June 18, 2012
The power grab in
the past week by the Egyptian military and lingering Hosni Mubarak-era
establishment, operating through the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF), is such a blatant attempt to prevent a truly democratic and republican
system of government from taking root in the country that it cannot possibly
succeed. It will generate tremendous counter forces in society from tens of
millions of ordinary and politicized Egyptians, who insist on achieving the
promise of the January 2011 revolution that toppled Mubarak, and ushered in a
slow transition to a more democratic system of governance.
The SCAF and its
Mubarak-era allies managed within a few days to go against the two strongest
sentiments that have driven ordinary Egyptians for the past 18 months: First is
the desire to see the old guard that tormented the citizenry through
authoritarian abuse of power held accountable, punished, and kept out of power
in the new democratic Egypt; and, second is the desire to see the military
establishment oversee an orderly transition by turning over power to an
elected, legitimate president and parliament. The SCAF’s old generals and
colonels sharply offended and provoked much of the population, by
heavy-handedly trying to keep the legitimately elected Muslim Brotherhood out
of power in both the parliament and the presidency, and signaling that it will
only turn over some powers to a civilian establishment, while retaining most
powers for itself, and for good measure keeping control of the process of
writing a new constitution.
The SCAF has
succumbed to the same disease that is challenging, and in places bringing down,
dictators and authoritarian military rulers across the Arab world: its members
believe that only they know what is best for the people of Egypt, and they
alone will determine how political power and decision-making authority are
dispersed in the country. This megalomanial and arrogant sense of all-knowing
wisdom caused the SCAF members to overplay their hand and issue a series of
imperial-style edicts giving themselves supreme power that overrides the
authority of the parliament, the president and the courts. This display of
monumental political greed, shortsightedness and sheer stupidity will now send Egypt
into a protracted period of political struggle, in which various political
forces in the country compete openly for power and legitimacy.
The critical issue now is to see which combination of actors can enjoy both
power and legitimacy at the same time.
This will take
some time. Most basic elements of the Egyptian political system are undefined
or nonexistent. We do not know if the current parliament will actually be
dissolved, as the supreme constitutional court decreed last week that it should
be. We will not know officially for a few days who is the winner of the
presidential election. We do not know the powers that the president and a new
parliament will enjoy. We do not know how long SCAF’s military rulers will
remain in power, or whether they will retain some, or many, powers if they do
turn over political authority to an elected civilian administration. And we do
not know what kind of constitutional commission will write a new constitution,
when that document will come into force, whether it will be credibly ratified
by the population, and how it apportions power, rights, responsibility and
accountability.
Egypt this week
is a country in post-revolutionary turmoil and deep transition, without a
governance system. But it will be fine. It will emerge from this transitional
moment in better shape than it has been at any time in the past two generations
-- because the Egypt that will configure itself during the coming phase will
enjoy the unprecedented quality of being a country that has been defined and
shaped by its own people.
We know very well
from polls, qualitative research and a chat with any stranger you choose on a
stroll along the Nile that Egyptians respect their armed forces and are deeply
devout (mostly Muslims, with some Christians). They appreciate the values,
order and certitude that emanate from a strong military and religious dictates.
We also know, however, that they do not want their country to be ruled by
military or religious officials. The Muslim Brotherhood indicated in recent weeks,
during the presidential runoff election, that it understood this; so it assured
Egyptians that a Muslim Brotherhood presidential victory would open the door to
a leadership that included all quarters and elements of the population. SCAF
did not understand the same lesson; it assumed that the trust it enjoyed was
endless, and allowed it to run amok and grab power for itself and the officer
corps for generations to come.
The enormous
power of populist legitimacy that was unleashed in January 2011 and toppled the
government will now regroup and reassert itself in more complex and
institutionalized political forms than merely demonstrating in public squares.
Through its childish power grab, SCAF guarantees that the slow political
development of Egypt will speed up dramatically, mainly in opposition to the
perception that a transitional military council is trying to transform itself
into a permanent military junta. That will not happen, as the coming weeks and
months will demonstrate.
Rami G. Khouri is
Editor-at-large of The Daily
Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and
International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.
Copyright © 2012
Rami G. Khouri -- distributed by Agence Global