Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat, Camp David, Thurmont, Maryland, Sept. 7, 1978. Corbis
As
the world continues to be transfixed by the political soap opera unfolding in
Egypt, perhaps none in the region have looked on more closely than the Israelis
and Palestinians. While there is much that divides the Israeli and Palestinian
leaderships, they share an enormous stake in the shape of Egypt’s future as
well as a growing unease about much of what they have seen so far.
For
Israeli officials, the toppling of Hosni Mubarak has led to the rise of
Islamist forces hostile to Israel and an increasing security vacuum along its
southern border, which casts doubt on the long-term durability of the 1979
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The fall of Mubarak and the rise of the Muslim
Brotherhood is equally troublesome for Palestinian officials in Ramallah, as it
eliminates their most powerful Arab ally and emboldens their Hamas rivals in
Gaza (Hamas being an off-shoot of the Brotherhood). The election of the Muslim
Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi to be the first civilian president since the
formation of the Egyptian republic sixty years ago has only intensified anxiety
in Tel Aviv and Ramallah.
Though
it is too early to say exactly what shape Egypt’s foreign policy will take, we
are unlikely to see any time soon either a continuation of the accommodationist
policies of Mubarak or a radical shift in Egypt’s dealings with Israel and the
Palestinians. Deeper changes in Egypt’s regional posture are likely over the
long-term but will depend on a host of internal and external factors, including
the relative success of political and economic reforms currently underway,
trends in U.S.-Egyptian ties, and developments on the Israeli-Palestinian front
and other regional dynamics. Despite the inevitable cooling in Egyptian-Israeli
and U.S.-Egyptian ties, however, the period ahead may not be all doom and gloom
in terms of Arab-Israeli peace, provided that Israel and the United States can
recognize and capitalize on an existing but narrow window before it closes.
Foreign Policy
Grievances
The virtual absence
of anti-Israeli and anti-American slogans throughout the eighteen-day uprising
in Tahrir Square is often cited reassuringly as evidence that the Egyptian
revolution was not about Israel or the United States. Such assertions are not
entirely accurate, though. While popular rebellions are seldom propelled by
foreign policy concerns, as opposed to domestic grievances, the Egyptian
uprising and the ensuing transition cannot be de-linked entirely from Israel
and the United States. The changes associated with Egypt’s ongoing political
transition will have a profound impact on Egypt’s relations with both countries
in the years to come.
Support for
Palestine and antagonism toward Israel are deeply ingrained in Egyptian
political culture and national consciousness. An issue that transcends partisan
politics and commands broad national consensus across all ideological and
demographic lines, the Palestinian cause is as much a matter of identity as it
is a question of public policy. Beyond sympathy for the plight of Palestinians,
hostility toward Israel is also fueled by Egypt’s own past sacrifices in blood
and treasure; four wars with Israel led to tens of thousands of Egyptian deaths
and billions of dollars in destruction. Even after three decades of formal
peace, most Egyptians still view Israel as a threat to national security and as
an enemy, not only of Palestinians but of all Arabs.
The Mubarak regime
did little to combat such sentiment. In fact, it frequently stoked populist
antipathy toward Israel as a way to boost its own domestic legitimacy. In an
environment where most forms of political expression were either severely
curtailed or banned altogether, the regime generally tolerated anti-Israel and
pro-Palestine activities, so long as they steered clear of criticism of the
regime itself. This balancing act became increasingly untenable during the
2000s and the so-called “war on terror.”
In the decade after
the September 11, 2001, attacks, Mubarak made Egypt a cornerstone of two key
pillars of American policy, U.S. counterterrorism efforts and the Arab-Israeli
peace process—which by the close of the decade had become virtually
interchangeable. Trilateral security coordination and intelligence sharing
reached unprecedented levels following the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian
Authority election in 2006. By making himself an indispensable asset to the
United States and Israel, however, Mubarak also fueled perceptions that his
regime was little more than an extension of American and Israeli policy.
Israel’s crackdown
against the Palestinian uprising (the Al-Aqsa Intifada) that began in September
2000 and the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq galvanized Egyptians and other
Arabs like rarely before. The proliferation of Palestine solidarity
initiatives, anti-normalization and boycott campaigns against Israel, and mass
demonstrations against Israel and the United States steadily increased into the
latter half of the decade in response to the 2006 Lebanon war, the Gaza
blockade, and the 2009 Gaza war (Operation Cast Lead). This decade’s events
served as a training ground and inspiration for proto-revolutionary groups like
the Kifaya! (Enough!) movement and the April 6 Youth Movement.
