Lawrence Summers

If the global economy was in trouble before the annual World Bank and IMF meetings in Tokyo this past weekend, it is hard to believe that it is now smooth sailing. Indeed, apart from the modest stimulus provided to the Japanese economy by all the official visitors to Tokyo, it’s not easy to see what of immediate value was accomplished.

The U.S. still peers over a fiscal cliff, Europe staggers forward preventing crises King Canute-style with fingers in the dyke but no compelling growth strategy, and Japan remains stagnant and content if it can grow at all. Meanwhile, each BRIC is an unhappy story in its own way, with financial imbalances impeding growth in the short run and deep problems of corruption and demography casting doubt on long-run prospects.

In much of the industrial world, what started as a financial problem is becoming a deep structural problem. If growth in the United States and Europe had been maintained at its average rate from 1990 to 2007, GDP would be between 10 and 15 percent higher today and more than 15 percent higher by 2015 on realistic projections. Of course this calculation may be misleading because global GDP in 2007 was inflated by the same factors that created financial bubbles.  Yet even if GDP was artificially inflated by 5 percentage points in 2007, output is still about $1 trillion short of what could have been expected in the U.S. and EU.  This works out to more than $12,000 for the average family.

With these results, it will be argued that the process of international economic cooperation is failing. It will be suggested that there have been failures of leadership on the part of the major actors. There will be calls for changes in the international economic architecture.

There is some validity in all of this. Political constraints interfere with necessary actions in much of the world because international processes do not trump domestic imperatives. U.S. politics have been dysfunctional in the run-up to the 2012 election.  The European Union sometimes makes the U.S. Congress look like a model of crisp efficiency in coming to conclusions. In Russia and China, authoritarian leaders lacking legitimacy have difficulty driving economic reform. So also do those with democratic mandates in India and Brazil.

Concern about dysfunctional politics and the processes of international cooperation is certainly warranted. But the best one can hope for from politics in any country is that it will drive rational responses to serious problems. If there is no consensus on the causes of or solutions to serious problems, it is unreasonable to ask a political system to implement forceful actions in a sustained way.  Unfortunately, this is to an important extent the case with respect to current economic difficulties, especially in the industrial world.

While there is agreement on the need for more growth and job creation in the short run and on containing the accumulation of debt in the long run, there are deep differences of opinion both within and across countries as to how this can best be accomplished.

What might be labeled the “orthodox view” attributes much of our current difficulty to excess borrowing by the public and private sectors; emphasizes the need for credibly containing debt accumulation over the long term; puts a premium on austere fiscal and monetary policies; and stresses the need for long-term structural measures rather than short-term, demand-oriented steps to promote growth.

The alternative “demand support view,” while recognizing the need to contain debt accumulation and avoid high inflation, emphasizes the need for steps to increase demand in the short run as a means of jump-starting economic growth and setting off a virtuous circle in which income growth, job creation and financial strengthening are mutually reinforcing.

International economic dialogue has been defined by vacillation between these two viewpoints over the last few years.  At moments of particularly acute concern about growth like spring 2009 and the present moment, the IMF and many but not all monetary and fiscal authorities tend to emphasize demand-support views. But as soon as clouds start to lift, orthodoxy reasserts itself and attention shifts to fiscal contraction and long run financial hygiene.

This is a dangerous cycle whatever your economic beliefs.  Doctors who prescribe antibiotics warn their patients that they must complete the full course even if they feel much better quickly.  Otherwise they risk a recurrence of illness and worse yet the development of more antibiotic resistance. So too with economic policy.  Advocates of orthodoxy prize consistency. Those like me whose economic thinking emphasizes promoting demand, worry that expansionary policies carried out for too short a time prove insufficient to kick-start growth while at the same time discrediting their own efficacy and reducing confidence.

The Tokyo meetings may not have had an immediate impact. But the IMF’s recognition of the need to sustain demand and avoid lurches to austerity can be very important for the medium term if and only if it is sustained through the next round of economic fluctuations.

PHOTO: International Monetary Fund (IMF) Managing Director Christine Lagarde speaks at the Development Committee at the IMF and World Bank Annual Meetings in Tokyo October 13, 2012. REUTERS/Stephen Jaffe/IMF/Handout

It is the mark of science and perhaps rational thought more generally to operate with a falsifiable understanding of how the world operates. And so it is fair to ask of the economists a fundamental question: What could happen going forward that would cause you to substantially revise your views of how the economy operates and to acknowledge that the model you had been using was substantially flawed? As a vigorous advocate of fiscal expansion as an appropriate response to a major economic slump in an economy with zero or near-zero interest rates, I have for the last several years suggested that if the British economy – with its major attempts at fiscal consolidation – were to enjoy a rapid recovery, it would force me to substantially revise my views about fiscal policy and the workings of the macroeconomy more generally.

Unfortunately for the British economy, nothing in the record of the last several years compels me to revise my views. British economic growth post-crisis has lagged substantially behind U.S. growth, and the gap is growing. British GDP has not yet returned to its pre-crisis level and is more than 10 percent below what would have been predicted on the basis of the pre-crisis trend. The cumulative output loss from this British downturn in its first five years exceeds even that experienced during the Depression of the 1930s. And forecasts continue to be revised downward, with a decade or more of Japan-style stagnation now emerging as a real possibility on the current course.

