We are pleased to have another guest post from Marc Morjé Howard on the differences and similarities between the 2011 revolutions in the Middle East and the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe. See here, here, and here for some of our earlier posts on this.
1) Neither set of movements was predicted—even by experts. Although for some this may raise questions about the value of “expertise,” in my view it puts into question the importance of prediction. Contingent events and human behavior in unknown situations are impossible to predict. The fact that most scholars failed to predict the particular decisions made by leaders like Gorbachev, Ceausescu, Ben-Ali, or Mubarak does not necessarily mean that they did not understand the regime or society. And it certainly does not mean we should stop studying countries, areas, and languages. Social science still has much to offer.
2) A key part of the anti-regime movements in both Eastern Europe and the Middle East resulted from elite defections, as political/military/security forces changed loyalties. The regimes were not monolithic, and the opposition gained strength as certain former leaders changed sides at pivotal points.
3) Although both sets of movements involved national events that were filtered through domestic contexts, they were also clear illustrations of the “international demonstration effect,” or “snowballing.” In Eastern Europe, the movements spread from Poland to Hungary to East Germany to Czechoslovakia to Romania and Bulgaria, and eventually to the Baltics, Ukraine, and even Russia itself. In the Middle East, they have spread from Tunisia to Egypt to Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, and even Syria.
4) The regional concentration in both cases has been remarkable, making it easy to follow by simply looking at a geographic map. Whereas earlier theories of democratization (preceding the events of 1989) focused on its domestic dynamics, clearly it has become a regional phenomenon, influenced by larger international factors as well.
5) The remarkable events in both regions provide a powerful challenge to easy and dismissive arguments about whether people in certain cultures yearn for freedom. There is clearly a powerful thirst for greater social justice and democracy—though it remains to be seen whether this becomes realized in new institutions that live up to these popular desires.
1) The larger geo-strategic environment is very different today. The movements of 1989 took place within the context of the Cold War, with two main super-powers and their mutually assured destruction. Today there are numerous complicating factors—some of which existed previously, but now have their own post-Cold War dynamic—including oil, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the rise of China, and many others.
2) It is important to remember that the East European states were not autonomous. Indeed, the Soviet Union was the guarantor of stability and continuity in the region. When Gorbachev made it clear that the Soviet Union would not intervene in Eastern Europe, the gates opened (quite literally in Hungary). Today’s Middle East contains a mix of small and large states with different levels of autonomy, but there is no equivalent to the Soviet Union lurking in the shadows.
3) The 1989 movements were not the first democratic protests in the region. Earlier movements had taken place in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1980-81), but these were all crushed. Nonetheless, they still stood as important precedents, to both the regime and the citizenry, which became useful later. Although dissent has been brewing in the Middle East for the past decade, there are no comparable precedents to these earlier East European movements.
4) The East European movements generally fit the classic (from O’Donnell and Schmitter’s Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, published in 1986) model of elite agency, whereby divisions between hard-liners and soft-liners in the regime led to pacts with the opposition, resulting in compromises on both sides. In this model, the “resurrection” of civil society only came later. In the Middle East, in contrast, the “popular upsurge” came first, before the elite divisions became apparent.
5) Unlike today in the Middle East, when the “opposition” is largely faceless, in Eastern Europe there were well-recognized dissidents who had much popular legitimacy. Although they may have been small in number, these writers, pastors, and environmental leaders were quite influential. In contrast, many of the long-standing opposition leaders in the countries of the Middle East are ineffective, coopted, or disconnected from contentious politics, thus contributing to the large gap between elite opposition politics and popular demands for democratic change.
6) Except for the Catholic Church in Poland, religion was almost entirely absent in the East European movements. Although churches were sometimes a “safe zone” in communist countries, the movements themselves were not religious, and the societies are the least religious in the world. In contrast, in the Middle East, although the movements have not been particularly religious, the societies certainly are, and the role of religion in political life remains a big, open, unanswered question.
7) All movements depend on communication—this has not changed—but the speed of the new media has obviously changed tremendously. Much of the information in the East European movements spread via samizdat (precious photocopies of texts and information from the outside that were smuggled around secretly). Today the spread of information is almost instantaneous via Facebook, Twitter, and blogs.
