Opinion

Felix Salmon

Is Kenneth Dam working for Elliott Associates?

Felix Salmon
May 13, 2012 00:59 EDT

Kenneth Dam is an unusually reticent professor. Since he released his amicus brief in the case of Elliott vs. Argentina, I’ve phoned him and sent him multiple emails to two different addresses, but have received no reply at all. Which is odd, because he clearly feels very strongly about the case — strongly enough to enlist Kevin Reed, of the white-shoe law firm Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, to put together his brief and submit it to the Second Circuit.

Such services don’t come cheap: my guess is that Reed charged Dam well into six figures for his services.

So why would Dam spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to submit an amicus brief in this case, yet at the same time evince no interest in talking to the press about it? He hasn’t returned Bloomberg’s calls, either, and neither is he quoted in Michelle Celarier’s story in the NY Post. But Celarier has managed to come out and say what many of us suspected, when we first saw the brief:

Elliott Capital Management’s Paul Singer must be sweating it…

Singer has enlisted the support of ex-Treasury vet Kenneth Dam, who served under Ronald Reagan and was deputy secretary of the Treasury under George W. Bush, to write a “friends of the court” brief for Elliott in a case the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is slated to hear later this month.

This wouldn’t be the first time that Elliott paid a venerable law professor to submit a brief in support of its case. But in this particular brief, there’s an unambiguous footnote:

Pursuant to Local Rule 29.1, Kenneth W. Dam states that he authored this brief and that it was not authored or funded by any party to this action.

On the off chance that you’re not familiar with Local Rule 29.1, it requires a disclosure statement under FRAP 29(c)(5), which in turn says that this footnote must indicate whether “a person — other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel — contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief and, if so, identifies each such person”. Since Dam identifies no such person, I would normally conclude that he paid the costs of preparing and submitting this brief himself.

But Michelle Celarier is a veteran and very well-sourced journalist, and if she says that Dam’s brief was commissioned by Elliott, I’m inclined to believe her.

It’s all very peculiar. Within the brief itself, Dam’s only declared interest is this:

Prof. Dam has a substantial interest in the outcome of this action because it presents issues involving the international financial markets, the role of international financial institutions, and U.S. international policymaking that he has written on and studied extensively.

Which might explain why he’s interested in the outcome of the action, but doesn’t come close to explaining why he’s willing to spend a very large amount of money attempting to influence the outcome of the action.

All of this could be cleared up, of course, very easily, if only Dam or Elliott were willing to answer some simple questions. But instead we get this:

Dam didn’t return a phone message and e-mail sent to his law school office seeking comment on the filing. Peter Truell, a spokesman for New York-based Elliott Management, declined to comment.

I first tried to ask Dam about this back on May 2, and then tried again on May 7. So far, I’ve heard nothing. So if anybody out there knows Ken Dam, and gets the opportunity to ask him a simple question, I’d be much obliged if you could ask him whether he’s working for Elliott. Then, if he says yes, ask him why he didn’t say so in his brief. And if he says no, ask him how much it cost to file this brief, and whether he personally paid the full sum. I’d be fascinated to learn what his answers are.

COMMENT

This post is surprisingly ill-informed (and/or malicious)for an author of your caliber, Felix. Slowlearner got it right. There’s nothing to see here, and certainly nothing that should call into question the good professor’s integrity.

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Counterparties: Your massive guide to JPMorgan’s failed hedge

Ben Walsh
May 11, 2012 17:23 EDT

Welcome to the Counterparties email. The sign-up page is here, it’s just a matter of checking a box if you’re already registered on the Reuters website. Send suggestions, story tips and complaints to Counterparties.Reuters@gmail.com

It turns out we probably should fear Voldemort. Yesterday Jamie Dimon hastily scheduled a 5 p.m. conference call in which he was forced to explain a sudden $2 billion loss in his Chief Investment Office, a division that was supposed to safely hedge the bank’s risk.

JPMorgan’s stock fell more than 9% on the news. Dimon, who last month called the issue a “tempest in a teapot”, said the hedges implemented by the “London Whale” (aka Bruno Iksil) were a “bad strategy, executed poorly”; he also conceded “many errors”, “sloppiness” and “bad judgement”.

The responsibility for mistakes ultimately rests on Dimon’s shoulders. Jonathan Weil noted that yesterday’s disclosures meant that “either Dimon misled the public about the gravity of the festering trades during his company’s first-quarter earnings call last month. Or he didn’t know what was happening inside the bowels of his own company.” Barney Frank didn’t let this opportunity pass him by, either, saying that “JPMorgan Chase, entirely without any help from the government, has lost, in this one set of transactions, five times the amount they claim financial regulation is costing them.”

Adding to Dimon’s chagrin was his acknowledgement in yesterday’s conference call that he gave proponents of increased financial regulation, including Barney Frank, yet another proof point. As Felix notes, the strong likelihood that the trades were Volcker-compliant “only goes to show how weak the Volcker Rule” is and affirms the need for “dumb rules” that traders can’t easily game.

So just what specifically went wrong? For a deep and wonky explanation, Lisa Pollack details what might have been going on and concludes that both regulators and Dimon should have seen the buildup of risk, if not the losses, long before yesterday. Heidi Moore also has a handy guide that spells out exactly what happened in non-financial English. Zero Hedge outlines how analysts need to change how they examine the profitability of big banks, and their hedging business model.

There’s still some dispute over whether Iksil’s positions were actually a hedge or just a disguised bet. Matt Levine has an extended take on this, and before the latest revelations the Epicurean Dealmaker pointed out that the difference between a hedge and speculation is subtle because “the same trade or financial instrument can be used in either way at different times and under different circumstances.”

Chief among Iksil’s errors, it seems, was a model that didn’t accurately capture the risk of the strategy. The CDS index Iksil was selling protection on has moved away from him recently, but why JPMorgan’s losses were so large relative to the index’s more modest change remains unclear. Derivatives are a zero-sum game, of course, and at least two hedge funds run by mostly ex-JPMers have made some $30 million each.

For his part, Dimon is far from finished explaining what went wrong, and we won’t have to wait long for his next attempt. On Wednesday, he taped an interview with NBC’s David Gregory to air on Sunday’s Meet the Press. After yesterday’s announcement, Dimon has decided to retape the appearance. – Ben Walsh

Before we move on to today’s links, we’re announcing the second Counterparties book giveaway. Exhausted by cetacean puns, we believe Jamie, Bruno et al. at JPMorgan deserve their own lolcats. Here’s an image to get you started. Send us your best work, and you could win a copy of Tadas Viskanta’s book Winning Strategies from the Frontlines of the Investment Blogosphere. We have two to give away!

JPMorgan
What it’s like to have your boss ask you to execute a $1 billion hedge – Kid Dynamite
Simon Johnson: It’s “stunning” that JPMorgan lost so much at a mild time in the credit cycle – Huffington Post
Levin: “The latest evidence that what banks call ‘hedges’ are often risky bets … banks have no business making.” – Senate.gov
The controversial measure of JPMorgan’s risk that tripled over the last year – BI
In their own words: JPMorgan’s risk management standards – JPMorgan
The 10-Q in which JPMorgan discloses CIO’s losses – SEC
Fitch downgrades JPMorgan – Bloomberg

New Normal
A map of economic mobility in America – South Carolina, Oklahoma and Louisiana rank worst – Pew
Jobless claims fall again – AP
More than 230,000 unemployed Americans are going to lose their unemployment benefits this weekend – WashPo

Be Afraid
What short-sellers mean when they say Chinese banks are “built on sand” – Bloomberg

Pork Products
Basically every important manufacturer in America gets some sort of government subsidy – NYT
Obama’s stupid idea for a manufacturing subsidy – Yglesias

Regulations
Occupational licensure as rent-seeking – Conversable Economist
The case for global accounting – Floyd Norris

Oxpeckers
The troubling financialization of the Washington Post – CJR

Compelling
Domestic oil production is irrelevant to oil prices – Yglesias

Startups
NYC is now the fastest-growing tech hub in America – Mashable

Alpha
Bond titan Jeff Gundlach was once in an extremely hilarious-looking ’80s rock band – Businessweek

Facebook
Co-founder Eduardo Saverin gives up his U.S. citizenship ahead of IPO, presumably to save on taxes – Bloomberg

COMMENT

MrRFox, you would be interested in this one:
http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/11/technolo gy/eduardo-saverin-facebook-citizenship/ index.htm

One fewer plutocrat paying US taxes…

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Chart of the day: The CDX NA IG 9 basis

Felix Salmon
May 11, 2012 12:00 EDT

tumblr_m3x7ybSKEM1qa8osno1_1280.jpg

Here’s the chart you’ve all been waiting for, courtesy of Reuters’s very own Scotty Barber: the spread on the CDX NA IG 9 index — the synthetic index on which JP Morgan’s Bruno Iskil was selling enormous amounts of protection — minus the spread on the index’s constituent bonds.