Whenever policy is failing to achieve its objectives, as in Britain today with respect to economic growth, there is a debate as to whether the right response is doubling down – perseverance and intensification of the existing path – or recognition of error or changed circumstances and a change in course. In Britain today such a debate rages with respect to the aggressive fiscal consolidation that the government has made the centerpiece of its economic strategy.  Until and unless there is a substantial reversal of course with respect to near-term fiscal consolidation, Britain’s short- and long-run economic performance is likely to deteriorate.

An effective policy approach to Britain’s economic problems must start with the recognition that the principal factor holding back the British economy over both the short- and medium-term is the lack of demand. It is certainly true that Britain faces important structural issues, ranging from difficulties in promoting innovation to deficiencies in the system of worker training. But it is apparent from the relatively low level of vacancies, the reluctance of workers to leave jobs, the pervasiveness across industries and occupations of increased unemployment and the testimony of firms regarding the formation of their investment plans that it is lack of demand that is holding the economy back from producing as much as it could.

Keynes writing during the Depression compared Britain’s economic problems to a “magneto” problem, referring to the fact that a car might have many infirmities, but if its electrical system did not work, the car would not go, and if it were fixed, the car would go even with other problems. So it is today. Moreover, to an extent that is greatly underappreciated in the policy debate, short-run increases in demand and output would have medium- to long-term benefits as the economy reaps the benefits of what economists call hysteresis effects. A stronger economy means more capital investment and fewer cutbacks to corporate R&D; it means fewer people lose their connection to good jobs and get addicted to living without work; it means that more young people get first jobs that put them on ladders to success; and it means more businesses choose leaders oriented to expansion rather than cost-cutting. The most important structural program for raising Britain’s potential output in the future is raising its actual output today.

The objection to this view comes in many forms, but it is in essence that “reversing course on fiscal expansion now would undermine credibility, backfire with respect to growth by risking a spike in capital costs, and risk catastrophe down the road as debts became unsustainable.” This line of argument is profoundly flawed. First, the behavior of financial markets suggests that it is economic weakness rather than profligacy that is the main source of concern about credit problems down the road. Why else would the tendency be for the costs of buying credit insurance on the UK to rise overall as interest rates fall? In similar vein, a strong tendency has emerged in both the UK and U.S. for interest rates to rise and fall together with stock prices, implying that it is evolving optimism and pessimism about the future, not changing views about fiscal policy, driving market fluctuations. Second, the reality is that the primary determinant of fiscal health in both the U.S. and UK over the medium term will be the rate of growth the economy achieves. An extra percentage point of growth maintained for five years would reduce Britain’s debt-to-GDP ratio by close to 10 percentage points, whereas austerity policies that slowed growth could even backfire in the narrow sense of raising debt-to-GDP ratios and turning the unsustainability of debt into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

A change in the pace of fiscal consolidation is necessary for Britain to have a chance to avoid a lost decade of economic performance. It is, to be sure, not sufficient. Rather than starving public investment today, now is the time to add to confidence by making plans for structural reforms to contain the growth of public consumption spending over time. It is also time to take overdue measures to promote exports and, after years of appropriately low investment, to restart housing investment. But at a time when demand is needed for growth and the private sector is hanging back, the first priority must be for the public sector to stop exacerbating the contraction.

PHOTO: Britain’s Prime Minister David Cameron gestures while viewing a parade of British Olympic and Paralympic athletes through London September 10, 2012. REUTERS/Adrian Dennis/POOL

With the selection of Paul Ryan as the Republican vice-presidential candidate, it is clear both political parties agree that the central issue in the coming presidential election will be the scale and scope of government involvement in the U.S. economy. There will be disagreement over what constituted “normal” levels of spending in the past and indeed over what constitutes “spending.” But there is a widespread view in both parties that it is feasible and desirable that in the future the federal government will be no larger as a share of the overall economy than it has been historically.

Unfortunately, this aspiration is unlikely to be achieved. Even preserving the amount of government functions the U.S. had before the financial crisis will require substantial increases in the share of the economy devoted to the public sector. This is the case for several structural reasons.

First, demographic change will greatly expand federal outlays unless politicians decide to degrade the level of protection traditionally provided to the elderly. Between Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, and other smaller programs, about 32 percent of the U.S. federal budget, or about 7.7 percent of gross domestic product, is devoted to supporting those over 65. The ratio of this age group to those of working age will rise from 1:4.6 to 1:2.7 over the next generation, implying an increase in federal spending of 5.6 percentage points of GDP, if no other adjustments are made. True, as Americans’ health and life expectancy improve, it may be appropriate to revise upward the assumed retirement age. However, it will be unlikely to counteract the expected 34 percent increase over the next generation in the share of the population that will be within 15 years of estimated life expectancy.

Second, the accumulation of more debt and a return to normal interest rates will raise the share of federal spending devoted to interest payments. In 2007, before the financial crisis, federal debt held by the public was equivalent to 36.3 percent of GDP. In a very optimistic view, where recommendations such as those of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (the Simpson-Bowles commission) are implemented, net debt held by the public will nearly double, to 65 percent of GDP, by 2020. This implies that the federal government’s outlays to service its debt will rise from 1.7 percent of GDP in 2007 to 3.2 percent of GDP in 2020.

Third, increases in the price of what the federal government buys relative to what the private sector buys will inevitably increase the cost of state involvement in the economy. Since the early 1980s, the price of hospital care and higher education has risen fivefold relative to the price of cars and clothing and more than a hundredfold relative to the price of televisions. Similarly the complexity and hence the cost of everything from cutting-edge scientific research to regulating banks rises faster than overall inflation. These trends reflect long-running developments in globalization and technology. They imply that if government is to continue providing the same level of these services, government spending as a share of the economy has to rise, by at least 3 percent of GDP.