Thus, somewhat
ironically, Palestine activism became a sort of incubator for the protest
movement that eventually led to the January 25, 2011, uprising. On one level,
Egyptians’ identification with Palestinian subjugation (and struggle for
eventual liberation) was a vicarious expression of their own yearning for
freedom. At the same time, pro-Palestinian activism along with anti-Israeli and
anti-American sentiment in Egypt became surrogates for anti-regime politics—epitomizing
the ever-widening divide between the ruler and the ruled.
Instead of working
to level the playing field on behalf of the Palestinians in the U.S.-led peace
process, as most Egyptians would have preferred, the U.S. expected Mubarak to
further pressure the beleaguered Palestinian leadership into participating in
(failed) negotiations and to refrain from reconciling with Hamas. Of all the
issues on the Israeli-Palestinian scene, however, none was more universally
unpopular or more damaging to Mubarak’s domestic standing than Gaza, which
became a rallying cry for established opposition groups like the Muslim
Brotherhood as well as the newly formed protest movements. By closing off the
Egyptian side of the border to Gazan trade, civilian traffic, and humanitarian
access, the Mubarak regime became complicit in the Israeli-imposed blockade of
the Gaza Strip and the 2009 Gaza war.
Egypt’s historic
peace treaty with Israel did more than just reconcile two former foes; it
consummated Egypt’s strategic reorientation toward the United States. While
Anwar Sadat may have signed the historic treaty, it was Mubarak who implemented
it, preserved it, and made it a pillar of Egypt’s strategic posture in the
region. Officially, Mubarak maintained a cool, arm’s length, and occasionally
confrontational stance toward Israel, while quietly deepening security
cooperation with Washington and Tel Aviv at all levels. Thus, despite the
notoriously cold peace kept by Mubarak, Israeli leaders considered him a
strategic prize.
Fairly or unfairly,
it is impossible to separate Mubarak’s growing unpopularity and waning domestic
legitimacy from his relationships with the United States and with Israel. On
one hand, much of Mubarak’s behavior in the region was seen as being at the
behest of both countries. And on the other hand, the invaluable political,
diplomatic, and especially military support provided by the United States
(largely in response to Israel’s needs) played no small role in sustaining the
Egyptian dictatorship.
Israel,
Palestine, and the ‘New’ Egypt
Pro-Palestinian and
anti-Israel sentiment has continued to animate Egyptian politics after the
uprising. Anti-Israel protests are commonplace and Tahrir demonstrations
regularly feature Palestinian flags and other symbols. Israel became a
convenient punching bag for populist politicians from across the ideological
spectrum, while Egyptian presidential candidates competed over who was more
pro-Palestinian.
Two events stand
out as particularly noteworthy. The storming of the Israeli embassy in Cairo on
September 9, 2011, by Egyptian protesters angry at the killing of Egyptian
border guards during an Israeli operation against militants in the Sinai weeks
earlier marked a turning point for all sides. The embassy attack, which
prompted an emergency evacuation of the ambassador and his staff out of the
country, was a signal to Israelis, Palestinians, and Americans alike that
change was coming. The Muslim Brotherhood and other political parties condemned
the embassy attack as an act of vigilantism unbecoming of a civilized state
rather than for the sentiment behind it.
Then, in March
2012, Egypt’s first freely elected parliament voted unanimously to expel Israel’s
ambassador in Cairo, a rare show of consensus in Egypt’s notoriously fractious
politics and a clear signal as to where Egypt’s political class stood vis-à-vis
Israel. In doing so, parliamentarians also approved a text declaring, “Revolutionary
Egypt will never be a friend, partner, or ally of the Zionist entity, which we
consider to be the number one enemy of Egypt and the Arab nation,” and further
urging the government, “to review all its relations and accords with that
enemy.” Although purely symbolic, given the parliament’s lack of authority in
diplomatic matters, the vote could not have been reassuring for Israel.
Despite the harsher
tone coming out of Cairo, very little has actually changed in Egyptian policy
toward Israel and the Palestinians since Mubarak’s ejection in February 2011.
The country’s interim rulers, the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF),
have said they will uphold Egypt’s international obligations, including the
treaty with Israel—as have most Egyptian political parties, both secular and
Islamist. Egypt also continues to support the Israeli-Palestinian peace process
(such as it is) and a two-state settlement of the conflict, and remains the
primary backer of the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority.