Three things jump out here. Firstly, the basis is negative, not positive. That means that the obvious trade was to buy the underlying bonds and hedge by buying protection on the index. That obvious trade, if held to maturity, should always make money. Iksil was funding that trade, by selling protection on the index.

Secondly, the chart is going up and to the right. Since Iksil was selling protection, that means the market was moving against him. Or, to put it another way, the obvious trade makes money when it expires at zero, and as the chart moves towards zero, Iksil loses money on a mark-to-market basis.

Finally, the move doesn’t seem to be all that huge — only about 30bp in this quarter. Which doesn’t seem remotely enough to cause a $2 billion loss. Still, Iksil managed it somehow.

Update: Many thanks to Sally Kohn for making the chart infinitely better by putting whales on it.

COMMENT

I think the trade is the Index Tranche. (IG9 has 125 original constituents, of which 4 have defaulted.) The tranche is 3%-7%. I.e. you lose money once 3% of the capital is wiped out. (i.e. say 6 names default, and recovery is 50% on each)

The biggest problem with CDOs, is the correlation between defaults is difficult to estimate or model. (i.e. if one of the underlying name defaults, how likely are the balance)
This can range from +100%, i.e. all credits in the index default together, 0%, i.e. no default is correlated with another, or -100%.
i.e. When one company defaults, all the others are surely not going to default during the balance tenor. (negative correlation happens when one company goes bust, but economy is doing very fine, and spreads on other credits tighten)

Now the basis is between the tranche, and the underlying index (not cash and CDS)

more details in this ZERO Hedge column
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/behind-iks il-trade-ig9-tranches-explained

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How dumb rules can mitigate model risk

Felix Salmon
May 11, 2012 11:22 EDT

We’re still not much the wiser on exactly how the London Whale managed to lose $2 billion this quarter, but I think Matt Levine has the smartest take. (This is why the blogosphere is so great: it’s full of people who used to do this kind of thing for a living, rather than just people who write about people who do this for a living.)

The key thing to note here is that while the monster hit to the P&L is what got all the headlines, the real problem here lay with JP Morgan’s risk models. A hint of far out of whack they are is given in the difference between the bank’s earnings release, which showed $67 million of value-at-risk in the Whale’s division in the first quarter, and the new SEC filing, which showed that number as actually being $129 million. Here’s Levine:

This was attributed to modeling changes made over the last year, and someone asked on the call “why did you change the VaR model?,” but I’m not convinced that’s exactly the right question. This, I suspect, is not an issue of a thing called a “VaR model” that sits in a central location and spits out numbers for regulators and 10-Qs; rather, this looks like the CIO’s trading desk modelling the actual P&L and risks of the trade wildly wrong. That seems to me like the simplest way to lose a billion dollars without noticing it.

I’d put this another way. JP Morgan’s Bruno Iksil, it seems, managed to find an incredibly profitable way of hedging the bank’s positions. Like any other economically rational actor, when he saw a lot of dollar bills lying on the sidewalk, he decided to pick them up. But in Iksil’s highly-complex world, a dollar bill isn’t really a dollar bill. Instead, it’s the output of a model. And if a trader can’t trust his model, he’s flying blind.

The problem is that pretty much by definition, it’s impossible to model model risk. We now know that Iksil’s model was deeply flawed. And indeed the minute that the rest of the world found out about his positions, they didn’t really pass the smell test: it’s very hard to see how writing an enormous amount of protection on an off-the-run CDX index would hedge anything much.

This is where grown-ups like Jamie Dimon are meant to step in. If they see billions of dollars in super-senior mortgage exposure, or in off-the-run CDX exposure, they’re meant to say “I know that your highfalutin’ models say that these exposures are risk free, but I don’t understand how this isn’t risky, so go unwind this trade”. Dimon has historically been very good at that — very good at refusing to simply trust that superstar traders earning eight-figure bonuses are doing nothing that might blow up in their faces. In this case, however, for some reason, he had blind faith in Iksil — and in Iksil’s models, which proved to be very faulty.

A modern trading desk is a bit like a high-tech airplane: nearly all of the time, you’re better off trusting your instruments than trusting your gut. But at the same time, if your instruments are broken, then trusting them can lead you to fly straight into the ocean.

This is why Basel I turned out to be much more robust than Basel II. Your sophisticated platform needs to be built on a foundation of dumb rules: simple limits on how big any one position can get, on how much exposure you can have to any one counterparty, or in general on any trade which is based on the hypothesis that your desk is smarter than anybody else on Wall Street.

Those kind of rules won’t prevent all blow-ups, of course, but they’ll help. They would have prevented this one, and they would have put an end to Jon Corzine’s disastrous MF Global trades, as well.

The problem is that traders hate dumb rules, because they cap the amount of money they can make. And traders have enormous power at investment banks these days, because they make the lion’s share of the profits. That’s why it’s important that the CEO of an investment bank not be a trader. And certainly it’s crucial that the CEO shouldn’t have his own trading account and buy and sell from his Blackberry during meetings, as Corzine did. That’s just a recipe for disaster.

COMMENT

The position they were supposed to be hedging simply became an excuse for them to put on the hedging trade itself. Dimon is too smart not to have known what was going on; everyone there had to be. When a hedge needs a hedge you’ve gone too far. They blew it, and they didn’t blow it because they were stupid, as Dimon is now trying to claim — they blew it because they were greedy and dishonest.

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JP Morgan: When basis trades blow up

Felix Salmon
May 10, 2012 18:39 EDT

I’m not sure if it was the biggest quarterly loss of all time, but Merrill Lynch’s $16 billion loss in the fourth quarter of 2008 certainly ranks very high up there in the annals of investment-bank blowups. It happened after the bank had already been taken over by Bank of America, and it was in the middle of the financial crisis, so it didn’t get nearly the amount of attention it deserved. But it was not simply a case of assets plunging in value. Instead, it was, in very large part, a basis trade blowup.

The basis trade is an arbitrage, basically. There are two different ways the market measures credit risk: by looking at credit spreads — the yield on a certain issuer’s bonds, relative to the risk-free rate — or by looking at CDS spreads, which are basically the same thing but set in the derivatives market rather than the cash bond market. Most of the time, CDS spreads and cash spreads are tightly coupled. But sometimes they’re not. And at Merrill, a huge part of that $16 billion loss was reportedly due to a bad basis bet: the basis on many credits became very large and very negative during the financial crisis.

This time around, the basis-trade disaster has happened at JP Morgan, where the famous London Whale seems to have contrived to lose $2 billion on what was meant to be a hedging operation. And once again, although the details are still very murky, the culprit seems to be the CDS-cash basis.

I’ve been meaning to write a post about the CDS-cash basis for a few days now, which is why I happen to have this chart handy, showing the basis for various European banks as of Tuesday May 8.

basis.jpg

These are very big numbers, for very big banks: UBS is at 75bp, Deutsche is at 83bp, Natixis is at 116bp, and IKB is at a whopping 392bp. And this is just the banks — other corporates have seen similar price action. The cost of protection has gone up sharply, while the cash bonds are still trading at very low spreads.

Bruno Iksil, the London Whale, had a massive long position on corporate CDS in general, and the CDX.NA.IG.9 index in particular. He was selling protection, betting that credit spreads would go down, rather than up. The position was meant to be a hedge, although it’s a bit unclear how JP Morgan could have some massive short position in corporate debt that it was hedging against. In any case, CDS spreads went up — and credit spreads, in the cash market, didn’t.

Cue a $2 billion loss.

Rarely has a position been as widely publicized as Iksil’s, and I wouldn’t be at all surprised to learn that the credits with the highest basis were precisely the credits CDX.NA.IG.9 index. Whenever a trader has a large and known position, the market is almost certain to move violently against that trader — and that seems to be exactly what happened here. On the conference call, when asked what he should have been watching more closely, Dimon said “trading losses — and newspapers”. It wasn’t a joke. Once your positions become public knowledge, the market will smell blood.

Of course, this loss only goes to show how weak the Volcker Rule is: Dimon is adamant, and probably correct, in saying that Iksil’s bets were Volcker-compliant, despite the fact that they clearly violate the spirit of the rule. Now that we’ve entered election season, Congress isn’t going to step in to tighten things up — but maybe the SEC will pay more attention to Occupy’s letter, now. JP Morgan more or less invented risk management. If they can’t do it, no bank can. And no sensible regulator can ever trust the banks to self-regulate.