Fourth, several methods that have been used to repress the deficit will soon be found to be unsustainable. Federal pension liabilities and the deferred maintenance of federal infrastructure are two examples.

Meanwhile, there is a steady decline in the fraction of tax returns that are audited, and there is evidence of growing tax noncompliance. Both are a reflection of unsustainable cuts in spending. And in almost any reasonable view of the state’s responsibility, large increases in inequality, such as those we have observed in recent years, should call forth increased government activity. All of these factors suggest the likelihood of increased pressure on federal budgets over the years ahead.

There are ways in which federal spending can be reduced. Defense spending, which now represents 4.7 percent of GDP (its average level over the past 40 years), could be reduced significantly. On the other hand, the fact that in a dangerous world our military is badly stretched by sustained deployments that are far smaller than even the first Iraq war suggests there is little ground for confidence that the Pentagon budget would be cut dramatically.

In some areas, technology could greatly reduce government costs, but it is important to recognize that by far the largest parts of the federal budget involve cash or in-kind transfers. These parts are far less susceptible to productivity-enhancing technologies than areas that involve the production of goods or services. There is scope for the elimination of outdated or duplicate programs, but efforts to identify waste, fraud and abuse invariably come up with only negligible savings.

For the next three months the U.S. will debate the merits of growing versus shrinking government. But for the next three decades the nation will confront the reality that major structural changes in the economy will compel an increase in the public sector’s fraction of the total economy unless there is a substantial scaling down in the functions that the federal government has long performed. How government can best prepare for the pressures that will come and how greater revenues can be mobilized without damaging the economy are the great economic questions for the next generation.

Even if the process of economic recovery proves protracted, the American economy will eventually recover, and cyclical issues will cease to dominate the economic conversation. It is likely that issues relating to inequality will move to the forefront. There is no question that income is distributed substantially more unequally than it was a generation ago – with those at the very top gaining share as even the upper middle class loses ground in relative terms. Those with less skill, especially men who in an earlier era would have worked with their hands, are losing ground, not just in relative but in absolute terms.

These issues frame an important part of the economic debate in this election year. Progressives argue that widening inequality jeopardizes the legitimacy of our political and economic system. They contend that at a time when the market is generating more inequality, we should not be shifting tax burdens from those with the highest incomes to the middle class, as has taken place over the last dozen years. And while they recognize that Steve Jobs earned his billions providing great value to consumers and making a substantial contribution to the American and global economies, they also point out that the social value associated with the activities giving rise to many other fortunes, especially in the financial sector, is less apparent.

Conservatives argue that in a world where everything is increasingly mobile, high tax rates run more risk of driving businesses and jobs overseas than they once did. They point out the central role of entrepreneurship in advancing economic growth and note that since most new ventures fail, the returns of success have to be very large if entrepreneurship is going to flourish. They take umbrage at the suggestion implicit in some political rhetoric on inequality that there is something wrong with success on a grand scale. And they worry that policy measures taken to directly combat inequality will have perverse side effects.

Unfortunately, the points on both sides of the argument have considerable force. While I support moves to make the tax system more progressive, the reality is that inequality is likely to remain high and rising even in the face of all that can responsibly be done to increase tax burdens on those with high income and redistribute the proceeds. A variety of measures such as allowing unions to organize without undue reprisals and enhancing shareholders’ role in setting executive pay are desirable. But they are unlikely even to hold at bay the trend toward increasing inequality.

Where does this leave the public policy agenda? The track record around the world of populist policies motivated by inequality concerns is hardly encouraging. Equally, passivity in the face of dramatic economic change is unlikely to be viable. Perhaps the focus of debate and policy needs to shift from a focus on inequality in outcomes, where attitudes divide sharply and there are limits to what can be done, to a focus on inequalities in opportunity. It is hard to see who could disagree with the aspiration to equalize opportunity or fail to recognize the manifest inequalities in opportunity today.

By definition, the number of children not born into the top 1 percent who move into the top 1 percent must equal the number of children born into the top 1 percent who move out of it over their lifetime. So a serious program to promote equal opportunity must both seek to enhance opportunity for those not in wealthy families and to address some of the advantages currently enjoyed by the children of the fortunate.

By far the most important step that can be taken to enhance opportunity is to strengthen public education. For the last decade we have focused on assuring that no child is left behind, and this effort must continue. But if we are to assure that everyone has a real chance for great success, we must also make certain that every child in public school can learn as much and go as far as his or her talent permits. This means judging schools on measures beyond simply the fraction of students who exceed some minimum. Over the last 40 years the nation’s leading universities have, with the strong encouragement and support of the federal government, made a major effort to recruit, admit, support and graduate minority students. These efforts will and should continue. But as things stand, a minority youth with strong board scores is considerably more likely to apply and be admitted to a top school than a low-income student with the same scores. It is time the nation’s leading institutions undertook the kind of focused commitment to economic diversity that they have long mounted for racial diversity.

What about the perpetuation of privilege? Parents always seek to help their children, and it is not realistic to think that privileged parents will do differently. But there is no reason why the estate tax should dwindle relative to the economy at the same time that great fortunes are increasingly dominant. Nor should tax planning techniques that are de facto tax cuts only for those with millions of dollars of income and tens of millions in wealth continue to be legal. It is not realistic to expect that schools and universities that depend on charitable contributions will not be attentive to offspring of their supporters. Perhaps, though, the custom could be established that for each “legacy slot” room would be made for one “opportunity slot”.

