Ian Bremmer

A Russian Spring grows as the prospects of Vladimir Putin returning to the presidency loom. Ian Bremmer, Susan Glasser and Gideon Rose talk with Thomson Reuters Digital Editor Chrystia Freeland about the prospects of an uprising in Russia similar to what we’ve seen in the Arab world.

By Ian Bremmer
The opinions expressed are his own.

After a week full of anti-government and pro-government protests, Russians woke up on Monday to big news. Mikhail Prokhorov, a political novice with billions of dollars—and the New Jersey Nets— to his name, announced his Presidential bid.  Alexei Kudrin, a longtime bureaucratic infighter, also declared his plans to re-enter the political arena. These developments were even more significant considering both were ousted in rather public quarrels with the powers that be just months ago. Kudrin said he would support and aid a pro-reform liberal party that would stand as a counterweight to the incumbent United Russia. Prokhorov intends to challenge Putin for the presidency in March 2012 on a platform that would appeal to Russia’s “disenchanted middle class.”

No matter what Kudrin and Prokhorov say in public, they both represent the same thing to Russia and the world: Vladimir Putin’s iron grip on power. As I’ve written before, Putin is the most powerful individual on the planet. To think that either man would risk his freedom or his fortune to oppose Putin’s Kremlin, no matter what their stated reasons are, is just wrong. That said, there are reasons to watch this “race” as it will give some insight into Putin’s inevitable third term as president.

Putin has had to deal with a growing sense of dissatisfaction in Russia as of late.  Growth and living standards are stagnating, while economic inequality persists. It is unclear whose pockets are being lined with the wealth generated by Russia’s massive natural resources. The lack of freedom of the press, centralized control over economic opportunity, and pervasive corruption that makes a mockery of the justice and security systems and other institutions, are Putin’s levers of power– and also the focal points for protesters. The protestors’ complaints crystallized last week over United Russia, Putin’s party, winning a smaller but still strong majority in the parliamentary elections. Accusations of election fraud were widespread and tens of thousands took to the streets in protest over the course of last week. Putin has not been in a position to crack down on these protests — they’re too visible and too widespread — but be sure that the oligarchs and ruling classes in Russia are on Putin’s side. While his tactics for retaining power have had to change, the outcome is the same.

Monday, a pro-United Russia rally in Moscow had the distinct air of a made-for-media event, with the college kids in attendance complaining their classes had been cancelled in order to compel them to turn out to show their “support” for the current regime. But the numbers, even if not to the extent that the state television claims, were there. Though Prokhorov and Kudrin will deny it endlessly, their candidacies are without a doubt sanctioned by the Kremlin. Just this year, Prokhorov was the leader of a pro-business liberal party that was created by and quite obviously aligned with the Kremlin. He quit because of a falling out with one of Putin’s Kremlin advisors — but it was not a falling out so great that Prokhorov became persona non grata. Quite the opposite, Prokhorov’s political resurrection may prove too useful for either Putin or the Kremlin middlemen to pass up.

Prokhorov has not forgotten that he owes his fortune and therefore his allegiance to Putin. As he already stated in his press conference, he doesn’t plan to dwell on attacking Putin (no more than 10% of his platform will be anti-Putin), but rather would like to talk about his plans for Russia. Kudrin has all but ignored Putin in laying out his case for a new party. Imagine if Newt Gingrich or Mitt Romney came out tomorrow and said they were done attacking President Obama and wanted to focus solely on their plans for the U.S. Both Kudrin and Prokhorov represent ‘acceptable opposition’ to Moscow. That’s a recipe for a gracious but certain defeat. Kudrin owes his allegiance to Putin for slightly different reasons, but the result is the same: both candidates exist to draw off votes and appease the intellectual classes who are disenchanted with Putin’s leadership. But they will do nothing to keep Putin from a third term as President.

Putin will run a campaign — he will go to a supermarket, complain that prices are too high, and prices will be lowered. He will find some way to distribute a token amount of the natural resource wealth to the public, such as ordering a price cap on gasoline.  He will spend the money it takes to make a noticeable impact for his base. He’ll make the gestures to the public and the media that he deserves a third term. And he’ll get it.

What will be interesting is whether Putin makes any adjustments to his leadership style upon winning that third term. Will he embrace some limited reforms? Will he attempt to prepare Russia for a day when he is no longer president? Putin, as president and now prime minister, has spent years gutting Russia’s institutions, in order to consolidate power. Could that, in the face of these protests, begin to be reversed, ever so slightly?

Whatever occurs in Russia, be sure that this is no Arab Spring. Changes are a long way off in Putin’s Russia. But the reemergence of Prokhorov and Kudrin in the political arena may just indicate that the Kremlin is toying with an idea of reform.

This essay is based on a transcribed interview with Bremmer.

Photo: Russian billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov speaks during a news conference in Moscow December 12, 2011. Prokhorov announced on Monday his intention to run for president during the March 2012 election. REUTERS/Sergei Karpukhin

By Ian Bremmer
The opinions expressed are his own.

Long live the king? You can’t hold it against the Russian people for wondering just how long Vladimir Putin intends to remain in power with the recent announcement that he plans to return himself to the presidency and swap his partner Dmitri Medvedev into the prime minister slot. The electoral game Putin is playing is being compared to “castling” in chess– a rook and a king swapping places, in order to shore up the defense.

