Avner
Cohen is consistent in an era of double standards and policy contradictions. In
The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb, he builds on his
well-established works and commitment to the transparency of Israel’s nuclear
program. His arguments are often intriguing, and in some ways both
philosophical and anthropological. It is correct that to have complete
international and domestic accountability and effective control of nuclear
programs, a significant level of transparency and a separation of powers
between the nuclear regulators, the military top brass, and the political
leadership is required. Cohen presents his case well.
Questionable,
nonetheless, is Cohen’s basic premise, which is that Israel would be better off
with a declared nuclear weapons program than its present opaque, but not
ambiguous, status. This is simply not true if the object is to enhance Israel’s
security. Cohen also argues that Israel should openly declare its nuclear
weapons program in order to improve its international standing as a state that
respects the norms governing the acquisition of nuclear weapons. It is very
doubtful that this would in fact enhance Israel’s political status because it
would be upgrading its nuclear weapon posture more aggressively rather than
contributing to nuclear disarmament. It is more likely that there would be
severe repercussions, both regionally and internationally.
Cohen
argues that having a transparent nuclear weapons program would enable Israel to
overcome or counterbalance diplomatic problems it faces as the result of the
stalemate in the Arab–Israeli peace process. There is no empirical or even
anecdotal evidence for this. On the contrary, it would more probably reconfirm
that Israel is pursuing renegade policies, inconsistent with international
efforts to diminish the role of nuclear weapons.
Israel
must seriously consider the ramifications of changing its posture from opaque
and unambiguous to declared. It is difficult to make predictions, but regional
states will be forced to react to the changing security paradigm and resulting
political pressures, and react they will. Certainly, efforts to curtail nuclear
proliferation in the Middle East—not to mention Iran—will become more
complicated and difficult.
It is
difficult to accept Cohen’s argument for a change in Israel’s nuclear posture.
It is rather disappointing that someone arguing about enhanced security would
ignore the fact that the asymmetry in nuclear programs and non-proliferation
obligations has been a driving force for proliferation, thus determinately
affecting international and regional security in the Middle East, including
Israel. A nuclear weapons declaration by Israel would only fuel further such
concerns, threatening the security of all states of the region.
Cohen’s
call for transparency is not misdirected, but it lacks context and comes at a
bad time. Transparency would be a useful and imperative part of any steps taken
by Israel to join the nuclear nonproliferation treaty as a nonnuclear-weapon
state, like South Africa; or as part of
the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East that
would include all the Arab countries, along with Israel and Iran. For
transparency to provide enhanced security for all, including Israel, it should
be coupled with a clear commitment to nuclear disarmament and the establishment
of a nuclear free zone, with practical steps by Israel in that direction and a
finite timeline for achieving that goal.
Nabil Fahmy is the founding dean of the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the American University in Cairo. A career diplomat, he served as Egypt’s ambassador to the United States from 1999 to 2008, and as envoy to Japan between 1997 and 1999. He fulfilled many other roles in his country’s foreign service, as a member of Egypt’s mission to the United Nations in New York, and as a senior government advisor on nuclear disarmament. He has specialized in multilateral affairs, conflict resolution, and disarmament and has published frequently on these topics. He serves as the non-resident chair of the Middle East Nonproliferation Project of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.