These are some ideas for advancing equality of opportunity. There are many more. It is an aspiration that those of every political stripe should share.

As the G20 leaders prepare to conclude their meeting today, once again good news has had a half-life in the markets of less than 24 hours. Just as news of European plans to stand behind Spanish banks rallied markets and sentiment for only a few hours, a Greek election outcome that was as good as could have been hoped did not even buoy markets for a day. There could be no clearer evidence that the current strategy of vowing that the European system will hold together, addressing each crisis as it comes in the minimally sufficient way and vowing at every juncture to build a system that is sound in the long term has run its course.

Nor is the G20 likely to change anything, at least not immediately. The troubled European economies and their sympathizers will demand more emphasis on growth, lower interest rates on their official debts and more transfers. The Germans will show sympathy with the objective of reform but will insist that financial integration must coincide with political integration, noting that no one gives away a credit card without maintaining control over its use. And the rest of the world will express exasperation with Europe’s failure to get its act together and demand that more be done. Officials blessed with more diplomatic ability than economic insight or courage will produce a communiqué that politely expresses a measure of satisfaction with steps under way, recognizes the need to do more, and looks forward to continued coordination and dialogue. The only good thing is that expectations are so low that this is not likely to disappoint the markets very much.

The unfortunate truth is that European debtors and creditors are both right in their main lines of argument. The borrowers are right that austerity and internal devaluation have never been a successful growth strategy, certainly not in an environment where major trading partners are stagnating. The suggested counterexamples, where fiscal consolidations have preceded growth, involve either stagnation relative to previously attained levels of income (Ireland and the Baltics) or buoyant demand associated with surging export demand, increasing competitiveness and low borrowing costs (many euro members in the early years). They are also right in their claim that even a previously healthy economy will quickly become very sick if forced to operate for several years with interest rates far above growth rates, as is the case across Southern Europe. And experience is clear in suggesting that structural reform is always difficult and slow-acting but much more difficult when an economy is contracting and there is no sector to absorb those displaced by reform.

Those chary of institutionalizing financial integration without major political integration are right as well. A sound system must involve those with deep pockets who are on the hook for liabilities, either as borrowers or guarantors, having control over borrowing decisions. A system where I borrow and you repay is a prescription for unsustainable profligacy. This is why there is now so much discussion of eurobonds and Europe-wide deposit insurance being linked with much deeper political integration. But there are two problems that lie behind the soft references to greater integration. The first is the question of who really has control. If decisions are to be made on a genuinely euro-area basis, it is far from clear, especially after the French election, that there is any kind of majority or even plurality support for responsible policies. If the idea is that the euro area’s future will be on the ECB model – a European façade behind which Teutonic policies are pursued – it is far from clear that this will or should be acceptable across the continent.

The second is the magnitude of the transfers that could be involved: A good guess would be that during the U.S. savings and loan crisis the American southwest received a transfer equal to at least 20 percent of its GDP from the rest of the country. Is there a real will to commit to potential transfers of this magnitude in Europe? Maybe all of this can be resolved, but it will surely not happen quickly.

Not all problems can be solved. It is not certain that the full repayment of all currently contracted sovereign debts, sustainable growth for all, and maintenance of all nations currently on the euro will prove feasible. The private sector, through its actions, is making clear that it recognizes this painful reality. Official-sector planning needs to recognize it as well. Outside of Europe, even as leaders hope for the best, they need to plan for the worst, ensuring adequate liquidity and demand in their economies even if the European situation deteriorates rapidly. The fortification of the IMF is a start in the right direction, but consideration needs to be given to national policies, to trade finance and to social safety nets as well.

But a euro-area collapse would be an economic disaster that might define this quarter century. Its prospect must concentrate the minds of all those in Los Cabos, not so much on reform as on immediate action. Little needs to be, or probably should be, said publicly. But those outside Europe must persuade those inside Europe that the rules change when the stakes rise. The ECB’s credibility will mean little if there is no longer a common currency. Issues of setting the right precedent seemed much larger 24 hours before Lehman than 24 hours afterwards. Now is the time for radical reductions in the rates charged by official creditors to European sovereigns, for a willingness to subordinate official debts – not for the purpose of privileging private creditors but to offer a prospect for systemic preservation – and for expansionary monetary policies in Europe that prevent deflation and encourage the growth that can create jobs and reduce debt burdens. Only if the system is preserved can its future be debated.

PHOTO: An Oxfam activist wearing a mask of Mexican President Felipe Calderon holds up a checklist during a protest in Los Cabos June 17, 2012. G20 leaders will kick off two days of meetings in the Pacific resort of Los Cabos on Monday. REUTERS/Andres Stapff

With the past week’s dismal U.S. jobs data, signs of increasing financial strain in Europe, and discouraging news from China, the proposition that the global economy is returning to a path of healthy growth looks highly implausible.

It is more likely that negative feedback loops are again taking over as falling incomes lead to falling confidence, which leads to reduced spending and yet further declines in income. Financial strains hurt the real economy, especially in Europe, and reinforce existing strains. And export-dependent emerging markets suffer as the economies of the industrialized world weaken.

