July 19, 2013
Following mass protests,
Egypt’s military intervened on July 3 to remove President Mohamed Morsi from
office, marking a dramatic turn in the country’s post-Mubarak transition. Egypt’s
armed forces are now back at the helm, with promises of a new political roadmap
and quick transition back to a civilian government. But the country is deeply
divided and the path forward is profoundly uncertain.
Four Egypt experts and
Sada contributors weigh in on Egypt’s current predicament. Each offers a unique
perspective on different factions’ motivations for political reconciliation and
compromise and whether a political solution is possible.
It’s
Not About Civil War
Nathan
Brown
Egypt today is not on the
brink of civil war. But neither is it engaged in any transition to a stable
democratic system. All sorts of rhetorical red lines have been crossed;
violence is now episodically deployed; and the sorts of abuses characteristic
of pre-2011 Egyptian politics (instrumental uses of xenophobia; muzzling of
media; abuses by security services) have returned in force. There is no
particular party to blame in this regard—or rather virtually every party can be
blamed.
Stepping back from the
struggles of the past two weeks—or even of the past two years—the basic
ingredients of Egypt’s political crisis come into sharp relief.
On the level of the
Egyptian state, there are two major problems. First, all the mechanisms of an
authoritarian order remain very much intact (military courts, an emergency
law—even though the state of emergency itself is expired—abusive security
services, restrictive laws governing press and civil society, and so on). They
no longer are centrally controlled by the presidency—but that leads to the
second problem. Important state actors operate without any political oversight
whatsoever. Some show limited signs of self-restraint but reject any external
checks (the military, al-Azhar, the judiciary). Others (most notably the
security apparatus) seem inclined to play a very dirty game indeed. And they
sometimes do so to public adulation.
And on the level of
political society, there are three problems. First, there is no commonly
accepted set of rules; many actors therefore seem to feel entitled to follow
their adversaries’ worst behavior. Second, political polarization is not only
deep and the rhetoric of delegitimation the most common language used; there
are also no venues for adversaries to find even limited common ground. Third,
formal organizations are weak. Most political parties are shells;
mobilizational social movements are powerful but ephemeral and have trouble
playing normal politics or even developing coherent strategies.
Against this long list of
problems, it is important to note that Egypt’s post-2011 political order has
two very positive features: it is far more pluralistic— in fact no single
political actor can dominate the system— and there is a high level of political
engagement. In July 2011, it is possible to add one additional, if quite odd,
positive factor. The defection of important Salafi actors from President
Morsi’s camp during the uprising and coup—whether it was an act of betrayal or
not— has prevented the political contest from degenerating into a struggle
between Islamists vs. non-Islamists.
What these elements
collectively mean is that no adversary can annihilate the others. The problem
is that this does not stop some from trying. But until Egyptians—and the
institutions that purport to serve them—come to terms with the fact that no
actor has either the ability or authority to speak for the entire people, the
new pluralism will produce neither stability nor democracy.
Nathan
Brown is a non-resident senior
associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and professor of
political science at George Washington University.
It’s
All About Inclusiveness
Mohammed
Samhouri
Out of the many important
lessons one can draw from the ouster of the Egyptian Islamist president Mohamed
Morsi early this month, two in particular are highly relevant and have
significant implications for addressing Egypt’s future political stability and
viability. First, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) failed to fully understand the
unique historical circumstances that brought them to power last summer. Second,
they failed to exercise the art of modern-day inclusive, participatory, and
consensus-building politics that is necessary to move post-Mubarak Egypt
forward.
As a consequence of this
tragic double failure, the MB has grossly misused the slim-margin (51.7%)
presidential mandate they were given by the Egyptian people in June 2012,
gradually advancing an Islamist agenda that was in sharp contrast to the
Egyptian people’s wider, more diverse, and more pressing aspirations—as shown
in their famous cry at Tahrir Square two and a half years ago for “bread,
freedom, and social justice.”
The price of this tragic
failure was quite high indeed, and it manifested itself by the end of Morsi’s
first year in office in a number of ways: an increase of the country’s
political instability and uncertainty, heightened social unrest and
fractionalization, deteriorating public and personal security conditions, and
the decline of the Egyptian economy to the point of near collapse. All of this
added to the sense of frustration of an already impatient public that was eager
to see tangible improvements in their lives and livelihoods.