COMMENT

At a minimum, CEO Dimon should resign from the NY Fed if not from JP Morgan Chase, as well.

One would think after the fiasco of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the too-big-to-fail (“TBTF”) banks would have learned a lesson about risk management — but, no, here we are again with JP Morgan Chase losing $2+ billion of their “own” money — and under the leadership of CEO Dimon who is one of those most vocal against limiting the banks’ proprietary trading under proposed legislation.

The shareholders, bondholders and managements of these TBTF banks should pay the price for “mistakes” such as JP Morgan Chase’s recent fiasco. However, the US taxpayer remains on the hook just as in the 2007-2008 financial crisis.

Banks have been granted their “franchises” and given preferential treatment to serve the needs of the general economy and to facilitate the movement of funds between individuals/entities wanting to have a relatively safe haven for their excess liquidity (aka, depositors) and those needing to borrow those resources. Proprietary trading of the TBTF banks’ “own” funds has little place in this economic environment — those funds should be distributed to the shareholders who can then invest in riskier asset classes under their own decision regimen. If a hedge fund investment is what they want, then let them make a conscious decision to invest in a hedge fund, without any Federal guarantee of the investment.

This approach would take much of the burden off US taxpayers to correct the ” sloppy” and “stupid” decisions (CEO Dimon’s own adjectives) that have been made by the TBTF banks in the post-Glass-Steagall era.

For more on the interaction of financial and political decision-making, see http://theviewfromthemiddleoftheroad.blo gspot.com/.

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Counterparties: Europe’s other crisis – the private sector

May 10, 2012 18:02 EDT

Welcome to the Counterparties email. The sign-up page is here, it’s just a matter of checking a box if you’re already registered on the Reuters website. Send suggestions, story tips and complaints to Counterparties.Reuters@gmail.com

By now, most of us are familiar with a sovereign debt crisis – Greece being the prime example of a highly indebted country unable to pay its bills. But the European crisis is being fought on several fronts at once. Today, S&P warned of a “perfect storm” of maturing debt for European companies – there’s some $46 trillion in debt coming due in the next five years. While this amount is global, S&P says poses a big problem for the Europe’s non-financial companies in particular. As the NYT reports this morning in a look at construction titan A.C.S. Grupo, Spain’s private sector may already be struggling with this type of problem. “The problem in Spain is not government debt, it’s private sector debt,” Jonathan Tepper of Variant Perception told the NYT.

In Spain, there are questions about the accuracy of the government’s estimation of its problem. Bloomberg’s Yalman Onaran, building off a report from the Centre for European Policy Studies, has a disturbing report of his own:

The government has asked lenders to increase provisions for bad debt by 54 billion euros ($70 billion) to 166 billion euros. That’s enough to cover losses of about 50 percent on loans to property developers and construction firms, according to the Bank of Spain. There wouldn’t be anything left for defaults on more than 1.4 trillion euros of home loans and corporate debt.

Taking those into account, banks would need to increase provisions by as much as five times what the government says, or 270 billion euros, according to estimates by the Centre for European Policy Studies, a Brussels-based research group. Plugging that hole would increase Spain’s public debt by almost 50 percent or force it to seek a bailout, following in the footsteps of Ireland, Greece and Portugal.

At FT Alphaville, Lisa Pollack dives into the analyst reports and wonders if Spain’s housing market has even bottomed out yet. If it hasn’t, banks will need significant additional capital. But instead of acting quickly, Nouriel Roubini says that a “bailout for Spanish banks has been postponed until the very last minute”. The private-debt problems in Spain risk worsening the country’s public-debt problems, especially in the context of an economy where the stock market is hitting a 9-year low and the government has just partially nationalized one of the country’s biggest banks. – Ryan McCarthy

On to today’s links.

TBTF
JPMorgan announces suprise $2 billion loss - WSJ
The FDIC is about to explain how it will save us from “too big to fail” banks – WSJ

Confessions

A trader’s reason for choosing his occupation: “actually, money is quite important” – Guardian

EU Mess
Former Greek econ minister: Bailout program “suicidal, not only for Greece but for the euro” – WSJ
China has stopped buying European debt – Bloomberg

Financial Arcana
How Chesapeake’s growth is fueled by murky, off-balance-sheet funding – Reuters
Chesapeake’s deals add $1.4 billion in previously undisclosed liabilities – WSJ

Wonks
Paul Krugman’s 18-slide presentation making the case against austerity – Princeton
Citi’s Buiter: Time for central bankers to do “helicopter money drops” – CNBC

Facebook
Facebook has a large and growing problem with mobile advertising – NYT
The rare hedge fund manager who’s hit it big on pre-IPO Facebook – Forbes
FTC investigating Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram for antitrust violations – Venture Beat

Economy
America’s healthcare costs add up to a hidden 8% VAT – Charles Hugh Smith

Alpha
The most important question an investor can ask: “What am I missing?” – DealBook

Oxpeckers
Who copyedits the copy editors? – The Awl

Troubling
China’s import-export activity just tanked – CNN Money

Politicking
Romney reportedly bullied a gay student while in prep school – WashPo

Awesome
A great profile of the hardest working financial blogger in the business – NYT
The billiant Joe Weisenthal – Felix

COMMENT

@Chris – Would have been much better for the Irish if their leaders could have demonstrated the resolve of their counterparts in the land of ice. But those pols couldn’t say “No” to a double-barreled dose of intimidation ala Merkozy.

Treason is an ugly word, but if one checks the legal definition, ….

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The brilliant Joe Weisenthal

Felix Salmon
May 10, 2012 10:38 EDT

Binyamin Appelbaum has delivered a 3,000-word day in the life of Joe Weisenthal for the NYT Magazine, complete with 18-page slideshow. (“7:06 am: Weisenthal catches the 6 train uptown from his apartment at the edge of the Financial district to the Business Insider offices in the Flatiron District.”) Nothing in the piece will come as any surprise to anybody who follows @TheStalwart on Twitter, although I think that Appelbaum doesn’t quite nail the way in which Twitter allows Joe to keep up a running self-deprecating meta-commentary on how crazy the job is that he’s given himself. You’ll never find a CNBC anchor, for instance, tweeting out anything like this, from this morning:

tweet.tiff

Jeffrey Goldberg nails Joe with a single tweet, saying that he “may have more shpilkes than anyone in America”. Which raises the single biggest issue I have with Appelbaum’s piece, as exemplified in his central thesis:

In the intensely competitive world of financial blogging, dominated by young men who work long hours and comment on every new development, Weisenthal stands apart by starting earlier, writing more, publishing faster.

Appelbaum is absolutely right that Weisenthal stands apart by starting earlier, writing more, publishing faster. That’s who Joe is. But he’s absolutely wrong that there’s an “intensely competitive world of financial blogging, dominated by young men who work long hours and comment on every new development”. Go on — name a single other financial blogger who fits that description. I’m waiting. There’s the anonymous group blog ZeroHedge, perhaps. But the fact is that Henry Blodget, in hiring and promoting Joe, has succeeded in identifying and harnessing and leveraging a nervous energy which has been there all along. He didn’t start with some kind of inhuman job description and then hire Joe to fill it; he found Joe and then basked in the fruits of encouraging him to simply be his natural self.

Yet again, it seems, the NYT Magazine has published a blogger profile which makes bloggers seem weird, immature, and hyperactive — the kind of profile where the subtext is that “it’s OK if you don’t care about the second-to-second noise and the personal revelations, you’re fine ignoring the blogosphere completely and getting a more considered view of things from the NYT instead”.

For instance, Applebaum devotes a large chunk of the profile to the genesis of a single tweet, which reads “DISASTER: MARCH JOBS REPORT MISSES EXPECTATIONS AT 120K (Analysts expected +205K) “. Pulling himself up to the full height of The Times, Appelbaum declares that the tweet “looks pretty silly in retrospect”, adding:

The creation of 120,000 new jobs was not a disaster by any reasonable definition. Other media outlets, some working almost as quickly as Weisenthal, chose far more modest words.

As Applebaum says, this was the first tweet about the jobs report that day — ahead of the ones saying simply “120k”. And in that ultra-fast tweet, Joe managed not only to get out the news of what the number was, he also managed to place it in the context of Wall Street expectations, explain that the number fell short of those expectations, convey the importance of the payrolls report, include a link to a live Business Insider story on the report, and do the whole thing with wry humor. Joe’s “DISASTER” was never meant to be taken literally: hyperbole is his stock in trade, he loves it, and his audience loves him for loving it.

