Morsi in Saudi Arabia: Wrong Trip, Wrong Timing?

Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi has left for Saudi Arabia on his first foreign visit since his inauguration. He leaves right in the middle of a constitutional crisis largely of his own making, and may be sending the wrong message at the wrong time.

On paper, the visit makes sense: Morsi wants to re-forge fraying ties with Riyadh and rebuild a onetime alliance with the Saudis; he also wants to reassure the Saudis about Iran's gestures of friendship to Egypt now that the Muslim Brotherhood has the Presidency.

But the Brotherhood's opponents in Egypt (and remember, Morsi got barely a quarter of the votes in the first round) suspect him of aiming to turn Egypt into something along the lines of the Saudi model, and others believe Saudi funding helped elect Morsi. (Officially, the Saudis have problems with the MB, though it isn't the sort of open propaganda campaign waged by the UAE against the Egyptian Brotherhood. But many private Saudis support the Brotherhood.) Leaving in the middle of a confrontation with the judiciary (and indirectly, SCAF) adds to the sense that Morsi is going to ask for seek support from his Saudi patrons at a difficult time.

Going anywhere in the midst of a crisis is a questionable call. Eleven days after taking office there is still no Prime Minister and not a single cabinet member named, except for the assurance (not really Morsi's call) that Field Marshal Tantawi will remain Defense Minister. The interim Cabinet of Prime Minister Ganzuri is presumably on its way out, the country is in a crisis, and the President is in Saudi Arabia.

I'd say it's the wrong trip, and any trip at this time is shows questionable judgment. His opponents — who may sense weakness right now — are unlikely to miss that.

Nathan Brown Explains the Legal Mess in Egypt (So I Don't Have To)

We no longer have a bumpy airplane ride. Instead we have a train wreck in slow motion. Well, actually, forget slow motion.

That's Nathan Brown on the legal mess in Egypt, in "Train Wreck Along the Nile." I'm not going to claim he clears everything up, but he does provide a sort of guide to the various legal claims the parties to the dispute are making. Since this constitutional-crisis-without-a-constitution appears to be turning into a full employment program for Egyptian lawyers for months to come, Nathan's  knowledge of legal and constitutional issues makes him a good guide.

The Libyan Elections: A First Step

The election results in Libya are still trickling in, but on the whole, the news seems good. There was some violence; there continue to be confrontations among militias; and the future remains uncertain, but the overall verdict seems positive. Western analysts are tending to proclaim that the liberal bloc led by former interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril has trounced the Islamists, which may or may not prove to be true, especially since such black-and-white categorizations may have little validity in Libya, where local or tribal considerations may have more weight than the secular/Islamist dichotomy. And, of course, elections are just the first step; the country is a long way from united. But it is a potentially rich and prosperous place, if it can get its act together,

A few, in some ways quite varied, interpretations of the elections from Juan Cole ("Top Ten Surprises on Libya's Election Day,"); Paul Pillar ("Democratic Form without Substance in Libya"); and Daniel Serwer ("Benghazi Needs a Hug"). (Note: the last post has seemingly disappeared from the Foreign Policy site. If the link starts working I'll put it back.)

Heydemann on the Syrian End Game

May I recommend a solid, perceptive, and enlightening post on managing the coming End Game in Syria by Steve Heydemann of USIP, over at Foreign Policy's Mideast Channel.

More on Egypt's Minority Communities

Not long ago I noted that the Egypt Independent had a series on Egypt's minority communities; that post had links to articles on the Armenian and Jewish communities. Since then they have run articles on Egypt's Levantine and Italian communities, both worth a look.

Court Rules Against Morsi Decree on Parliament

This really shouldn't occasion much surprise: Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court has ruled that President Morsi's executive order recalling the Parliament that the Court had dissolved is unconstitutional. Right now this has deteriorated into a question of jurisdiction and power, mostly at the level of "I do too!" "No you don't!""Do Too!""Don't." But this morning's Parliamentary move by referring its case to an appeals court may have defused the potential for an explosion: if Parliament was still trying to sit in defiance of the Court, the potential for violence might be much greater than in the present situation, where the lawyers will be arguing it out. A Twitter comment:

Egypt's Parliament Meets for 12 Minutes, Refers Fate to Courts. Wait—What Just Happened?

