If the state collapse process accelerates in Syria, the result is predictable. But will it be possible to reunite Christians, Alawites, Kurds (whose intra-group differences are many) and Sunni Arabs after a long statehood crisis in Syria? Can we be so idealistic as to argue that these groups will be able to reorganize the Syrian state on a foundation of legitimate and effective citizenship? Automatically, the collapse of the Syrian state makes each group (Alawites, Kurds, etc.) more ethnicity or sect-oriented. Deprived of the state's institutions of protection, ethnic or sectarian enclaves become the people's only recourse for protection, and even of survival. At this point, the good news is that, despite many negative developments, Syria is in the earliest phase of state collapse.
On the other hand, unlike the big Western states, a typical Middle Eastern state (including even Turkey) has only a small number of big cities that constitute the backbone of the state apparatus, including the civil and economic networks. By and large, a Middle Eastern state is either a city-state or a state made up of a league of several cities. Therefore, state collapse is easy in many Middle Eastern countries. For instance, the whole Syrian political system is founded on the league of cities like Damascus, Homs, Aleppo and Latakia. Thus, state collapse is mostly related to the public order and the protection of institutions in those cities. How the different groups locate themselves in this urban structure is very important. For instance, unlike the Free Syrian Army (FSA), Kurdish groups like the Democratic Union Party (PYD) tend to concentrate on the relatively small peripheral cities like Afrin, Derek or Kobani. The Bashar al-Assad regime's long-term survival strategy is to arm the small villages in the northeastern and eastern parts of the province of Latakia. In this way, while clashes in big cities hasten state collapse, political activism in the peripheral cities or rural villages hastens territorial unity.
Finally, state collapse is not seen as a disaster for all groups. Ironically, state collapses have always created opportunities for ethnic or sectarian groups that had been underrepresented in state processes. For example, the collapse of the Ottoman state ended with many opportunities for many nations and ethnic groups. Similarly, it was mainly the Kurds and Shiite Arabs of Iraq who benefited from the energy generated by the collapse of that state. Thus, a key question is: How do the various groups think of the Syrian collapse, both on the domestic and global levels? For instance, the PYD did not permit the FSA to pass through Afrin to reach Aleppo. Dozens of PYD checkpoints in this region are the concrete signs that various Kurdish groups have become the beneficiaries of state collapse in Syria. Although a little exaggerated in the international media, there is truth in the perception that state collapses have always been opportunities for radical groups throughout the region.