The question is not whether the current policy path is acceptable. The question is, what should be done? To come up with a viable solution, consider the remarkable level of interest rates in much of the industrialized world. The U.S. government can borrow in nominal terms at about 0.5 percent for five years, 1.5 percent for 10 years, and 2.5 percent for 30 years. Rates are considerably lower in Germany, and still lower in Japan.

Even more remarkable are the interest rates on inflation-protected bonds. In real terms, the world is prepared to pay the U.S. more than 100 basis points to store its money for five years and more than 50 basis points for 10 years. Maturities would have to reach more than 20 years before the interest rates on indexed bonds become positive. Again, real rates are even lower in Germany and Japan. Remarkably, the UK borrowed money last week for 50 years at a real rate of 4 basis points.

These low rates on even long maturities mean that markets are offering the opportunity to lock in low long-term borrowing costs. In the U.S., for example, the government could commit to borrowing five-year money in five years at a nominal cost of about 2.5 percent and at a real cost very close to zero.

What does all this say about macroeconomic policy? Many in both the U.S. and Europe are arguing for further quantitative easing to bring down longer-term interest rates. This may be appropriate given that there is a much greater danger from policy inaction to current economic weakness than to overreacting.

However, one has to wonder how much investment businesses are unwilling to undertake at extraordinarily low interest rates that they would be willing to undertake with rates reduced by yet another 25 or 50 basis points. It is also worth querying the quality of projects that businesses judge unprofitable at a -60 basis point real interest rate but choose to undertake at a still more negative real interest rate. There is also the question of whether extremely low safe real interest rates promote bubbles of various kinds.

There is also an oddity in this renewed emphasis on quantitative easing. The essential aim of such policies is to shorten the debt held by the public or issued by the consolidated public sector comprising both the government and central bank. Any rational chief financial officer in the private sector would see this as a moment to extend debt maturities and lock in low rates – exactly the opposite of what central banks are doing. In the U.S. Treasury, for example, discussions of debt-management policy have had exactly this emphasis. But the Treasury does not alone control the maturity of debt when the central bank is active in all debt markets.

So, what is to be done? Rather than focusing on lowering already epically low rates, governments that enjoy such low borrowing costs can improve their creditworthiness by borrowing more, not less, and investing in improving their future fiscal position even assuming no positive demand stimulus effects of a kind likely to materialize with negative real rates. They should accelerate any necessary maintenance project – issuing debt leaves the state richer not poorer, assuming that maintenance costs rise at or above the general inflation rate.

As my colleague Martin Feldstein has pointed out, this is a principle that applies to accelerating replacement cycles for military supplies. Similarly, government decisions to issue debt, and then buy space that is currently being leased, will improve the government’s financial position as long as the interest rate on debt is less than the ratio of rents to building values – a condition almost certain to be met in a world of sub-2% government borrowing rates.

These examples are the place to begin, because they involve what is in effect an arbitrage, whereby the government uses its credit to deliver essentially the same bundle of services at a lower cost. It would be amazing if there were not many public investment projects with certain equivalent real returns well above zero. Consider a $1 project that yielded even a permanent 4 cents a year in real terms increment to GDP by expanding the economy’s capacity or its ability to innovate. Depending on where it was undertaken, this project would yield at least an extra 1 cent a year in government revenue for each dollar spent. At any real interest rate below 1 percent, the project pays for itself even before taking into account any Keynesian effects.

This logic suggests that countries regarded as havens that can borrow long term at a very low cost should be rushing to take advantage of the opportunity. This is a view that should be shared by those most alarmed about looming debt crises, because the greater your concern about the ability to borrow in the future, the stronger the case for borrowing for the long term today.

There is, of course, still the question of whether more borrowing will increase anxiety about a government’s creditworthiness. It should not, as long as the proceeds of borrowing are used either to reduce future spending, or raise future incomes.

Any rational business leader would use a moment like this to term out its debt. Governments in the industrialized world should do so too.

Once again European efforts to contain crisis have fallen short. It was perhaps reasonable to hope that the European Central Bank’s commitment to provide nearly a trillion dollars in cheap three-year funding to banks would, if not resolve the crisis, contain it for a significant interval. Unfortunately, this has proved little more than a palliative. Weak banks, especially in Spain, have bought more of the debt of their weak sovereigns, while foreigners have sold down their holdings. Markets, seeing banks holding the dubious debt of the sovereigns that stand behind them, grow ever nervous. Again, Europe and the global economy approach the brink.

The architects of current policy and their allies argue that there is insufficient determination to carry on with the existing strategy. Others argue that failure suggests the need for a change in course. The latter view seems to be taking hold among the European electorate.

This is appropriate. Much of what is being urged on and in Europe is likely to be not just ineffective but counterproductive to maintaining the monetary union, restoring normal financial conditions and government access to markets, and re-establishing economic growth.

The premise of European policymaking is that countries are overindebted, and so unable to access markets on reasonable terms, and that the high interest rates associated with excessive debt hurt the financial system and inhibit growth. The strategy is to provide financing while insisting on austerity, in hopes that countries can rein in their excessive spending enough to restore credibility, bring down interest rates and restart economic growth. Models include successful International Monetary Fund programs in emerging markets and Germany’s adjustment after the expense and trauma of reintegrating East Germany.

Unfortunately, Europe has misdiagnosed its problems in important respects and set the wrong strategic course. Outside of Greece, which represents only 2 percent of the euro zone, profligacy is not the root cause of problems. Spain and Ireland stood out for their low ratios of debt to gross domestic product five years ago, with ratios well below Germany’s. Italy had a high debt ratio but a very favorable deficit position. Europe’s problem countries are in trouble because the financial crisis under way since 2008 has damaged their financial systems and led to a collapse in growth. High deficits are much more a symptom than a cause of their problems. And treating symptoms rather than underlying causes is usually a good way to make a patient worse.