The showdown at the Cairo Corral seemed imminent, the Earps and Clantons facing each other down, and then — everybody went home. Egypt's dissolved Parliament, recalled by President Morsi in what seemed a challenge to both the military and the Supreme Constitutional Court, assembled, voted to refer its fate to the Appeals Court (technically seeking advice on how to implemnet the SCC dissoluton), and dissolved 12 minutes later pending the appeal. Two days of sound and fury, of sturm und drang, ended with — what, exactly?

A prolcedural point made, to be sure: Parliament chose to appeal its own fate, but did noy seek to legislate. Some suspect a more abstruse point may be in play: SCAF having handed over executive power to Morsi in the interim, Morsi may argue that constitutionally the legislative authority now devolves to him, not to SCAF. But that bsttle is one for the courts, not the streets. That seems implicit here:

Speaker Saad al-Katatny chaired a general meeting that discussed means of enforcing the verdict. He said the decision by President Mohamed Morsy to reinstate the assembly did not defy the court's ruling, but rather reversed the consequent decision by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to disband the assembly.

"In all of its activities, the state is bound by laws. The People's Assembly is fully cognizant of its competences, and respects the judiciary," Katatny stressed.

He added that he had consulted the legislative committee to enforce the verdict and its relevant measures, but noted that Article 40 of the Constitutional Declaration, which has governed the country since March 2011, stipulates that the Court of Cassation has jurisdiction over the validity of parliament memberships.

 So who blinked, and who won? I think that Morsi and the Parliament may have made a procedural point for the legal maneuvering ahead, but hardly the daring reclamation of Presidential authority this was being portrayed as over the past couple of days.

Was this the intended scenario all along, or an 11th hour dialing back of the crisis? Morsi's move alarmed many liberals and others who feared the Muslim Brotherhood was making a ploy to get back the Parliament it dominates and thus control the political arena as a whole; the fact that the MB's Shura Council held a meeting shortly before Morsi's move added to fears that, despite his "resignation" from the movement, it is not Morsi but the MB leadership calling the shots. The Brotherhood has frequently overplayed its hand in the past year and a half, and may have done so again.

But that will be hard to judge until it's clear what Morsi intended from the beginning. Was the plan all along to go to the brink and then back off, as seems to have happened? Was the plan all along to make a recondite constitutional point, and then let the courts figure it out? (Meanwhile, pending cases relating to Parliament were postponed to July 17.)

An initial impression is that the MB hurt itself here: it seemed to be flouting the rule of law (even if the SCC is a Mubarak-packed body) and alienating some of its own allies. In the end, it may have backed away from a confrontation it was going to lose. Or perhaps this compromise (if that's what it is) was its goal all along.

Collision Course?

Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi's order yesterday to reconvene the dissolved Parliament certainly appears to throw down the gauntlet in a challenge to the military, though so far the military response has been unclear while the Supreme Constitutional Court has reaffirmed that its decision is binding on all state authorities.

There are a few pundits suggesting that the decree actually represents a compromise with SCAF; Morsi called back the dissolved Parliament but not for a full four-year term; rather he called for new elections as soon as the new constitution is written, But if the decree represented a secret deal with SCAF, that is far from apparent so far, and the simplest explanation seems to be that Morsi has elected to move the presumably inevitable test of strength between the elected President and the military forward to his first days in office.

Yet Morsi and Field Marshal Tantawi appeared together today at a military graduation ceremony without outward indications of conflict.

The election of Morsi was seen by some as avoiding a constitutional crisis if SCAF had been perceived as rigging the election outcome; but another type of constitutional crisis, one involving a head-on clash between the executive and the judiciary with the military presumably siding with the latter. Already some of the legal arguments are centering around whether SCAF was acting in an executive or legislative capacity when it moved to enforce the court decree, since presumably Morsi has now inherited SCAF's executive but not its legislative powers.

Once again Egypt shows its ability to have a constitutional crisis despite the impediment of not currently having a constitution.

And once again Marc Lynch's greatest contribution to political theory, the "Calvinball" model of Egyptian politics, proves to be prescient.

UPDATE: Michele Dunne on "Morsi's Counter Coup."

Bilal Saab with Sitki Egeli: Interview on theTurkish F-4 Downing

Bilal Y. Saab at the Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East blog has a Q&A with Turkish defense analyst Sitki Egeli discussing the Turkish F-4 downed by Syria. I found it illuminating, clearing up some questions, though obviously the Turkish and Syrian narratives. It includes this map from Dr. Egeli:

 

The Crescent and the Sun: Japanese in 19th Century Ottoman Istanbul

Yamada Torajiro in Ottoman Garb

I could start the week by writing about the crisis over President Morsi's attempt to restore the dissolved Parliament in Egypt. I'll be writing about that today, but not just yet.

