hope" of those dizzying Tahrir days towards the grimmer, darker political struggles to come. I never made my scheduled trip from Doha to Manama. That week, the Empire struck back:

Read on

Last week, CNAS released my report "Pressure Not War," which attempted to lay out a path forward on Syria which could accelerate a political transition without a military intervention.  It's generated a great response, and a lot of hopefully productive debate.

I was surprised that the most interesting and heated arguments focused upon my recommendation to take top Syrian regime officials to the International Criminal Court if they do not immediately move towards a ceasefire and political transition. This was only one of a number of layered, interlocking proposals designed to offer a non-military alternative to protect Syrian civilians and accelerate progress towards a durable political transition. Even if it didn't materialize, the rest of the arguments about the limits of military options and the ways to advance a political solution would still apply.   So I wasn't expecting that one point to draw so much attention.

But I'm glad that it did, since I would like to see international justice at the center of the debate.  Despite all the obvious obstacles, I don't agree that the ICC and the instruments of international justice can not be brought into play against Bashar al-Assad and the top officials of the Syrian regime.  I see a real possibility that Syria could be referred if it is made a top diplomatic priority, and mounting such a diplomatic campaign would be useful even if the effort failed.  But there is a serious and ongoing discussion about whether using the ICC as a instrument of pressure is desirable, even if possible -- for Syria, or for building global norms against impunity for atrocities.

Read on

I've been in Doha for the week, and so haven't been able to blog or produce a video blog. But since I've got wireless access for the moment, I wanted to draw attention to a few things of note which have dropped while I've been on the road.

 -  I was absolutely floored and thrilled that the Middle East Channel was named as a finalist in the "Website Department" for the 2012 National Magazine Awards for Digital Media -- the Ellies.  It's a testimony not just to the Middle East Channel's editorial team but to the community of academics, journalists and policy analysts who have contributed so much over the past year.   Thanks to everyone! 

 - The National Interest has published my response to Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev's article on Libya and the "new Wilsonianism" in American foreign policy. I argue that the Obama  administration's approach to the Middle East "may be neo-Wilsonian, but it is a careful and pragmatic example of the breed." Read it here. 

 - I contributed this comment to the Economist's debate over intervention in Syria.   You won't be surprised that I continue to regard military intervention as unwise and unlikely to either protect Syrian civilians or to hasten a political transition.  Read the full argument here. 

 - POMEPS has released a new briefing on the Syria crisis collecting recent Middle East Channel articles and analysis. You can read my introduction and download the brief here.  You can also watch a video of a recent POMEPS panel discussion on Syria here or on C-Span -- I particularly recommend the detailed and thoughtful discussion of the nature of the uprising in Damascus by Salwa Ismail of SOAS, but there's plenty of interesting material there. 

 - The Kindle edition of my book The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East is now available for pre-order.  It will be released March 22, five days before the paper version is published.    We will be officially launching the book in Washington DC on March 27 in a CNAS event and reception featuring me and Hisham Milhem -- RSVP here! 

  Back soon! 

How should the United States, and the international community, respond to the escalating bloodbath in Syria?  Over the last two months, the overwhelming weight of  editorial and op-ed commentary has been in the direction of calling for military action of some sort --- especially to arm a Free Syrian Army.  The calls for military action span the spectrum:  from John McCain and Lindsey Graham and the FPI-FDD group of conservative hawks to liberal interventionists and even... FP bloggers.  For people desperate to do something to help the Syrian people, and at the same time for people keen to deal a blow to Iran or bring down a long-hated regime in Damascus, the time seems right for some form of military intervention.  

I was a strong supporter of the intervention in Libya. But the diversion of the debate about Syria towards military options has been counterproductive.  None of the military options on offer, including arming the Free Syrian Army, are likely to significantly help the Syrian people and most risk making things far worse.  But the recent display of a broad-based international consensus, including the 137-12 vote in the United Nations General Assembly condemning the regime's violence, and the first meeting of the "Friends of Syria" group on Friday in Tunisia make this a crucial time to seriously explore non-military options which have a more realistic chance to be adopted.. and to succeed.  

In a new report released today by the Center for a New American Security, I argue that if the goal is to help the Syrian people and not just to hurt an Iranian ally then the international response to the Syrian crisis must focus less on whether to use military options than on ways to improve the prospects for a "soft landing" after the fall of the Assad regime.    The report lays out a number of concrete suggestions for mobilizing diplomatic pressure and breaking the intensifying polarization between two Syrian communities in order to push for a political transition. I can't offer any guarantees that this strategy will work quickly or cleanly... but neither can those now recklessly calling for poorly conceived military action.