Business Insider is a bit like a much more honest, much funnier version of CNBC: while other media outlets still work within a tradition of self-importantly handing down the news on engraved stone tablets, TBI is much less reverent — about the news, about itself, about anything really. At its heart, the part of TBI that Joe runs is basically color commentary on the markets — sometimes fast, sometimes clever, sometimes stupid, sometimes profane. It doesn’t matter, so long as it isn’t boring.

If you care about the markets, this kind of coverage is exactly what you want. Dry reports saying that this went up and that went down are a waste of time: if you wanted to just know what was up and what was down, you could simply look at the numbers yourself much more easily. And quotes from analysts and strategists aren’t much better: their main interest is in looking considered and intelligent, which means that they self-censor and tend to produce boring banalities. TBI, by having no equity in being right, gets to enjoy itself, and reflect the manic energy of a trading floor and the kind of attention span those traders have.

Appelbaum does praise Joe, too: he has nice things to say about this post, from November, for instance. Here’s Appelbaum’s précis of what Joe wrote:

In a post last November titled “Everyone Is Wrong About What Is Driving the Market These Days,” Weisenthal reproduced a Google search showing a slew of articles describing the stock market as “headline-driven,” meaning that prices were responding to the latest news. Then he showed a chart he created illustrating the close relationship between movements in stock prices and a basic economic indicator.

“So it’s a ‘headline-driven market’?” he wrote. “Nah, not really. . . . The market is just moving with the fundamentals, week in and week out. The headlines are mostly a distraction.”

That’s 95 words. The post itself is 62 words long.

A large part of Joe’s genius is that he writes short better than anybody else in the business. The NYT Magazine, of all places, with its one-page magazine feature, should value that. Writing short is what gives Joe’s blog posts punch, that’s what explains how Twitter is such a natural medium for him, and that’s why Blodget values him more highly than any other writer at TBI. I only wish I were better at learning from him myself.

COMMENT

I like how this post uses examples of what’s wrong, sad, stupid, and shallow about the current state of business journalism – not just Weisenthal – and turns them into examples of why it’s all just so great.

A self-mocking CNBC that’s not invested in getting things right. Beautiful.

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Counterparties: Pondering a Grexit

Ben Walsh
May 9, 2012 18:05 EDT

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Europe’s “slow motion trainwreck” – Nouriel Roubini’s words, not ours – now looks increasingly like it’s coming closer to a halt for Greece.

After elections last week, the Greek left has been unable to form a coalition, and the country may be forced to have yet another election. Greece’s left is refusing to join a coalition with any party that supports austerity, which puts the country in an extremely tough position between euro zone-led economic goals and mass dissent. The BBC’s Paul Mason, who suggests that “to be in power [in Greece] is to commit political suicide,” puts the predicament this way:

[Greece] cannot stay in the Euro without abiding by the rules. And the rules, as currently designed, will force the economy into a downward spiral and destroy social cohesion.

As a result, pundits are once again handicapping a Greek exit from the euro. Citi puts the probability at 75% within 12-18 months, Credit Suisse at 15% within the year, while John Taylor thinks Greece is “very likely” to leave the euro this summer. And Roubini still thinks the euro zone cannot hold together and that a bailout for Spain is next. (For a simple background on the sovereign debt crisis that is fueling the pessimism, this St. Louis Fed presentation is worth reading.)

The anti-austerity movement’s fresh validation at the polls has pushed the rest of Europe, or at least the Germans, to adopt an increasingly weary and fatalistic tone toward Greek politicians who oppose austerity. The message is that Germany is done bargaining, although the extent to which it ever did is debatable. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble put it bluntly: “If Greece decides not to stay in the euro zone, we cannot force Greece … They will decide whether to stay in the euro zone or not.” For context, while Greeks are anti-austerity, they want to stay in the euro.

Of course, what Germany and the rest of the euro zone can do is withhold the next installment of promised aid. Earlier today, German ministers warned Greek politicians that any deviation from austerity would mean forfeiting that aid. It’s worth remembering that while all this is going on, Germany, along with the UK and U.S., has in the short term seen borrowing costs fall as Europe’s debt crisis continues.

But, for now, we’ll make do with a bit more can-kicking: Today, euro zone governments decided to deliver the next $6.7 billion tranche of aid. – Ben Walsh

On to today’s links.

Right On
Obama affirms his support for same-sex marriage – ABC News
Want to encourage long-term investing? End default quarterly reporting – FT Alphaville

Housing
Mortgage companies now making you wait more than 70 days to refinance – WSJ

Politicking
Two-thirds of private sector job creation in the past 50 years has come under Democratic presidents – Bloomberg

EU Mess
Roubini now predicting military actions, apparently – Finalternatives
Martin Wolf: What Hollande must tell Germany – FT

New Normal
Food stamps may soon support more families than unemployment insurance – NYT
CHART: Consumer credit, minus student loans, looks rather grim – The Big Picture
The unemployment rate would be 7.1% without government job cuts – WSJ
Rortybomb destroys David Brooks on structural unemployment – Next New Deal

Ridiculous
Half the mortgages FHA has modified were in default a year later – Bloomberg
Fannie Mae won’t ask for more tax dollars – for now - Businessweek

Facebook
The “gadget-enthusiast” Morgan Stanley banker behind almost every major tech IPO – DealBook

Remuneration
Orszag: Income volatility, one trait the rich and the poor share – Bloomberg
Chesapeake CEO has taken out $1.9 billion worth of loans to fund personal investments – Reuters

Defenestrations
Einhorn wins: Green Mountain chairman fired – Slate

Deals
AOL’s Tim Armstrong: We’re investing in TechCrunch and Engadget, not selling them – Adage
AOL is reportedly looking to sell TechCrunch and Engadget, months after staff departures – Pandodaily

Vicarious Consumption
Bloomberg Pursuits, noted chronicler of billionaires’ car collections, to double number of issues – Talking Biz News

TBTF
Chase is launching prepaid debit cards – WSJ

Wonks
Emanuel Derman uses photoshop to illustrate optimal subway exits – Reuters

COMMENT

Just watch and see – the EZ is going to keep pumping money to the Greeks no matter what they do. If PIIGS try to exit the EZ it’s economic death for everyone, and most decision-makers understand this.

As said before, only the strong can survive the “withdrawal method”. Sooner they get on with that sooner this problem can start to be solved. Greece and Germany cannot even theoretically share a common currency without the generating the kind of mess we see right now.

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Rent vs buy, Manhattan edition

Felix Salmon
May 9, 2012 16:15 EDT

newpic.jpg Yesterday, I published the chart on the right, showing that in the nation as a whole, houses look like they’re a pretty good value, relative to rents, for the first time in many years. The chart elicited an email from one New Yorker, asking whether the same thing was true here in Manhattan.

It’s a good question, so I asked Jonathan Miller, of Miller Samuel, to provide some New York data which I could overlay on the US chart. And here’s the result:

manhattan.jpg

The most striking thing, of course, is how expensive New York is relative to the country as a whole: that huge spike in the original chart now just looks like more of a foothill.

But it’s also clear that even with record-low interest rates, Manhattan prices are still a lot higher than Manhattan rents.

It wasn’t always that way. Rents were higher than prices from the fourth quarter of 1994 through the fourth quarter of 1999 — a full five years, during which prices rose from $227,500 to $320,000. Which in hindsight was a great time to buy, seeing as how prices now are at $775,000.

Obviously the Manhattan data series, with fewer transactions, are much noisier than the national series. But broadly speaking, it costs you the same amount to buy a house today, in terms of your monthly mortgage payment, as it did at the end of 2004, when the median sales price was just over $600,000. By the standards of recent history, then, Manhattan real estate is a lot more affordable than it was during the bubble. But look back a couple of decades, and it still looks expensive. And compare it to rents, and it still looks like you’d be better off renting than buying.

COMMENT

Mtge deduction isn’t exactly proportional to mtge payment. In low interest rate environment, the interest rate portion is smaller percent of total payment.

It would be interesting to see the graphs by size (1BR, 2BR) as portions of 1BR in rentals and purchases may vary over time. I agree with earlier statements that total costs of buying should include HOA + real estate tax (or maintenance) and cost associated with tying up down payment. Minus interest deduction.