There might be defense at the heart of the strategy, but Putin’s ruling party, United Russia, despite some recent murmurings, is still the only game in Moscow. Which is to say that Vladimir Putin is by all reckoning the most powerful man in the world. What other leader, leaving aside third-world strongmen, has so completely consolidated his rule over a country, as Putin has? His success is all the more venerable when one considers that Putin is leader of a country of nearly 150 million people — and at the helm of the one of the world’s most important economies. Attention must be paid to him. Sure, other leaders around the world may have more people or even larger economies, but they don’t have as full a grip on the reins of power as Putin. (And few have ever been reverently photographed riding horseback shirtless, petting a tiger, or playing piano in tux and tails.)

Even with this switcheroo, little will change about Russia’s, which is to say Putin’s, stance on foreign or domestic affairs. Despite years of inspired reformist speechifying from President Medvedev, little has changed in the ossified Russian bureaucracy. That speaks to his true, limited, authority. The civil service system he declaims remain inefficient and antiquated, and presents ample opportunity for the kind of low-level corruption that greases the wheels of local politics across the world. Medvedev has been a friendly face for the Western world, someone who says the right things on its grand stages; but he has had little influence, as president, over the country’s true direction. As the prime minister in waiting, look for that trend to continue.

It’s hard to believe the public pronouncements that the decision to castle was made years ago, as Putin has told the press. Medvedev’s recent statements simply don’t bear that out. Nor does the sudden ouster of Finance minister Alexei Kudrin. Kudrin was upset because he wasn’t given advance warning of the decision. That speaks volumes about who is important at the Kremlin — power there is controlled by Putin’s tiny circle and those on the periphery, titles aside, are kept completely in the dark.

Having said all this, one reason Putin’s not afraid to pull such a brazen act is that the swap will have little to no impact on foreign investment or the Russian domestic economy. A recent move towards an improved investment climate in Russia’s strategic sectors (facilitating, among other things, ExxonMobil’s recent mammoth joint venture with Rosneft) is the natural outcome of lower oil prices and limited inbound investment. Again, some of the signals coming out of Russia may change — Putin as president may once again show something like disinterested contempt towards the West and its demands of his regime in terms of human rights or international conventions, but as in his previous terms, such talk will be just that. The Kremlin has strategically opened itself up to smart money in foreign direct investment and will continue to let Western money in on its own terms. That won’t change.

There’s not much more else to see here from a policy perspective, or a political one. The parliamentary “elections” after all, will be between Putin’s United Russia, the ever-weakening Communist Party, and an “opposition” party that is actually financed by the Kremlin. When Putin eventually leaves the scene, which might not be for decades, the extraordinary centralization of power in his Kremlin and weakness of the bureaucracy will be a profound mess for whoever tries to succeed him. But, until that time, for any pretenders to the Russian throne, it’s checkmate.

This essay is based on a transcribed interview with Bremmer.

Photo: Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev (L) and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin walk at the residence in Zavidovo in the Tver region September 24, 2011. Putin declared on Saturday he was ready to return to the Russian presidency after current head of state Medvedev announced he would bow to his mentor at March’s election. REUTERS/Sergei Karpukhin

People talk about the Russian presidential election like it really matters. But it doesn’t. The supposedly big news and debate right now is whether or not Russian President Dmitry Medvedev will run for president again in 2012.

The real news that no one is talking about is not the presidential election parlor game being played in Moscow right now, but is about an authoritarian government feeling the need to try to paint a veneer of democracy. Besides, the fall parlor game will matter much more than this spring one.

Western media can keep making it out to be as big a deal as they want to, but, ultimately, it doesn’t matter if Medvedev stays on as president or if Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin returns to the post. While Medvedev looks like he is trying to distance himself from Putin — he has taken a different stance on Libya and is pro-US and Europe and pro-private sector — Medvedev, as much as he may be interested in running again, is not going to run against Putin if Putin puts himself in the race.

Historically, Russia has had show trials; this is a show election. In the past, Russia has put on trials to try to convince the Western world that there is a rule of law and that government transparency exists in their country. But this presidential election is feeling much too like the Khodorkovsky trial, yet another show trial that failed to prove that fair trials exist in Russia. There is no rule of law in Russia.

What’s remarkable about the Khodorkovsky trial is that we are still talking about it a decade later. It’s not in Russia’s interest to let Khodorkovsky speak publicly, but the Russian government feels a need to allow Khodorkovsky to go through the motions of talking to the media so that it looks like he is receiving a fair trial. The trial isn’t for Russians themselves, but for Russia watchers.

Despite a handful of people and media publications who see right through Russia’s vexing charade, there is a deep rooted reason why they continue to put on such a show — Russia’s  insecurity complex. It is exactly that complex, and the diverted energy to cover it up, that makes Russia continually bluster any meaningful political and economic reform.

Despite Russia’ desire to compete with the West, the fact is their economy is not growing – in fact, banks are starting to pull out of the country. Yet Russia is so desperate to be considered a superpower and accepted as an advanced Western nation that they continue to flex their  muscles. In the end, this only makes them look  yet weaker , especially against the backdrop of their next door neighbor, China, which is growing, along with its confidence.

For now, the outcome of who’s going to run for president is probably already predetermined, but it looks nice for Russia to have foreign speculation of plurality in their country. Contrary to common wisdom, it would be a mistake to count Medvedev out. While Putin is still quite popular and could easily get reelected, going back as president shows weakness on his part and it’s great to have Medvedev be his plausible deniability.

This essay is based on a transcribed interview with Bremmer.

Photo: Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (R) and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in Moscow on June 22, 2011. REUTERS/Denis Sinyakov