Embracing transition
Bassma Kodmani argues that a neutral platform is required in which dialogue between all interested parties can take place
Bassma Kodmani , Tuesday 12 Mar 2013
Time and again we have repeated that the Arab revolutions are without vision, without ideology and without leaders; that youth discovered or invented the strategy to bring down authoritarianism, but that no one knows where we are going.
Are we being impatient? How long does it take to transition? If by 'transition' we mean the end of stagnation and the emergence of dynamic societies, the short answer would be that transition will last the rest of our lives.
Revolutionary processes are turbulent and muddy; they are much bigger than the sum of the groups that triggered them, and no single political force can manage the process alone. They need to exude the new substance of democratic politics. In these contexts, the best contribution analysts can make is to formulate the right questions.
If transition is a founding moment, should it be governed by special measures and rules? What pattern of institution-building should we seek to promote during the time of the establishment of the constitution and the new institutions of the state? Is the rule of the majority sufficient to bestow legitimacy on the new institutions, or should the rule of inclusiveness prevail in order to secure the solid adherence of all social and political groups, however small they are in numbers of votes?
In Tunisia, in Egypt, in Yemen, in Libya, and even within the Syrian opposition, while the regime is still in place, the quest for a national consensus in the name of the higher national interest collides with the narrow partisan strategies and calculations of the different groups.
Should we deplore this or simply forget the romanticism of the revolutionary moment and admit that this is the essence of democratic politics and the way other societies were shaped?
In the absence of a public debate and unresolved differences over decades, we have too many issues to sort out. Should we therefore consider that fighting out our differences is healthy and consider that when the dust settles, we can engage again in a process of reform? Have the revolutions only lifted a lid that makes reforms possible, or are we to undergo radical transformation of all institutions inside and outside the state?
Politics or 'dirty' politics?
Are the democratic forces – the liberals, secularists and leftists – mere idealists trying to apply democracy by the book, as it is defined in the old democracies of the West? There is a gap between, on the one hand, those who consider that the new edifice of democracy can be built brick-by-brick, according to an architectural plan set in advance, and local forces – Islamists and other traditional groups – on the other hand, who build their constituencies based on the social realities of their countries.
The former are busy designing the ideal plan, while the latter are playing politics – some would say 'dirty politics' – with a view to tame the society and develop the mechanisms to control it. They bribe their voters with goods and services, mobilise their followers to flex their muscles when needed and strike tactical alliances to win in the arithmetic game of elections.
They seek to strike deals with anti-revolutionary forces of the 'deep state,' impose their people in the media, infiltrate unions, enact laws that stifle freedoms and endanger the independence of the judiciary. They are accused of having created an undemocratic environment in the political market where the rules of competition have become unfair.
But neither Islamists nor any other single political force will be able to face the challenges of the post-revolution era alone. Some believe that by showing greed in the control of power, Islamists should be left to lose their credibility and take all the blame, while others say societies cannot afford it, the economies are bankrupt, the security risks are too high and the cost to the population is simply unbearable.
In this context, how are we to preserve the constituencies of democratic politics?
Politicians and technocrats
If there is no shortcut to a stable democracy, the question becomes: can we shield some vital areas from partisan politics to limit the cost to the people?
Some, like the prime minister of Tunisia, called for the formation of a government of technocrats in the name of the higher national interest. Is there legitimacy for technocrats to govern? We agree that the people who started the revolutions did not rise to confront the security forces because they want an Islamic or a secular state, but because they wanted freedom and dignity in addition to jobs, housing, the means to build a family and a future.
A government that delivers on these demands and works to establish respect of human rights and restore dignity, rather than promote identity politics, is likely to earn the legitimacy that stems from performance. Or are these eminently political choices that only political groups can make, depending on the constituencies they rely on?
Outside partners and the cost-benefit rationale
The longevity and resilience of our authoritarian systems had driven theories about Arab 'exceptionalism.' Our revolutionary processes have their specificity as we seek to integrate diverse communities, traditional and modern, ethnic, religious and sectarian, into one polity.
But how exceptional is the Arab world in this regard? We believe we joined the rest of the world when we shook off the crocodile skin in which our societies were trapped.
When outside partners ask us questions related to their own concerns, we are not in a position to provide answers that will alleviate their anxieties as we ourselves are searching for answers to existential questions.
Arab countries are at best in a turbulent trial-and-error period, as in Tunisia and Egypt, and at worst dying by the hundreds every day, as in Syria. If they want to avoid inaction in such turbulent and fast changing contexts in which a cost-benefit analysis may be impossible or irrelevant, how should regional and international partners formulate effective foreign policies?
The role of an Arab institution, such as the Arab Reform Initiative, is to mobilise the community of Arab thinkers and activists to generate multiple organic views and locally grounded agendas where change rather than stagnation (dressed up as stability) is embraced. We are unlikely to avoid mistakes because of this knowledge, but we can make sense of what is happening – and that, in itself, is a key safeguard to avoiding the loss of confidence.
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