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Principal reductions begin in earnest

Felix Salmon
May 9, 2012 10:06 EDT

This is an important milestone, even if it’s too little, too late:

Bank of America Home Loans has begun reaching out to customers who may be eligible for forgiveness of a portion of the principal balance on their mortgage under terms of a recent settlement…

The bank estimates average monthly savings of 30 percent on mortgage payments of customers who qualify for this program…

Bank of America actually began making principal reduction offers under the program guidelines in March, initially concentrating on homeowners who were already in the modification review process. So far under this early initiative, about 5,000 trial modification offers have been mailed, providing a potential total of more than $700 million in forgiven principal. Homeowners are required to make at least three timely payments before the modification can become permanent.

On average, the principal reduction being offered is substantial: it’s on the order of $150,000. And this offer is being extended to some 200,000 homeowners, which means we’re talking a lot of mortgage principal here: some $30 billion.

In reality, however, the actual amount of principal forgiven by BofA is likely to be much smaller than that. As we’ve seen with HAMP, banks are incredibly good at putting people into three month trials, and then managing to determine that for whatever reason they don’t qualify for conversion to permanent modification. What’s more, ironically, many homeowners might not be able to afford to accept this principal reduction, since after the end of this year, forgiven principal will count as income, for income-tax purposes, and the income tax on $150,000 of windfall income is substantial.

Still, principal reduction is exactly what the country needs right now, and I’m glad that it’s finally beginning to happen. I wrote about the subject in The Occupy Handbook, and this seems as good a time as any to put my chapter up online. So here goes.

There’s a lot of blame to go around when it comes to the causes of the financial crisis, but at heart, it was about debt — or, as the the financial markets like to call it, leverage. Investment banks created highly leveraged mortgage-backed securities that blew up; commercial banks backed up their holdings of super-senior debt instruments with little or no capital; homeowners bought houses with no money down, paying for them by borrowing amounts they could never afford to repay.

In many ways, the debt-fueled housing bubble was the financialization of America carried to its logical conclusion. From the early 1980s onward, economic growth was increasingly a function of leverage: small improvements amplified by being turbocharged with debt. A little debt can do wonders for growth — but like a drug addict, the economy eventually needs that much debt just to stand still, and ends up having to take on more and more leverage to sustain the growth it’s used to.

With leverage, of course, comes danger — what finance types call “systemic risk.” If the debt stops getting rolled over, as happened in 2007, then the entire economy can come to a screeching halt, with the loss of trillions of dollars in wealth, not to mention millions of jobs across the country. When the party stops, as happened in 2008, a new word enters the lexicon: deleveraging. It’s a central paradox of finance: while the economy needs credit in order to grow and to create jobs, it also needs to reduce the total amount of debt outstanding, in order to reduce not only individual and corporate debt burdens but also the risk of another massive crunch.

Deleveraging is always a painful process. When done on a nationwide scale, it often takes the form of inflation, which tends to hurt the poorest members of society in a particularly invidious way. When done on a case-by-case basis, it involves the loss of a lot of wealth. After all, your liability is my asset. (The money in your checking account, for instance, is counted toward your bank’s total liabilities. If your bank repudiated your claim to that money, then it would be richer, but you would be poorer.) Nevertheless, deleveraging is necessary. And every so often, it’s possible to find a positive-sum way of making it happen: a plan that makes everybody better off.

How can writing down debts ever benefit a creditor, the person to whom those debts are owed? The answer lies in the fact that if a debt is not going to get paid off in full anyway, the creditor’s best interest lies in simply maximizing the value of what he does end up receiving. Let’s say you owe me $1,000 — but then you come and tell me that you can’t afford to pay me back. You’re faced with a choice. Either you empty out your checking account and I take everything in it, which is $250, or you can find some money elsewhere and give me $450 in settlement of the debt. If I’m sensible, I’ll take the $450 — and I’ll leave you with a working checking account.

Compared to the $1,000 I had in the first place, I’m worse off, but that’s a sunk cost at this point, and there’s no point crying over spilled milk. I have to face the situation as I find it today, and make the best of it.

You’d think that banks, in particular, would be alive to the sunk-cost fallacy — partly because denial is a pretty bad business strategy at the best of times and partly because they all worship at the altar of something called “mark to market.” That is, they check to see what their loans are worth every day (or at least every quarter) and then value the loans at what they’re worth in the real world rather than how much was borrowed in the first place. Yet banks — and this probably comes as little surprise, at this point — can and do behave in surprisingly irrational and childish ways. A lot of the time, especially when it comes to dealing with homeowners, they seem more interested in inflicting misery than in maximizing their own financial returns.

All of this comes into starkest focus with respect to mortgages. America has millions of underwater homeowners, many of whom are behind on their payments and all of whom are significantly less likely to pay off their mortgage in full than they would be if they actually had equity in their houses.

It’s simple logic, used by every company and commercial real estate operation in the land. If you owe more than your property is worth, and you can walk away from that property and discharge your debt in full, then you should absolutely do so: indeed, the Mortgage Bankers Association did exactly that in 2010. It had a $75 million mortgage on its Washington, D.C., headquarters but sold the building for $41 million, moved out, and is renting elsewhere, relieved of the burden of $75 million in debt.

Banks hate it when people walk away from their homes. (The act is often called “jingle mail,” because you’re essentially mailing in your keys to the bank.) At the same time, they’re often enormously reluctant to do the one thing that is completely effective at preventing people from doing that, which is to reduce the principal due on the mortgage so that the amount of the mortgage is lower than the value of the home. The US government, too, has been reluctant to push this as a solution: its attempts to encourage banks to refinance mortgages have all been centered on reducing monthly mortgage payments rather than the total amount owed. In fact, many government-backed mortgage modifications actually increase the total principal amount because of various fees tacked on during the modification process.

Even if your mortgage payments go down, it can still make all the financial sense in the world to stop paying them, especially if you run into trouble. If you can rent a nice place for less than your mortgage payments, and if you have no real prospect of owning any positive equity in your home for the foreseeable future, it makes sense to free up a lot of cash flow by just stopping payments on your house. This is especially true when banks can take well over a year even to start foreclosure proceedings.

The result is a huge “shadow inventory” of homes overhanging the market. These homes aren’t yet for sale but will at some point get sold in a foreclosure sale, depressing values across the neighborhood. As a result, in 2011, no one wanted to buy — and house prices continued to fall, despite record low mortgage rates of less than 4 percent.

So what should happen when people get into trouble making their mortgage payments on a house that is underwater? After 2008, banks tended to do one of two things. They waited for an interminable amount of time, then initiated foreclosure proceedings and kicked the family out of their home. Alternatively, they worked out a mortgage modification that didn’t reduce the amount owed by a single dollar, thereby maximizing the probability of a redefault and of the homeowner’s having to go through the same painful process all over again.

There are multiple ways of doing this better. The simplest is just for the banks to unilaterally reduce the principal amount owed on a mortgage. It’s much more effective, always, for a bank to reduce principal and keep the interest rate constant than it is to do what they tended to do after 2008, which was to keep the principal constant and reduce the interest rate. Why don’t they reduce principal? They don’t because doing so involves writing down the value of the mortgage on their books — something they’re bound to do sooner or later, but which they’d much rather do later than sooner.

As the depressed stock prices of every bank in America in 2011 attested, however, no one really believed the values that the banks put on their mortgages — they weren’t kidding anyone. Coming clean on the true value of their mortgage portfolio might hurt banks’ quarterly earnings, but it wouldn’t necessarily hurt their share price. Once the mortgages are marked down to a reasonable level, banks can be much more sensible about how they’re going to deal with homeowners in difficulty.

There are circumstances in which banks have shown themselves willing to take losses on the mortgages they own. One is when they sell a big portfolio of mortgages to some third-party investor: such portfolios are often sold at just 10 percent or 20 percent of the face value of the mortgages if a lot of those mortgages are in default. Another scenario, and it happens pretty frequently, is the short sale, in which a homeowner sells a house and hands over all the proceeds to the bank, and in turn the bank writes off the mortgage, even though it isn’t fully paid off. Then, of course, there’s the worst scenario of all: you fall behind on your mortgage, and the bank forecloses on your property, taking over the deed to the house. At that point, the bank will turn around and sell the property, almost certainly for less money than it was owed on the mortgage, and take a loss.

All of these mechanisms open up possibilities for keeping homeowners in their homes, even after they’ve fallen behind on their mortgage payments: you just need a little imagination. For instance, let’s say you’re a bank that has foreclosed on a home. Standard operating procedure in such a situation is normally to kick the occupants out, put the house up for auction, and take whatever you can get for it. But there’s no rule saying you have to do that; indeed, there’s no rule saying that you have to evict the home’s occupants at all. Instead, why not rent the house back to them at the market rate? The market rent will almost certainly be lower than what they used to have to pay in mortgage payments, and at the same time you get to avoid kicking the family out of their home. Everybody wins in this case. The family gets to stay where they are, the neighborhood isn’t blighted by a boarded-up home being sold at auction by an owner who doesn’t care about it, and the bank gets a healthy income stream rather than a modest sale price.