I could start the week with the crisis in Syria, or the elections in Libya. But I won't.

I'm going to start the week with something completely different: 19th Century Japanese in the late Ottoman Empire. From the Istanbul Research Institute's Blog, "A Fin de Siècle Japanese Romantic in İstanbul." 

The narrative is from the catalogue of an exhibit called The Crescent And The Sun: Three Japanese İn İstanbul: Yamada Torajirō, Itō Chūta, Ōtani Kōzui.

After the Ottoman frigate Ertuğrul struck rocks on the Japanese coast after a typhoon in 1890, following a visit to Japan, Japan rallied to provide relief to the families of the hundreds of sailors who died. Yamada Torajiro took the donations to Istanbul, and soon was allowed to open a store displaying Japanese exports and promoting trade. He wrote extensively, introducing Turkey to Japan as well as promoting Japan in the late Ottoman Empire. There's more at the link; he apparently lived into the 1950s and his memoir (in Japanese of course) appeared in 1957.

Election Eve in Libya

Libya's first nationwide democratic elections, for a General National Congress, is tomorrow.Sporadic violence and continuing clashes among militias have plagued the campaign. I claim no expertise on Libya and haven't followed events that closely, but this BBC Q&A backgrounder offers the basics.

After 50 Years, France Still Holds Key Algerian Archives

In conjunction with yesterday's 50th anniversary of Algerian independence, this Reuters report deals with the ongoing dispute over France's continuing to hold key archives from its occupation, including such basics as maps showing underground gas lines and electrical wiring, but also including Algerian manuscripts dating from before the French occupation of 1830 and originating in Algeria. Half a century later, Algeria and France are still trying to disentangle the legacy of 132 years of rule.

The Manaf Tlas Defection

Close families: Bashar and Manaf

Here is why the Manaf Tlas defection matters: Hafiz al-Asad, father of Bashar al-Asad, and Mustafa Tlas, father of Manaf, met at the Syrian  Military Academy in Homs in the early 1950s and became lifelong friends. During the 1958-61 United Arab Republic, when Egypt and Syria were united, the two men were stationed together in Egypt. When the UAR collapsed, the Nasser regime arrested Asad; Tlas accompanied Asad's family safely back to Syria. Asad showed his gratitude for the rest of his career; Tlas served as his longtime Defense Minister, despite a penchant for embarrassing comments to the press. Bashar al-Asad has known Tlas' sons Firas and Manaf all his life. The father, Mustafa Tlas, now 80, is believed to be outside the country; some say he is undergoing medical treatment in Paris. There are reports that Firas, who is a businessman, is also outside the country. But Manaf was a serving military officer, a general. Now he is  in Turkey, a defection, confirmed after a day of rumors, that hits quite close to the Asad family. The elder Tlas, along with former Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam, was one of the two visible high-level Sunnis in the largely Alawite regime of Hafiz al-Asad; Khaddam had left the country and broken with Bashar even before the uprising. Now the family that symbolized the presence of Sunnis in the Asad regime has broken with the Asads.

Joshua Landis, who has been very cautious about writing off Bashar, now says, "The Tlas defection sends the sign that the regime is done for."

Today is Algeria's 50th Independence Day

On July 5, 1962, Algeria became independent of France after its eight year war of independence. They're celebrating their 50th anniversary today. Algeria's half century as a nation has often been turbulent, but its war against the colonial power remains one that many other countries saw as a model. A happy independence day to Algeria at 50.

The Guardian on Libyan Imazighen

In yet another report on the emerging consciousness of the Amazigh (pl. Imazighen, also "Berber") people in Libya since the fall of Qadhafi, The Guardian has this report.. [Note: Link wasn't working; should be fixed now.]

One quibble: before the fall of Qadhafi, "anyone who spoke Tifinagh in public could be arrested." The author means Tamazight, Tifinagh is the ancient script, still used by the Tuareg and revived anong North African Imaghen. Speaking a script is indeed a challenge (do you speak any Cyrilllic, or how about Kufic?)  Otherwise, a useful article.