The cause of Europe’s financial problems is lack of growth. In any financial situation where interest rates far exceed growth rates, debt problems spiral out of control. The right focus for Europe is on growth; in this dimension, increased austerity is a step in the wrong direction.

Systematic comparisons suggest that when economies are demand-constrained and safe short-term interest rates are near zero, policy measures that reduce the deficit by 1 percent have a multiplier of 1 to 1.5 – implying that a 1 percent reduction in a country’s ratio of spending to GDP or an equivalent tax increase reduces its GDP by 1 to 1.5 percent. Essentially, cutting deficits will have a disproportionately adverse effect on GDP because the multiplier is larger than 1 on the growth-reduction side of the equation. This means that austerity measures at the national level are likely to be counterproductive in terms of creditworthiness. Fiscal contraction reduces incomes, limiting the capacity to repay debts. It achieves only limited reductions in deficits once the adverse effects of economic contraction on tax revenue and benefit payments are accounted for. And it casts a shadow over future growth prospects by reducing capital investment and raising unemployment, which inevitably takes a toll on the capacity and willingness of the unemployed to work.

These considerations are magnified at the continental level. Slowdowns in one country reduce the demand for the exports of other countries. As a matter of arithmetic, increases in saving and exporting in some countries have to be offset by increases in spending and importing in others. Germany’s enormous success in recent years has been achieved by becoming a large-scale net exporter – it would not have been possible without large-scale borrowing and importing by Europe’s periphery. The periphery cannot possibly succeed in substantially reducing its borrowing unless Germany pursues policies that allow its surplus to contract.

Skeptics will rightly wonder how a prescription for more spending by countries that already have trouble borrowing can be correct. The answer lies in the difference between borrowing by individuals and countries. Normally, an individual helps his creditors by borrowing less; but a person who stops borrowing to finance commuting to his job does his creditors no favor. A country’s income is determined by spending, so a country that pursues austerity to the point where its economy is driven into a downward spiral does its creditors no favor. Yes, there will ultimately be a need to raise retirement ages, reform sclerosis-inducing regulations and restructure benefit programs; phased-in commitments in these areas would be constructive. But the prospect for political and economic success in these endeavors depends on growth being restored.

Only if growth is restored can the euro endure and European financial problems be resolved. If there was ever a situation that called for a collective response, this is it. Going forward, the IMF and international community should condition further support not merely on individual countries’ actions but on a common European commitment to growth.

PHOTO: European Central Bank (ECB) President Mario Draghi addresses the European Parliament economic and monetary affairs committee in Brussels, April 25, 2012. REUTERS/Yves Herman

Arithmetic done under the constraints of politics is always suspect, and one should always examine carefully the claims of those seeking votes. But smart observers have learned to distinguish between the claims of political candidates and their advisers on the one hand, and proposals that have been evaluated by independent scorekeepers like the Congressional Budget Office on the other.

This principle has never been better illustrated than by the “budget analysis” put forward by Governor Romney’s chief economic adviser, Glenn Hubbard, in a recent Wall Street Journal column. Hubbard constructs a budget plan he imagines that President Obama might propose someday, engages in a set of his own extrapolations and then makes a set of assertions about it. He does not discuss President Obama’s actual plan or how it has been evaluated by the CBO. Nor does he invest his credibility in defending the claims that Governor Romney has made regarding his own fiscal plans – he simply states that, “Yes, President Obama and Mitt Romney have budgets with competing visions. But Governor Romney’s budget makes tough choices…” without delving into the specifics or trade-offs that Romney’s “tough choices” entail.

President Obama put forward a plan earlier this year that would reduce deficits by more than $4 trillion over the next decade. It would bring discretionary spending to its lowest levels since the 1960s. It includes $2.50 in spending cuts for every $1 in additional revenue. It also asks everyone to pay their fair share of taxes, repealing the Bush tax cuts for families making more than $250,000, and closing loopholes and shelters like preferences for private jets, hedge fund managers and offshore investments.

The independent Congressional Budget Office confirms that it would stabilize the debt as a share of the economy – thus returning us to a tenable fiscal path. It would do that while allowing increased investments in education, research and infrastructure that are critical to stronger, shared economic growth in the years to come. By focusing on building a strong economy for the future, it expands the tax base and reduces pressures for future tax increases.

But rather than criticize this approach, Hubbard ignores it – and instead chooses to invent a set of assumptions that bear no relationship to the president’s actual policies. His figures are not explained, but they apparently arbitrarily assume that the president must raise taxes to pay for spending above a level of Hubbard’s choosing.

Rather than filling imaginary gaps in the president’s budget, which has been spelled out in sufficient detail to permit evaluation by independent experts, Professor Hubbard should perhaps fill in some of the many gaps in Romney’s plans.

Start with his tax plan. The Romney campaign has been very clear about what he is promising: $5 trillion in tax cuts on top of extending the Bush tax cuts, with those benefits heavily weighted toward the country’s wealthiest taxpayers. Romney claims to pay for this plan by ending tax shelters, principally for the wealthy, but he hasn’t specified a single tax break that he would close. Romney himself has acknowledged the lack of details in his plan, stating in reference to his tax plan that “frankly, it can’t be scored.” I have been party for many years to searches for “high-income tax shelters” than can feasibly be closed. I know of no reputable expert in either political party who would find that there is anything even approaching $5 trillion in potential revenue to be generated from this source.