The only new
developments to emerge since Mubarak’s removal have been Egypt’s brokering of a
Fatah-Hamas reconciliation agreement in April 2011 and the growing security
vacuum in the Sinai, neither of which is irreversible. Even the highly
unpopular closure of Gaza, despite some changes in the management of the Rafah
border crossing, is largely the same as it was under Mubarak. More crucially,
Egyptian-Israeli security coordination has continued throughout Egypt’s
tumultuous political transition and despite the heightened tensions on both
sides of the border.
In
fact, Egypt’s overall foreign policy orientation remains remarkably similar to
what it was under Mubarak, including Egypt’s close strategic partnership with
the United States and its cooperation with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states
(despite the latter’s open hostility toward the Egyptian uprising). This should
come as no surprise given that the military in general and the intelligence
apparatus in particular have continued to control Egyptian foreign and national
security policy. Islamists have had little say in governing the country during
the transition much less in formulating foreign policy.
Perhaps the most
fundamental change to come out of the Egyptian uprising—and which will be among
the most difficult to roll back—is the increased importance of public opinion,
which is now a force in domestic politics and even policy-making like never
before. The weight of public opinion was evident throughout the transition. In
addition to the vote to expel the Israeli ambassador, for example, there were
the populist positions adopted by the unelected government installed by SCAF
such as the decision to turn down International Monetary Fund loans and the
uproar over the release of American non-governmental organization workers. The
attitudes of ordinary Egyptians are likely to have an even more pronounced
impact on politicians now that they are accountable before their constituents.
Peace Treaty
Inertia
The ascendancy of
the Islamists, who now hold the presidency of the Arab world’s most important
country, could result in a reorientation of foreign policy in due course. But
there are three reasons to expect more continuity than change in Egypt’s
foreign policy over the next several years, regardless of who holds the levers
of power.
In the first place,
Egyptians are simply too consumed with domestic issues to pursue an ambitious
foreign policy agenda at this time. Despite the supposed handover of power to
an elected president on June 30, the country’s turbulent transition is anything
but complete. On the contrary, the election of a highly polarizing figure like
Morsi and SCAF’s rather brazen attempts to hold on to power, suggest that the
democratic transition is at best just beginning and at worst put off
indefinitely.
Meanwhile, with the
fate of the parliament and constitution-drafting process still largely up in
the air, Egypt’s three-way power struggle between the military, the Islamists,
and revolutionary forces is likely to continue for some time. This uncertainty
and the continued potential for instability are exacerbated by the ever-present
threat of popular unrest and an economy teetering dangerously close to collapse.
As a result, foreign policy matters will continue to take a backseat to
domestic issues such as the economy and security. Like many unfulfilled
aspirations of the Egyptian revolution, Egypt’s re-emergence as a dynamic actor
in the region and a leader of the Arab world will clearly have to wait.
The
absence of major differences of opinion among Egyptians, whether at the popular
or political levels, also favors continuity. Despite the fractious nature of
Egyptian politics, there is a fairly broad consensus across social, political,
and ideological lines on foreign policy matters in general and on Israel and
Palestine in particular. Several recent polls also show that, while Egyptians
are generally split over whether the Camp David peace process was positive or
negative for Egypt, there remains support among the main political forces—including
Islamists, nationalists, leftists, and revolutionaries—for maintaining the
treaty, if with greater reciprocity and balance. The main changes Egyptians
would like to see in the relationship have to do with security arrangements in
the Sinai, natural gas sales to Israel, and Israel’s overall treatment of
Palestinians.
In
the end, the most important determinant of Egyptian policy toward
Israel/Palestine in the short- to medium-term remains the role of Egypt’s
military. SCAF’s muscular role in politics will persist for some time. In
addition to preserving their vast economic interests, the ruling generals have
repeatedly sought immunity from government oversight, budgetary scrutiny, and
even prosecution, while continuing to control key government functions. Whether
or not such exemptions are ultimately codified in the constitution, SCAF has
made it clear—most recently in its unilateral “constitutional addendum”—that it
seeks to retain control over areas that bear directly or indirectly on Egypt’s
foreign policy, including defense, national security, and intelligence, as well
as other sovereignty portfolios such as the justice and interior ministries. It
is this fact more than any other that has prevented a full-blown panic on the
part of the Israelis, even after the election of a Muslim Brotherhood leader to
the presidency.