AJE's Arafat Report: The Longer Version

On Tuesday I reported on Al Jazeera English's investigative report claiming Yasser Arafat showed traces of exposure to radioactive polonium in his last days. At the time I embedded their first short news report and noted that the full report would be broadcast later that day. I'm now embedding the full report. I know some are calling for exhuming the body while others are saying there's no real evidence. Judge for yourselves.

Tomorrow is the Fourth of July . . .

. . . and so I declare my independence of blogging for one day. See you Thursday, and a happy fourth to my American readers. (No hard feelings, British readers. That tax on tea was a long time ago.)

Clayton Swisher on His AJE Arafat Story

I noted earlier today Al Jazeera English's big story today claiming to have documented the presence of radioactive polonium in Yasser Arafat's body at the time of his death in 2004.  At AJE's blogs, reporter Clayton Swisher, who got the story, discusses his experience with the story.

And again full disclosure, as previously noted Clayton is a former colleague of mine from his days at MEI, pre-Al Jazeera English.

Fatal Stabbing in Suez: A Case of Salafi Vigilantism?

The stabbing death of a young man who was walking with his fiancee in Suez when he was approached and rebuked by three bearded men in galabiyyas (the conservative Islamist "uniform") has provoked alarm in Egypt, especially since the killing has reputedly been claimed by a shadowy "Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice," modeled presumably on the Saudi religious police body of that name but unofficial and essentially a vigilante group. I call the group "shadowy" because when it first made itself known some months back through a Facebook page, reporters could not locate any actual members, spokesmen, offices, etc. and it appeared to exist only on Facebook. Although its Facebook page now appears to have been removed, perhaps by Facebook for taking credit for a crime, blogger Zeinobia has an image of their declaration in Arabic, though she clearly suspects old regime elements trying to provoke anger at Islamists, rather than real Islamists. Such provocateurs did operate under the former regime, and the notion is not impossible.

The Muslim Brotherhood has denounced the killing, but it will further serve to raise questions in the minds of many Egyptians about what the future of Egypt may look like. Whether real radical Salafis did this, which seems likely, or provocateurs aiming at blaming them, the young man is still dead and the alarm among many Egyptians is real.

AJE Claims Arafat Showed High Levels of Polonium at Time of Death

Allegations that the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat was poisoned have always seemed far-fetched, the usual Middle Eastern conspiracy theories, despite the fact that his doctors never offered a cause of death and there was no autopsy after his death in 2004. Rumors that he died of AIDS, liver disease, etc. were rampant but unproven.

Al Jazeera English is claiming today to have conducted a nine-month investigation and is reporting that a radiation laboratory in Lausanne, Switzerland, has found high levels of radioactive polonium in Arafat's personal affects (clothing, toothbrush, etc.), suggesting his body contained the radioactive substance in his last days. Polonium was responsible for the death of exiled Russian former spy Alexander Litvinenko, who died in London in 2006. According to the AJE report (a fuller hour-long report will reportedly be aired soon):

Polonium is present in the atmosphere, but the natural levels that accumulate on surfaces barely register, and the element disappears quickly. Polonium-210, the isotope found on Arafat's belongings, has a half-life of 138 days, meaning that half of the substance decays roughly every four-and-a-half months. “Even in case of a poisoning similar to the Litvinenko case, only traces of the order of a few [millibecquerels] were expected to be found in [the] year 2012,” the institute noted in its report to Al Jazeera.

But Arafat’s personal effects, particularly those with bodily fluids on them, registered much higher levels of the element. His toothbrushes had polonium levels of 54mBq; the urine stain on his underwear, 180mBq. (Another man’s pair of underwear, used as a control, measured just 6.7mBq.)

Further tests, conducted over a three-month period from March until June, concluded that most of that polonium – between 60 and 80 per cent, depending on the sample – was “unsupported,” meaning that it did not come from natural sources.

I have no idea if Arafat was really poisoned, but this does at least suggest an agent that was used, which  previous conspiracy theories have not.  Palestinians will of course assume Israel was behind any poisoning plot. Whether it is possible to confirm any of this at this late date is of course questionable. And one must wonder why, given the amount of questions at the time, this was not discovered (or revealed) at the time of his death?

Full disclosure: Al Jazeera English reporter Clayton Swisher, who worked on this story for the past nine months, is a former colleague of mine at the Middle East Institute.

The Al Jaseera English report (again, a longer report will be aired later today):