Only by taking into
account these complex political, social, security, and economic factors can one
fully understand what happened in Egypt on June 30, and—perhaps more
impressively—why an unprecedented 20 million Egyptians (by some counts) took to
the streets demanding an early end to Mosri’s four-year tenure in office. Only
in this context should one judge the adequacy of the “roadmap”—such as the
timetable for its implementation, how the committees in charge for amending the
suspended 2012 constitution will be formed and what the nature and scope of
their mandate will be, and whether the different powers vested in the interim
president will be acceptable to different political players—for the post-Morsi
transition, announced by the Egyptian interim president on July 9, and assess
its chances of failure or success. And only in this context is it possible to
emphasize the crucial need for a speedy political reconciliation and to
strongly caution against a non-inclusive transition process that could drive
Egypt further into the unknown.
Mohammed Samhouri is a Cairo-based economist and a former senior fellow and lecturer at Brandeis University’s Crown Center for Middle East Studies in Boston.
Tough Going for Reconciliation?
Mohammed Salem
What will come after the fall of Mohammed Morsi?
The question was not considered before the June 30 demonstrations and remains
unanswered. Its complexity may arise from the fact that the protests focused
solely on the immediate removal of the Muslim Brotherhood, without considering
how to deal with them after their fall from power. This has led to the present
crisis, which if not defused could easily reverse the gains of the January 25
Revolution. A solution to bypass a potential catastrophe is desperately needed
to move forward—turning back is not an option and the status quo is not
sustainable. Undoubtedly, national reconciliation appears difficult at the moment,
with a host of challenges standing in the way:
- Both sides are digging in and refuse to yield ground or listen to
creative compromises proposed in good faith.
- The post-Morsi period began with muzzling the media, freezing the
assets of Brotherhood leaders, and a massacre by the Republican Guard, all
of which created an atmosphere hardly conducive to reconciliation.
- A sense of fascism—whether religious or exclusionary fascism within
secular opposition circles seeking to wipe out the Brotherhood—is rising
to the surface as both sides reject any calls for reconciliation.
- The military leadership is not offering solutions that would
incorporate the Brotherhood in the political process. El-Sisi and the
other generals are making two critical mistakes in this regard: they are
not offering any compromise solutions, and their actions have proven
different from their initial promises.
- The Brotherhood is also refusing to participate in any dialogue
unless Morsi is reinstated. For the Brotherhood, this is a fight for
survival.
Even though the chances of reconciliation appear
remote, there is some cause for hope in the fact that overcoming the crisis is
in both sides’ interest. Despite the Brotherhood’s unyielding rejection of
dialogue, there are members who see a need for a safe exit and some
reassurances for the post-Morsi era. Although they are few and far between, the
idea could gain traction in the future, particularly since the military seems
disinclined to yield to the Brotherhood’s demands—not to mention that the
Brotherhood’s illusion of defections within the army’s ranks now seems
far-fetched.
Meanwhile, it is in the army and the secular
opposition’s interest to legitimize the new political process, prove that what
took place wasn’t a military coup, and demonstrate that its aim is to put the
revolution back on track and prevent Egypt from reaching civil war. Talk of
political diversity must be anchored in comprehensive national
reconciliation—before rushing off to the ballot box.
This text was translated from Arabic.
Mohammed Salem, a researcher at the Cairo-based Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies.
Par
for the Course
Nadine
Abdalla
Egypt’s experience
demonstrates that operational democratic procedures are not sufficient for a
successful transition. These procedures have to be held within a consensual
framework among political and social actors. A new political order has emerged
in recent weeks in Egypt that will probably lead a new transitional process
under the military’s tutelage. This order is governed by the liberal opposition
and the Salafi Nour party and is implicitly supported by state institutions
(the bureaucracy, judiciary, and security apparatus). Inclusiveness—and
therefore the reintegration of the Muslim Brotherhood—remains the only hope for
a sustainable transition. Otherwise, political instability is likely to
increase and the state could possibly collapse under the pressure of an
increasing economic crisis—repression will thus be the tool to achieve
stability. In this case, Egypt will risk returning to a semi-authoritarian
regime partially similar to the Mubarak era.
Taking into consideration
two principles—a sincere attempt to reintegrate the Muslim Brotherhood and the
new configuration of power relations mentioned above—Egypt can have a
transition toward a “competitive authoritarian” regime in the short term. This
will possibly have the following features: a balance of power between the
parliament (that is roughly half Islamist) and the president (most probably
with a military background or possibly from the opposition); a security
apparatus similar to the Mubarak era regarding the police and the army at the
heart of the regime; and an open political space that includes relatively free
elections. It is also worth noting that the political space was opened up after
the January 25 revolution and no regime has since been able to close it.
This scenario would
suggest that Egypt’s several setbacks are part of its long and slow
democratization process.
Nadine
Abdalla is a research fellow at the German Institute for International and Security
Affairs.
This
article is reprinted with permission from Sada. It can be accessed online
at: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2013/07/15/what-will-become-of-egypt/gfji