And if the bank prefers to get cash rather than be a landlord? No problem: it can simply sell the property to someone happy to rent it out to the current occupants. Many such organizations and individuals exist: in days of record low interest rates, people with money often jump at the opportunity to make a decent rental yield on their investment, especially if they’re helping out a family in straitened circumstances at the same time. Often, such a rental contract will include a clause allowing the former owners to buy the house back at a pre-set price: the new owner might ask for a 10 percent profit after one year, a 15 percent profit after two years, and so on. If the family members manage to qualify for a mortgage to buy their house back, then the new owner will sell it to them — for less than the occupants originally paid but more than the new owner/landlord paid. Again, everybody wins.

Similarly, if a bank sells a defaulted mortgage for a fraction of its face value, then there are lots of ways in which the new owner can keep the former homeowners in their house and still make money. The principal amount can be reduced, of course, as can interest payments — and you probably wouldn’t be surprised to learn how much simple and sympathetic human contact can help.

Most of the time, homeowners have no ability to get through to a sensible human being at their mortgage company who can understand what they’re saying and make empowered decisions with regard to any possible mortgage modification. Instead, they get the standard run-around: they’re constantly being asked to fax in documents that always seem to then go missing. By contrast, if you buy a mortgage and approach the homeowner with good will and a genuine desire to find a reasonable solution, it’s amazing how often something mutually beneficial can be worked out. Indeed, a company called American Homeowner Preservation (AHP) is doing just that: it’s set up a hedge fund devoted to buying pools of defaulted mortgages and keeping the homeowners in their homes, and it is making good money doing so. All it takes, really, is a little bit of compassion and an ability to be inventive — rather than following exactly the same script every time.

AHP started with a simpler, nonprofit model: it would act as a broker, putting together willing buyers with underwater homeowners. The homeowners would do a short sale to the buyers at the home’s market value, and the buyers would lease the house back with an option to repurchase. That model didn’t work, because the banks refused to cooperate. While they were okay with short sales in general, they were emphatically not okay with any short sale that involved sellers remaining in their home. Tired of fighting and losing endless battles with the banks, AHP decided it would be a lot easier to buy the mortgages themselves. That way, AHP didn’t have to deal with impenetrable and illogical bureaucracies all day.

The banks have a reason for making it hard for people to sell their homes and stay in them regardless: they’re worried that lots of other homeowners will attempt the same stunt. However, it only makes sense to sell your house if you’re significantly underwater on your mortgage. And if you’re significantly underwater on your mortgage, then it probably makes sense to sell your house whether you get to stay in it or not.

Indeed, one of the more evil tricks of America’s banks is that the very people who need the most help with their mortgages — people who are far underwater — are also the people least likely to be able to get it. If you bought your home at the top of the market and it’s now worth a lot less than you borrowed to buy it, you’ll probably be rejected for the kind of mortgage refinance that everybody else can get with no difficulty. As a result, if you’re current on your underwater mortgage, banks and investors reckon that mortgage is worth not less than par (because it’s underwater) but, rather, more than par — about 106 cents on the dollar, on average. On a $200,000 mortgage, investors will pay a $12,000 premium just to be able to collect your high-interest mortgage payments, which you can’t reduce because you’re not allowed to refinance.

It’s a little bit crazy: if these homeowners were rational, especially if they live in a nonrecourse state like California, they would just mail their keys in to their bank and be done. That’s certainly what the bank would do, in the same situation. (In 2009, for instance, Morgan Stanley mailed back the keys to five San Francisco office buildings worth $1.5 billion rather than pay the mortgage on those buildings out of its record profits that year.)

Instead of reacting with gratitude to the fact that these underwater homeowners are paying their mortgages in full, though, banks punish those homeowners by forcing them to continue paying the high interest rates they locked in at when they bought at the top of the market. Mortgage rates had never been lower than they were in 2011, which meant that mortgages that couldn’t be refinanced to a lower rate were particularly valuable to banks.

If you’re current on your mortgage, the banks won’t let you refinance, and if you’re behind on your mortgage, they won’t let you stay in your home, even if you have a willing buyer waiting with the cash to buy the house and let you do just that. There’s only one exception to this rule, and it’s a fascinating one. If a bank bought its mortgages below par rather than lending the money out itself, then it’s quite likely to be open to the idea of principal reductions. For instance, when Wells Fargo bought Wachovia and when JP Morgan Chase bought Washington Mutual, they bought those banks’ mortgage portfolios at a large discount to par. It turns out that those mortgages — the ones bought from Wachovia and WaMu — have been getting modified with principal reductions.

The behavioral psychology here is very easy to understand. No bank wants to admit that it wrote idiotic loans by writing down its own assets from par. Meanwhile, it’s much easier to write up an acquired asset, which is what Wells and Chase can do if they manage to put some smart principal-reduction plans in place. (Some principal reductions, indeed, have even been done for homeowners current on their mortgages.)

Economically speaking, of course, what the banks are doing here makes no sense at all. Either writing down option-ARM (adjustable-rate mortgage) loans makes sense, from a profit-and-loss perspective, or it doesn’t. If it does — and, yes, of course it does — then the banks should do so on all their toxic loans, not just the ones they bought at a discount.

The solution, then, is clear. We need to encourage banks — and servicers — to mark their mortgages to market, and to do whatever makes sense if they’re being realistic about how much those mortgages are worth. And while it’s okay to assume that homeowners will develop an emotional attachment to their homes and pay more than necessary to stay in them, it’s not okay to take advantage of that fact to extract thousands of dollars a year in extra mortgage payments from those homeowners.

More generally, principal reduction in mortgage modifications has to become the rule rather than the exception. The reason the government’s efforts to fix the mortgage market have failed so miserably is that those efforts have centered on interest payments, not the total amount owed. A sluggish housing market will act as an economic drag for as long as millions of homeowners owe vastly more than their house is worth.

If done right, these policies can be implemented in a positive-sum way, making everybody — including the banks doing the write-downs — better off. For instance, the government could impose higher capital standards on banks that insist on marking underwater defaulted mortgages at par, and give the banks an incentive to write down principal that way, while making the whole banking system safer at the same time.

Not all deleveraging can be done this efficiently or painlessly, but that’s a great reason to grab this low-hanging fruit while we can. If we don’t want the United States to continue to suffocate under the weight of far too much debt, we have to start making serious efforts to bring our debt burden down. This one’s a no-brainer. Let’s do it.

 

COMMENT

@FifthDecade- the basis for a “plain vanilla” mortgage loan was one established by the GSEs, the so-called “conventional-conforming” mortgage. The “conforming” meant that it held to Fannie and Freddie standards. This meant:
20% down payment
28% “front ratio” i.e., income compared to a total of Principal, Interest, Taxes and Insurance
36% “back ratio” or “PITI” plus recurring monthly debt.

Minimum FICO score 660

Compensating factors that could stretch debt ratios:
Higher credit score
Profession (the civil service was especially favored)
Length of current employment/career path

Lower down payments down to 5% with mortgage insurance (this has been around since 1956)

There were also No-Income Check loans for the self employed, but these required higher down payments and stronger credit history. These were not GSE products however, and they came to be abused. Now, someone who owns a McDonald’s or a hardware store can’t get a mortgage, no matter if they put down 40% and have an 800 FICO. No one is securitizing the paper, nor are they putting it in portfolio.

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Counterparties: Economists’ false choice

May 8, 2012 17:27 EDT

Welcome to the Counterparties email. The sign-up page is here, it’s just a matter of checking a box if you’re already registered on the Reuters website. Send suggestions, story tips and complaints to Counterparties.Reuters@gmail.com

Should the government speed up the pace of the economic recovery in the short term? Economists have a way of making simple questions quite complicated.

The current debate among a handful of top economists centers on whether the problem with Western economies is cyclical – the result of the economy’s normal ups and downs – or more structural. Ezra Klein calls this divide “Larry Summers vs. the long-termers.” The latter camp includes Raghuram Rajan, who’s out with a new piece in Foreign Affairs. To Rajan, the crisis is a “wake-up call” on our high levels of personal and public debt. The only way to fully reverse a decades-long slump in middle-class incomes, he says, is through longer-term solutions like worker retraining and education reform. In the short term, this effectively means some degree of continued suffering for the unemployed.