8) After the movements of 1989 ran their course, the communist regimes actually fell (even if they reorganized and competed electorally in some cases). In the Middle East, this has not happened (yet?). The outcomes of the ongoing transitions in Egypt and Tunisia are unclear, and it remains to be seen whether they will yield a clean break from authoritarian politics. In the other countries, autocrats still remain in charge, even if they have been shaken by the protests.
9) Extending from point 5, when the communist regimes fell, known opposition leaders were ready to assume office. Poland’s Lech Walesa and Czechoslovakia’s Václav Havel were the most prominent, but most East European countries had new leaders ready to fill the gap. This remains an open question in the Middle East.
10) In terms of the eventual consolidation of democracy in Eastern Europe, NATO and the European Union have played crucial roles by encouraging democratic reforms and making them conditions of membership. There are no equivalent regional organizations in the Middle East that could help to push these regimes to further democratize, and they are certainly not going to be invited to join NATO or the EU.
The 2011 movements in the Middle East have been beautiful, inspiring, and worth supporting. They are certainly reminiscent of the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe in many respects. Yet a closer inspection shows that the important similarities are nonetheless outweighed by key differences. As a result, I am pessimistic about the long-term effects of these movements and their ability to bring about consolidated democracy.
It is ironic, in my view, that so many observers have chosen the term “Arab Spring” to characterize these events. It does not take an especially astute historical memory to recall that the East European analogue to this concept was in fact the “Prague Spring” of 1968. In a sense, the term may actually be appropriate—even if unintentionally so—for the result in the Middle East may wind up looking more like the brutal crackdown and crushing of dissidents and opposition of 1968 than the successful democratizing revolutions of 1989.
‘It is important to remember that the East European states were not autonomous. Indeed, the Soviet Union was the guarantor of stability and continuity in the region. When Gorbachev made it clear that the Soviet Union would not intervene in Eastern Europe, the gates opened (quite literally in Hungary). Today’s Middle East contains a mix of small and large states with different levels of autonomy, but there is no equivalent to the Soviet Union lurking in the shadows.”
Doesn’t the United States play this role, to some extent? At least in the case of Egypt and Yemen (where we accepted the revolutions) and Bahrain (where we still maintained support for the current rulers).
I agree with many of your points, but some of the differences seem a bit overstated. On 2) The Romanian and Yugoslav regimes were not dependent on Soviet intervention to maintain themselves. Even Poland managed to repress opposition for its entire communist history without relying on Soviet forces, though of course Gorbachev’s hands-off policy of nonintervention did encourage mobilization there and elsewhere. On 6) the Catholic Church in Poland is a very big exception, and at any rate nationalist mobilization played a big role in some of these revolutions, which is also playing some role in the middle East (there hasn’t been that much religious mobilization there, contrary to expectations). On 5) the opposition was largely faceless in Bulgaria, Romania, and the GDR, and the regimes there still fell. Even in Czechoslovakia (where Havel became president) the opposition was tiny and largely unknown to most Czechoslovak citizens until very late in the game (see, for this point, Stephen Kotkin’s “Uncivil Society” and Steven Pfaff’s work). On 4) Only Hungary and Poland really fit the O’Donnell and Schmitter model of hardliner/softliner divisions first, leading to compromises; in the GDR, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, mobilization came first, and there were no important hardliner/softliner divisions at the top. In the GDR, you had to go as far down as Modrow, the party chief in Dresden, to find anything resembling a real “softliner” in the O’Donnell and Schmitter sense; in Romania there were no real softliners, though Ion Illiescu and the National Salvation front later presented themselves as such; and in Bulgaria the softliners only emerged “opportunistically” after the communist hierarchy saw the writing on the wall, and they decided to get ahead of events by ousting Zhivkov; Mark Beissinger’s “elite defection” model applies there (in his “modular revolution” piece in Perspectives on Politics), not O’Donnell and Schmitter’s model. In the Middle East one can find similar divisions between hardliners and softliners (e.g., within the Baath party in Syria). On 3) there have been protests in the Middle East before, though whether or not one wants to call them “democratic” depends on one’s point of view; even Libya experienced anti-Qaddafi protests in the past, all of which were crushed. Point 9) is a bit overstated as well; what does it mean for a leader to be ready to take power? El Baradei and Amr Moussa are seasoned politicians in Egypt, who could easily take power in a free election there (I’m not saying they are highly popular, only that they are leaders). Revolutions produce leaders, not the other way around.