January 05, 2013
The Arab Spring’s echoes in sub-Saharan
Africa are more complex than initially imagined; for example, much has been
made of how Libya’s crisis has led to Mali’s crisis, but rather less has been
said about how the transitions in North Africa may set the stage for new forms
of security cooperation in the Sahel. Such possibilities are quietly taking
shape now, even as the world struggles to find a multilateral response to
northern Mali. A prime example is the upcoming January 2013 meeting of the
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) in N’djamena, Chad, where Morocco
will likely continue its steps to take command of the organization.
CEN-SAD was set adrift by the Arab
Spring, which unmoored the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and
shook the African Union (AU) by removing its key supporter, Muammar Qaddafi.
The least known of the AU’s eight regional economic communities (RECs), the
Community of Sahel-Saharan States proffered lofty and increasingly improbable
visions of economic union and political/cultural exchange for an ever-growing
swath of the continent; it mushroomed from six to 28 members over
thirteen years through Libyan largesse. By late 2011, however, the organization
looked likely to fade along with the death of Libya’s dictator.
Meanwhile, the Arab Spring opened up
new partnership opportunities for Morocco, Africa’s only non-AU member country,
which has been long isolated by the Western Sahara conflict and its rivalry
with neighboring Algeria. With the polarizing personalities of Qaddafi and Zine
el Abidine Ben Ali gone, there may be glimmers of a new hope for one of the
African Peace and Security Architecture’s most troubled northern REC: the Arab
Maghreb Union (AMU), whose revival Tunisia looks set to push forward. Also
about a year ago, African states began lobbying Morocco to revitalize
CEN-SAD.
Of these alliances, CEN-SAD must be
particularly attractive to Morocco, for several reasons. Its preeminence in the
organization will likely go uncontested; no other member has the spur, stature,
and stability to lead it. Other potential leaders (namely Nigeria and Kenya)
are firmly ensconced as anchor states in existing, functional RECs—Nigeria in
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Kenya in the East
African Community (EAC), among others. Egypt remains deeply embroiled in
regional diplomacy and its own internal affairs, and Algeria’s absence from
CEN-SAD should allow Morocco free reign to guide the organization independent
of its neighbor.
Moreover, the Kingdom may enjoy novel
forms of influence within a REC based on a projection of Africa’s Arab and
Muslim North into the continent’s South; CEN-SAD apparently an abbreviation
taken from Arabic letters sin and sad (for al-sahil and al-sahara), covers over
half of Africa’s nations, and what unites such a diverse set of countries—from
the Gambia to the Comoros, and Somalia to Sierra Leone—more than any connection
to ecoclimatic or environmental conditions, is Islam. With the exception of
Algeria, CEN-SAD is the REC of all Muslim-majority African
states (as well as member states with
significant Muslim minorities)—convenient for a king whose authority rests in
part on his position as “Commander of the Faithful” (amir al-muminin).
More importantly, however, leadership
of CEN-SAD would allow Rabat to engage in a region where it has deep and direct
security concerns. Moroccan officials regularly reference the south and
southeast as major sources of concern, especially for rising transnational
threats. The bordering Sahel is a zone of illegal immigration; of illicit
trafficking in weapons, arms, and people; and of operation and sanctuary for
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and a proliferating set of armed groups.
These challenges are clearly costing Morocco; as more illegal migrants settle
in the country, more trafficking corrupts Saharawi youth, and more Islamist
terrorist attacks threaten metropolitan centers and tourist hubs. While
weathering the Arab Spring, the Moroccan government adopted a new constitution
in July 2011 that restates Morocco’s foreign policy priorities, with notable
prominence given to sub-Saharan Africa. The Sahel is explicitly highlighted,
and it follows only the Maghreb and the umma (and precedes the Mediterranean
world) in the document’s listing of Morocco’s regional priorities. For all of
these reasons, the country has an interest in adopting and adapting the
ready-made structure of CEN-SAD—an organization with a history not only of
economic interaction and cultural exchange, but of deployment of multi-national
forces for peacekeeping operations (as it did in 2001 with
the Central African Republic).
Last June, Rabat took the first
step: hosting a
CEN-SAD meeting aimed at revitalizing the organization and shifting its focus
toward security. The upcoming N’djamena meeting should provide further insight
into Morocco’s intentions and CEN-SAD’s prospects and direction. Key indicators
to watch include responsibilities and authorities delegated to CEN-SAD’s new
peace and security committee; financial commitments made to CEN-SAD by member
states, particularly Morocco; proposals to locate any CEN-SAD organs outside of
Tripoli, Libya (where the organization is presently housed); the role taken by
weighty members, such as Egypt, Senegal, Nigeria, and Kenya; and the emphasis
placed on security questions in CEN-SAD’s west (like Mali and Nigeria) rather
than its east (such as Somalia and Sudan–South Sudan). Last month in N’djamena,
Chadian government officials described a scenario in which peripheral nations
peel away, no longer drawn to the table by Qaddafi’s carrots (or sticks), and
CEN-SAD tightens to a ten-country community focused exclusively on the REC’s
west. This would prime the organization for action in places like northern
Mali. Finally, beyond the meeting itself, any reaction from Algeria regarding a
Moroccan-led CEN-SAD reboot will have major implications. A particularly
interesting and thorny situation for Morocco would be an Algerian application
for membership.
The January 2013 summit under the
presidency of Chad will mark an advance, but CEN-SAD will remain hard pressed
to make any quick-fuse intervention in the Mali crisis. Nonetheless, this
improbable REC may eventually find itself engaged there and in the Sahel more
broadly—whether in the current crisis or another down the road. The Arab
Spring’s reverberations are full of contradictions and ironies. It may be that
CEN-SAD’s founder had to die for the organization to live, and that the REC’s
anchor state will shift from one of the AU’s strongest advocates, Libya, to its
only non-member, Morocco. The straight line from the Libya crisis to the Mali
crisis is rather clear, but the ultimate meaning of the Arab Spring for peace
and security in Africa remains to be seen.
Dr. Benjamin P. Nickels is an assistant
professor of transnational threats and counter-terrorism at the Africa Center
for Strategic Studies. This article is in part based on direct conversations
with Moroccan, Libyan, and Chadian officials in Washington, DC and N'djamena,
Chad.
This
article is reprinted with permission from Sada.
It can be accessed online at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/03/morocco-s-engagement-with-sahel-community/ez1k