One problem with this, to Summers, Krugman and others in the cyclical camp, is that cyclical unemployment quickly becomes structural. Adjusting for demographic trends, Brad DeLong looks over April’s 342,000 labor force dropouts and comes to a depressing conclusion:

…that is a gap of 0.7%-1.1% points of the adult population: people who really ought to be in the labor force right now, but who are not. Are they now part of the “structurally” non-employed who we will never see back at work, barring a high-pressure economy of a kind we see at most once in a generation? Probably.

Looking at the Beveridge Curve, David Kotok finds more reasons to believe in the structural unemployment story. Laura Tyson isn’t as convinced, but worries that technology is making our labor problems worse.

But the structural vs. cyclical debate may not be a binary choice. Klein, like the IMF, suggests things like spending and worker retraining could be immediate and budget cuts could be phased in as the economy recovers. “If ever there was a false choice, this is it,” as Jared Bernstein puts it. – Ryan McCarthy

On to today’s links.

Alpha
“Billion-dollar” traders are quitting Wall Street’s biggest banks – Bloomberg

Financial Arcana
The frightening “sub-priming” of commodities – FT Alphaville

Facebook
Financial advisers are scrambling to get their clients into Facebook’s IPO – or something like it – WSJ
Facebook’s Zuckerberg takes just five questions at kickoff for Facebook’s $10 billion IPO – Reuters
Facebook Funds: The Biggest Scam Running – Reformed Broker
What Mark Zuckerberg’s hoodie really means for Facebook’s IPO – CNBC

Housing
In the wake of the mortgage collapse, rents are hitting historic highs – LAT

Crackdowns
Invisible Hand, meet Greased Palm – The world gets tough on bribery – New Yorker
The lobbying push to weaken the FCPA is now officially dead – Corporate Crime Reporter

Old Normal
How the industrial revolution and a group of entrepreneurs saved the British penny – Bloomberg

Visual Silence
A plug-in that takes all those pesky words off the Internet – Cool Hunting

EU Mess
A reminder that spending cuts are only half of the austerity equation – Marginal Revolution

It’s About Time
Bank of America begins its principal reduction program – Bank of America

Primary Sources
Credit card comeback: Consumer revolving credit increased 7.8% in March – The Fed

Politicking
The Ryan budget’s war on data collection – Econ Browser

New Normal
The number of master’s degree holders and PhDs receiving food stamps has almost tripled since 2007 – Chronicle of Higher Education

Oxpeckers
The Atlantic‘s new business site is called “Quartz” – Quartz

Crisis Retro
Taxpayers may make a $15 billion profit on the AIG bailout, GAO projects – Reuters

COMMENT

+ for fresnodan, in suggesting that the issue just might be the wages offered, and not so much the rich “lottery winner” payouts available via UE or SSDI.

See also: “shadow economy.” $20 an hour, as a cost paid by an employer, nets to about $11 for a worker after taxes, overhead and “benefits” are deducted. That same $20 taken in cash? It feels like money.

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Chart of the day: Let’s go buy a house!

Felix Salmon
May 8, 2012 15:20 EDT

newpic.jpg

Many thanks to Ben Walsh for putting this chart together for me. The source is this data at the Census bureau, inspired by page two of the first-quarter 2012 Census bureau report on rental vacancies and homeownership.

The first thing to look at here is the blue line, which shows that the median asking rent for vacant rent units tends to rise pretty steadily. It doesn’t spike during housing bubbles, and it doesn’t plunge when those bubbles burst. Which is one reason why if you can, it’s always a good idea, when you’re buying a home, to take a look at what rents are like in the area. That’ll help you work out whether prices are too high.

David Leonhardt performed this exercise two years ago, and came to the conclusion that in some parts of the country, including South Florida, Phoenix and Las Vegas, buy-to-rent ratios were making houses look attractive again. I wasn’t completely convinced, but over the past two years, prices have continued to fall, while rents have continued to rise — sometimes painfully so.

In the chart, the red line shows the mortgage payment you’d have to make if you took out a standard 30-year mortgage for the median asking sales price for vacant sale units. In reality, your mortgage payment would be lower, since this doesn’t take into account any downpayment. But in any case, thanks to ludicrously low mortgage rates below 9% 4%, that number is now lower than the median national rental price. This is the first time that’s happened since 1988, and probably for quite some time before that, too.

Remember that houses for sale tend to be bigger and more valuable than houses for rent, too — which only goes to underscore how good a deal buying is versus renting right now.

Of course, not all markets work this way: around New York, there are lots of places where it’s still a lot cheaper to rent than to buy. But if rental prices are a good gauge of the value of housing — and I think they are — then I think we might finally have reached the point at which most Americans are getting good value when they buy a house.

To put it another way, we can now take advantage of long-term fixed financing (thanks, Uncle Sam!) to own a home for a monthly payment less than the cost of renting. Which doesn’t mean that prices won’t fall further, of course. But at least there’s a good chance that if you do buy a house right now, with a fixed-rate mortgage, then if push comes to shove you’ll probably be able to rent it out and more than cover your mortgage payments.

COMMENT

qrt145, one way to look at buying a house is as an exercise in capital allocation. You can borrow the capital (in which case you pay mortgage interest) or you can put up the money out of savings (in which case you forgo investment gains). Since the value of the house will tend to increase with inflation, the real cost of that capital is 2%-3% lower than the nominal cost of the funds.

The real benefit of that outlay is the difference between the cost to rent and the cost to own (taxes, insurance, maintenance). All of these items should presumably increase with inflation.

E.g. Our house might sell for $330k or so, would rent for around $24k/year, and costs about $8k-$12k/year to own. The cost of our capital is the difference between what we might earn in a comparably secure investment (3% bond yields?) and the inflation rate (2%?), or about $3k/year. Thus it is much cheaper for us to own than to rent.

But as you say, this analysis presumes that the value of the home trends with inflation. Over long periods of time, beginning from a normal situation, that tends to be true. Over shorter periods of time you can end up with large trading gains or losses.

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When shareholders topple CEOs

Felix Salmon
May 8, 2012 09:51 EDT

The Telegraph has dubbed it Shareholder Spring: in the UK, these days, CEOs are falling left and right after shareholders complain about their pay. First came David Brennan, the CEO of pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca, who decided to spend more time with his family after shareholders made it clear they wanted him out. Next up was Sly Bailey at publisher Trinity Mirror, who was also facing a shareholder revolt. Now it’s the turn of Andrew Moss, the head of insurer Aviva, who waited until after shareholders voted against his pay package before handing in his resignation.

Mark Kleinman notes something very interesting about the Aviva vote: while a majority of shareholders voted against Moss’s pay package, less than 5% actually voted against him staying on as chief executive.* The former vote, on pay, was non-binding, while the latter vote was binding — and clearly almost no shareholders had the appetite to actually fire Moss, even if that was what they ultimately ended up doing. In the UK, says Kleinman, “the effect of the pay vote was to leave Moss in an untenable position”. At the same time, says Helia Ebrahimi, “Man Group chief executive Peter Clarke is currently hanging by a gossamer thread after shareholders turned on his remuneration package”.

In the US, of course, none of this is true: Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit is still comfortably ensconced in his position, despite clear shareholder rejection of his compensation package.

I suspect that what’s going on in the UK is a harbinger of what will happen, eventually, in the US. One can’t expect a perennially tone-deaf company like Citigroup to set the tone for corporate America as a whole — this is a firm, remember, which honestly thought the Fed would allow it to buy back $8 billion of its own precious equity. And if you don’t listen carefully to your regulators, you’re definitely not going to listen to your shareholders.

But as we see more pay package rejections in the US, I think that CEOs with cleaner ears will prove themselves capable of understanding the message being sent. After all, few shareholders vote no on pay with the thought process “I think you would be a great CEO, just as long as you earn a little bit less money”. These votes are a clear rejection of cronyism at the board level, and it behooves boards to start listening.

I might be dreaming, here, but in the age of Occupy, there’s a case to be made that boards are just a little bit more aware than they used to be that they answer to shareholders, and that the biggest shareholders — pension plans, mutual funds, that kind of thing — are ultimately representing the interests of the 99%. So long as the masses stand idly by, the plutocrats will happily award themselves ever more obscene quantities of money. But when shareholders notice and object, CEOs like Andrew Moss know that the gig is up.

*Update: Originally I said that more than 95% of votes were cast for Moss staying on as CEO, that’s wrong. Only 4.6% of votes were cast against him, but another 5% or so were withheld.

