April 24, 2013
While
observers may disagree about the various reasons Algeria has proved thus far
resistant to the Arab Spring, there can be no doubt about the role of the
regime’s notorious Department of Intelligence and Security (French acronym,
DRS). Perhaps aided by the lingering memory of Algeria’s bloody civil war—which
took as many as 200,000 lives—the DRS has been effectively
able to prevent protests from turning into a revolution. Yet regional changes
seem to revive civil society activists' demands for greater freedoms. And in
response, the government is reverting to the harsher repression.
On March
26, several members of Algeria's League for Human Rights (French acronym,
LADDH)—including Kamel Dinne Fakhar, a senior member of the group’s executive
committee—were assaulted by security forces following a peaceful sit-in in the
northern-central city of Ghardaia. The approximately twenty LADDH activists
were subsequently arrested. Several were held in custody—some even in solitary
confinement. “The sit-in took place in protest of the high amount of money
[sic] the regime spent on Ghardaia's traditional Carpet Festival,” explained
Yacine Zaid, a senior member of the LADDH.1 “People demand that this
money will instead be put into building up Algeria's infrastructure and
combating a high unemployment rate. We have to solve the real problems of this
country.” According to the official press
release of the LADDH, activists were subjected to grave human rights
abuses—some to an extent that they even engaged in a hunger strike. They were
released temporarily on April 2.
On March
25, a day before the LADDH arrests, the police prevented 96 civil society
activists from traveling to Tunisia; these activists had intended to
participate in the World Social Forum, which brings together around 50,000 participants annually to
discuss human rights and social responsibility. According to a press release of
the International Committee of Support to Autonomous Algerian Trade Unions
(French acronym, CISA), the group was held for five hours in their two buses
close to the Tunisian border in the northeastern section of Tebessa before
being denied entry. No official reason was given; police only noted that they
were “following
instructions.”
Although
unrelated, both incidents are only two of the most recent indications that
demands for greater government accountability are increasing in the country.
Yet these incidents also signal that the level of regime repression is
intensifying showing le pouvoir’s ability to enforce stability in
the face of mounting domestic and regional challenges.
Vigilant
of this increased social activism, the country’s regime has adopted an
elaborate strategy aimed at enforcing political stability notably by the
Algerian government’s increased use of its notorious secret service, the DRS
and also by shuffling around political actors and forces. This shuffling
consists of what many Algerians have come to call lifting du pouvoir, or a
regime “facelift.” For example, in January 2013, the
ambitions of Ahmed Ouyahia (of the National Rally for Democracy) and Abdelaziz
Belkhadem (of the National Liberation Front)—for a long time considered the
most likely candidates for the 2014 presidential election, despite their deep
unpopularity—were nullified when the latter was dismissed from and the former
resigned as the secretary-generals of their respective political parties. Many
view such developments (cosmetic notions of political change) as having been
enforced from the top-down in order to appease the increasingly restless
population.
Those who
still decide to oppose the regime—be it on the streets or through the web—are
easily tracked down by the DRS, which is widely known as one of the world's
most effective and ruthless intelligence services.
More
notable is the recent increase in the scope and intensity of the regime’s
repression, which has also drawn a renewed attention on Algeria’s notorious
security services. Since the civil war, DRS officers have made their mark on
Algeria’s political system, and today (more than ever) they seem to view their
role as the guardians of the country’s stability and security. While Bouteflika
has, to some extent, regained controlled over the army by appointing officers
close to his loyal circles, the security forces remain under the control of the
DRS. This has become particularly obvious over the past few months which have
witnessed a resurgence in the activities of Islamic extremists in the
region—particularly in neighboring Mali. But the threat became more concrete to
many Algerians when a splinter group of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, known
as the “Battalion of Blood,” took hundreds of Algerian and foreign workers
hostage at the Tigantourine gas facility near to the city of In Amenas,
resulting in the death of 39 hostages and 29 militants.
The
regime’s strong response to the hostage crisis—which was criticized by outside
observers for having led to high casualties—was guided by Major General Athmane
Tartage, whom many view as one of the DRS’s most influential figures and likely
to be its future chief. What many fear is that the methods employed by the DRS
to deal with Islamic extremists are going to be used to silence the
increasingly active human rights militants and political activists.
It seems
as if the deteriorating security situation—negative spillovers of weapon's
smuggling from Libya, an increase in Islamic radicalism in the Sahel, and the
crisis in Mali—could indeed give a free hand to the DRS once more to “enforce
stability” at all costs.
Anne Wolf is a Tunisia-based
freelance journalist and researcher specializing in North African affairs.
This article is reprinted with
permission from Sada. It can be accessed
online at:
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2013/04/16/stability-at-all-costs/fzsl
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1 Interview with the author