Yes to Camp
David, But with Changes
Egyptian policy
toward Israel and Palestine in the coming years is likely to focus on three
points. First, Egypt will maintain the peace treaty with Israel but will
eventually seek certain adjustments—something most Egyptian political parties,
secular and Islamist, have already called for. The most likely candidate in this
regard relates to the status of the Sinai, a matter of intense concern for
Israelis and Egyptians alike. Camp David-imposed restrictions on the ability of
Egyptian forces to deploy in the Sinai are seen across the board—by SCAF,
Islamists, and secular political groups alike—as an affront to Egyptian
sovereignty and national pride. At the same time, there is a longstanding fear
that Israel seeks to permanently push Gaza, demographically and politically,
onto Egypt. For their part, Israelis fear an increasingly lawless Sinai is
becoming a haven for jihadi extremists on its southern flank and for weapons’
smuggling into Hamas-controlled Gaza.
Egyptian
authorities acknowledge the security problems in Sinai and have recently begun
to crack down on jihadi militants there, but are equally worried about the
prospect of unilateral Israeli actions in the Sinai. Despite their shared
concerns regarding the region, Israeli leaders are disinclined to consider
changes to the peace treaty for fear of establishing a precedent. Even so,
renegotiating aspects of the treaty could be in Israel’s long-term interests,
not only for addressing a key security concern but, perhaps more important, by
making Egypt’s current rulers—including previously rejectionist Islamists—direct
stakeholders in the treaty.
Second, Egyptian
policy is likely to focus on reconciliation of Palestinian factions rather than
on the ‘peace process.’ To the extent that Egypt does engage in
Israeli-Palestinian affairs it will be limited to areas where its own national
security is directly affected. Thus, we are likely to see less emphasis on
negotiations with Israel and more emphasis on preventing Israeli-Palestinian
violence and on promoting internal Palestinian reconciliation. There are
practical as well as political reasons for this. The palpable absence of any
meaningful peace negotiations has already led to a focus on crisis-prevention
over conflict-resolution by many of the parties concerned. For their part,
Egyptians will be even less inclined to deal with distractions much less crises
on their eastern borders.
Even the Muslim
Brotherhood, which may find itself facing new pressures from both the military
and angry revolutionaries, will find it hard to do more than pay lip service to
the cause of Palestine—let alone that of Hamas. Although Hamas remains the
biggest beneficiary of the Brotherhood’s success, its current sense of
triumphalism may be short-lived. A protracted and difficult transition in Cairo
will leave Egyptians in general and the Brotherhood in particular more inclined
to keep things quiet along its eastern border. More important, while a further
easing of the Gaza closure is certainly possible, a full-blown opening of the
border as Hamas officials have been calling for is probably not in the offing.
The
Brotherhood has already signaled a move in this direction. Despite organic ties
with Hamas, it has adopted a relatively neutral position regarding the latter’s
feud with Fatah during the transition. This may be due to a desire to avoid
confrontation with SCAF, as well as with the United States, or may be part of a
calculated attempt to establish its credibility as a future interlocutor. The
Brotherhood’s neutrality comes at a time when the military regime, specifically
Egyptian intelligence, is playing a more evenhanded (or at least less overtly
pro-Fatah) role in reconciling the two Palestinian factions. In his inaugural
speech, President Morsi pledged not only to support Palestinian rights but also
made clear that Palestinian national reconciliation was a prerequisite for the
Palestinian people to recover its territory and sovereignty.
Calm in Gaza
requires a political arrangement on both the Hamas-Israel and the Hamas-Fatah
tracks. The prospect of an Egyptian-mediated reconciliation between Hamas and
Fatah does not sit well with Israel, which considers Hamas a terrorist group
and opposes its inclusion in Palestinian governance. On the other hand, Israel
could stand to benefit from the fact that Egypt is keen on preventing war and
containing conflicts along its eastern border. This was evident in Egypt’s
brokering of the March 2012 Gaza truce, which ended four days of fighting
between Israel and Palestinian militants, as well as the deal that ended a
potentially explosive mass hunger strike by Palestinian prisoners in May 2012.
The
fact that the Brotherhood may be inclined to push Hamas to reconcile with Fatah
and maintain a ceasefire with Israel does not mean Hamas will necessarily
comply. While the Brotherhood clearly has influence over its Islamist allies in
Palestine, perhaps even inordinate sway, it is not in a position to issue
orders to Hamas leaders either inside or outside Gaza. The willingness of Hamas
to go along with Egyptian preferences, however, may depend on what Morsi and
the Brotherhood can deliver for Hamas politically. Since a total opening of the
border is unlikely at this time, Hamas may seek the assistance of Egyptian
Islamists.