COMMENT

Attempting to tie shareholder toppling of CEO’s to the Occupy movement is laughable – unless I’m supposed to believe that the Carl Icahn’s and Dan Loeb’s of the world are now part of the Occupy movement. With a few exceptions – which become virtually non-existent once you reach really large market cap companies – CEO pay is such a small percent of company earnings that the financial impact is muted.

The real issue with board cronyism, and what really does have a financial impact to shareholders, is a board that isn’t willing to perform its job of overseeing management. Excessive pay for mediocre performance is a symptom, so it can be a useful metric as a signal of other problems, but the real issues are a board that won’t question an imperial CEO as he or she runs the company into the ground. Said differently – a board that won’t question the pay of a mediocre or poor CEO also isn’t very likely to fire a mediocre or poor CEO, which is the real problem. That’s why you see activist shareholders focused on company strategy and changing management, not whether the CEO makes a few million more or less.

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Counterparties: Change comes to Europe

Ben Walsh
May 7, 2012 17:55 EDT

Welcome to the Counterparties email. The sign-up page is here, it’s just a matter of checking a box if you’re already registered on the Reuters website. Send suggestions, story tips and complaints to Counterparties.Reuters@gmail.com

Change, of a sort, has come to Europe. On Sunday, François Hollande became the first Socialist president of France in almost two decades. The NYTWSJ and Bloomberg each covered the results as a blow to German-led austerity. Greece, for its part, had a far more tumultuous election, in which attempts to form a new government may result in yet another vote.

If austerity has upended politics in Greece and France, it’s less clear how it will affect EU politics. Despite the election of France’s new anti-austerity president, Tyler Cowen rightly notes that a decline in trust among European leaders could prove as big a setback as any specific policy disagreement. Matt Yglesias is also not sure Hollande will radically change things: The debate, he writes, needs to become “more partisan, reflecting two different visions of a common European future rather than a bunch of different national agendas.”

Of course, Hollande cannot unilaterally push Germany’s Angel Merkel to endorse a stimulus package, and Mario Draghi suggested last month he thinks the ECB’s role is largely over.

Europe has a choice about what it wants to do now, Ezra Klein writes. The most likely option, despite Draghi’s comments, is that the ECB may be pushed to do even more. Mainly Macro sees the problems of Greece as an exception that demonstrates the need for the ECB to truly act like the euro zone’s central banker and publicly state inflation and interest rate targets. Of course, such a plan would erode many of the benefits Germany reaped from the euro, which are well documented.

Or, it could be that we just get kinder, gentler austerity. Christine Lagarde and Anders Borg, writing on the IMF’s blog, say that “fiscal adjustment should be done in a way that protects the poor and most vulnerable, and shares the burden across the population.” – Ben Walsh

And on to today’s links:

Wonks
Cowen: Never mind Europe, start worrying about India – NYT
Why Obama should recess-appoint Christina Romer to the Fed – The Atlantic
Obama’s two Fed nominations killed by Congress – Reuters
An excellent, wonky guide to our incredible shrinking labor force – Rortybomb

The Web Is Not Dead
The disastrous economics of mobile apps for publishers – Technology Review

Very Frequent Fliers
Unlimited free first-class flights – The men who flew too much – LAT

Reuters Opinion
“The average VC fund returns less money to investors than they invested in the first place” – Felix
Stop demonizing Putin – Stephen F. Cohen
A London divided against itself – John Lloyd
What a Euro growth pact should contain – Hugo Dixon
Social Security is not going broke – David Cay Johnston

EU Mess
Why you shouldn’t count on radical change from France’s new Socialist president – Bloomberg Businessweek
If you randomly picked 12 countries from across the globe, they’d fit together better than the EU – The Atlantic
Greece plunges into turmoil after voters reject austerity – Guardian
Citi: There’s a 75% chance that Greece leaves the euro zone in 18 months – CNBC
Krugman: Europe’s voters “are wiser than the Continent’s best and brightest” – NYT
Germany, for better or worse, is still in control of Europe’s economic path – WSJ
Greece’s democratic left refuses to join the bailout alliance – Reuters

Facebook
Is Facebook ever going to be cool again? That’s like asking “is the phone company cool?” – NYMag
Yes, the Winkelvoss twins are starting a VC firm – Mashable

The Oracle
Buffett: U.S. banks have liquidity “coming out of their ears” – Bloomberg

Alpha
Doubting Anthony Scaramucci is a bit like doubting Steve Jobs, says Anthony Scaramucci – NYMag
One of John Paulson’s largest funds is down again, falling 6.7% – Bloomberg Businessweek

Taxmageddon
The “fiscal cliff” coming on Jan. 1 could mean a 30% drop in the stock market – WSJ

Oxpeckers
Users are fleeing the WashPost’s “social reading” app – Forbes

 

COMMENT

This whole mess with the EU/EZ is really nothing but good, at least in a power-politics sense, for the US, isn’t it?

The unified EU had demonstrated an intention to make its mark by behaving in an obstructionist and hostile manner toward the US in international politics. The added clout that (apparent) unity provided made the EU far more of a problem than the individual nations of Europe – even ever-hostile Germany – could be. Thanks to the Euro debacle, that unhelpful influence seems to be diminished now. Good riddance.

Now, there’s just the matter of placing the shackles on China – one way or the other – and the US will once again be secure, all alone and unchallenged on the top of the hill, and for a good long while. Cool, said the Tuesday troll.

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New York’s expensive bikeshare

Felix Salmon
May 7, 2012 15:04 EDT

New York’s new bike-share program, sponsored by Citibank to the tune of $41 million (plus $6.5 million from MasterCard), will go live at the end of July, and the prices are public already. Transportation commissioner Janette Sadik-Khan called them “the best deal in town short of the Staten Island Ferry.” Which, not really.

The Staten Island Ferry is free, of course, but that aside, New York transportation has a very simple pricing scheme. To a first approximation, all rides, whether on the subway or the bus or some combination of the two, are $2.50, no matter how long they are.

And the bikes cost a lot more than that.

As with all bike schemes, there’s a base price to enter the scheme — $10 per day, $25 per week, or $95 per year. Then the first half-hour of bike riding is free (45 minutes if you’re an annual member); after that, you pay on a per-ride basis as well, starting at $4 when you bike for more than half an hour.

The $10-per-day cost is already a significant expense: that’s four subway rides right there. And then the hourly charges really start to rack up if you keep the bike for some length of time. If you take the bike around Governor’s Island, for instance, and stay there for a couple of hours, you’re likely going to end up in the 3-hour time bracket, which is $49. On top of your $10 daily rental. As Garth Johnston puts it, for any real let’s-bike-around-the-city plans, you’re definitely going to be better off just buying your own bike.

What’s more, New York is significantly more expensive than similar schemes in rival cities like Washington and London. Here’s a chart of the cost of one trip, based on a 24-hour membership:

2.jpg

London’s 24-hour membership is just £1, or $1.61, and the cost for the second half-hour is only another £1. Which means that anybody can get on a bike, ride it for an hour, and pay just £2 — less than the cost of a journey on the Tube. In New York, by contrast, getting on the bike costs $10, and then the second half-hour costs another $4, for a total of $14. That’s more than four times the cost of the London bike. By the time you’re on the bike for 90 minutes, the New York cost goes up to $23; you’d need to be biking twice as long to pay that much in London.

Here’s the full chart, going out to the maximum charge for 24 hours:

24.jpg

As you can see, none of these schemes are exactly friendly towards someone just taking a bike and using it to bike around for, say, six hours. But if you do that in London, you’ll “only” pay $58: in Washington, it’s $85, and in New York, it’s $131.

I can’t think of any other area where London is so much cheaper than New York: it’s just weird to me that New York would set the prices for this scheme so high. Maybe the problem is that they haven’t found a lot of places to put the docking stations, so they’re having to set the price high to keep the demand in check. All we’ve been told so far is that the plans for the docking stations will be available “soon”; it’ll be fascinating to see how many of them there are in the first instance.

But one thing’s sure: the price difference between renting a bike and hailing a cab is very small in New York, while it’s very large in London. Which probably makes cabbies very happy, while doing very little to reduce congestion.

COMMENT

here’s what it costs in Milano:
subs:
annual (365 days) 36 €
• weekly (7 days) € 6,00
• daily (24 hours) € 2,50

use:
the first 30 minutes are free.
After the first 30 minutes you will pay € 0.50 for every subsequent half hour or fraction of half hour for a maximum of two hours.
Remember that the bike cannot be used for more than two hours*. After the two hour limit, you will be charged a € 2 penalty per hour or fraction of hour. Service is automatically suspended if you exceed this time limit three times. In this case, you can’t reactivate your card but you must subscribe again.
At least 10 minutes must elapse between the first and second use.

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