Romney has also proposed a massive defense buildup, even while he says he will cut spending deeply enough to balance the budget. I think it’s clear why he won’t tell voters which cuts he would make: because in the past, disclosing his planned budget cuts was politically damaging.

We have seen this movie before. When President Clinton left the White House, our country was paying down its debt on a substantial scale. I was privileged as secretary of the treasury to be buying back federal debt. President George W. Bush campaigned on a program of tax cuts supported by economic advisers not subject to the rigors of official budget scorekeeping. The results – trillions of dollars of budget deficits – speak for themselves.

This is a very consequential election. As we continue to recover from the largest economic crisis in generations, we face a continuing need to strengthen the job market, address large fiscal challenges and build an economy that is based on sustainable, shared economic growth. Voters should have a chance to choose between clear alternatives. President Obama – consistent with his obligations as president – has laid out a multiyear budget embodying his vision for the future, and it has been evaluated by independent experts. It is time for Romney to do the same.

Economic forecasters divide into two groups: those who cannot know the future but think they can, and those who recognize their inability to know the future. Shifts in the economy are rarely forecast and often not fully recognized until they have been under way for some time. So judgments about the U.S. economy have to be tentative. What can be said is that for the first time in five years a resumption of growth significantly above the economy’s potential now appears as a substantial possibility. Put differently, after years when the risks to the consensus modest-growth forecast were to the downside, they are now very much two-sided.

As winter turned to spring in 2010 and 2011, many observers thought they detected evidence that the economy had decisively turned, only to be disappointed a few months later. A variety of considerations suggest that this time may be different. Employment growth has been running well ahead of population growth. The stock market level is higher and its expected volatility lower than at any time since the crisis began in 2007, suggesting that the uncertainty hanging over business has declined. Consumers who have been deferring purchases of cars and other durable goods have created pent-up demand. The housing market seems to be stabilizing. For years now, the rate of family formation has been way below normal as young people moved in with their parents. At some point they will set out on their own, creating a virtuous circle of a stronger housing market, more family formation and demand, and further improvement in housing conditions. Innovation around mobile information technology, social networking and newly discovered oil and natural gas is likely, assuming appropriate regulatory policies, to drive significant investment and job creation.

True, the risks of high oil prices, further problems in Europe, and financial fallout from anxiety about future deficits remain salient. However, unlike in 2010 and 2011, it is probable that these risks are already priced into markets and factored into outlooks for consumer and business spending. There has already been a significant escalation in oil prices. The European situation is hardly resolved but is unlikely to deteriorate as much in the next months as it did last year. And market participants report great alarm about the deficit situation. So it would not take great news in any of these areas for them to actually contribute to upward revisions in current forecasts.

What are the implications for macroeconomic policy? Such recovery as we are enjoying is less a reflection of the natural resilience of the American economy than of the extraordinary steps that both fiscal and monetary policymakers have taken to offset private-sector deleveraging — a process that is far from complete. A convalescing patient who does not finish the full course of treatment takes a grave risk.  So too the most serious risk to recovery over the next several years is no longer the possibility of either financial strains or external shocks but that policy will shift too quickly away from maintaining adequate demand toward a concern with traditional fiscal and monetary prudence.

On even a pessimistic reading of the economy’s potential, unemployment remains 2 percentage points above normal levels; employment, 5 million jobs below potential; and GDP, close to $1 trillion short of potential. Even with the economy creating 300,000 jobs a month and growing at 4 percent, it would take several years to reattain normal conditions. So a lurch back this year toward the kind of policies that are appropriate in normal times would be quite premature.

Indeed, recent research on what economists label hysteresis effects suggests that slowing could have highly adverse consequences. Brad Delong and I argue in a recent paper that it is even possible that premature and excessive movements toward fiscal contraction by shrinking the economy risk exacerbating long-run budget problems.

How then to respond to valid concerns about fiscal sustainability, excessive credit creation and the eventual return to normality in a world where policy credibility is essential? The right approach is to pursue policies that commit to normalize conditions but only when certain thresholds are crossed. The Federal Reserve might commit to maintain the current Fed Funds rate until some threshold with respect to unemployment or expected inflation is crossed. Commitments to fund infrastructure over many years might include a financing mechanism such as a gasoline tax that would be triggered when some level of employment or output growth has been achieved. Tax reform could phase in new rates in pace with the rising economic performance.

Contingent commitments have the virtue of providing clarity to households and businesses as to how policy will play out, and in areas where legislation is necessary, eliminating political uncertainty. They allow policymakers to project a simultaneous commitment to near-term expansion and medium-term prudence — exactly what we require right now. An element of contingency in policy is always there in a volatile world. Recognizing it explicitly is the way to provide confidence and protect credibility in a world whose future no one can gauge with precision.

PHOTO: A help wanted sign hangs on the door of an Autozone shop in Golden, Colorado September 17, 2009. REUTERS/Rick Wilking

However the U.S. presidential election turns out, the trifecta of the Bush tax cut expiration, the debt limit ceiling on the horizon once again, and the Congressionally mandated sequesters – cuts in domestic spending – will force the president and Congress to wrestle with fiscal issues either in a lame duck session after the election or in early 2013. The decisions they make will have profound impacts on America’s fiscal future.