A
third area of focus related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict involves
Egyptian relations with the United States. Although the alliance will remain
intact, tensions that began well before the 2011 uprising have accelerated
throughout the transition. Egyptian efforts to push for Palestinian unity or
changes in the peace treaty with Israel could strain relations even further.
Either way, security coordination with both the United States and Israel is
likely to continue in the coming years.
In the meantime,
the delicate balance the United States now maintains with Egypt’s military
rulers on the one hand and its elected civilian (and thus far mainly Islamist)
officials on the other is likely to grow even more complicated and
uncomfortable in the years to come. Not only must each side contend with
domestic constituencies that remain staunchly opposed to any U.S.-Islamist
dialogue, they must also tread lightly so as not to alienate political actors
in both countries. This will be particularly difficult for the U.S.
administration, which must strike a balance not only between the military and
an Islamist president but between these two power centers and more secular,
liberal groups as well.
Looking
Forward
Over
the long term, we should expect to see much deeper changes in Egyptian dealings
with Israel and the Palestinians, though it will take time for the gap between
public sentiment and government policy to narrow. This assumes, of course, that
some kind of democratic transition is still occurring—which is by no means
assured, especially given recent developments, but neither is it entirely
precluded. In any event, to the extent that such a shift does occur, it will
most likely involve movement from both ends toward the middle. In other words,
we can expect to see gradual changes in public opinion and government policy
simultaneously rather than sudden, dramatic shifts in one or the other.
Both the Muslim
Brotherhood and the ultra-conservative Salafis have shown a capacity for
compromise, particularly the former. In fact, the Brotherhood’s discourse with
regard to Israel and the Palestinians underwent a major transformation during
the transition—even before it won a majority in the parliament. The apparent
overhaul of the Brotherhood’s electoral program from 2010 to 2011 is especially
striking. Whereas both programs contain the standard references to the “Zionist
enemy,” the 2011 program of its newly created Freedom and Justice Party (FJP)
is considerably more tame, dropping the most incendiary references to Israel,
such as the “rapists of the Al-Aqsa Mosque,” and eliminating the section on the
“Palestinian cause” altogether. Even the anti-blockade language was heavily
watered down, to the point that it no longer even mentions Gaza by name.
Whether such
changes are indicative of a genuine political evolution or are merely cosmetic
and tactical, only time will tell. More importantly, the evolution of Egyptian
policy toward Israel/Palestine, over say the next five to twenty years, will
depend on numerous factors, including the results of Egypt’s economic reform.
The
extent to which the military remains involved in the political sphere, and the
manner in which it may eventually be eased out, will certainly affect Egypt’s
long-term posture toward Israel/Palestine. Having already witnessed a major
set-back in the transition to democratic civilian rule, the prospects for
pushing the military from politics in the near future are not promising, though
not impossible further down the road. While continued military rule may seem
good for Israel in the short-term, it is ultimately unsustainable. Although a
civilian-led government will undoubtedly reflect anti-Israel populism as a
factor, it is also more likely to pursue a rational course of action.
The success or
failure of Egypt’s economic recovery will also affect future relations with
Israel and Palestine, which of course is also bound up with its own
interminable transition. Economic improvement will afford Egypt the space to
play a more active diplomatic role in the region and beyond, and could reduce
its overall dependence on U.S./Western and Saudi/Gulf assistance. On the other
hand, continued economic hardship will prolong Egypt’s diplomatic stagnation
and perhaps further fan the flames of populism and xenophobia.
Egypt’s posture in
regard to Israel/Palestine will of course also depend on the future of
U.S.-Egypt relations. Despite recent strains, and growing calls in both
Washington and Cairo for phasing out the strategic partnership, the alliance is
likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Over time, however, irrespective
of who rules Egypt or which party comes to power, Egyptian foreign policy is
likely to become more independent and more assertive, making some sort of
parting of the ways inevitable. In which case, it would be reasonable to expect
the military-military aspect of U.S.-Egyptian ties to be the last to go.