Read on

Over the last few days there has been a cascade of politicians and analysts jumping on the bandwagon of arming the Free Syrian Army, from John McCain and Elliott Abrams to FP's Daniel Drezner. It's easy to understand why. The failure of the U.N. Security Council has blocked diplomatic efforts to achieve a political transition and has triggered a clear escalation in violence by Bashar al-Assad's regime. With the horrifying images of the dead and wounded in Homs and elsewhere, many people want to do something to stop the atrocities. But almost everyone who looks carefully at options for military intervention, however, quickly realizes how daunting such an operation would actually be with neither airstrikes nor safe areas likely to succeed and nobody (thankfully) willing to admit to contemplating boots on the ground.

As I expected a few weeks ago, arming the Free Syrian Army has therefore emerged as an attractive option to many. Advocates of arming the FSA argue that providing the internal Syrian opposition forces with advanced weapons, communications, and other support would even the military balance and give them a fighting chance against the Assad regime. It would give them the means to defend their cities and protect the population from security forces. It might allow them to take the fight to Assad and hasten the fall of his regime. Many Syrians on the ground are asking for such assistance. And it would do all this without the risks and costs of Western military intervention.

I have said many times that this is where I think Syria is going, whether or not the United States makes a decision to join the game (thus far, reportedly, it has not, but presumably the option is being debated). I want to find ways to help the Syrian people too, badly. And I can fully understand why this looks like an attractive option. But people need to think far more carefully about the implications of funneling weapons to the Free Syrian Army before leaping into such a policy. Here are some of the questions that need to be asked.

Read on

The veto cast by Russia and China on Saturday blocked action by the United Nations Security Council to back the Arab League's initiative to stop the killing and facilitate a political transition in Syria.  The vetos came despite a concerted effort by the resolution's backers to meet the most significant objections, in particular their consistently repeated assurance that there would be no military intervention.  It was not the "revenge of the BRICS" as some have suggested, since both India and South Africa backed the 13-2 majority (and Brazil would have done so had it still been on the Council). US Ambassador Susan Rice called the vetos "shameful."  I agree.

Read on

"Do not let the Syrian people down; the violence must end," implored Arab League Secretary General Nabil al-Arabi at the Security Council yesterday.  U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton posed the challenge even more bluntly:  "We all have a choice: Stand with the people of Syria and the region or become complicit in the continuing violence there."  As the death toll rapidly mounts, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe denounced the "shameful silence of the Security Council."  Most of the people around me in the press gallery at the Security Council seemed to feel the weight of what felt like an historic, urgent public debate. 

But as fierce as the urgency for action in the face of the rapidly escalating body count was the crystal clear rejection of any authorization for military intervention.  Qatari Foreign Minister Hamed bin Jassem began the debate by assuring that the League was not calling for a military intervention, and returned to the floor at the end of the session to again stress the point. "We aim to avoid any foreign intervention, specifically any foreign military intervention," declared the Arab League's Nabel al-Arabi.   U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton dismissed fears about another Libya-style intervention as "a false analogy," and in a press opportunity outside the Council told reporters that "we want to underscore that there is no intention to seek any authority or to pursue any kind of military intervention." Even Juppe, the most passionate voice for the resolution, insisted that "absolutely nothing in the draft could lead to such intervention."  The Security Council will not be authorizing military action in Syria any time soon.

Read on

The formal seating of Egypt's Parliament today, after a grueling two months of elections and political turmoil, marks the end of one stage of Egypt's transition. The Islamist-dominated Parliament will begin its work without clearly defined powers or responsibilities amidst a fractured, suspicious political environment. We will now see whether this Parliament will be able to deliver on the hopes invested in electoral legitimacy and emerge as an effective check on the power of the SCAF. In many ways, the real struggles start now.

The first test of the resilience of this path will come in two days, the anniversary of the January 25 revolution. I expect that there will likely be a large turnout that day, with all political forces joining in. The question, though, is what happens after the big crowds go home: do activists decide to try another sit-in and force themselves back onto the political stage? And if they do, has the SCAF learned anything from the past few months and recognized that again resorting to tear gas and violent assaults on protestors will overturn the plans it has proposed for an orderly political transition process?

I don't expect the coming months, during which a constitution is supposedly to be drafted and Presidential elections organized and the transition to civilian rule completed, to go smoothly or easily. I still believe that Egypt would be better served by holding Presidential elections and transferring executive power to a legitimate civilian government more quickly, and allowing more time for a Constitution to be drafted and fully debated. But that doesn't seem to be the path Egypt is taking. So for now, let's just hope that the Parliament asserts itself quickly and effectively, and focuses on truly important issues and isn't sidetracked by debates over religion. Let's hope that the activists who have done so much to drive change in Egypt can work with this Parliament in a common drive to ensure that the SCAF lives up to its promises for a genuine democratic transition by the summer. Let's hope that the SCAF doesn't destroy its own plans by teargassing or murdering protestors in Tahrir this week.

Read on