For many observers, the central question on the table is about entitlement programs: What will be done with them? Growth in entitlement spending associated with our aging population and its rising health care costs is the major factor in overall federal spending growth. But the capacity of near-term policy changes to have large impacts on that spending is less than many would suppose. The rising ratio of retirees to workers means that Social Security benefits at current levels will not be sustainable without some kind of tax increase. Sooner or later, revenue will have to rise or else outlays will have to be curtailed. While it is surely better to act sooner, the reality is that, out of necessity, action on entitlements is inevitable.

While almost everyone agrees on the desirability of containing federal health care spending, this is likely to be more difficult than we’d like to believe. Certainly beneficiaries can bear more of the cost of their government insurance than others, and there are steps like malpractice reform and the further encouragement of preventive medicine that should be taken. Yet without intrusions into the private health care system that are unlikely to be politically acceptable, there are severe limits on what can be done. Otherwise the result will be unacceptable cuts in the availability of care for the clients of federal programs. Given all the uncertainties associated with new technologies, changing lifestyles, and ongoing changes in the private system, health care reform will and should be a continuing project.

But let’s place health care aside for now. Less discussed in the context of major deficit reduction is tax reform. For a variety of reasons, 2013 should be the year when the tax code is overhauled in a substantial way.

First, the United States will need to mobilize more revenue. This year the federal government will collect less than 16% of GDP in taxes—far below the post World War II average. The combination of an aging society, rising health care costs, debt service costs that will skyrocket whenever interest rates normalize, a still-dangerous world in which our allies’ defense spending is falling even as that of potential adversaries rises rapidly, and a growing fraction of the population unable to hold steady work means that in all likelihood federal spending will need to be larger not smaller relative to GDP in the future.

Raising marginal corporate rates or increasing individual rates beyond their Clinton-era level raises serious issues about incentive effects or encouraging tax shelter activities. Raising rates is, in any event, unlikely to be politically feasible. A much better strategy for raising necessary revenue would start from the premise adopted by the Simpson-Bowles bipartisan commission that tax expenditures are a form of government expenditure and presumptively should be cutback unless they can be justified.

Second, the current tax system is, in certain ways, manifestly unfair at a time of rising inequality. As is well recognized, America’s rich have gotten richer with the top 1 percent’s income share rising from the 10 percent range to the 20 percent range over the last generation, while middle class incomes have stagnated or worse. There is plenty of room for debate about the causes of rising inequality, and the extent to which reducing inequality should be a central objective of government policy and about the possible disincentive effects of excessively progressive taxes.

But there are fairly expensive aspects of the current tax system that favor the most fortunate – aspects that border on the indefensible. Recent political debates have pointed to loopholes that permit a few of the very fortunate to accumulate tens of millions of dollars in a tax-free IRA when almost everyone else is constrained by a $2,000 contribution limit. Can the observation that Ireland, Bermuda, and Luxembourg are three of the five jurisdictions where the U.S. corporate sector earned the most profits reflect anything other than rampant tax sheltering? Anyone who doubts this should ponder the fact that in 2007, U.S. corporate profits in Bermuda totaled 646% of Bermuda’s GDP. The treatment of profit incentives paid to investment operators who make no investment of their own money but simply receive the “carry” as they invest other people’s money is another example of an inappropriate provision.

These examples and many others are not only significant because of revenue the government could recoup while also making the tax system fairer. They matter because they illustrate the power of special interests to shape fundamental aspects of economic policy. Reform could be an important step towards rebuilding citizens’ confidence in the federal government, which is sorely lacking today.

Third, even while raising too little revenue and giving much away to various shelter efforts, the current tax system also manages to excessively burden economic activity. Corporate rates at the very high end of the world range encourage firms to manage their affairs so as to minimize reported U.S. profits using devices like transfer pricing, and to encourage the use of debt rather than equity finance. Employers who know that their workers face high tax rates work to find ways of providing compensation in the form of tax free perquisites rather than money income. High marginal rates on individuals, along with a substantial capital gains differential, encourages individuals to spend time and effort that should be used more productively on engineering conversions of ordinary income into capital gains.

While the U.S. tax code is altered frequently, serious reform is no more than a once in a generation happening. The last serious tax reform effort took place in 1986, meaning we are overdue. The Simpson-Bowles proposal for eliminating all tax expenditures and radically reducing tax rates provides an excellent starting point for a debate the country should have.

The delicate question is: How should Washington prepare for serious tax reform during what is likely to be a unique window of opportunity in late 2012 and 2013? The timing is essential, both because of all of the deficit reduction activity, but also because spending-side reforms will have a much more difficult time moving forward if revenue is not addressed as well.

It is tempting to say presidential candidates should put forward their tax reform proposals in detail and allow voters to choose. However, this is unlikely to work. Indeed, the more tax issues are discussed during the campaign, the more the candidates will be driven to make pledges about things they will never do—pledges that might make tax reform that much more difficult.

Here is an alternative: Leaders in both parties should commit themselves to the goal of tax reform for growth, fairness and deficit reduction. They should acknowledge that every tax expenditure or special break has to be on the table. They should have their staffs are compile a large inventory of options. The relevant Congressional committees should take testimony from experts of all persuasions. And then right after the election, the negotiations should begin. Nothing that is likely to be done during the next four years will be more important.

Photo: U.S. President Barack Obama receives a standing ovation as he addresses a Joint Session of Congress inside the chamber of the House of Representatives on Capitol Hill in Washington September 8, 2011.