The political
evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood (or any successor movements or parties that
may emerge from it) and other Islamist forces, including in the diplomatic
realm, is likely to continue over the long term. However, this will largely
depend on the success or failure of Egypt’s democratic experiment as well as
Western and Israeli responses to Islamist success. Since democratic backsliding
would likely have a disproportionate effect on Islamists (as with the recent
dissolution of parliament), a return to autocracy, or a prolonging of military
rule, is likely to radicalize them on a greater scale than other political
trends. Likewise, a resumption of American hostility to Islamism of the kind
witnessed in the previous decade, or an escalation in Israeli rhetoric, such as
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s references to Islamism as the “insatiable
crocodile,” can only fuel anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment.
Finally,
developments on the Israeli-Palestinian front will also help shape Egypt’s
outlook on the matter. The continued absence of progress toward a comprehensive
resolution of the conflict will likely harden Egyptian antipathy and distrust
at the public and political levels toward the United States and Israel.
Moreover, a resumption of large-scale Israeli-Palestinian violence,
particularly if it involves heavy Palestinian casualties, will inflame public
sentiment and put pressure on Egyptian politicians to respond. Such a scenario
might even re-entrench military rule (perhaps with U.S./Western acquiescence),
undercut economic recovery, and radicalize large segments of the Egyptian
political class. While even the most just Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement
will not compel Egyptians to love Israel or Israelis, it will help to stem the growing
reservoir of hostility and even hatred as well as restore Egyptian trust in the
United States.
Opportunity
for Peace?
The
Israeli-Palestinian peace process had stagnated well before the dramatic Arab
Spring. With the exception of a brief period in the final year of the George W.
Bush administration, no serious negotiations have taken place between the
parties throughout the preceding decade. The loss of Mubarak and the rapid rise
of Islamists in Egypt and elsewhere have made a negotiated settlement less
appealing to Netanyahu and more urgent for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.
While
an Islamist president in Egypt, a hardline government in Israel, and a divided
Palestinian leadership may not seem like the ingredients for a diplomatic
breakthrough, particularly against the backdrop of declining American influence
and generalized turmoil in the region, the prognosis need not be completely
negative. This notion is not based on an optimistic reading of present
realities, but on a realistic view of future possibilities. Namely, if from an
Israeli point of view the region looks bad today, there is no reason to believe
it will look any better in the future, even when things settle down. Such a
reading should be an incentive to more seriously explore the possibilities that
exist.
Although Morsi’s
election hardly represents a mandate for the Islamic project, Islamists are
likely to remain key players in Egyptian politics for some time. Regardless of
his Islamist ideology, the current president’s views on foreign policy, and
particularly on Israel and Palestine, are squarely with those of mainstream
Egyptian society. In any case, regardless of who is in power (again, assuming a
democratic transition has not been foreclosed), Egyptian policies are likely to
become more responsive to public opinion, not less. Likewise, as Egypt
stabilizes politically and economically over time, its involvement in foreign
engagements is likely to increase rather than decrease, as will the eventual
easing of the military from its political role. Nor do trends elsewhere in the
region favor Israeli delays in achieving a peaceful settlement with the
Palestinians. Any future political configuration in a post-Assad Syria, for
example, is likely to include a strong contingent from the Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood, already a major force within the country’s opposition movement.
None of this is to
say that a Palestinian-Israeli breakthrough is imminent or even likely, only
that initiating a credible peace process between Palestinians and Israelis is
possible even under present conditions. Any serious initiative on this front,
however, would require substantial political will and investment on the part of
the United States as well as a modicum of stability in Egypt’s transition.
Although neither of these conditions currently exist, it is not inconceivable
that one or both could come about by the end of 2012 or early 2013.
At a minimum, the
current hiatus presents an opportunity for the United States, in conjunction
with its international and regional partners, to re-think a deeply flawed and
severely outdated approach to Arab-Israeli peacemaking. This will require a
willingness to go beyond failed mechanisms like reliance on the Quartet—a
mediation bloc consisting of the U.S., the European Union, Russia, and the UN—and
a recognition that regional players, including Egypt, have a leading rather
than supporting role to play. More importantly, it will also require the United
States and Israel to adapt to new realities not just in Egypt but in Palestine
as well. The notion that a meaningful peace deal could be reached in the
absence of Palestinian unity was always questionable. In the wake of the Arab
Spring, however, it is totally untenable.
Khaled Elgindy is a visiting fellow at the
Brookings Institution’s Saban Center for Middle East Policy in Washington, DC.
He is a founding board member of the Egyptian-American Rule of Law Association.
From 2004 to 2009, he served as an advisor to the Palestinian leadership on
permanent status negotiations, notably during those launched at Annapolis in
November 2007.